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5FOREWORD
This collection of studies dedicated to the comparative analysis of the decision ma-
king factors in the ﬁeld of national security policy in the three neighboring states – the
Republic of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine, constitutes a natural continuation of the 
research performed by the Institute of Public Policies in the ﬁeld of transformations
and reforms of the security sector of the Republic of Moldova during 2000-2005.  With-
in the framework of the study “Strategic evaluation of national security and defense 
of the Republic of Moldova” issued in 2002, it is stated that the Republic of Moldova 
has no coherent strategy of national security. In this respect, a considerable issue for 
Moldovan society is to revise the security strategies, as well as the whole system of 
national defense and security. Undoubtedly, economic stability and prosperity, as well 
as obtaining strategic investments from outside, are directly dependent upon the gen-
eral climate of security, the climate of the security of these investments, of territorial 
integrity and settling the Transnistrian conﬂict, and of the quality and eﬃciency of the
national security and defense system.
In order to reach successfully the strategic tasks of European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration aimed at by the Republic of Moldova and represented today as a national 
option, there is an eminent necessity for some fundamental transformations, primarily 
at the level of the elite. The increase of the role and the responsibilities of institutions
from the security sector require better cooperation among civil and military oﬃcials,
as well as an eﬃcient and democratic system of control and supervision. The ﬁnancial
and human resources require a more eﬃcient administration. There is an increasing
need for coordination among the institutions from the security sector based upon a 
clearly formulated strategy, followed by a set of coherent actions and a conscious at-
titude on the part of public administration and the society as a whole. 
Consequently, the purpose of the three teams of researchers from the neighboring 
countries is to simultaneously examine and to discuss together the legal framework and 
diﬀerent aspects of the activity of the Supreme Security Council from the Republic of
Moldova, the Supreme Council of National Defense from Romania and the Council of 
National Security and Defense from Ukraine in the process of planning (or) develop-
ment and decision making in security sector of the three neighboring states. The last
but not the least was, for the participants of this project, the task of contributing to the 
creation of a permanent forum of discussions and consultations on the issues of na-
tional and international (regional) security, development of civil-military relations and 
principles of civil control over the security sector. The activities within the framework
of the project have also had a beneﬁcial impact upon the development of collaborative
relations among the partner institutions. These relations aim to clarify some subjects of
public interest for our countries and to synchronize some actions of common interest.
6It is praiseworthy that some of the practical conclusions and recommendations 
made by the authors of the studies from this collection within the framework of the 
workshop that took place in Kiev on 6-7 June 2005 and of the trilateral conference 
organized in Chisinau on 12 July 2005 now, at the beginning of the year of 2006, have 
already started to be applied. Thus, the Republic of Moldova has established the con-
venient legal format and initiated adequate administrative mechanisms for the deve-
lopment (or) planning and qualitative implementation of the Individual Partnership 
Action Plan (IPAP) Republic of Moldova – NATO. The process of elaboration and im-
plementation is monitored by the President of the Republic of Moldova and the Su-
preme Security Council and coordinated by the National Commission on elaboration 
and implementation of IPAP constituted by the Decree of the President of the Republic 
of Moldova from 5 August 2005. The launching of the IPAP process conﬁrms the Eu-
ropean and Euro-Atlantic orientation of the Republic of Moldova and oﬀers, together
with the objective of integration in the EU, the perspective of plenary connection of 
the country to the area of Euro-Atlantic security and its return to the European fam-
ily. The Individual Partnership Action Plan will be the main document as regards the
launching of the process of reform and modernization of State Administration agen-
cies specialized in the ﬁeld of national security and defense, a process necessary within
the framework of accomplishing policies of European integration. 
Within this context, we would like to express our profound gratitude to our project 
partners – the Institute for Public Policies from Bucharest and the International Centre 
for Policy Studies from Kiev; to the representatives of security councils from Moldova, 
Romania and Ukraine for the oﬀered information, support and participation to the
activities of the project; as well as to the representatives of the mass media who covered 
the events within the framework of the project and who constantly informed public 
opinion as regards the conclusions and recommendations forwarded by the experts.
Institute of Public Policies
7NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Iurie Pintea
The National Security Council is a traditional element of the national security system
in democratic countries. Its roles and missions in most cases are similar. Usually, the 
Council is a crucial point of the national security system and has the purpose of advis-
ing the President on internal, foreign and military policies related to national security. 
The Council is also the main forum of the President for considering these issues with his
principal advisers on national security and cabinet oﬃcials. At the same time, it is the
main tool of the President in practical coordination of these policies among diﬀerent
governmental agencies. The Council is not a body that makes oﬃcial decisions (except in
some states, or speciﬁc situations, such as crises, exceptional situations, war time, etc.). 
THE FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE ROLE  
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
The organizational models, roles and prerogatives of Councils vary from state to 
state. Each model has at its base a number of factors, which are proper only to a speciﬁc
case and which predetermine the speciﬁc features of the Council. Among the most
relevant factors, the following have to be mentioned (1) the constitutional system, (2) 
the balance of political forces, (3) the geopolitical framework and (4) the personal-
ity of the President. 
1. The constitutional system (i.e. the way of investiture and executive power attri-
butions) establishes the relations between branches of power, the structure of govern-
ance and the role of constitutive elements of the executive branch of the government. 
These speciﬁc features of the constitutional system pre-establish the limits of the ﬁeld
where the Council can be placed and, implicitly, the limits of its prerogatives. 
Thus, in a “presidential” state system the head of state is much more independent 
in choosing Council organization and investing it with the powers s/he deems neces-
sary and resulting from the political objectives and the program of administration. In 
such a system the head of state takes part actively or even governs directly the security 
policy (especially the external and military policy), and the Council’s role can be very 
important, often exceeding the prerogatives of an advisory body and eventually chang-
ing into a key element of executive power.
A similar situation can take place especially when the president considers that s/he 
needs not only an advisory body, but also a tool for making and executing decisions as 
8well, which would be totally subordinated to the head of state and protected in a more 
secure way from the inﬂuence of the Parliament, in comparison with the Government.
This model can be selected in cases when the executive branch is limited in its actions
in oﬀering the necessary support to the President because of various legal or political
constraints, or, vice versa, in order to limit the political ambitions or the inﬂuence of
the government. 
In this respect, the Ukrainian example would be relevant, where the existence of the 
Council itself is established by the Constitution. The decision of President Yuschenko
of spring 2005 on the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDCU), 
more precisely on its Secretary, invested them with prerogatives and powers that in 
many respects have competed with the Government’s tasks. 
On the one hand, this decision has pushed the NSDCU and security policy of 
Ukraine to the foreground of national policy, and national security has become a topic 
of mass media and civil society. In such conditions, the Ukraine’s role in international 
security policy has increased considerably, and the President has had the possibility to 
take more cardinal decisions on issues of great importance for national security, which 
had been postponed for many years or promised during the election campaign.
On the other hand, the NSDCU Secretary has taken over a number of powers that 
had belonged exclusively to the executive power until then. This change has taken place
without changing the governing rules of administration. As a result, the traditional 
relations within the Government have been distorted, leading to duplication and over-
lapping of powers, actions and prerogatives, and ﬁnally to an open conﬂict between the
Secretary of the Council (Petro Poroshenko) and the Prime Minister (Iulia Timosh-
enko). 
The Security Council has another organization and another role in a “parliamen-
tary” state system. Within such a framework, the legislative branch of the government 
has much more inﬂuence on the security policy of the state and more possibilities to
control the Government. In this case the role and prerogatives of the President, and, 
therefore, of the Council, are mostly determined by the Parliament’s decisions, by the 
balance of forces within the Parliament and by the relations between the Parliament and 
Presidency. In such situations, the President is often less autonomous, more limited in
his/her actions, and the Council is more often a subject of parliamentary control from
the part of the standing parliamentary committees specializing in national security. 
2. Certainly, in reality each constitutional system is far from a theoretical one, being 
heavily aﬀected by the balance of forces in the political arena. Thus, when there is no
parliamentarian majority favorable to the president in a parliamentarian constitutional 
system, the ﬁght for power will represent his main concern. In this case, there is a risk
that the Council would be used as a tool in the political processes, and its role in na-
tional security would be reduced to minimum. In fact, in such situations, not national 
security, but the ﬁght for power is the main concern of all branches of the government.
9Another example is the case when the head of state controls the Parliament and 
the executive, or has a strong inﬂuence on both. In such situations, the president is
free to choose the ﬁeld, the issues, the staﬀ and the Council’s degree of involvement in
national security issues. 
3. The geopolitical framework establishes national interests, threats and risks for 
national interests, the political objectives of governance, the security policy agenda 
and, in this way, the role and prerogatives of the Supreme Security Council. The geo-
political situation is a more ﬂexible factor than the constitutional system and it engages
more frequent changes in a national security system’s organization and agenda.
Relevant examples in this respect are oﬀered by the Baltic States and the changes
that occurred recently in the role and prerogatives of the supreme security (defense) 
councils of these countries because of adherence to NATO. These elements of the na-
tional security system were set up at the same time as the declarations of independence 
and sovereignty, and corresponded to the speciﬁc situation of that period. The Coun-
cils were focused mostly on military defense issues and had a major inﬂuence in the 
beginning, when the Baltic States’ security was based ﬁrstly on their own eﬀorts and
potentials, and implementation of adherence objectives had to be supported by cardinal 
actions, ﬁrst in the military security sector. The adherence to the North Atlantic Al-
liance completely changed the geopolitical framework of these countries. On the one 
hand, this event signiﬁed “giving up a part of the national sovereignty” to the interest of
the Alliance and collective decisions. This fact transferred a part of the most important
responsibilities from the national level to the interstate level. On the other hand, the 
weight of concerns in the military defense sector was considerably reduced. Therefore,
the role of the defense councils lost a degree of importance in recent years. 
Another example of geopolitical framework inﬂuence is non-traditional risks and
threats, which have emerged on the security agenda in recent years. Thus, in most
democratic states the initial eﬀorts of counteracting international terrorism were
mostly coordinated or even totally conducted through national security councils, 
which proved to be the most adjusted tools of immediate response for this new type of 
challenge to national security.
4. The personality of the President is the main subjective factor that determines 
the role and prerogatives of the Council. “The National Security Council is set up to do
one thing – to advise the President. I make the decisions, and there is no use trying to put 
any responsibility on the National Security Council – it’s mine.” Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
the USA President, 1953-1961. 
When the National Security Council has this sole purpose – to advise the President – 
it is the personal qualities of the head of state that will determine his or her activity, some-
times even in spite of any legislative acts or regulations. No state presidents are ordinary 
individuals, but ﬁrst, they are strong and ambitious leaders invested with enormous re-
sponsibilities. Each of them has his or her own deﬁnite qualities, knowledge and skills,
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which establish how the President needs to be assisted in decision-making. Thus, each
President organizes the team and establishes the activity rules in accordance with his or 
her own options. 
Some heads of state feel very comfortable in trusting other people. In this case, the 
governing team members enjoy a greater degree of autonomy. Sometimes they fail and 
are not trusted anymore. Others do not feel comfortable “trusting other people at all al-
lowing them to express their opinion and because of these they must take more decisions 
individually, collect and analyze a tremendous amount of relevant information”1.
The most known experience of relations between the President and National Secu-
rity Council, which is relevant in this context, is that of the USA. President Eisenhower 
(1953-1961), for example, had a predilection for a military-style staﬀ system, and was
the initiator of an extensive structure for monitoring the implementation of policy 
decisions. In addition, this administration established a tradition for the Secretary of 
the National Security Council of cumulating the position of the National Security As-
sistant (NSA) to the President. In his turn, President Kennedy (1961-1963), “preferred 
policy-making with ad hoc groups, dismantled Eisenhower’s elaborate NSC machinery 
and allowed the Special Assistant for National Security Aﬀairs and his staﬀ to assume
the primary coordination role”2. Kennedy’s liberal style was to blur the diﬀerences be-
tween the political decision-making process and the operational process, which Presi-
dent Eisenhower’s “military” staﬀ carefully observed. Similar to Kennedy, President 
Johnson (1963-1969) preferred informal arrangements, relied on ad hoc groups and 
trusted friends, and let the National Security Council structure atrophy further.
Only under Presidents Nixon (1969-1974) and Ford (1974-1977) did the numerous 
NSC staﬀ led by Henry Kissinger have the possibility to concentrate its activity on ac-
quiring analytical information from diﬀerent agencies that would allow the National
Security Assistant to oﬀer the President the best possible range of options for decision.
President Bush (1989-1992), beneﬁting from considerable experience in governance
and external policy (having held previously the oﬃce of Vice President for 8 years)
cardinally streamlined the activity of the Council. Even on his inauguration day, Presi-
dent Bush issued the directive of organizing the NSC that established its missions, 
organization, structure and main rules of activity. The reorganization of the Council
included the establishment of the Principals Committee, the Deputy Committee and 
eight Policy Coordinating Committees carrying regional and functional responsibili-
ties instead of multiple interdepartmental working groups. This Council had a crucial
role during such events as the collapse of the USSR, the uniﬁcation of Germany and the
military operations of US troops in Iraq and Panama. 
1 From the interview held by the author with a US National Security Council staﬀ-member in No-
vember 2004.
2 History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997, US State Department.
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In his turn, the actual president of the US, George W. Bush, is considered to be “…very 
strong in «business administration». He has a very strong business background and 
feels comfortable in making decisions in the way they are made in big business. He has 
organized his staﬀ to support him in a proper way. He does not see the need to be a
expert in every ﬁeld, as long as he feels comfortable and has experts who can give him 
good advice. In comparison with G.W. Bush, President Clinton wanted to become an 
expert on every issue, and he used to analyze and study a tremendous volume of infor-
mation in order to answer individually whatever question could appear”3.
The above examples put forth some suggestions on how the personality of the presi-
dent of any state can inﬂuence the activity of the Council and its staﬀ. In reality, the in-
ﬂuence of the president is practically absolute and the staﬀ of the Council is structured
and organized according to the president’s wishes in order to correspond to his or her 
political objectives and management style. 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP
When we are speaking about the Security Council, it is important to make a dif-
ference between the Council itself, the decisional structure and the NSC apparatus. 
As a rule, the Council’s membership consists of the statutory members (persons who 
become council members due to their oﬃcial status), the “circumstantial” members
(persons who become members due to the circumstancial political objectives or due 
to their personal qualities) and “guests” (persons who are invited to take part in some 
Council meetings).
It is a common practice that, in addition to the head of the state and the Secretary of 
the Council (the Advisor on national security to the President), the statutory members 
are the minister of defense and the minister of foreign aﬀairs, their sphere of respon-
sibility being the main topic of the Council. In addition, Council membership is more 
often extended to include the Chief (chiefs) of the General Staﬀ of the Armed Forces
(or the highest person in the military hierarchy), the Minister of Internal Aﬀairs and
the Chief (chiefs) of the Information Service (Special Services Directors). The other
members of the National Security Council are appointed according to: 
• the real hierarchy of the state powers;
• the administrative structure, organization of the government and the preroga-
tives of constitutive elements;
• the perception of the security concept and the area it covers (in some cases not 
only military and external policy, but also economic, energy, information, etc.);
3 From the interview held by the author with a US National Security Council staﬀ-member in No-
vember 2004.
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• the level and importance of the issues discussed;
• the President’s personal relations with each member.
The membership changes with the election of a new president, with changes of ad-
ministration, with the amendment of political priorities and objectives, etc. The per-
sonality of each member, the level of responsibilities and competence with which he or 
she contributes to the council’s activity are not less important.
The Chairman of the Parliament rarely becomes a Council member. In a parliamen-
tary system, such a situation could be a source of tension because it inverts the hierar-
chy of the authorities within a state, in comparison with the presidential system. At the 
same time, the presence of the Chairman of the Parliament in a way changes the role of 
the Council from a consultative body to the President into a consultative body or even 
a supreme decisional one at the state level. On the other hand, inviting the Chairman 
of the Parliament to the Councils’ meetings, or more often inviting the Chairmen of
the parliamentary standing committees on national security, is a well-known practice. 
It is argued that this allows the Council to deﬁne more viable solutions for the most
important issues, and that it is necessary for the overall coordination of the decision 
implementation processes.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ORGANIZATION
The organization of the Council and decisional processes in diﬀerent countries are
not well known. Only some countries have laws or regulations that oﬀer enough details
on the issue. The most relevant examples in this respect are presented by the experience
of the USA. In this country, it has become a tradition that at his inauguration, the Presi-
dent of the US issues a presidential decision document, which revises the framework of 
the presidential administration’s organization concerning national security issues. 
In the case of President Clinton, for example, this document was the Presidential 
Decision Directive (PDD2) of January 21, 1993. The President, Vice President, Secretary
of State, and Secretary of Defense were members of the NSC. The Director of Central In-
telligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ were included as statutory advisers.
The new membership of the NSC included the following oﬃcials: the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Assistant to the President for National Security Aﬀairs, the U.S. Repre-
sentative to the United Nations, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and 
the Chief of Staﬀ to the President. Although not a member, the Attorney General would
be invited to attend meetings pertaining to his jurisdiction. The heads of other agencies
and departments, and other oﬃcials would be invited to the NSC meetings if required.
This Directive kept these traditional elements of the US NSC structure:
The NSC Principals Committee – a senior interagency forum for discussion and 
consideration of national security issues that do not require the President’s direct 
participation. The Committee has the mission “to revise, coordinate, and monitor the
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development and implementation of the national security policy”4. The membership
of the Committee was identical to the membership of the National Security Council 
except, certainly, the President, and it allowed the State Secretary and Secretary of 
Defense to be represented, only in some cases (if unavailable), by their deputies. The
Assistant to the President for National Security Aﬀairs served as Chair at the Princi-
pals Committee meetings. 
The NSC Deputy Committee – a senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consid-
ering policy issues aﬀecting national security. The Committee had the mission of revis-
ing, coordinating, and monitoring the eﬃciency and the results of inter-departmental
processes, of the Interagency Working Groups inclusively, which were established in 
accordance with the same Presidential Directive. The basic concern of the Committee
was the implementation of political decisions. The Committee had as its members the
deputies of the Principals Committee members. The Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Aﬀairs chaired the DC meetings. The Deputy Committee was
also responsible for day-to-day crisis management and it was convened at the request 
of any Principals Committee member. 
The system of Interagency Working Groups – permanent and ad-hoc – which act-
ed under the authority of the Deputy Committee and was chaired at the Assistant-Sec-
retary level. For example, the interagency working group on foreign policy or defense 
issues was chaired by the Assistant to the Secretary of State or by the Assistant to the 
Secretary of Defense accordingly. The working groups were convened regularly ac-
cording to Deputy Committee decision and had the mission “to review and coordinate 
the implementations of Presidential decisions in their policy areas”5. The Directive re-
quired establishment of strict guidelines governing the operation of interagency work-
ing groups, including their competence, decision-making process and time frames. 
These groups also identiﬁed and studied the issues that would be considered by the
senior decision-making committee, and they had the mission of preparing the needed 
documents for the respective meetings. The groups had geographical, functional and
ad hoc areas of responsibility. 
The need to have a developed structure for such decision-making processes has not
once been felt in the case of the Republic of Moldova. Thus, the Decree of the President
of the Republic of Moldova regarding the organization of the Supreme Security Coun-
cil (Nr. 1824-III from May 25, 2004) stipulates that “alongside the Supreme Security 
Council should be established the committees for foreign and internal policy, econo-
mic-ﬁnancial policy, ecologic and social policy, antiterrorist policy, and the analysis
4 Organization of the national Security Council. Presidential Decision Directive PDD 2. January 20, 
1993.
5 Presidential Decision Directive PDD 2. January 20, 1993.
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and information center”. However, up to now this stipulation of the presidential decree 
has not been implemented in practice, and therefore it does not oﬀer any examples for
analysis. Considering the organizational structure of the presidential apparatus, the 
press releases and the following decrees of the President of the RM, we will conclude 
that the presidential staﬀ has quite limited possibilities as regards national security.
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL
The Supreme Security Council Secretary has, as a rule, a triple role: (1) to deter-
mine the agenda of the Council’s meetings and ensure that the necessary documents 
are prepared; (2) to lead the Council’s apparatus (staﬀ) activity, and (3) to act as As-
sistant (Counselor) to the President for national security issues. The major objective
of the Secretary’s activities is to provide the President with the needed expertise and 
information for the decision-making process, to monitor the development of security 
policy and to implement the respective decisions in a coherent way. The permanent
concern of the Advisor is to “look at how the President would be best served in his 
decision-making, what he needs to know in addition to what he wants to know and 
how to keep the process moving in a direction that he wants it to move.”6
As a Secretary of the Council, his or her primary concern is of organizational mat-
ter and is focused on how to ensure successful organization of the Council’s meetings. 
In this case, the Secretary is working for more “masters”, assisting each member of the 
Council in the decision preparation process. 
As a director of the Council’s Staﬀ (Apparatus), the Secretary has the duty of or-
ganizing and leading a team, which, depending on its extension, quality and status, 
can assume a monitoring, coordination, administration, implementation, etc., role, of 
political decisions within the national security system. 
As the Advisor to the President on national security issues, the Secretary can actu-
ally be the spokesperson of the President in this area, and his or her inﬂuence is placed
above the ministry of defense or the ministry of foreign aﬀairs. For instance, “within
the Administration of President Clinton the National Security Advisor (Samuel Bergh-
er, n.a.) was invested with a signiﬁcant authority, and he was a very inﬂuential person,
in some cases he was even more inﬂuential than the Defense Secretary or the State
Secretary”. During the current Bush administration, the situation has been diﬀerent:
“Dr. Rice is a very inﬂuential person, but the way the President asked her to fulﬁll her
role was not to challenge the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. They are
clearly the leaders in the Government in their area. So ﬁrst, Staﬀ supports her in advis-
6 Samuel R. Berger, National Secuirty Advisor to the President Bill Clinton.
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ing the President and helping coordinating policy but the Staﬀ doesn’t dictate policy
answers to the Department of Defense or Department of State”7.
Indeed, this function is crucial for the good functioning of the whole national secu-
rity system. For the head of the state it is very important that the Secretary (Advisor) be 
placed in the decisional hierarchy where the president considers necessary, without the 
parliamentary approval and without the obligation to report to the parliament. 
The personality of the Secretary–Advisor and of his/her relations with the Presi-
dent often determine the eﬃciency of the whole system. Of course, the Secretary’s role
is established by the President. In case the President intends to make foreign or nation-
al security policy himself or herself, in the literal and even daily basis, the role of the 
Secretary–Advisor is diﬀerent than in the case where the president is more interested
in domestic aﬀairs and more inclined to delegate authority to his orher principal advi-
sors. Thus, due to the Secretary’s physical proximity to the President, and permanent 
access to and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the President, the personality of the Secretary de-
termines greatly whether he or she would be an “honest broker” of the diﬀerent points
of view of the bureaucratic system of governance, an intermediary of relations between 
diﬀerent governmental departments or a political actor and a decision-maker.
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL PROCESSES 
The decisional-operational process in the national security sector is a complex
one and has more overlapping, sustaining and mutually competing elements. This
process is diﬀerent from state to state depending on the range of objective and sub-
jective factors, but as a rule, it has the same key elements. The main element in this
respect is the National Security Strategy which is subject to oﬃcial or principle ap-
proval, namely by the Supreme Security Council. The strategy is developed within a
complex coordinating process together with the involvement of the most important 
governmental departments and agencies. This document, as a rule, reﬂects the in-
terests, aims, and the strategic objectives of the Presidential Administration in the 
national security sector during the entire governing period or on a yearly basis. At 
the same time, this document serves as a basis for development of the state’s internal 
organization of the decision making processes on national security issues. The key
role in the elaboration and monitoring of the implementation of this strategy belongs 
to the Council’s staﬀ.
In the national security system, the development of decisions and of the president’s 
directives is as a rule a formal process that includes all the structural elements. For ex-
7 From the interview held by the author with a US National Security Council staﬀ-member in No-
vember 2004.
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ample, in the US case, it comprises the Council, the Principal Committee, the Deputy 
Committee, the permanent Inter-agency Working Groups and the ad hoc groups. Each 
separate element has a predetermined role and limited responsibilities and prerogatives. 
Concomitantly, alongside the oﬃcial processes, the structure of the Council facili-
tates multiple unoﬃcial interactions, which have a major impact on the national secu-
rity sector. Thus, the National Security Advisor to the President, the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defense meet regularly for consultations at weekly lunches. There
are also Weekly Lunches focused on foreign policy issues within which the National 
Security Advisor to the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense 
meet the US representative to the UN, the Central Informational Agency Director, and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ. There are also weekly lunches and a great
number of other unoﬃcial meetings on the deputy level. In addition the members of
the Council’s staﬀ take part as observers in the departmental top-level meetings. All
these unoﬃcial processes are considered a democratic tradition of the governing sys-
tem functioning in the US.
CONCLUSIONS
The need to develop coherent forward-looking national security policies and strate-
gies dictates the necessity of reorganizing the national security system of the Republic 
of Moldova in a way that it would become responsive to national needs and would 
withstand the challenges of personality and circumstances. Comparing the role of Na-
tional Security Councils from a number of countries and analyzing the conditions that 
determine their eﬃciency, we will notice the importance of a permanent assistance
body that would correspond to the volume and importance of the Council’s missions. 
Thus, when we are reviewing the role, attributions and the structure of the Supreme
Council of Security of the Republic of Moldova, it is extremely important to take into 
account how the SCS is assisted in decision-making; what are its organizing procedures 
and assisting bodies; what are the processes initiated, coordinated, run and monitored 
by the apparatus, as well as their results. 
Organizational reform is not a panacea. There is no perfect organizational design,
no ﬂawless managerial settings. The reason is that organizations are made up of indi-
viduals, and individuals invariably use informal means of dealing with one another 
depending on personality and temperament. Even an excellent organizational struc-
ture cannot transform false or impetuous leaders into perseverant and wise ones. 
However, a deﬁcient organizational design can make good leaders less eﬃcient and
less eﬀective.
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LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE SUPREME SECURITY 
COUNCIL – REALITY AND EXPECTATIONS
Victor POPA 
Republic of Moldova
1. General notions concerning  
the security of national sovereignty
In order to elucidate comprehensively the eﬃciency of the way the Supreme Secu-
rity Council’s activity is organized, several theoretical issues should be discussed con-
cerning the relationship between national sovereignty and national security, as well 
as between state security and public security. According to the Constitution of the 
Republic of Moldova (Art. 77, paragraph 2) the Head of State is the guarantor of state 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Therefore, it is necessary to under-
stand the extent of his/her prerogatives as a guarantor.
It is well known that sovereignty has a unitary character, but essentially involves 
two dimensions in which they are manifested at internal and external levels. These
dimensions are directly connected with the state’s right to decide freely on its internal 
and external rights. Thus, we can speak about “internal sovereignty” and “external sov-
ereignty” or, in other words, about “state sovereignty” and “sovereignty of the state”. 
It is considered that state sovereignty supposes the supremacy of state power; and sov-
ereignty of the state supposes the independence of state power. Supremacy may be 
deﬁned as the quality of being superior to any other existent social power in a certain
country at a certain moment. It is materialized in the state’s right to establish a legal 
framework and to assure its enforcement. 
Independence, the main element of the notion “sovereignty of the state”, is ex-
pressed in the state’s right to establish its internal or external policy by itself, freely 
and according to its own considerations, without any interference of any other state or 
international body. This quality also implies the commitment to respect international
law and the rights of other states. It is easy to see that both components – sovereignty 
and independence – are inseparable and conditioned reciprocally. Moreover, the so-
vereign state appears as independent in respect to the solution of its internal problems, 
as well as to the solution of its external problems. 
Referring to external sovereignty and internal sovereignty, French jurist Raymond 
Carre de Malberg emphasized that external sovereignty is nothing else but the state’s 
sovereignty toward another foreign state, but that internal sovereignty is not possi-
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ble without external sovereignty. A state which remains dependent on another foreign 
state does not have sovereign power inside the state. Internally, sovereignty is limited 
by the Constitution, which strictly stipulates the functions of the state’s power insti-
tutes. Not even externally can sovereignty be unlimited, because a national state is an 
element in the international system or, otherwise named “independence within inter-
dependence” of the “national sovereignty in the sovereignties’ system”. This is important
to be acknowledged especially by the states that belong to the European Community 
and those which are about to accede, because a very important part of a state’s sover-
eignty (border security, national defense, economic security, etc.) becomes a collective 
prerogative of all community members. 
In state power, we should see a property of the state entities expressed through the 
eﬀect of the power that belongs to them. This is done through the aptitude of imposing
the general will even on those who oppose it, bringing all the citizens to unity. Other-
wise, the state is characterized as a power capable of ruling and reducing individual or 
collective resistance. 
Hence, we can deﬁne state sovereignty as the quality of the state’s power to be su-
preme in relation to any other existent social power within its territorial limits and to 
be independent in relation to any other foreign state or international institution. This
quality is expressed by the state’s right to establish deliberately, without any interfer-
ence, the purpose of its internal and external activities, as well as the basic tasks and 
required means for their realization. According to Article 2 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Moldova usurpation of state power is the most serious crime against the 
nation. 
Therefore, we can emphasize that national sovereignty, the exclusive holder of which
is the nation, should be protected eﬃciently from possible infringements, regardless of
whether these are coming from the outside or inside the country.
The task to protect sovereignty obviously belongs to the state, or, more precisely, to
political institutions and public authorities involved in exerting national sovereignty 
– Parliament, Head of State, Government and Justice. The mechanisms and competen-
cies of these public institutions regarding the protection of national sovereignty are 
directly dependent on the responsibilities and functions executed by them. These com-
petencies should be speciﬁc for each authority, and possible abuses or work negligence
should be prevented through diﬀerent mechanisms.
In order to appreciate correctly the attributions of each public authority in the 
sphere of national sovereignty protection it would be useful to know some of the ele-
ments of that sphere. On a day-to-day basis, many expressions are used such as national 
security, state security, public security as well as economic security, alimentary secu-
rity, ecological security, etc. Common to these expressions is the notion of “security”, 
which etymologically means “shelter from any danger, peace as a result of the absence 
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of any danger”. Referring to the state, security can be considered as an ensemble of 
laws, measures concerning protection, security of people, goods, etc., or an ensemble 
of state institutions having as a task the protection of political, social and economic 
organization of the society created in the state. 
Thus, the notion of national security is a general one, and has an integration char-
acter and should be perceived as the lack of any danger for the whole nation, the state’s 
organization of the nation, the constitutional system, economic, technical-scientiﬁc
and defensive potential, for the basic rights and interests of the citizens, as well as for 
the public order. We have mentioned the integration character referring to the fact that 
national security contains, as composing elements, the other existent types of security 
which are also related to the citizens and their public and individual interests. 
By national security, which is assured by the state’s Armed Forces, we must under-
stand the issues that refer directly to the protection of national sovereignty, territo-
rial independence and integrity. We should understand that we are dealing with the 
protection of the political system established by the Constitution, protection of the 
economic basis of the state, and protection of the constitutional democracy. In other 
words, national security involves the protection of political power, which exclusively 
belongs to the people, from the possible infringements from outside the state, as well 
as from inside the state, which have the purpose of overthrowing the power, chang-
ing the political system through violence or other ways that are not provided by the 
Constitution. 
Public security must be understood as the protection of citizens’ basic rights and 
liberties, assurance of public order, protection of the environment, social protection of 
the citizens and other issues of organizing a decent way of life for the state’s citizens. 
Dividing the national security into constituent elements, such as state security and 
public security, oﬀers the possibility of establishing deﬁnite competencies and respon-
sibilities referring to diﬀerent public authorities in the sphere of national security,
taking into consideration the fact that in accordance with Art. 6 of the Constitution, 
power is divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. This means that
the functions and attributions of public authorities involved in the exertion of power 
should not intersect. Thus, we must understand that the Parliament, Head of State,
Government and judicial authorities shall possess speciﬁc duties or responsibilities
depending on the function fulﬁlled by them. These are tasks that cannot be repeated
or intersected. Evidently, in this very situation we can speak about the mechanism that 
gives the possibility to these authorities to mutually control the realization of the du-
ties that will give the possibility of excluding  possible abuses. In other words, power 
will be balanced through these mechanisms.
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Schematically, national security can be represented as follows: 
2. General characteristic of the legal framework  
of the security system
The appearance and conﬁrmation of the Republic of Moldova as a sovereign, inde-
pendent, democratic state based on the rule of law, and the adoption of the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Moldova have determined the imperative need to correlate the 
national security system with constitutional regulations, external and internal policy 
principles, and international norms concerning national security, and to establish pri-
orities and separate public authorities’ competencies in the sphere of national security. 
The quality of regulations in this important ﬁeld is directly dependent on numerous
factors such as the form of government, state structure, political system, the degree of 
the development of democracy, economic development, and the level of political and 
legal culture of the whole society.
The conception of National Security in the Republic of Moldova
On May 5, 1995 the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted the Decision 
on the National Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova1, which served as a basis 
1 The Oﬃcial Gazette “Monitorul Oﬁcial” of the Republic of Moldova nr. 35/399  from 29.06.1995.
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for the development of state policy in the ﬁeld of national security, for the approval of
adequate documents and regulations in order to streamline the institutions that ad-
minister and organize the activity of the national security system bodies. 
We will mention that this document is not a successful one, because it does not 
depict a unitary and ﬂexible framework of planning and conceiving the sectional ap-
proach in the ﬁeld of security, whose foundation should be the imperative of protecting
national values and identity, and assuring internal resources indispensable for eco-
nomic, cultural and social programs that would help Moldovan society approach and 
implement the European performance criteria. The notion of “national security” is
deﬁned in a simplistic way as the protection against the internal and external threats
of an individual, society and state, as well as their rights and interests established by 
the Constitution and other laws of the Republic.
Some possible threats to national security, which can be interpreted in an inade-
quate way and can lead to the deliberate harming of some inherent rights of citizens or 
some of their associations, are represented too inconsistently. Thus, the actions aimed
at provoking tense social situations or social conﬂicts are qualiﬁed as a danger for the
national society. This can aﬀect some activities of trade unions, the members of which
can be accused of actions that can jeopardize national security. The same can be said
about actions that aim to harm the constitutional rights and liberties of citizens. In-
deed, such actions are inadmissible, they come into collision with the principles of the 
“rule of law”, but they cannot be a risk or threat to the national security of the state. 
Such actions, if they are accepted by state authorities, can harm democracy, can estab-
lish a totalitarian system (for ex: USSR), but certainly they cannot harm the security 
of the state. 
Basic principles and methods of national security are incorrectly established. First, 
we should mention that basic principles are those that arise from the Basic law; sec-
ond, in the theory of law the principle is considered the fundamental element, an idea, 
an essential law that underlies a scientiﬁc theory that can take the form of an axiom,
anticipation, postulate, main idea, and fundamental thesis. Therefore, the following
cannot be considered as principles:
• Separation of the competencies of institutions providing national security;
• Creation and improvement of the legal framework and mechanisms of policy 
development, and of the exertion of control upon the adoption and application 
of decisions in the sphere of national security;
• Coordination of eﬀorts with other states in order to identify, prevent and defeat
possible threats to the national security of the Republic;
• The maintenance of high-level military readiness of the Armed Forces.
We disagree with the statements that national security is provided through the 
creation and improvement of the legal framework of national security, which estab-
lishes the security bases, public authorities’ competencies, rights and duties of citizens, 
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enterprises, institutions, organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
in the sphere of national security. We cannot speak about the rights and duties of citi-
zens, enterprises, institutions, organizations and non-governmental organizations in 
the sphere of national security. It is true that Art. 56 and 58 of the Constitution es-
tablish such duties for citizens as Devotion to the Homeland and the Holy Duty of 
Defending the Homeland. However, national security is an intrinsic function of public 
authorities, which exert state power, as well as of the institutions specialized in this 
area (National Army, Information and Security Service, Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs,
and other bodies that hold similar responsibilities). 
Title II of the Concept, entitled The National Security System, leaves much to be de-
sired. The National Security System is deﬁned incorrectly as the organized integration of 
the management bodies of the military and special units, provided with ﬁnancial, material,
and technical resources in accordance with the possibilities of the national economy, state 
and local budgets, as well as the totality of legal regulations and activity programs that en-
sure the stability of public authorities and protection of the person, society and whole state 
against external and internal threats. The Parliament, the Head of State and the Justice
authorities do not ﬁt in this deﬁnition because we are speaking only about the executive
bodies, military and special units. Afterwards, the local budgets do not ﬁt into the na-
tional security system, because  Art.109 of the Constitution oﬀers local autonomy to local
public authorities based on public services decentralization, and Art. 18 of the Law on 
Local Public Administration does not establish under their jurisdiction any competen-
cies referring to national security. This means that local budgets cannot be used to cover
the expenses related to the issues that are not included in their area of responsibilities.
We consider that a correct deﬁnition of the National Security System can be the
following: ensemble of the means, state regulations and institutions that have the 
function and responsibilities of implementing, protecting and aﬃrming the na-
tional interests of the Republic of Moldova within its national borders and abroad. 
The legislative, executive and judicial bodies, enterprises, institutions, non-govern-
mental organizations, and citizens are established as national security system elements. 
We can see that the plural form is used while referring to the legislative and execu-
tive bodies (?), and as components – all the institutions and organizations, including 
NGOs and citizens. We consider this incorrect because an educational institution, a lo-
cal public administration, and an NGO cannot be included or considered as elements 
of the national security system. 
The main tasks of the national security system are also considered aberrant, be-
cause the objectives that lead to the protection and implementation of the national 
security interests are not speciﬁed. Moreover, the international security environment
and the role of the Republic of Moldova within diﬀerent international Pacts and struc-
tures are not taken into consideration. In spite of this, the following arrangements are 
presented:
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• The Parliament carries out the legislative regulation in the area of national security
and exerts direct control on the legislation implementation by the national security 
bodies. (According to Art. 66 of the Constitution, the Parliament exerts control 
on the Government activity only according to the aspects and limits provided 
by the Constitution. The Constitution does not stipulate the Parliament’s direct
control on the legislation’s execution by the national security bodies);
• The Government promotes internal and external policy of the state according to
national security interests; it exerts the general leadership of the national security 
bodies. (According to Art. 96 of the Constitution, the Government exerts the 
implementation of the internal and external policy of the state. As regards the 
general leadership of the national security bodies – it is a completely aberrant 
regulation, because in that case it should be understood that the Government 
leads with the Parliament and the Supreme Security Council, the president of 
which is the Head of State). 
• The Justice provides the operative examination of the materials from criminal
cases on oﬀences against the state; it investigates the generating causes and condi-
tions. (During the examination of civil and criminal causes, the Justice follows 
the Codes of civil and criminal procedures, which do not contain provisions 
concerning the operative examination of materials from criminal cases on of-
fences against the state).
• The Republican prosecutor’s oﬃce, in concordance with the Law on the Prosecu-
tor’s Oﬃce of the Republic of Moldova, exerts the prosecutor’s supervision of the
national security legislation observance. (According to the amendments to Art. 
124 of the Constitution, passed in July 2000, the prosecutor’s oﬃce was deprived
of the supervision function of the legislation’s observance). 
In Art. 5 the national security bodies are listed, but the Parliament is not included 
because Art. 4 mentions the Parliament as part of the system, as an element, and its 
mission is also established. We consider incorrect the fact that the Supreme Security 
Council is included among these bodies as well, because, according to Art. 12 of the 
Law on the Security of the State the Supreme Security Council is a consultative body, 
which forwards recommendations to the President of the Republic of Moldova, who is, 
at the same time, the Chairman of the Supreme Security Council.  Thus, the President
of the Republic of Moldova should be mentioned as a national security system element, 
but not the Supreme Security Council, because the President can take into consid-
eration the Council’s recommendations. He can also ignore these recommendations 
because, according to Art.77 of the Constitution, he is endowed with the function of 
being a guarantor of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. 
Art. 6 in its deﬁnition of state security contains a wide range of national security
components, including economic, technical-scientiﬁc, and defense potentials, as well
as individual rights and interests against the informational and subversive activities 
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of special services and foreign organizations, criminal attempts of certain groups or 
individuals. 
At the same time, the main tasks of state security are reduced to the informative 
activities carried out in order to acquire political, economic, technical-scientiﬁc and
military information necessary to the President of the Republic of Moldova, the Parlia-
ment and the Government for the fulﬁllment of the tasks related to national security,
military, foreign policies, foreign economic policies , as well as counter-intelligence 
activities in order to reveal and combat the illegal or subversive activities of foreign 
special services and organizations, groups and individuals with hostile intentions.
Moreover, the same Art. 6 establishes that the direct leadership of the state secu-
rity bodies and sub-units is exerted by the Information and Security Service of the 
Republic of Moldova, headed by the General Director of the Information and Security 
Service (ISS). That, in our opinion, is incorrect due to the fact that according to the law
the ISS can lead only its own bodies. 
Referring to Military Security, we do consider that the Armed Forces of the state 
represent a way through which national security is provided, especially the Security of 
the State and evidently public security, because special operation units of the Ministry 
of Internal Aﬀairs are part of the state’s Armed Forces. For these reasons we consider
as incorrect the deﬁnition given to national security which “assures military defense of
the state against external and internal military dangers through the implementation of 
the defense policy, creation of the Armed Forces capable of rejecting a possible military 
aggression”, due to the fact that the same article stipulates that Military Security has 
the goal of providing national defense, border protection, as well as the maintenance 
of public order through the Armed Forces. 
In our opinion, the deﬁnition of Civil Protection is correct, but we consider that 
Civil Protection is not a separate element of national security, but a part of public se-
curity, because one of its activity purposes is to provide the protection of population, 
goods and cultural values in the aftermath of emergency situations (natural and eco-
logical calamities, damages, catastrophes, epiphytes, epizooties) as well as against dif-
ferent means of modern destruction.
The Law on the Security of the State2
On 31.10.95, promoting the Concept on National Security, the Parliament adopted 
the Law on the Security of the State, which considers adequately the problems of state 
security. The Law rectiﬁes some errors made in the National Security Concept and
establishes correctly the principles of state security. In addition, the law requires that 
2 The Oﬃcial Gazette of the Republic of Moldova nr. 10-11/115 from 13.02.1997.
25
the observance and protection of individual rights and freedoms be the main duties of 
the state. At the same time, it establishes that the activity related to the protection of 
national security cannot function to the detriment of the legitimate rights and liberties 
of an individual. The competencies of the Parliament, Head of State and Government
in the area of national security protection are also established according to the consti-
tutional provisions. 
Our task in this research is to identify the existent drawbacks, eliminate them, and 
thus contribute to the improvement of the national security of the state. Certainly, the 
drawbacks of the National Security Concept have also aﬀected the Law on the Security
of the State. From our viewpoint, it would be better if the law had the title The Law on
National Security, because the law could tackle other issues related to public security 
which were mentioned in the Concept but were developed neither in this nor in any 
other law. On the other hand, we believe that having many laws on national security 
problems is not a good idea. Even the two basic laws (the Law on the Security of the 
State and the Law on the State Security Bodies) have repetitive clauses, address the 
same issues, and even contradict each other.
The National Security Conception does not deﬁne clearly the national security sys-
tem (the national security system represents the organized integration of the admin-
istrative bodies of the military and special units). Obviously this law contains certain 
misleading aspects and even some errors.
Thus, Art. 13 of the Law establishes that the system of state security bodies includes
the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova, Guard and Protection 
State Service, Border Guards Department, Customs Department, as well as the educa-
tional institutions and other non-military organizations of the state security bodies. We 
can only say that the authors of this law did not have a clear vision of many theoretical 
issues, because a system should include an ensemble of elements arranged in a certain 
order that function in a certain dependent and inter-dependent way and have a certain 
common purpose. As to the system of the state security bodies, all the institutions that 
have a direct relation to these issues should be part of the system. Obviously, the Parlia-
ment, Head of State, Government and legal authorities should be included in this sys-
tem. It is not clear why Art. 9-12 stipulate competencies of the Parliament, Head of Re-
public, Government and Supreme Council of Security if these bodies are not part of the 
state security system. We also consider absolutely incorrect the fact that the Ministry of 
Defense was not included in this system since the sovereignty protection, independence 
and territorial integrity cannot be assured without the National Army.
We will emphasize some errors contained in this Law. Art. 8 does not allow the 
disclosure of information considered a state secret, military secret or commercial or on 
duty secret, her conﬁdential information the disclosure of which can harm the rights
or liberties of an individual.  It is wrong and unconstitutional to ban the disclosure of 
work information that is considered a work secret. According to Art. 34 of the Consti-
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tution, public authorities are obliged to provide accurate information concerning their 
public duties or issues of personal interest to citizens. The constitutional norm stipu-
lates that the right to information should not be detrimental to the security measures 
to protect citizens or national safety. Therefore, a work secret is not a state secret if it
is not related to citizens’ security or national security. The stipulation not allowing the
disclosure of information that can harm the honor and dignity of the individual is re-
dundant. The relation of the individual’s honor and dignity to state security problems
is not clear. 
Art. 7, paragraph 7 has another error because it stipulates the following: in case 
the body (oﬃcial person) that exercises measures to ensure state security has infringed
upon the rights and legal liberties of an individual, or has prevented the implementa-
tion of these measures without good reason, the hierarchically superior body of the state 
security, the prosecutor or the judge are obliged to undertake measures in order to fully 
reestablish the rights and liberties of a harmed person and thus cover the moral and ma-
terial damages in accordance with the legislation. 
It is not clear what type of hierarchy is referred to in the text, because the state secu-
rity bodies are not in a subordination hierarchy. From the law, we should withdraw that 
the Information and Security Service (ISS) has as its subordinates the Guard and Pro-
tection State Service, the Border Guards Department or the Customs Department, and, 
in case of need, can cancel the decisions of these hierarchically subordinated bodies. 
The stipulation that the public prosecutor or the judge are obliged to undertake
measures to reestablish the absolute rights and liberties that were infringed upon make 
no sense, because the prosecutor and the judge carry out their activity according to the 
respective legislative framework (The Law on the Prosecutor’s Oﬃce, the laws on the
organization and functioning of the judicial system in the republic).
The Law on the State Security Bodies3
On the same day, i.e. October 31, 1995, the Parliament adopted the Law on the State 
Security Bodies. This law repeats some provisions from the Law on the Security of the
State. The fact that the Parliament adopted two important laws on the same day points
to their poor quality. There was no need for two laws on state security issues since both
of them regulate the same issue. We think that these two laws should be combined, 
and that only one law should be adopted to regulate the whole set of social relations 
that can appear in the process of providing national security. It is important to take 
into account that aside from these two laws there is also the Law on National Defense 
adopted on 25.07.2003. This law is more complex and regulates nearly the whole set of
3 The Oﬃcial Gazzette of the Republic of Moldova nr. 10-11/115 from 13.02.1997.
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social relations in the national security sphere and also repeats some stipulations from 
the Law on the Security of the State and other laws related to the state security bodies. 
Nevertheless, we will start the analysis with Art. 3 and 8 of the Law on the State Se-
curity Bodies, which stipulate the competencies of the state security bodies. Again, the 
authors of the law mixed up the notions of attributions and obligations because Art.3 
stipulates the functions of the state security bodies as follows:
• To defend the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, 
to protect and guard the state borders, to defend the Constitutional regime, 
rights, liberties and legitimate interests of individuals against illegal attempts;
• To provide to the Parliament, the President of the Republic of Moldova and the 
Government, the intelligence and information necessary to solve state security 
problems (in the economic, foreign and internal policy sphere), and to promote 
social-economic development and technical-scientiﬁc progress;
• To protect, within the limits of their competencies, the national economy from 
criminal infringements, to prevent emergency cases and situations in telecom-
munication, transportation and infrastructure of vital importance;
• To combat terrorism, organized crime, and corruption, which undermine 
the Security of the State, as well as to discover, prevent and counter-act other 
types of legal oﬀences, the criminal prosecution that falls under state respon-
sibility, etc.
In Art. 8, “Duties of the state security bodies”, other competencies are provided that 
establish what state security bodies should do in this area. We have noticed in this ar-
ticle that some of the tasks from Art.3 are repeated:
• To inform public authorities on a regular basis about state security issues.
• To protect, within their competence, the Constitutional rights and liberties of 
citizens of the Republic of Moldova;
• To make decisions, together with other public administration authorities, con-
cerning the protection by Guard and Protection State Service of highly placed 
oﬃcials, politicians, foreign personalities visiting the Republic of Moldova;
• To issue and supervise the implementation of normative acts and regulations 
on the Security of the State, issued  in order to implement the provisions of the 
Constitution, laws and decisions adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of 
Moldova, Government’s decisions and orders;
• To combat terrorism, organized crime, and corruption, which undermine the 
Security of the State.
This Law, for the third time, establishes the state security bodies system, repeat-
ing the identical regulations of the above-analyzed laws: the Information and Security 
Service of the RM, the Guard and Protection State Service, the Border Guards Depart-
ment and the Customs Department. It is obvious that we are not dealing with a system, 
but only some bodies that are part of the system. 
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Moreover, among the competencies established by Art.3 and 8 we can ﬁnd “to protect, 
within the limits of their competencies, the national economy from criminal infringements, 
to prevent emergency cases and situations in telecommunication, transportation and infra-
structure of vital importance; to combat terrorism, organized crime, and corruption, which 
undermine the Security of the State”. We would like to mention that these competencies 
are inherent for the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs, as well as for the Prosecu-
tor’s Oﬃce. These bodies certainly are not mentioned among those protecting state secu-
rity and are not parts of the system referred to in the above-mentioned three Laws.
From the practical and theoretical points of view, an important issue is the control 
over state security institutions. This is exerted by public authorities, which exercise the
power of the state. Thus, Art. 25 establishes that:
(1) The Parliament exerts control over state security bodies through parliamentarian
hearings and investigations, hearing the reports of the state security institution 
leaders at public or closed sessions, as well as through the participation of the 
Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on na-
tional security at the working meetings of the Board of the Information and Secu-
rity Service of the Republic of Moldova. 
(2) The permanent control over the state security bodies’ activities is exerted by the
Parliament through the National Security Standing Committee.
We do consider that the regulation provided by Art. 25 on the control exerted by 
the Parliament exceeds the mandate that the Parliament should have. It contradicts 
the theory of the state separation of powers, even referring to Art. 66, (f) of the Con-
stitution, which establishes that the Parliamentary control over the executive branch is 
exerted under Constitutional forms and limits. 
According to the principle of separation of powers in a state, the competencies of 
the authorities exerting state power (the Parliament, the Head of State, the Govern-
ment and the Justice authorities) must not intersect. Thus, we must understand that the
Parliament cannot interfere in diﬀerent issues within the competencies of the execu-
tive branch bodies. Art.1 from the Law determines that the state security bodies are 
specialized structures of the executive branch. Therefore, the control over these bodies’
activities is an inherent function of the President and Government of the Republic of 
Moldova. These authorities are the main pillars of the executive branch. Referring to
the Parliament, we have already mentioned Art. 66, (f) of the Constitution that estab-
lishes the parliamentary control exerted under the Constitutional limits and forms. 
These forms are provided by Art.104 (the Parliamentary report; Art. 105 (Questions
and Interpellations); Art. 106 (Motion of distrust). The stipulations of these constitu-
tional regulations are further developed by the Parliament’s regulation. 
The activity of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on national security exceeds
its competencies, because its missions are to approve drafts and legislative proposals, to
undertake parliamentary investigations, to consult public administration bodies and 
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other institutions, and to issue advisory notices or recommendations (Art. 27 from the 
Parliament’s regulation)4. Speaking about the Parliamentary Hearings, we must un-
derstand the Government report concerning its activity during a session. The Standing
Bureau of the Parliament can initiate other hearings concerning the issues of major 
public interest (art. 112/1 of the Parliament’s regulation). Therefore, the hearings are
organized not by the Standing Committee on National Security, but by the Parliament 
in its meeting and only once during a session, i.e. only twice a year at most.
Thus, the main task of the Standing Committee on National Security should be the
approval of bills or legislative proposals related to national security issues, but not the 
organization of hearings and interfering with diﬀerent directions or imperative pro-
posals to the institutions charged with the mission of providing national security. The
provision that allows the participation of the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Parlia-
mentary Standing Committee on National Security at the working meetings of the Board 
of the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova is absolutely useless.
Nevertheless, the reality is diﬀerent because the Parliamentary Standing Committee
on National Security involves the solution of some of the problems that are not within 
the competencies of the Parliament. In order to be more convincing, we will bring as 
an example some decisions adopted by the Parliament at the Committee’s initiative. 
Thus, on 16.07.1999, after examining the report of the Standing Committee on National 
Security concerning the control exerted on the activity of the penitentiary system, the 
Parliament decided to compel the Government to fulﬁll the following actions:
• to consider the possibility of allocating additionally 22 million lei to the De-
partment of Penitentiary Institutions and to submit to the Parliament propos-
als concerning changes to be operated in the budget Law of 1999;
• In order to consolidate the technical-material basis of the penitentiary institu-
tions and to assure the fulﬁllment of guard, supervision and escort functions of
detainees, the Government will transfer the necessary equipment and materials, 
a military site and other goods from the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs, Ministry
of Defense, Ministry of Transportation and Communication, Municipal Coun-
cil of Chisinau to the balance of the Department of Penitentiary Institutions, 
and will use extra-budget ﬁnancial sources for the above mentioned aims;
• To pay oﬀ the arrears at money and food rights for 1996, the arrears at the
exclusive allowance of dismissal for 1998 to the personnel of the penitentiary 
institutions and to provide measures for further allocation in time of diﬀerent
resources regarding this purpose; 
• to distribute 1200 hectares of farming land from the reserves for the peniten-
tiary institutions’ use. 
4 The Oﬃcial Gazette of the Republic of Moldova nr. 81-92\765 from 19.12.1996.
30
Another example is the Parliamentary Decision from March 27, 2003 referring to 
the investigations of the observance of the Law on Custom Bodies, which established 
the following: 
The Government:
• will allocate additional ﬁnancial resources for technical and equipment im-
provement of the custom bureaus and posts, including for building terminals 
within the control zones of bureaus and border checkpoints;
• will issue orders to the Ministry of Finance to allocate totally, in accordance 
with the State Budget Law for 2003, the ﬁnancial resources assigned to the Cus-
toms Department, as well as the resources established by Art.121, paragraph (2) 
of the Customs Code. 
The Customs Department administration:
• will objectively establish the qualiﬁcation grades to the administrative person-
nel of the Department and its subdivisions, which did not fulﬁll their duties
properly (This fact was revealed in the report on the results of the Law on Cus-
toms observance).
The General Prosecutor’s Oﬃce:
• will investigate the penal ﬁles shelved during 2000-2002 on the basis of the lack
of elements constituting an oﬀense, and it will submit a report on the investiga-
tion to the Parliament; 
• will study the results of the Customs Department activity investigation and in 
cases when infringement elements are ascertained, it will oblige the criminal 
investigation and preliminary inquiry bodies to continue the necessary proce-
dures and to submit the materials to the court. 
There are the same regulations with the Parliament’s Decision from August 04,
2002 concerning the results of the investigations on observance of the Law on Cara-
bineers Troops (internal troops) of the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs. For example, the
Government is to:
• solve within three months the problems related to the accommodation infra-
structure for the personnel of the Carabineers troops deployed on the military 
site nr.100; 
• compel the Ministry of Defense to modify the Regulation regarding the medi-
cal-military commission of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova, ap-
proved by the Minister of Defense order nr. 230 from December 15, 1997, in 
order to allow recruiting into the Carabineers troops conscripts with the 1st and 
2nd health grades. 
The same can be said about the Decision adopted on November 23, 2001 on the
Commission report concerning the observance by the Ministry of Defense of the Law 
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on Military Duties and Military Service of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova. 
And in this case, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova compels the Government 
to undertake a number of actions as, for example: 
The Government, within three months:
— will examine the issue of reorganization of the military airﬁeld Marculesti into
a double destination airport;
— will undertake necessary actions for the further use of the military camps “Ra-
doaia”, “Milestii Mici”, “Vadeni” and “Marandeni”;
— will return apartments to the Ministry of Defense instead of the ones received 
from the ministry’s fund in accordance with the guarantee letters of the Gov-
ernment;
The created situation is due not only to the Commission’s pressure, but also to the
wrong conception developed by the Parliament through its Decision on the Standing 
Committees’ areas of activity, passed on April 08, 20055. According to this conception, 
the areas of activities of the standing committees are established in contradiction with 
the Parliament’s Regulation adopted by the organic law. Thus, for the Standing Com-
mittee on National Security, Defense and Public Order the following areas of activity 
are established:
1. The national security issues, the military service within the specialized institu-
tions of the executive branch assigned to protect national security;
2. Combating crimes, corruption and terrorism, assuring public order and road 
traﬃc security; state border guard and regime, central public and regional au-
thorities’ mandates on state border protection.
3. The Armed Forces reform (national army; border guards troops, carabineers
troops), military and alternative service, social and juridical protection of mili-
tary personnel, service organization within the Customs Department, Peniten-
tiary Institutions Department and Emergency Situations Department; observ-
ance of state secrets; providing citizens with identity documents.
Besides, as the last argument, we will mention the Parliament’s competencies on 
national security established by Art. 9 of the Law: 
a) Provides legislative regulation in the sphere of national security;
b) Approves the National Security Concept;
c) Creates a legal basis for the creation and national security bodies activities; 
d) Establishes the state border;
e) Approves the budget for the Security of the State; 
f) Ratiﬁes and denounces international treaties on the security of the state.
5 The Oﬃcial Gazette of the Republic og Moldova nr. 59-61/212 from 15.04.2005.
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As we can see, the Parliament does not have administrative competencies; these are 
exclusively inside the executive branch of the power. Therefore, the Parliament bodies
cannot have such prerogatives.
Thus, we can say that the DECISION concerning the areas of activity of the Parlia-
mentary standing committees from 08.04.2005 is in contradiction with Art.66 of the 
Constitution, as well as with the law on the state security bodies. Thus, through the
above-mentioned decisions, the Parliament violates the principle of power separation 
within the state. This kind of control and decisions substitutes the Government activ-
ity and attempts to lead it, ignoring the fact that the Government carries the political 
responsibility through resignation for its mistakes and failures, including the sphere 
of national security.  
Art. 26 from the Law, entitled the Control exerted by the President and Government 
of the Republic of Moldova, is also deﬁcient by determining that:
(1) The Government and the President of the Republic of Moldova examine the
reports of the state security body leaders concerning the results of the institu-
tions’ activities, state security, human rights and liberties observance and other 
questions;
(2) The President of the Republic of Moldova together with the Government approve
the programs concerning the state security bodies activity, establish the types of 
information presented by these bodies and the way of their presentation. 
As we can see, this article does not determine the whole set of control mechanisms 
held by the head of state as a guarantor of sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity. These problems are more successfully considered in the Law on National
Defense.
The stipulation contained in Art. 27 on the judicial control on the state security bod-
ies’ observance of the human liberties and rights, establishes that this type of control is 
exerted within the examination of criminal cases in courts. Such type of control is also 
exerted within the investigation of causes of legal oﬀences and contraventions com-
mitted by the state security bodies’ personnel. 
It is necessary to mention that the judicial bodies, in accordance with the Law on 
judicial organization, nr. 514-XIII from 06.07.1995, carry out justice for the defense 
and achievement of basic rights and liberties of citizens, enterprises, institutions, and 
organizations, as well as try the causes concerning civil, administrative and criminal 
judicial relations6. As we can see, the courts do not perform judicial control but carry 
out justice, or, in other words, reestablish broken judicial norms regardless of the per-
son and the examined criminal causes.
6 The Oﬃcial Gazette of the Republic of Moldova nr. 58/641 from 19.10.1995.
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The same thing can be said about Art. 28 on the supervision exerted by the public
prosecutor, because the Prosecutor’s Oﬃce was deprived of the right to supervise the
accuracy of the laws’ observance, including by the state security bodies. With regret, 
the lawmakers in many normative acts on national security have committed this error. 
This is only due to the fact that after the change of a constitutional norm the adjust-
ment of a great number of regulations from diﬀerent legislative acts to the constitu-
tional standard does not take place.
The Law on National Defense7
This law passed on August 25, 2003 and, as we have previously mentioned, accord-
ing to its content it regulates more eﬃciently a certain set of social relations in the ﬁeld
of national security. Obviously, this law is greatly related to state security issues, only in 
the case of accepting the idea that state security is only the protection of the sovereign-
ty, independence and territorial integrity of the state. We will not comment entirely on 
this law, but only emphasize some speciﬁc issues connected with some theoretical and
practical aspects of state organization and functioning.   
We will consider the issue concerning the function of the Commander In Chief of 
the Armed Forces, carried out by the Head of State. This issue is tackled diﬀerently by 
some experts in the sphere of constitutional law. Art. 25 of this law develops the con-
stitutional norm according to which the President of the Republic of Moldova is the 
guarantor of state sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and that is why 
he is endowed with the function of the Commander In Chief of the Armed Forces. The
law establishes that the President exerts the general management of the national defense 
system and coordinates the activity of the public administration institutions in the area 
of national defense. This regulation is a correct one and does not cause great conﬂicts,
but Art. 29 changes the situation completely because it provides the following:
1) During peace and wartime, the Armed Forces leadership is carried out by the 
Supreme Commandment of the Armed Forces headed by the President of the Re-
public of Moldova – the Commander In Chief of the Armed Forces. 
2) In order to fulﬁll his duties, the Commander In Chief of the Armed Forces issues
orders and directives, compulsory for the whole personnel of the Armed Forces. 
We will mention that on December 16, 1996 the General Public Prosecutor of the 
Republic of Moldova interrelated the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova. 
He required the Court to interpret the stipulations of Art.87 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Moldova, and to establish if the President of the Republic of Moldova, as 
the Commander In Chief of the Armed Forces and according to the Head of State com-
petencies in the ﬁeld of defense, has the right to lead the Ministry of Defense.
7 The Oﬃcial Gazette of the Republic of Moldova nr. 200-203/775 from 19.09.2003.
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In the adopted DECISION, the Constitutional Court stated that the President of the 
Republic of Moldova governs the Ministry of Defense according to the competencies in 
the sphere of defense established by the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and 
other laws that do not run counter to the Constitution. 
Although the Constitutional Court’s interpretation exists, we do have some con-
cerns on this delicate matter. Besides, an ample conﬂict took place in 1996, when the
Minister of Defense of that period, General Pavel Creanga, was dismissed through a De-
cree signed on March 15, 1996 by the President of the Republic as Commander In Chief 
of the Armed Forces. The Constitutional Court declared this Decree unconstitutional.
This proves the fact that the President of the Republic of Moldova does not govern
the Ministry of Defense. The leadership of the ministry is carried out by the minister,
who complies with all the rules applied to any minister. At the same time, the Head of 
State is the Commander In Chief of the Armed Forces, among which are all the armed 
forces, including the National Army, Border Guards and Carabineer Troops. Should we 
really understand that the Head of State leads both the Carabineer and Border Guard 
Troops? Obviously not. There are separate laws concerning these institutions, which
establish their structures, organization and leadership. It is true that the Head of State 
is the guarantor of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, so in case of a 
threat to these speciﬁc state characteristics, he can assume the commandment of the
Armed Forces, and according to the Constitution, his Decrees will be compulsory and 
executed on the whole territory of the Republic of Moldova.      
As regards national security, we shall mention that it is provided by a system, which 
is a part of some more authorities and public bodies, each one in charge of a certain 
number of competencies and responsibilities. This system consists of the Parliament,
the Head of State, the Government, a number of ministries and some specialized serv-
ices. The general governing of the system is the responsibility of the Head of State.
We should take into consideration that this governing should be carried out through 
speciﬁc methods, and the authorities and institutions that are part of this system are
not subordinated directly to the Head of State. Due to this, the attributions stipulated 
in Art. 25 of the Law are correct: 
a) Submits to the Parliament for approval the drafts of
— National Security Conception;
— Military Doctrine of the state;
— General structure and number of personnel of the Armed Forces;
— Armed Forces regulation on military discipline; 
b) Approves:
— Supreme Security Council regulation;
— General Staﬀ regulation;
— Projects and plans on the Armed Forces organization and development; 
— Armed Forces mobilization plan; 
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— Armed Forces battle plan; 
— Military Regulations; 
c) Coordinates international military co-operation activity;
d) Performs general management concerning the accumulation of resources for 
the needs of the national defense system;
e) Issues decrees on conscription and demobilization; 
f) Conducts negotiations, signs international agreements in the military sphere 
on behalf of the Republic of Moldova and submits them to the Parliament for 
ratiﬁcation, as the law requires;  
g) Submits to the Parliament proposals concerning participation in international 
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations with military personnel, troops and 
equipment; 
h) Appoints and dismisses, according to the legislation, the Armed Forces Supreme 
Commandment oﬃcers and vice-ministers of defense;
i) Promotes into supreme military ranks established by the law.
3. The Supreme Security Council’s (SSC)  
role in assuring national security
In order to understand correctly the role of the SSC in the national security system, 
we should clear up some issues concerning the role of the Head of State in this system. 
Traditionally, the Head of State belongs to the executive branch of power, even if the 
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova does not mention it. This raises some ground-
less arguments among a certain category of experts. The functions and responsibilities
of the Head of State certify the fact that the President and the Government exert the 
executive power. 
Paragraph 2 of Art. 77 of the Constitution stipulates that the President of the Re-
public of Moldova represents the state and is the guarantor of the sovereignty, na-
tional independence and territorial unity and integrity of the country. The function of
the guarantor of sovereignty, national independence, territorial unity and integrity is 
accomplished in two ways. The President, as the state’s representative carries out his
responsibilities through internal and external negotiations, signing Treaties, Agree-
ments, Statements, Memorandums, Messages to the nation, or to the Parliament in or-
der not to admit harming the national sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity 
or national security. 
During this study, we have already tackled some issues on the duties of the Head of 
State as a guarantor. Depending on the form of government, from state to state, heads 
of state are endowed with more or less mandates as guarantors. It is true that not every 
Constitution uses the term guarantor. 
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The term “guarantor” appeared for the ﬁrst time in the Constitution of France, which
stipulates in Art. 5 that the president is the guarantor of the national independence, ter-
ritorial integrity and international treaties observance. The same is stipulated by Art. 80
of the Romanian Constitution. In addition, Art. 77 of the Republic of Moldova Constitu-
tion states the same, but with a smail diﬀerence to what is mentioned in the constitutions
of France and Romania. In the Republic of Moldova, the president is also the guarantor 
of sovereignty. At ﬁrst glance, no diﬀerence is seen, but in reality, it does exist.
Art. 15 of the Constitution of France, Art. 92 of the Romanian Constitution, as well 
as Art.87 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, determine that the president 
is the Commander In Chief of the Armed Forces and fulﬁls the function of the Presi-
dent of the Council of Defense (security) of the country. Similar regulations can also 
be met in other European constitutions, such as: 
• The Constitution of Austria (Art. 80) – the Commander In Chief of the Armed
Forces is the President of the Federation and the leadership of the federal army 
is carried out by the federal minister of defense;
• The Belgian Constitution (Art. 167) – the King is the Commander In Chief of
the Armed Forces; 
• The Constitution of Germany (Art. 115 b) – from the moment the defense situa-
tion of the country was declared, the Armed Forces Command was taken by the 
federal Chancellor;
• The Constitution of Spain (Art. 62) – the King is the Commander In Chief of
the Armed Forces, but Art. 97 stipulates that the Government exerts the general 
leadership of internal and external policy, military and civil issues management, 
as well as national defense issues. 
• The Constitution of Italy (Art. 87) – the President is the Commander In Chief of
the Armed Forces and he is the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Defense. 
• The Constitution of Portugal (Art. 123) – the President assures the national se-
curity, state unity, normal functioning of the state’s democratic institutions, and 
he is the Commander In Chief of the Armed Forces. 
• The Constitution of Bulgaria (Art. 100) – the President is the Commander In
Chief of the Armed Forces and the President of the National Security Consulta-
tive Council. 
• The Constitution of Estonia (Art. 78, paragraph 16) – the President is the Com-
mander In Chief of national defense. 
• The Constitution of Poland (Art. 28) – the President is the guarantor of state
sovereignty and security, and of territorial integrity and inviolability. 
In the Constitution of Hungary (Art. 29), the Czech Constitution (Art. 63), the Consti-
tution of Slovakia (Art. 102) and in other Constitutions we can ﬁnd the same regulations. 
As we can see in the above-mentioned Constitutions, the “independence and sovereignty 
guarantor” term is not broadly used. An exception is the Constitution of Poland where 
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it is stipulated that the President is the Guarantor of state sovereignty and security, ter-
ritorial integrity and inviolability. Portugal only mentions the “assurance of independ-
ence”. All the other Constitutions contain only the stipulation that the Head of State is the 
Commander In Chief of the Armed Forces. Analyzing the constitutional mandates of the 
above-mentioned heads of states, we can see that similar to the Constitution of the Repub-
lic of Moldova the president can declare, with the Parliament’s preliminary approval, the 
general or partial mobilization of the armed forces. In case of an aggression against the 
country, he undertakes the necessary actions to stop and defeat the aggression, declares a 
state of war and immediately informs the Parliament. Such type of Constitutional regula-
tion means that the head of state has the responsibility of organizing the defense of the 
country, when dangers to the territorial integrity and independence emerge.
Certainly, we should not think that the Head of State waits passively until dangers to 
the country emerge, and only then steps into the position of armed forces commander. 
All countries have developed and adopted military doctrines and strategies concern-
ing national security, in which the roles, functions and duties of each public authority 
and specialized bodies concerning national security protection are established. 
Commanding the Armed Forces is not an exclusive function of the President of the 
state, because at the top of the institutions of the national security system, there are 
ministers, members of the Government, and certainly, the President cannot interfere 
in the operational command. Moreover, the Constitution even does not confer or him 
such competencies. 
The need to fulﬁll such function ﬁnds its explanation in political pluralism and
the multiparty system, because both the Parliament and Government are made up of 
diﬀerent political party representatives, as well as of ministers of “ force”. In an emer-
gency at the national level, it would be unacceptable to set out political debates on the 
necessity of using armed forces. It is true that the Head of State can be a part of a po-
litical formation, but the requirements of Art. 77, par. 2 demand from the President to 
place national interests ﬁrst. The president’s function of guarantor is incompatible with 
any other partial interests, it is connected legally and through the oath of the President 
to the Parliament and the Constitutional Court, (Art. 79) to protect democracy, basic 
human rights and liberties, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and 
unity of Moldova. 
Analyzing all the President’s duties, we emphasize the fact that he does not have the 
mandates to be involved directly in the management process. What the Constitution 
does oﬀer are suﬃcient possibilities for him to accomplish successfully the function of 
the main representative of the state and guarantor of sovereignty and national inde-
pendence. The explanation for this is that the president does not carry political respon-
sibility for his activity; this postulate is stipulated in the Constitutions of all countries 
with a republican form of government, regardless of the form of the republic (presiden-
tial, semi-presidential, or parliamentary). The president can be called to account only if
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he commits some exceptional actions that violate the Constitution. Art.81, paragraph 3 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova says that the Parliament can settle accu-
sations of the President if he committed an oﬀence, and the President can be dismissed
only if he violates Constitutional stipulations (Art. 87). The political accountability of
the President can appear only in case of a bad government, which can be expressed by 
the impeachment procedure of the Parliament (Art. 103). 
Political irresponsibility of the President certiﬁes that he is protected by the Consti-
tution, being the representative of the state, guarantor of sovereignty, which, in some 
circumstances, can bring moral prejudices to him notching his authority.
In order to protect the Head of State from possible mistakes, according to Art.6 
of the Law on National Defense, as well as according to other regulations previously 
analyzed, the President of the Republic is endowed with the right to institute and ad-
minister the consultative bodies on state security. In the Republic of Moldova, this in-
stitution is entitled The Supreme Security Council. In Bulgaria, this body is mentioned 
even by the Constitution and is entitled The Consultative Council of National Security, 
emphasizing the fact that this body is a consultative one. In other countries, this body 
is entitled the Supreme Council of Country Defense. Thus, it emphasizes that only
issues concerning the defense of the country are parts of its responsibilities, such as 
dangers to territorial integrity and independence. 
At ﬁrst glance, it seems that there are no diﬀerences between the Council of Secu-
rity and Council of Defense, but actually, diﬀerences do exist. Theoretically, we can say
that there is a possibility that the Head of State, as a guarantor of national sovereignty, 
can assume unlimited mandates only if he is personally responsible for national secu-
rity. Through national security, we understand all other types of security as food se-
curity, demographic security, industrial security, biologic security, ecological security, 
etc. As an example, we can mention the regulations from the Law on national security 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which suggests the following as dangers for the national 
security of Kazakhstan in Art.5 of this law:
• The worsening of the socio-political situation, expressed through intereth-
nic and inter-religious conﬂicts, mass disorder, meetings, demonstrations,
non-sanctioned meetings, illegal pickets and strikes;
• The unexpected worsening of the ecological situation;
• Damages to economic security, including the use of strategic resources against 
national interests that would obstruct investment, including the impediment of 
foreign investments’ aﬄuence and the withdrawal of capital from the country;
• The worsening of the demographic situation; an unexpected decrease of the
birth rate and an increase of the death rate, as well as the appearance of some 
uncontrollable migratory processes;
• The worsening of the quality of education and of the country’s intellectual po-
tential;
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• The imperfection or lack of a suﬃcient normative basis for the protection of the
country’s national interests. 
As we can see, alongside some real dangers, which can threaten independence, of 
the change of the political system with violent means, there are also some issues (mass 
disorder, meetings, demonstrations, non-sanctioned meetings, illegal pickets and 
strikes, etc.) that can hardly be considered as threats to national security. Art. 9 that 
determines the Head of State’s competencies already attributes to him the right to ap-
prove the National Security Concept, to evaluate real dangers to national security and 
to issue documents (Decrees) on national security. Thus, the President of Kazakhstan,
without carrying any political responsibility concerning his activity, intercedes in a 
very broad area of activity which actually is the responsibility of the Government and 
other authorities. These latter should carry political responsibility when, for example,
the demographic situation is worsened, the birth rate suﬀers a sudden decrease, the
death rate increases, some uncontrollable migratory processes occur, or the intellec-
tual potential and the quality of education of the country are decreasing.
Concerning the Republic of Moldova, we will notice with satisfaction that in our 
legislation, we do not have such stipulations that would strengthen the prerogatives of 
the head of state under the cover of national security needs, but we do have other types 
of problems. Thus, the threats and dangers stipulated in the National Security Concept
do not correspond to those from the Law on the Security of the State. The table below
illustrates this.
Possible threats to national security
The national security concept The state’s security law
• Direct aggression and territorial claims of 
other states;
• Local or regional conﬂicts in the immediate
vicinity of the Republic of Moldova’s bor-
ders;
• Uncontrolled transportation of arms, as well 
as of nuclear, bacteriologic, and chemical 
weapon components on the territory of the 
Republic of Moldova and in its border vicin-
ity;
• Actions intended to change the constitu-
tional order through violence, to undermine 
or liquidate the sovereignty, independence 
and territorial integrity of the republic;
• Actions intended to undermine or liquidate 
the economic, technical-scientiﬁc, and de-
fensive potential of the country, or create 
hazardous ecological situations;
• Actions intended to change through violence 
the constitutional regime, to undermine the 
sovereignty, independence and territorial in-
tegrity of the country. These actions cannot be
interpreted as against political pluralism, the 
achievement of constitutional rights and liber-
ties of a person;
• Activities which contribute in a direct or indi-
rect way to military actions against the country 
or waging civil war;
• Military actions and other violent actions that 
undermine the state’s foundation;
• Actions which will provoke exceptional events 
in transportation, telecommunication, eco-
nomic entities and those of vital importance;
• Espionage, transmission of information which 
represents a state secret to other states, as well 
as illegal obtaining or holding of information 
which is a state secret for its later transmission 
to foreign states or anticonstitutional organiza-
tions;
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• Actions intended to create tension in the so-
cial sphere and to provoke social conﬂicts;
• Terrorism, organized crime, drug traﬃck-
ing, and illegal immigration;
• Actions directed to harm the constitutional 
rights and liberties of citizens;
• Manifested treason through giving assistance 
to a foreign state in its hostile activity against 
the Republic of Moldova;
• Actions aimed at overthrowing through vio-
lence legally elected public authorities;
• Actions that harm the constitutional rights and 
liberties of citizens, and there by jeopardize the 
security of the state; 
• The preparation and perpetration of terrorist
acts, attempts on life, health and inviolability 
of highly placed oﬃcials of the republic as well
as foreign  public personalities visiting the Re-
public of Moldova;
• The embezzlement of arms, munitions, combat
technologies, explosive and radioactive materi-
als, poisonous and toxic substances, drugs, and 
other kinds of materials, their smuggling, pro-
duction and use;
•  Illegal transportation and possession of the 
above-mentioned substances, only if the state 
security interests are harmed through these il-
legal actions; 
• Setting up illegal organizations or groups which 
jeopardize the security of the state or the par-
ticipation in their activity; cases of organized 
crime and/or corruption which undermine 
state security;
Regarding the Supreme Security Council of the Republic of Moldova, which works 
in accordance with the Regulation approved by the Decree of the President of the Re-
public of Moldova of 08.10.978, we had that the functions are correctly considered, 
although the sphere of activity stipulated in Art. 1 is incorrectly described:
– “The Supreme Security Council is a consultative body which analyses the ministries
and department’s activity in the sphere of national security, and forwards recommenda-
tions concerning the internal and external policy issues of the state to the President of the 
Republic of Moldova”. We are not saying that this is a mistake committed by the Head 
of State, because in the very Regulation the provisions of the Law on the Security of the 
State are reproduced. We believe that in order to provide state security the SSC should 
not conﬁne itself only to anaalysis of ministries and departments, but also should con-
sider some wider issues, like the analysis of the social-political situation of the country, 
policies of neighboring countries and of the international community concerning the 
Republic of Moldova, as well as other issues dealing directly with national security. It is 
8 The Oﬃcial Gazette  of the Republic of Moldova, nr. 69-70/592 din 23.10.1997.
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very important to deﬁne accurately the SSC’s spheres of activity, these are directly relat-
ed to the competence with which the Supreme Security Council should be invested, and 
hence the correctness and promptness of the actions of the President of the Republic. 
Another issue that stirs discussions is the following: Should the Supreme Security 
Council be a consultative body alongside the Presidency or should it be a decision-mak-
ing body headed by the President? The answer is – a consultative body, regardless of
the form of government, structure or the socio-economic and political situation in 
the state. We have already mentioned in this study that the authority invested by the 
Constitution together with the right to exert the power of the state is the President of 
the Republic, who has certain responsibilities and obligations.   
In a modern state, the delegation of attributions of a military nature to certain 
social and political groups is not possible. National defense and the maintenance of 
public order in the state are exclusively governmental responsibilities. Because of this, 
political party spirit is prohibited for the staﬀ of the bodies which are part of the state
military forces. Thus, it should be mentioned that heads of state, during the exertion
of their mandates, should suspend their activity in any political party. Such kind of 
regulation exists in the constitution of Romania, France and other countries, but un-
fortunately, it is not stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, and this 
damages the exertion of the president’s functions. 
Therefore, we would like to mention that the decisions adopted by the Head of State
should be his own. If the SSC were transformed into a deliberative body, the constitu-
tional order would include another authority exerting state power, which would, there-
fore, require a constitutional and investiture provision from the Parliament as the su-
preme representative authority. We should also take into account the fact that although 
the Head of State is leading this body, the latter, being a collective structure, will be able 
to adopt certain decisions against the will of the President. Such a body would be possi-
ble in the case of a state implementing a regime of assembly as its form of government, 
which is typical of Switzerland, which has no Head of State. For the republican form of 
government, issues dealing with state security are traditionally within the competence 
of the Head of State. Even in monarchies, the commander in chief of the armed forces 
is the monarch. 
Speaking about the SSC make-up stipulated by Art. 6, we consider that it is mean-
ingless, because  Paragraph 1 establishes the SSC’s oﬃcial members: “prime-minister,
minister of defense, minister of foreign aﬀairs, minister of internal aﬀairs, minister of
national security, minister of ﬁnance, Head of the Armed Forces General Staﬀ, Head of
Civil Security and Emergency Situations and Secretary of the Supreme Security Coun-
cil”, but Paragraph 2 allows the President of the Republic to appoint the SSC members 
and other persons with a responsible function. 
We consider that the Law should not imperatively ﬁx who should be a member of
the SSC, because it is only a consultative body, and the President should decide inde-
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pendently who should be a part of this Council. Nevertheless, we consider that the Law 
can propose that the Council be formed of important ministers and oﬃcials of the
Government, heads of security institutes, military commanders, political party leaders 
represented in the Parliament, and highly professional legal experts. 
We also believe that in order to avoid some possible abuses, the SSC Regulation 
should include the SSC Service competence because the mandate: “the organizational 
and informational assistance of the Council’s activity” is too general. The same thing
can be said about the SSC Secretary’s duties. 
We will expose our personal opinion on the Coordinating Council concerning the 
combating of corruption and crime9. It is true that corruption and organized crime are 
considered as a certain danger to the Security of the State. Thus, the SSC should include
in its activity the study of issues concerning this scourge of the society and recommen-
dations to the President regarding some actions which should be undertaken by him. 
Otherwise, it is our opinion that the Coordinating Council double the activity of the 
SSC in the ﬁeld of combating corruption and crime, or even make the SSC specialized
in this speciﬁc sphere. Art. 21 (a) of the Coordinating Council Regulation, conﬁrms this
idea according to which it oﬀers to the President consultations and recommendations
on providing national security through combating corruption and crime. In having a 
Coordinating Council an the issues of combating corruption and crime, the President 
assumes the responsibility concerning the rate of corruption and crime in the state, as 
long as the Government is responsible for the situation in the state, and as long as the 
Head of State exerts control over the eﬃciency of measures undertaken by the SSC.
4. Conclusions and recommendations
Generally, the Republic of Moldova has a complete system of national security pro-
vision, and this system contains juridical regulations concerning the functioning and 
organization of the systemic elements. 
At the same time, this important sphere, in our opinion, contains serious gaps and 
drawbacks. These are generated by a series of legislative acts that sometimes are not
mutually coordinated, are reciprocally doubled, and contain incorrect and contradic-
tory regulations.
In this context, we believe that the following actions have to be undertaken: 
I) Through a Presidential Decree, a working group should be formed of highly qual-
iﬁed specialists, representatives of ministries, security bodies, and academics, whose
mission would be to draft the following documents:
9 The Oﬃcial Gazette of the Republic of Moldova nr. 116-118/859 from 27.09.2001.
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A) The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, which subsequently
will be submitted to the Parliament for approval;
B) The Law on National Security;
C) The amendments to a number of laws that establish the status, the way of or-
ganization and functioning of the bodies which are part of the national security 
system, adjusting them to the stipulations of the new Law on National Security;
D) The Supreme Security Council Regulation.
II) We believe that the National Security Strategy should include the national doc-
trine of defense, and should establish basic concepts of the national security activity. The
strategy should synthesize objectives, specify deﬁnitions and correlate ways of actions
for the state security components, having a structure that would include the following:
• The deﬁnition of national security interests;
• The speciﬁcation of the objectives that lead to the protection and aﬃrmation of
these interests;
• The evaluation of international security environment;
• The identiﬁcation of the internal and external risk factors;
• The directions for actions and main means for the provision of national security;
• The directions for actions and main means concerning the reintegration of the
Republic of Moldova’s territory.
The strategy should measure the security level of the Republic of Moldova, which
is also characterized by many vulnerabilities in almost all the economic and social 
spheres. The Moldovan society witnesses the enlargement of unconventional risks, be-
ing deeply marked by the irrational actions of some forces that are promoting separa-
tism as a way of splitting and weakening state sovereignty.
The strategy should be the basic document which grounds defense planning at
the national level. The document would establish: the main objectives and tasks of
the institutions involved in national security and defense; measures and actions that 
should be undertaken by these; natural, human, material, ﬁnancial and other types of
resources which should be ensured for the constitution and preparation of the forces 
involved in national defense and security, according to their missions. 
Civic, non-governmental, academic and commercial structures must be attracted 
in the national security system, speciﬁcally those that possess technologies and infor-
mation interfacing with national security and that can contribute to the balance of all 
areas of the internal sphere– economic, social, civil, and military. 
In special terms of cooperation with NATO and the European Union, the strategy 
should stipulate the guarantees of constitutional order, improvement of the political 
system, development of the civil society, streamlining of the national defense capac-
ity, modernization of the institutions providing public order, combating terrorism and 
organized crime, harmonization of the inter-ethnic relations, and formation of partici-
patory conduct at the regional level.
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After a prospective and perspective analysis concerning the general evolution of
the Republic of Moldova, as well as the dynamics of the operative situation, the na-
tional security strategy should include the whole set of issues concerning public secu-
rity, and should respond to the planned institutional and operational objectives and 
transformations. In this way, it establishes the structure, missions of the component 
forces of public security and order, logistics, and the manner of their management and 
cooperation. It is needed to identify the threats and risks to public order and security. 
Moreover, courses of actions should be established, as well as the principles of realiza-
tion, deﬁnition of “public order” and “public security” concepts, as well as those of
“maintenance”, “assurance”, and “reestablishment” of public order. 
The strategy concerning Public Security will make more eﬃcient the actions meant
to prevent and combat crime; guarantee and protect constitutional rights and liber-
ties, public and private property; assure the necessary climate for the operation of state 
institutions and citizen security according to the law. As a work variant, the idea of a 
separate Strategy concerning public security can be accepted, because the Government 
should be responsible for all of these matters.
In general, the strategy should be a medium-term planning document whose pur-
pose is the harmonization and compatibility of the Moldovan system of national secu-
rity and public order with those of the European Union states, by developing an eﬃ-
cient juridical and action framework, which would respond to the planned structural 
and functional transformations and objectives.
Based on the National Security Strategy, the ministries and the rest of public in-
stitutions involved in the sphere of defense, public order and national security will 
develop strategies, projects and plans meant to implement the security interests and 
objectives of the Republic of Moldova. The respective strategies will be submitted to
the Government for approval in order to ensure the integration and complementary 
character of the actions and activities included in these documents. Coordination of 
the unitary application of the actions undertaken by the Government, ministries and 
the rest of public institutions involved in the sphere of defense, public order and na-
tional security, are to be achieved by the Supreme Security Council.
The President of the Republic will submit the strategy to the Parliament, due to the
fact that the President is the guarantor of sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity. We consider necessary to amend the Constitution and establish that every 
newly elected president will submit the National Security Strategy to the Parliament 
for approval. 
III) As we have already mentioned, the 3 laws (the Law on the Security of the State, 
Law on State Security Bodies, and Law on National Defense) should be transformed 
into one law only entitled the Law on National Security. It should explain the National 
Security Strategy and establish state security and public security tasks. It should deﬁne
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more precisely and clearly the national security system and, depending on constitu-
tional stipulations, it should establish missions, competencies, and responsibilities of 
each element of the system. 
IV) A set of amendments to the normative acts stipulating the issues of the Armed 
Forces, the Border Guard Troops, the Informational and Security Service, and the civil 
protection bodies’ organization and functioning should be prepared with the draft of
the new Law on National Security. 
V) Having deﬁned all the issues concerning the National Security Strategy, obvi-
ously a new Supreme Security Council Regulation will be required which will more 
precisely establish its functions, structure and competencies.
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THE SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL  
IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM.  
THE ACTUAL ROLE, NEEDS  
AND REFORMS OPPORTUNITIES
Vadim ENICOV 
The Supreme Security Council (Consiliul Suprem de Securitate) of the Republic of 
Moldova was established by presidential decree, passed on August 20, 1991. During 
this period it has been chaired successively by the three Moldova state presidents: Mir-
cea Snegur, Petru Lucinschi and Vladimir Voronin. This study refers to the activity of
the Supreme Security Council during 2001-2005, when President Vladimir Voronin 
chaired it.
Supreme Security Council and national security policy.  
The role of the Supreme Security Council in developing  
and implementing the National Security Concept, in establishing  
national interests, threats, risks and responses
According to the Law on Security of the State (nr. 618-XIII, passed on October 31st, 
1995) „The Supreme Security Council is a consulting forum which considers the activ-
ity of ministries and departments in the sphere of national security and develops rec-
ommendations to the President of the Republic of Moldova regarding the internal and 
foreign policy of the state”. The Supreme Security Council is one of the four supreme
public authorities able to act in the sphere of national security; the other three authori-
ties are the Parliament, the President of the State and the Government. The members
of the SSC are approved by the President. Actually the Supreme Security Council in-
cludes the Prime minister; the Chairman of the National Security Committee of the 
Parliament; ministers of Defense, Foreign Aﬀairs and European Integration, Economy,
and other high level oﬃcials.
The Supreme Security Council, being endowed with large responsibilities in the sphere
of national security, considers issues related to state security, public security, military se-
curity, economic security, ecological security, and other issues of high importance.
Consequently, it might be easily observed that both the competencies of SSC and 
its structure determine its role in establishing national security policy, and developing 
and implementing the National Security Concept. Being a consulting and collegial 
body, the SSC is also a forum where the information, opinions and proposals on the 
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most important security issues converge from its members – representatives of the su-
preme public authorities which have responsibilities on national security. Due to this 
fact, the decisions taken by the SSC are consistent, reﬂect a coordinated position of the
state power branches, and have necessary conditions for eﬃcient implementation.
The National Security Council and foreign policy.  
The role of the SSC in the Foreign Policy Concept’s development  
and implementation
The Supreme Security Council hasn’t had any direct involvement in the implemen-
tation of foreign policy. According to the Constitution, this is a speciﬁc activity of the
President of the Republic of Moldova, who, as a constitutional authority, represents 
the state and, according to Article 86, carries on negotiations and signs international 
agreements on behalf of the Republic of Moldova. The Head of State executes his pow-
ers in foreign policy with the assistance of the Presidency Apparatus special services 
and his Foreign Policy Counselor.
The Supreme Security Council is a collegial authority whose responsibilities in the
sphere of security have to be distinguished from the activity in the sphere of foreign 
policy. Nevertheless, some issues considered at the Council meetings have been con-
nected to the foreign policy of the state in terms of bilateral relations with other coun-
tries, as well as the state’s position on some international aﬀairs.
In this context, many issues considered by the SSC may be listed. As an exam-
ple, the decisions adopted in connection with international antiterrorism eﬀorts or
with international assistance have been either connected to the relations with diﬀerent
countries of the world, or to the oﬃcial position of the Moldova Government on the
issues (Session on the 6th of October, 2001). Also, the decisions to allow Moldovan 
Armed Forces to participate in international activities may be mentioned. (Sessions on 
the 13th of December 2002 and on the 21st of April 2003).
In the same context may be listed the decisions concerning migration (the sessions 
on September 24th, 2001 and May 3rd, 2002), concerning border security and human 
and drug traﬃcking (the session on October 26th, 2001), and concerning the Transnis-
trian conﬂict settlement (session on July 21st, 2004). These decisions also considered
the relations with countries such as Austria and the Russian Federation.
The SSC sessions that considered these problems will be covered in the respective
chapters of the study. 
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The Supreme Security Council and the Transnistrian  
conﬂict settlement process
The fact that the Supreme Security Council had been never involved in the Tran-
snistrian conﬂict settlement process until the summer of 2004 is a very relevant one.
The reason was that, during this period, only purely political ways of conﬂict settlement
were considered. This approach has been characteristic to the period of time starting
from the ﬁrst agreements that were with the non-constitutional administration of the
East regions of the Republic of Moldova, up until the development and negotiations of 
the so called “Kozak memorandum”. Unfortunately, not all the actions undertaken by 
the Presidential administration and the Government of the Republic of Moldova have 
had signiﬁcant positive results. On the other hand, the attempts undertaken in order
to bring public institutions and economic agents’ activities under the constitutional 
jurisdiction of RM hare brought to light the true intentions of the “Smirnov group”, 
revealing at the same time the lack of co-operation among the guarantor-states. 
During 2004, many provocative attacks were undertaken against the authorities of 
the Republic of Moldova. We might mention, for example, the actions of closing schools 
that teach the state language in Latin script, the illegal arrests of Moldovan citizens by 
Transnistrian police, and others. At the same time, by the end of the ﬁrst semester of
2004 a lot of information had been collected referring to criminal activities in the East 
regions, actions that have revealed the real threats to national, regional and internation-
al security. As a consequence of these illegal and aggressive actions of the East region’s 
authorities, a set of political and economic measures has been developed, the objective 
of which is to make the Transnistrian authorities stop the criminal actions.
The ﬁrst session of the Supreme Security Council that considered the problems of
the Transnistrian conﬂict settlement process took place on July 21st, 2004. The issue was
developed on the agenda of the session as following: “1. Concerning the transactions 
and other ﬁnancial relations between the banks and other ﬁnancial institutions of the
East regions of the Republic of Moldova and the banks and ﬁnancial institutions of the
other states. 2. Regarding the export of metallurgical products produced by the Metal-
lurgical Factory of Rîbniţa, and the export from other economic agents of the left-bank
of Nistru”. At this session were presented collected data about the huge number of 
international ﬁnancial operations that have used ﬁnancial recourses coming from con-
traband, arm and munitions trade, and other illegal sources. The ﬂows of funds were
directed to ﬁnancial institutions of such states as the Russian Federation and Austria,
in order to legalize its provenience. The council concluded that these activities directly
threatened the economic security of the Republic of Moldova and became a signiﬁcant
threat to regional security. The eventual use of these funds was also considered, pre-
suming possible destination to criminal activities and international terrorism.
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A separate, but closely related, problem was the export of goods from the Metal-
lurgical Factory of Rîbniţa situated in the East regions. This was included in the ses-
sion due to information oﬀered by Spain and the United States of America concerning
the import of metallurgical products in these countries using false certiﬁcates claim-
ing Moldovan origin. Analyzing the ﬁgures of the metallurgical products import into
Moldova and export of such items to other countries from the Metallurgical Factory of 
Râbniţa reveals a criminal schema of money laundering causing huge negative eﬀects to
the national budget and the budgets of the importer-countries.
During this Council session other issues were also discussed, such as the activity 
of schools in the East regions, the illegal arrests of Moldovan citizens by the militia of 
these regions, and the eﬀorts of the separatist authorities to keep the farmers on the
left-bank of the Nistru-river from cultivating their own lands.
At this session the fundamental decision was adopted to stop the negotiations with 
the administration of the East regions. Among the other decisions concerning practical 
measures developed at this session of the Supreme Security Council the following may 
be named: the request to diﬀerent countries and international organizations to prohibit
the illegal international ﬁnancial activities of Transnistrian institutions; the interdic-
tion of the export of goods by economical agents from the East regions that do not have 
any connection with the budgetary system of the Republic of Moldova; the development 
of a complex program concerning settlement of the Transnistrian conﬂict.
Afterwards, these problems and their solutions were discussed at the ordinary ses-
sions of the SSC several times. Some new actions contributing to the re-invigoration of 
the settlement process were identiﬁed during these sessions. Among them the follow-
ing must be named: adhesion to the international organization ﬁghting against money
laundering (Egmont Group); the negotiations concerning the problems of schools and 
others. It is necessary to mention that the Apparatus of the Supreme Security Council 
has become responsible for the permanent monitoring of the above mentioned issues, 
for the collection and systematization of the information concerning the activity of the 
institutions involved in this process.
The Supreme Security Council in crisis situations  
and struggle against corruption and terrorism
The struggle against corruption
Even before the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2001, the struggle against 
corruption was declared as a priority of the actual governing party. It was considered 
as the crucial problem that needed to be solved for a the state to function better, and 
to ensure public and economic security. The Supreme Security Council continuously
focused its attention on this problem and considered its diﬀerent aspects. During the
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sessions either practical or particular cases, or issues concerning system functioning 
were discussed with the perspective of crucially diminishing corruption. 
Realizing that the majority of the problems that aﬀect state security are based on
corruption, we will give some examples of the SSC activity in ﬁghting corruption by
describing particular cases that have became problems of national concern.
In autumn of 2003 a crisis situation emerged on the bread market and market of 
related products, manifested through the lack of necessary quantity and the low qual-
ity of raw materials. This economic crisis primarily aﬀected the disadvantaged social
strata. The increase of prices was a real danger for social security and measures needed
to be imposed to protect the population. 
Initially treated as a problem caused by the drought of the summer of 2003 and the 
small harvest, the problem attracted the attention of the SSC because a clear govern-
mental program for solving the problem had been missing.
A number of inspections were initiated regarding the activity of state agencies hav-
ing responsibilities in the ﬁeld, concerning law observance and good administration
of enterprises with preponderant state capital stocks, and especially of the joint-stock 
company “Franzeluţa”, as well as economic activity of private businesses, observance 
of legalities on the import of wheat, methods of wheat storing, manufacturing and 
price establishment. 
The inspections revealed violations of law by authority executives at diﬀerent levels,
starting with breaches of discipline and ending even with crimes, the most serious of 
which were cases of corruption. As a consequence of the results of the inspection, on 
February 28, 2004 the Supreme Security Council met in a session in order to investigate 
the situation of the bread market, and the legal framework. According to the decision 
of the SSC, improvement of the situation in this sphere and development of some gov-
ernmental preventive programs were considered a duty of competent authorities. At the 
same time the attention of SSC members was also focused on the crimes committed by 
some executives of the Government and businesses. The Center for Economical Crimes
and the Fight Against Corruption, the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs, and the General
Prosecution were asked to investigate all these cases. As a consequence, several penal 
cases were initiated, and some of them ended with severe Court decisions.
Another aspect of SSC activity in the sphere of the struggle against corruption was 
the development of the National Strategy for the Fight Against Corruption and its Pre-
vention, and of the Plan of activities for the implementation of the strategy. The ne-
cessity of developing such a strategy was outlined at the majority of the SSC sessions 
during the years 2002-2003. During this period an important eﬀort was made to ﬁnd
the reasons and premises of corruption and its prevention, methods of prevention and 
struggle against it. Nearly all governmental institutions, legislative agencies and civil 
society took part in this process. The activities were permanently monitored and con-
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ducted by the SSC service. After the implementation of the initial project, diﬀerent local
and international experts were involved in ﬁnalizing.
The strategy of corruption prevention and the struggle against it was determined as
an actual priority of economic, political and social reforms in the Republic of Moldova. 
The strategy’s goals were based on the understanding that corruption can not be ex-
terminated only by punitive and restrictive measures, that a new assessment of this 
phenomena was necessary, including an evaluation of a combination of diﬀerent meth-
ods, tools, and market-economic mechanisms. The document classiﬁed corruption
according to international documents – the Civil Convention concerning corruption 
(Strasbourg, 04.11.1999), the Punitive Convention concerning corruption (Strasbourg, 
27.01.1999), and other deﬁnitions of this – and stipulated opportunities for the adjust-
ment of the national legislation to the standards of conventions and anticorruption 
treaties. The prevention and anti-corruption measures have been identiﬁed as priority
and complementary actions of:
– the improvement of the legal framework and law enforcement activities;
– the prevention of corruption in public institutions and political processes;
– the enhancement of cooperation of public institutions with civil society, inclu-
ding raising public awareness and civil education.
The plan of activities contains the list of planned actions, responsible institutions
and terms of implementation. It is necessary to mention that coordination of the 
planned actions was established as a duty of the SSC service.
On April 15, 2004, a session of the SSC was convened to consider this issue. Be-
side members of the SSC, other oﬃcials participated in the session: representatives of
the Financial Commission, Fiscal Service, Supreme Court of Justice, Customs, Border 
Guards, Statistic and Sociology Departments, Trade Unions and Employees, Univer-
sities and NGOs. Several participants presented their ideas concerning the Strategy 
Project and the Plan of Action. The means of adoption and implementation of these
documents were also discussed. 
During this session ﬁxed terms were adopted for development and approval of the
Strategy and of the Plan of Action by the Government, and their subsequent submis-
sion to the Parliament. The ﬁnal phase of this activity was on December 16, 2004,
when the Parliament adopted the Resolution Nr. 421-XV concerning approval of the 
National Strategy of the prevention and struggle against corruption, and of the Plan 
of Action. Starting from the year 2005, with the support of the European Council, 
many practical actions have already been implemented for the accomplishment of the 
planned tasks.
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The struggle against terrorism
The activities of the Supreme Security Council concerning the struggle against ter-
rorism obviously have been inﬂuenced by international developments during recent
years. Before 2001 terrorism was considered mostly as a problem of only a few states, 
and antiterrorism actions were designed accordingly. Taking into account most of the 
international agreements about the struggle against terrorism, in our opinion, inter-
national cooperation today is far from our expectations. The same approach to this
problem was also characteristic to the Republic of Moldova. After the tragic events
on September 11, 2001, the deﬁnition of international terrorism received new content,
and revealed the real threat that terrorism represents to all states. At the same time, 
the speciﬁc conditions that might encourage terrorism’s development have been con-
sidered from a new perspective, as, for example, illegal operations with money, arms 
traﬃcking, the existence of diﬀerent regimes and regions that are not controlled by the
international community, the security of transports and communications.
The ﬁrst attempt of the Supreme Security Council of the Republic of Moldova to
ﬁnd solutions to the problems related to international terrorism took place on October
6, 2001. The opportunities of international cooperation in this sphere were discussed
at this Council session and some actions supporting this cooperation were planed. The
decision approved was mostly a political one having a declarative content concern-
ing the cooperation of the Republic of Moldova with other countries in the struggle 
against international terrorism. The necessity of such a decision was caused by the
events mentioned above and by the cooperation of the world states in the undertaken 
activity. At the same time, a decision was adopted at this session concerning permis-
sion to military airplanes to over ﬂy and land at the national airports.
The priorities of the SSC activities for the following years were discussed during
the session on October 6, 2001. Thus, the problem of international cooperation in the
sphere of terrorism was a subject of discussion during the sessions of December 13, 
2002, and April 21, 2003. The approval of the participation of the National Army engi-
neers at the operations conducted in the framework of the International Security Force 
in Afghanistan was on the agenda at the session on December 13, 2002. The participa-
tion of the National Army in the international post-conﬂict humanitarian operations
was considered during the session on the 21st of April 2003. In both cases the partici-
pation of the Moldovan armed forces in the mentioned operations was accepted. The
decisions have been implemented.
Also in the framework of counteraction of international terrorism, during the ses-
sions of the SSC, the issues concerning the security of traﬃcs were also considered. In
this context it is necessary to reveal the role of the SSC in the evaluation of the real situ-
ation and the development of proposals aiming to improve the situation. Being a subject 
of concern for many law enforcement agencies of the state that have speciﬁc responsi-
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bilities in the area, as well as for the senior executives of these agencies, the necessity 
to evaluate the real situation has been the basis for approval of a number of classiﬁed
operations. As a result, a low level of air traﬃc security was revealed. After obtaining
some negative results, on August 28, 2004, a council session was convened with the 
purpose to consider the issues concerning the real security measures implemented at 
the “International Airport Chisinau” State Company. According to the decision of the 
SSC, the relevant agencies were charged to implement necessary actions and improve 
the situation. That has also included the development of some complex cooperation
plans among relevant governmental agencies, continuous training of personnel and the 
renovation of the technical equipment. At the same session the decision was made to 
punish the persons who were considered responsible for the low security level.
After this session some measures for the improvement of the situation were taken,
but they were considered insuﬃcient by the SSC. This fact determined that a new ses-
sion was convened on the same subject, on October 14, 2004, where the level of execu-
tion of the SSC’s decisions was considered. At this session reports from responsible 
persons about the undertaken measures were presented and they were asked to extend 
and intensify the relevant activity. This case also gives an example of the way the Su-
preme Security Council controls the execution of its decisions.
At the same session the issue of the state air space over-ﬂy legality and security was
considered. It concerned especially the unauthorized and uncontrolled ﬂights to/from
the Eastern regions of the country. This problem is closely related to the Transnistrian
conﬂict settlement process, but also obviously weakens antiterrorism eﬀorts. Stop-
ping the activity of the Tiraspol Airport was determined as a duty of the Government, 
but, because of outer reasons, the decision of the SSC concerning this subject was not 
executed.
Crisis Situations
The Supreme Security Council of the Republic of Moldova has been summoned as a
competent body to take imperative decisions in many crisis situations. This is because
the majority of SSC members are heads of powerful institutions and key ministers. 
This is also because representatives of the Parliament and Presidency are among its
members. More than that, at the SSC sessions any other persons can be invited who 
have relevant responsibility in a speciﬁc ﬁled. Therefore, when a decision is made many
bureaucratic obstacles are being omitted concerning endorsement of some actions or 
legal drafts like legal expertise by the relevant governmental institution and following
submission to the Government, or by the relevant parliamentary commissions and fol-
lowing submission to the Parliament.
The SSC decisions do not have the power of a legal provision and are not manda-
tory, they are counseling, and have the status of a recommendation. The simplicity of
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the procedure for passing decisions is also due to this. A problem or a crisis situation 
that appears is being studied in a very short time by every concerned institution; after-
wards the members of SSC discuss it, consider other competent persons’ opinion and 
make the decision. The advantage of this decision-making mechanism is its eﬃciency
and simplicity during crisis situations.
The presence of high level oﬃcials from diﬀerent institutions allows a quick and 
comprehensive assessment of all important issues and a viable and practical decision. 
This method has proved its eﬃciency over time.
Some of the problems discussed during the SSC sessions might be considered as 
crisis situations, such as the bread crisis or the situations provoked by the Transnis-
trian conﬂict, mentioned above.
Another example of the SSC activity during a crisis situation was its activity con-
cerning the cases of smuggling petrol. In fact, from the beginning of its activity in a 
new format in 2001, the SSC has been aware of threats to national security represented 
by cases of smuggling petrol. It was obvious that smuggling surpassed the level when it 
was just a crime under the Penal Code and became a real threat for the economic secu-
rity of the state. The prices for petrol products have been growing continuously growth,
but the budget corresponding revenues continuously decreasing. The economical secu-
rity of the state has become dependent on some illegal companies ruled by organized 
criminal groups, which at any moment could provoke a large crisis. A long period of 
time has been necessary for the evaluation of this phenomena and development of 
some functional counteracting mechanisms.
The crisis situation on the petrol products market was discussed during the ses-
sion on May 24 2002. During this session were presented information and results of 
investigations conducted by several state institutions such as the Ministry of Interior, 
Information and Security Service (Intelligence Service), General Prosecution, Customs 
Department, Sociology and Statistics Department. These reports were analyzed and
systematized, and the mechanism for counteractions was outlined. It became obvious 
that one of the main causes of the contraband with petrol products was the high level of 
corruption in state institutions, from the custom checkpoints and to the control of seals 
at petrol stations. Some administrative measures had to be imposed.
The Government was forced to undertake some actions to repair the situation. The
activity of several customs subdivisions were checked, and many cases were discovered 
regarding staﬀ involvement in contraband schemas. The law enforcement agencies ini-
tiated several penal cases and the guilty persons were prosecuted. Governmental de-
cisions were adopted on the issue, some drafts concerning legislation improvement
have been developed, and some measures concerning the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness
of inspections and checks performed by subdivisions of the Standards and Metrology 
Service, and Fiscal Service.
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Supreme Security Counsel and the democratic control  
over the Armed Forces
During its activity the SSC several times has considered issues related to the Armed 
Forces. The situation has been discussed in diﬀerent aspects: the discipline of soldiers
and oﬃcers, the integrity of the military property and the modernization of the Na-
tional Army.
On December 13, 2001 a session was convoked concerning the situation in the Na-
tional Army, precisely regarding issues related to the sale of military equipment, and also 
regarding the defense minister’s report on some aspects of the National Army’s inter-
national cooperation. Several cases of law violations related to patrimony sale were re-
vealed, and issues related to military post–conﬂict operations were discussed. The deci-
sion of the SSC established some measures aiming to improve the situation in the ﬁeld.
During the SSC session on March 6, 2003 the crime level and the observance of 
constitutional rights with respect to the military personnel in the National Army were 
discussed. The a basis for this session’s convocation was information about crimes
committed by military or against them. An unacceptable situation was discovered in 
this ﬁeld and the Government and other institutions saw it as their duty to establish an
eﬃcient struggle against criminality in the Armed Forces. Some responsible oﬃcials
were sanctioned.
An important issue discussed during the SSC sessions was the modernization of the 
army. After the examination of several drafts and proposals about army reform, which
were also based on a number of recommendations of the Council of Europe, the Min-
istry of Defense developed and submitted to examination the Concept of the National 
Army’s reform and modernization. At the session on May 13, 2004, this concept was 
approved, and the decision was made to send it to the Government for examination. 
Also at this session were discussed problems about the conditions of weapons storage. 
An Action Plan was approved and it was decided to inspect the storage facilities of all 
the institutions having weapons. The decision has been executed.
Supreme Security Council and national security system budget.  
The capacity to inﬂuence the budget priorities
During its activity the Supreme Security Council has not been involved in bud-
getary policy. This being an unspeciﬁc domain for the “institutions of power”, whose
representatives compose the majority of SSC members, the budgetary policy has been 
in the attention of the SSC only occasionally, through the examination of some issues 
that could inﬂuence the budgetary process.
Therefore, at the SSC session on October 15, 2002, the observance of the Law on
prevention and ﬁghting against money laundering was discussed. We say that it is a
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problem that has inﬂuence on the budgetary process, because money laundering is a
ﬁeld in which fraud and several crimes have been committed that directly inﬂuenced
the ﬁnancial discipline and tax collection of the budget. The infringements and com-
mitted oﬀenses in this ﬁeld are related to the economical activity of companies, ﬁnan-
cial institutions and control agencies of the state. According to the SSC decision some 
administrative measures were outlined aiming to improve the situation in this ﬁeld.
One of the problems discussed recently was related to the security of banking and 
ﬁnancial sphere of the country (the session on March 30, 2005). The necessity of dis-
cussing this problem was imposed by the increasing number of cases of illegal activi-
ties by some banks, of cases of intentional or ﬁctive insolvency, and of cases of money
forging and use. At this session were outlined tasks related to the activity of institutions 
that protect the law and the National Bank of Moldova. It also referred to the National 
Bank of Moldova’s activity concerning control on legal authorization, supervision and 
settlement of the activities of bank and ﬁnancial institutions.
The capacity of the Supreme Security Council and its apparatus 
 to fulﬁll its missions attributed by law. The capacity of the Supreme
Security Council to address issues that are not stipulated by law
The analysis above indicates a big number and the diversity of problems discussed
during the SSC sessions. We consider that the responsibilities attributed by law to the 
SSC are fully executed. We would also like to outline the role of the SSC in solving less 
traditional problems for national security.
Thus, at the session held on January 25, 2002 were discussed problems related to the
ecological situation and the priorities of the ecological security related activities. At the 
Council session were presented reports of academics regarding such issues as air and 
water pollution, soil erosion and persistent threats of landslides. According to the SSC 
decision the Government was obliged to develop the National Program for ecological 
security and assistance.
Though the existent legislation does not provide responsibilities to the SSC in this
ﬁeld, due to their importance, these issues were also discussed at the SSC session. By
now some modiﬁcations have been made to the legal framework, and giving the SSC
responsibilities for the ecological security of the state.
In the same framework, at the SSC session on June 20, 2003, the situation with 
national forests was discussed. By a special decision the Government was asked to de-
velop a program for forest realm rehabilitation. The decision was executed concerning
the implementation of the program. Concerning this implementation, the SSC service 
is thill monitoring the level and quality of its execution.
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Another less speciﬁc issue was the situation related to construction and measures
for security in construction, discussed at the session on July 31, 2002. The need to ex-
amine this issue was motivated by the Ministry of Construction and Territory Devel-
opment. The experts of this ministry developed complex research concerning the situ-
ation in construction in diﬀerent localities of the RM, and concerning eventual threats
for the population. Several violations were reported regarding illegal construction and 
unauthorized reconstruction of existent buildings. Especially, the threat of crumbling 
refers to living blocks that were modiﬁed illegally. As a duty of the Government and
other institutions, a complex action plan was developed against illegal construction 
and the assurance of construction security.
A problem that was permanently in the attention of the SSC and its service is the 
national and international adoptions and children’s rights protection. The existent
problems were discussed at several sessions, the last one on January 11, 2005. At this 
session, a decision was made to establish by the Government the National Committee 
for adoptions and a working group to draft a law on the juridical status of adoption.
The decision was executed.
Proposals
The activity of every state institution needs permanent improvement. The social
and state development, new international relations impose the development and im-
plementation of new mechanisms of activity, the identiﬁcation of new solutions and
the elimination of threats to national security.
Recently, on June 3, 2005, the President’s decree from 30.05.2005 on the SSC con-
stitution was published. According to this decree the membership of the council was 
changed by excluding some previous members. Also, the provision was excluded con-
cerning the creation of specialized commissions of the SSC.
Among the objectives of improving the activities of the SSC are the following: de-
veloping the national security concept, the Law on the Supreme Security Council, and 
the modiﬁcation of the normative acts related to national security.
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ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
SYSTEM AND EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE  
OF THE SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL ROLE
Viorel CIUBOTARU
I. The Role and Inﬂuence of the Supreme Security Council  
and its Staﬀ at diﬀerent stages of the process  
of the establishment of the National Security System
1. Stages of the Process of the establishment  
    of the National Security System
A. Initial and Present Structure of the National Security System 
The Declaration of Sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova within the USSR was 
adopted on the 23rd of June 1990. That political-legal fact further allowed the govern-
ment of that time to undertake a number of actions focused on the establishment of the 
ﬁrst bodies intended to fulﬁl some functions of the national security system (NSS).
Thus, in a period of two months after the adoption of the Declaration, the De-
partment for Military Issues was created and carabineer troops were established. Such 
actions of the Moldavian Government were blocked by the USSR authorities of that 
time. During the ﬁrst term of 1991, both the carabineer troops and the Department for
Military Issues were dissolved by Government Decree. The invoked argument was the
“campaign” of intimidation by the Moldavian Government of secessionist provokers of 
the districts of Comrat and Vulcănești in October 1990.
The events occurred on the 19th-24th of August 1991 in Moscow – the establishment 
of the “State Emergency Committee” (the well-known “GKCP”) – boosted the estab-
lishment of the Supreme Security Council (SSC) and of the whole national security 
system in the RM. The SSC was set by presidential decree on the 20th of August 1991, 
in full putsch.
After the establishment of the SSC, throughout a six-month period, were set three
essential bodies of the national security system were set: in September, the Ministry of 
National Security; in October – the Troops of Border Guards; in February 1992 – the 
Ministry of National Defence. The above-mentioned three bodies and the SSC formed
at the initial stage the frame and the core of the SSN. 
In addition to these, during the ﬁrst months of development of the NSS, a number
of ad-hoc working committees were also created, such as the Parliamentary Committee 
in charge of developing proposals concerning the settlement of problems in the east region 
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of Moldova and the Parliamentary Committee in charge of investigating the causes of 
the socio-political crisis in the Southern region of the Republic of Moldova (Căușeni and 
Ciadâr-Lunga). 
The ad-hoc bodies of the national security system also had some temporary pre-
rogatives imposed by the conjuncture or by the conjunctural way of dealing with vital 
state issues inherent to the political class and the governors of that time. Among those 
prerogatives were:
• Developing proposals (within a one-month time-frame!) concerning the ways 
to solve problems, and submitting them to the Parliament for examination (the 
Parliamentary Committee in charge of developing proposals concerning the settle-
ment of problems in the east region of Moldova);
• Pointing out the reasons for the tense socio-political situation in the Southern 
area of the Republic of Moldova (Parliamentary Committee in charge of investi-
gating the causes of the socio-political crisis in the Southern region of the Republic 
of Moldova (Căușeni and Ciadâr-Lunga) after the tragic incident occurring dur-
ing the night of 23rd to 24th of May 1992);
• Informing the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova and public opinion about 
the results of the investigations (Parliamentary Committee in charge of investi-
gating the causes of the socio-political crisis in the Southern region of the Republic 
of Moldova (Căușeni and Ciadâr-Lunga) after the tragic incident occurring dur-
ing the night of 23rd to 24th of May 1992);
• Submitting to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova proposals concerning 
the measures for improvement of the socio-political situation in the Southern 
area of the Republic of Moldova, which was destabilized as a result of the acti-
vation of armed criminal elements, who attempted to take over legal bodies of 
state power (Parliamentary Committee in charge of investigating the causes of the 
socio-political crisis in the Southern region of the Republic of Moldova (Căușeni 
and Ciadâr-Lunga) after the tragic incident occurred during the night of 23rd to 
24th of May 1992).
The fulﬁlment of the above-mentioned prerogatives contributed, although partial-
ly, to the establishment of the system of prerogatives of the NSS. 
At present, in addition to state border guard, the NSS also fulﬁls the following pre-
rogatives:
• Ensuring civil protection against natural and environmental calamities, acci-
dents and catastrophes, epizooties, ﬁres, as well as applying means of modern
destruction (Department for Civil Protection and Emergencies);
• Ensuring state security in the economic, political, internal aﬀairs, and socio-eco-
nomic development ﬁelds (Information and Security Service, Department for
State Protection and Guard, Border Guards Department);
• Fighting against terrorism (Information and Security Service, Department for 
State Protection and Guard, Border Guards Department);
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• Developing a strategy for the development of society in the political, economic, 
social and cultural ﬁelds (Presidential Council);
•  Protection and guard of the people who enjoy the right to state guard and guard 
of objects under its competence (Service for State Protection and Guard).
Practically, all the prerogatives were granted to the NSS throughout the period 
1994-2001, mainly during the period 1995-1998.
B. Criteria for Staging the Establishment of the National Security System
From the time of the establishment of its ﬁrst bodies up to present, the prerogatives
of the NSS have substantially, although unilaterally, evolved, in parallel with the preroga-
tives of each body of this system. The sphere of NSS competence has permanently enlarged 
both due to the establishment of new bodies and to the integration of existing bodies 
into the NSS, as well as due to granting new prerogatives to bodies of the NSS or to the 
co-optation of new prerogatives as a result of the integration of new bodies into the NSS.
The Supreme Security Council has been the ﬁrst form of institutionalization of
a prerogative directly related to national security within the Moldavian central gov-
ernment. For almost two months, the SSC has been the only body empowered with 
relevant prerogatives to the NSS. At present, the NSS comprises a large (although ab-
solutely incomplete and even inadequate from some viewpoints) spectrum of bodies 
with relevant prerogatives for the NSS. Therefore, the development of the NSS’ com-
position can be, by itself, a relevant criterion for examining the development of the 
structure of the NSS.
To be operational and to fulﬁl its missions, the NSS needed a conceptual mechanism
to generate its prerogatives. Such a mechanism (“The Concept of Foreign Policy of the
Republic of Moldova”, “The Concept of National Security of the Republic of Moldova”,
“The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Moldova”, “The Law on State Security”, “The
Law on the Bodies of State Security”) was practically developed and approved in 1995, 
throughout one year. Seven years later, in 2002, a new conceptual document was ap-
proved – “The Concept of Military Reform”.
Such a temporal and systemic discontinuity excludes in fact the possibility of apply-
ing this criterion for the development in time of the conceptual contents of the NSS.
C. Stages of Establishment of the National Security System 
If the process of development of the system of prerogatives in the ﬁeld of national
security and the process of modiﬁcation of the composition of NSS bodies are examined
from the perspective of the respective two criteria, four stages can be easily identiﬁed:
1) First Stage. This stage started when the SSC was established and ended late in 1992,
when the frozen situation of the Transnistrian conﬂict was institutionalized.
2) Second Stage. This stage started after an intermezzo of almost one year. It be-
gan with the reorganization of the Ministry of National Security (in September 
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1993) and with the enlargement and the deﬁnition of its prerogatives. This stage
ended late in 1995, when the list of NSS prerogatives and bodies was conﬁgured.
The process of their practical implementation started in 1997, marking the be-
ginning of the third stage.
3) Third Stage. In the third stage, a new composition of the SSC was established 
and the NSS prerogatives, set up during the previous stage, were put into force. 
The third stage ended with the reorganization of the Ministry of National Secu-
rity into the Information and Security Service (in 1999). 
4) Fourth Stage. The full modiﬁcation of the SSC’s composition in 2001 can be
considered as the beginning of this stage. After several months, the Centre for
Fighting against Economic Crimes and Corruption (CFECC) was set up.
The four stages lead as to the application of the third criterion – a combined one: the
development of the SSC composition criterion which reveals in an exact and relevant 
manner the real situation in the ﬁeld of the Moldavian policy of national security.
2. Criteria for Staging the Activities of the Supreme Security Council  
    and the Corresponding Stages 
The work of the SSC and of its Staﬀ can be staged according to the following criteria:
• governance (from the viewpoints of numerical and nominal SSC composition); 
• from the viewpoint of SSC prerogatives according to the above-mentioned cri-
teria, the following stages can be deﬁned in the work of the Supreme Security
Council.
The governance criterion leads to the following stages:
I. First stage: 20.VIII.1991 – 30.VII.1993 (the period of political domination of 
President Mircea Snegur in coalition, 
volens-nolens, with the People’s Front 
and its exponents);
II. Second stage: 30.VII.1993 – II.1997 (the period of political domination of 
the political group represented by the 
Agrarian Democratic Party in coalition 
with President Mircea Snegur, who was 
rather their hostage); 
III. Third stage: II.1997 – IX.2001; (the period of political domination of 
the group represented by President Petru 
Lucinschi);
IV. Fourth stage: IX.2001 – up to present; (the period of political domination of 
the Communist Party and of the groups 
represented by the Party led by President 
Vladimir Voronin).
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The prerogative criterion. The Supreme Security Council was set up by presidential
decree on the 20th of August 1991, during the Moscow coup attempt. From that date 
to 1997, the Supreme Security Council functioned without any legal basis. Apart from 
the presidential decree of the 20th of August 1991, there was no other legal document 
considered as strategic concerning the work of this body.
In 1995, the Law on state security bodies and the Law on state security were passed, 
which entered into force in 1997. These laws empowered the Supreme Security Council
to analyze the activities of all bodies involved in ensuring state security and to make 
recommendations to the Head of State.
The Regulation of the Supreme Security Council deﬁning the prerogatives of this
body, of its members and its composition was signed on the 8th of October 1997 by 
President Petru Lucinschi. According to the prerogative criterion, the activities de-
ployed by the Supreme Security Council can be classiﬁed in the following stages:
I. First stage: 1991 – February 1997; 
II. Second stage: February 1997 – up to present.
No new documents have been adopted since 1997 to redeﬁne the prerogatives of
the SSC.
3. Stages in the Work of the Supreme Security Council and its Role  
    as a Body within the National Security System 
Since the issuance of the presidential decree (on the 20th of August 1991) on the 
establishment of the Supreme Security Council, there have been no other available 
documents concerning its activities. The data used below were found in mass-media
sources from that time.
A. First stage: 20.VIII.1991 – 30.VII.1993  
     (period of political domination of President Mircea Snegur  
      in coalition, volens-nolens, with the People’s Front  
      and its exponents)
This period was marked by the domination of the political process by the represent-
atives of the People’s Front, in collaboration (sometimes controversial) with President 
Mircea Snegur and with many political personalities and oﬃcials in his immediate
circle. At that time, the People’s Front was the most popular political force in the Re-
public of Moldova; it supported continuously Mircea Snegur during his accession to 
the supreme leadership and to his election as President of the Republic of Moldova. 
Such a collaboration ended because of development in the Transnistrian conﬂict that
forced Mircea Snegur to accept integration into the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. This was followed by the approach to the agrarians and by the “renunciation” of
the ideas promoted by the People’s Front.
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Legal Basis for the Establishment of the Supreme Security Council. The Supreme
Security Council of the Republic of Moldova was set up by the Presidential Decree no. 
162 of the 20th of August 1991. The legal foundation for this document was point 2 of
article 113/4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova of 1978, providing that 
the President is empowered to undertake the required measures aimed to defend the 
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, by the means of 
consultative bodies set up to that end.
Such provisions were included in the Fundamental Law of the Republic of Moldova 
on the 3rd of September 1990, when the Supreme Soviet passed the Law of the Republic 
of Moldova on the institution of the function of President of the Soviet Socialist Mol-
davian Republic and the Law on some amendments to the Constitution of the Soviet 
Socialist Moldavian Republic.
According to the Presidential Decree, the establishment of the SSC was aimed at the 
“co-ordination of all actions focused on ensuring the security, the independence and 
the territorial integrity of the country”.
The goal expressed in the Decree, including “ensuring the independence of the
country”, involves several points. First, the GKCP group and its activities were be-
yond the legal frame, while its activities were intented to violate the laws of the USSR. 
Compared to the GKCP, Chișinău’s authorities were legitimate and their activities were 
aimed against usurpers.
Thus, in the lack of a central (federal) power, the political power in the Republic of
Moldova, as a component part of the USSR, committed to ensure the functioning, the 
legality and the legitimacy in the territory of the republic (the Decree uses the word 
“republic”, not “state”). The sovereignty of the people proclaimed in summer 1990 can
be included within that legal and legitimate frame.
The Presidential Decree on the establishment of the SSC was a reaction to the events
occurring in Moscow on the 19th of August and a natural outcome (although, seldom 
realized or wished) of the political developments during the period 1985-1991. The
coup attempt made by the GKCP and its possible success threatened the transforma-
tions undertaken previously, including the proclaimation of sovereignty. Throughout
the year 1991, the idea of proclaiming independence was broadly promoted, including 
by the representatives of the political authorities of our country, while the overthro-
wers aimed mainly at avoiding such a development.
Composition of the Supreme Security Council. Under its initial composition, the 
SSC included the following members:  
1. Mircea Snegur, President of the Republic of Moldova;
2. Alexandru Moșanu, President of the Parliament of the Republic of 
Moldova;
3. Valerii Muravschi; Prime-Minister of the Republic of Moldova; 
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4. Tudor Botnari, Head of the State Security Committee; 
5. Ion Costaș, Minister of Defence; 
6. Nicolae Ţîu, Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs,
7. Constantin Antoci, Minister of Internal Aﬀairs,
8. Alexandru Arseni, Head of the Human Rights and National Relations 
Committee of the Parliament of the Republic of 
Moldova;
9. Victor Berlinschi, Head of the Committee on Issues of Crime Figh-
ting;
10. Mihai Cotorobai, Head of the Local Government and Local Economy 
Committee; 
11. Gheorghe Mazilu, Head ad-interim of the Committee for State Security 
and Military Issues; 
12. Tudor Panţîru, Head of the Committee for Law Issues.
After the dismissal of Valerii Muravschi, the position of Prime-Minister was held
ex oﬃcio by Andrei Sangheli (02.08.1992).
Issues Raised by the SSC
Throughout the period 20.08.1991 – 30.07.1993, the press of that time reported nine 
meetings of the SSC. The ﬁrst meetings of the SSC (15.10.1991, 1.11.1991) held after the
proclamation of independence focused on setting up the national armed forces, the 
border guard troops and the police.
The situation in Western Transnistria (the Eastern area of the Republic of Moldova)
and the armed Transnistrian conﬂict were among the issues raised at those meetings.
The worsening of the situation in the Eastern area imposed the need to declare a state of
emergency and to set the direct command of the President of the Republic of Moldova 
by the means of the Supreme Security Council (28th of March 1992).
In the lack of a legal frame deﬁning the limits of the SSC prerogatives (except the
Presidential Decree of the 20th of August 1991 which simply provides for the “co-or-
dination of all activities to ensure the security, the independence and the territorial 
integrity of the republic”, without specifying the forms and the mechanism for such a 
co-operation), it can be assumed that as a result of the institution of the direct com-
mand of the President of the Republic of Moldova by the means of the SSC, the Head 
of State took full responsibility, while the SSC was transformed into a body which held 
supreme state political and decision-making power.
The meetings held on the April 11, June 20, July 3, and July 17 focused exclusively
on the situation in Western Transnistria, taking into account the position of the Rus-
sian Federation in the conﬂict and the attack made on the town of Bender by bands of
mercenaries. The meeting held on the August 11 focused on the Moldavian-Russian
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Agreement on the Stabilization of the Situation in the Conﬂict Area and on the pro-
gramme of the holiday (!) “Limba Noastră” (“Our Language”).
Privatization was another issue largely dealt with by the SSC. The sudden accel-
eration of the privatization process, after an artiﬁcial equivocation of about one year,
was debated within the SSC meeting of the May 7 1992, while the armed conﬂict was
in full swing. The inclusion of the privatization issues in the SSC agenda reveals the
quality of the political leadership of the country. That is probably the reason why the
Transnistrian conﬂict served as a tool for promoting personal interests diﬀerent from
the country’s interests. Further developments in the ﬁeld of privatization largely con-
ﬁrmed the above.
Taking into account the political developments of that time, in particular, the devel-
opments concerning the “separatism” issue, the actions undertaken by the Moldavian 
authorities can be qualiﬁed as unsatisfactory as they did not give any positive results
from the perspective of national security. Among all the issues tackled by the SSC, the 
establishment of border guard troops is the only issue which could be considered as 
having satisfactory results.
National armed forces revealed their real quality in the armed conﬂict of 1992: they
did not succeed to eliminate the problem of separatism. During the armed conﬂict, the
units of special police were the most eﬃcient as they had existed in Soviet times, too,
and they had been trained following the model of Soviet special units.
The developments of the Transnistrian conﬂict were a total failure for the Republic of
Moldova. The SSC did not succeed in setting the conﬂict, could not avoid armed confron-
tation and did not have an adequate reaction to the intervention of Russian troops against 
the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova.
In its early stages, the SSC did not strengthen the capacity of national security. 
The results of its activities were negative, practically a total and resounding failure,
and the country is still facing the eﬀects of their enormous damage to national secu-
rity. That period determined the further developments of the Republic of Moldova as a
social-political, geopolitical and geo-economic entity.
B. Second Stage: 30.VII.1993 – X.1997 (Snegur – Agrarians Period)
The new composition of the SSC was formally approved in July 1993, although the
Council entered a period when it was impossible to exert its functions formally after
President Mircea Snegur declared his new political course in the speech at the plena-
ry session of the Parliament, on the 24th of December 1992. As a result of that speech, 
in which Mircea Snegur dissociated himself from the course promoted by the People’s 
Front exponents within the SSC (where they held 7 in 12 mandates) and in the Parlia-
ment leadership, the Republic of Moldova entered a political crisis (which started with 
the demonstrative dismissal of the People’s Front representatives in the Parliament lead-
ership on the 28th of January 1993, while President Mircea Snegur was making an oﬃcial
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visit to Paris). The crisis turned out fatal for President Mircea Snegur. It ended up with
the redistribution of the levers of political power between Mircea Snegur, Petru Lucin-
schi (who had been recalied from the function of ambassador of the Republic of Moldova 
in Russia and elected on the 4th of February 1993 by the “agrarian” majority as President 
of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova) and Andrei Sangheli, the leading exponent 
of the group with the euphemistic and totally inadequate name of “Agrarians”.
Thus, the period under consideration can be characterized by the progressive loss
of political inﬂuence by Mircea Snegur in favour of the agrarian group. This period
culminated in Mircea Snegur losing the presidential election to Petru Lucinschi.
Composition of SSC. The transfer of the political power from the People’s Front of
Moldova to the “agrarians” had repercussion on the SSC’s nominal composition. The
new Council included 9 members (instead of 12):
1. Mircea Snegur, President of the Republic of Moldova; 
2. Petru Lucinschi, President of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova;
3. Andrei Sangheli, Prime-Minister of the Republic of Moldova; 
4. Constantin Antoci, Minister of Internal Aﬀairs;
5. Vasile Calmoi, Minister of National Security; 
6. Nicolae Chirtoacă, State Councillor to the President of the Republic of 
Moldova;
7. Pavel Creangă, Minister of Defence;
8. Gheorghe Gusac, State Minister;
9. Nicolae Ţîu, Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs, since the 22nd of October 
1993 – ambassador of the Republic of Moldova in the 
United States.
All 7 supporters of the People’s Front were replaced with “agrarians”, more exactly – 
either with people promoted by Andrei Sangheli – V. Calmoi, P. Creangă, or with peo-
ple promoted or maintained by Mircea Snegur – C. Antoci, Gh. Gusac, N. Ţâu (Petru 
Lucinschi, who had recently come from his “exile” as ambassador had not succeeded by 
that time to restore or to recruit a network of trust worthy people to be promoted).
Key-Issues Faced by the State during That Period
Political Instability. From the political perspective, the stage under consideration 
was an unstable one. The triumvirate triad Snegur-Lucinschi-Sangheli turned out to be
a tactical one and shortly after the parliamentary election of the 27th of February 1994, 
it dissolved. Each of the above-mentioned political personalities held a key position in 
the state and maximally exploited his position during the political confrontation with 
his opponents. The quality of the SSC was aﬀected by such a confrontation.
In July 1995, Mircea Snegur declared his total dissociation from the “agrarian” 
group and his opposition to the tandem Lucinschi-Sangheli. From that time forward, 
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SSC, whose members were Mircea Snegur, Petru Lucinschi and Andrei Sangheli, the 
latter being declared adversaries, could not operate any longer, at least formally.
On the 31st of October 1995, the Parliament adopted the Law on State Security Bod-
ies and the Law on State Security, but these laws entered in force 14,5 months later. 
The laws had been adopted when Petru Lucinschi was President of the Parliament and
entered in force only when Petru Lucinschi became Head of State.
Acceleration of Social-Economic Decline. During the period 30.VII.1993 – X.1997, 
the socio-economic decline intensiﬁed considerably and reached a level which could
be qualiﬁed as collapse. Most people lived under the poverty line. Regardless of the
massive privatization, of putting into circulation a convertible currency, and of market 
liberalization, the economic reform did not progress. A large exodus of the labour force 
to Russia, to Balkan countries and to European Union countries started during that 
period. The foundations of the demographic collapse were laid. In addition, there was
an explosion of criminality, including of organized crime.
Privatization. The process of privatization was under way, with a particular inten-
siﬁcation within the period August 1994-July 1996. The obsolete concept of privatiza-
tion developed early in the ’90 was abandoned. The process of privatization, considered
previously as the key ho successful economic reform and to increasing people’s welfare, 
transformed into the massive appropriation of state ownership by the political-ﬁnan-
cial groups of the duumvirate of the “agrarians” who ruled the country. The most at-
tractive were the economic units supposed to bring immediate revenue. In fact, the real 
purpose of the process of privatization consisted of enriching some circles instead of 
fostering economic entities and economic development in general, with a further posi-
tive impact on other sectors of state security.
Legalization of “Gagauzian” Secessionism. In the period under consideration, the 
Moldavian authorities attempted to settle some basic problems faced by the Republic of 
Moldova. The Parliament dominated by the Lucinschi-Sangheli group granted uncondi-
tioned territorial-administrative autonomy to a non-indigenous cultural-territorial group 
which forms 3,5% of the country’s population, does not live in the same area, but in three 
micro-areas separated by localities with indigenous and allogeneous population.
Such a decision made by the ruling group led in fact to the legalization of paramilitary 
anti-state criminal groups from a number of localities of the Southern area of the country. 
The establishment of the “Gagauzian” TAU was a political step towards the legalization of 
the Tiraspol separatist regime and did not really solve the problems faced by the “minori-
ties”. It was rather a direct attempt on the national security of the Republic of Moldova.
Consolidation of the Occupation Regime in the Eastern Area of the Country. The
situation in the Eastern area of the Republic of Moldova did not evolve positively. 
The endeavours undertaken in that sense can be reduced to continuous concessions
made by Chișinău and the legalization of most aspects and of the main functions of 
the separatist regime.
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The major issues debated during the negotiation process were the status of the area
and the presence of the units of the former 14th Army on the territory of the Republic 
of Moldova.
Among the political personalities in the Moldavian political arena, Petru Lucin-
schi, President of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, had a permanently grow-
ing inﬂuence. Before his appointment as ambassador of the Republic of Moldova in
Russia, Petru Lucinschi had played an active role both in overcoming the armed stage 
of the conﬂict and in the post-conﬂict stage. Shortly after his election as President of 
the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, Petru Lucinschi met the separatist leaders. 
It seems that the President of the Parliament was the motor for launching the political 
dialogue between the legitimate power and the separatists, resulting mostly in con-
tinuous concessions made by Chișinău.
In 1996, the conﬂict parties signed a number of documents which enhanced per-
manently the level of legitimacy of the separatist regime and strengthened it. On the 
7th of February, Chișinău recognized the right of the separatist regime to conduct for-
eign economic activities, using the customs stamps of the Republic of Moldova. The
Protocol on Mutual Agreement Issues of the 11th of March recognized the separatist 
regime as a result of granting it such prerogatives as: having a Fundamental Law, pass-
ing laws, having symbols, establishing direct contacts in the economic, cultural and 
technical-scientiﬁc ﬁelds, ( as far as other ﬁelds are concerned, they need the consent
of Chișinău’s authorities), etc.
On the 17th of June 1996, the experts submitted the Memorandum on the Normali-
zation of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, which meant 
legalization of the separatist regime which controlled the Eastern area of the Republic 
of Moldova. President Mircea Snegur refused to sign the memorandum, while Petru 
Lucinschi, President of the Parliament, criticized the position of the President of the 
Republic of Moldova.
Despite the lack of information concerning SSC activities, on the one hand, and, 
taking into consideration the political, economic, social, etc. developments, including 
the above-mentioned ones, on the other hand, the activities of the Council can be qual-
iﬁed as unsatisfactory and damaging to the country. The processes occurring during
that period have directly aﬀected the national security of the Republic of Moldova.
Role and Inﬂuence of the Supreme Security Council at that Stage
There is a lack of information on SSC activities. There no data concerning national
security issues examined by the SSC, neither concerning the overlooked issues, nor 
concerning non-implemented SSC decisions.
Nevertheless, taking into account the way of implementing the privatization proc-
ess, as well as the recognition of two separatist regimes – “Gagauzian” and “Tiraspo-
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lian” (both of them being in fact creatures of the secret services of the USSR-Russia and 
of Russian groups of organized crime) – SSC activities can be qualiﬁed as baneful or
as a totally inactive.
The activity (as well as the inactivity) of the Supreme Security Council has seriously
harmed the national security of the Republic of Moldova. The level of the country’s
vulnerability to both external and internal threats has risen. The developments of the
privatization process have directly aﬀected the economic security of the Republic of
Moldova, having also serious repercussions on other aspects of national security. The
concessions in the Gagauzian and Transnistrian issues were an attempt on the territo-
rial integrity of the Republic of Moldova and provided to other states (Russia, Turkey 
and other) pressure tools in their relationship with the Republic of Moldova.
C. Third Stage: 1997-2001 (Lucinschi Period)
There is no documentary or other kind of information available concerning the
work of the Supreme Security Council at this stage.
Shortly after his inauguration, President Petru Lucinschi promulgated the Law on 
State Security Bodies and the Law on State Security. The Parliament passed these laws
while the new Head of State was President of the Parliament. On the 8th of October 
1997, President Petru Lucinschi signed the Decree of the Approval of the Regulation of 
the Supreme Security Council.
Composition of the SSC. The members of the Supreme Security Council (08.10.1997-
21.05.1998):
1. Petru Lucinschi, President of the RM, Jan. 1997–Apr. 2001: Presi-
dent of the RM. In Jan.-March 1998, Petru Lu-
cinschi supported the BMDP in parliamentary 
elections.
2. Ion Ciubuc, Prime-Minister (Jan. 1997–March 1999). In January 1997, he was 
appointed as Prime-Minister. In 1998, he took 
part in the electoral campaign on the side of the 
BMDP
3. Tudor Botnaru, Minister of National Security (Jan. 1997–May 
1999).
4. Valeriu Pasat, Minister of Defence (Jan. 1997–March 1998–May 
1999) Minister of National Security (May 1999–
Nov. 2000–Dec. 2001).
5. Valeriu Chiţan, Minister of Finance, Apr. 1994–March 1998.
6. Mihai Plămădeală, Minister of the Interior (Jan. 1997–March 1998).
7. Vladimir Donţul, Head of the General Staﬀ of the National Army
(Oct. 1997–Jan. 1998);
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8. Anatol Cociug, Head of the Department for Civil Protection and Emergen-
cies (Jan. 1997–Nov. 1997), replaced with Anton Gamurari.
The members of the Supreme Security Council (21. 05.1998–March 1999):
1. Petru Lucinschi, President of RM. In 1998, sided with the BMDP at parlia-
mentary elections. In 1999 launched the initiative to trans-
form RM into a presidential republic.
2. Ion Ciubuc, Prime-Minister. In Jan.–March 1998, sided with the BMDP 
in the electoral campaign. Prime-Minister until February 
1999.
3. Tudor Botnaru; Minister of National Security (Jan. 1997–May 1999).
4. Valeriu Pasat, Minister of Defence (Jan. 1997–March 1998–May 1999) 
Minister of National Security (May 1999–Nov. 2000–Dec. 
2001).
5. Anatolie Arapu, Minister of Finance (March 1998–Nov. 1999). ADR-Sturza 
Period.
6. Victor Catan, Minister of Internal Aﬀairs (March 1998–Nov. 1999).
ADR-Sturza Period
7. Anton Gamurari, Head of the Department for Civil Protection and Emergen-
cies (Nov. 1997–July 1999).
The members of the Supreme Security Council (March 1999–December 1999):
1. Petru Lucinschi, President RM. In 1999, launched the initiative to transform 
the RM into a presidential republic.
2. Ion Sturza, Prime-Minister; March–November 1999, Prime-Minister;
3. Tudor Botnaru; Minister of National Security (Jan. 1997–Maz 1999). Re-
placed with V. Pasat as Minister of National Security.
4. Anatolie Arapu, Minister of Finance (March 1998–Nov. 1999);
5. Victor Catan, Minister of Internal Aﬀairs (March 1998-Nov. 1999).
6. Valeriu Pasat, Minister of Defence (Jan.1997–March 1998–May 1999) Min-
ister of National Security (May 1999–Nov. 2000–Dec. 2001). 
Replaced with Boris Gamurari as Minister of Defence;
7. Anton Gamurari, Head of the Department for Civil Protection and Emergen-
cies (Nov. 1997–July 1999), replaced with Constantin An-
toci in Sep. 1999.
The members of the Supreme Security Council (Dec. 1999 – March 2001):
1. Petru Lucinschi, President of RM. In 2001, sided with the “Alianţa Braghiș” 
party at parliamentary elections.
2. Dumitru Braghiș, Prime-Minister. December 1999–March 2001, Prime-Min-
ister.
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3. Valeriu Pasat, Director of the Information and Security Service. In 1999, 
Minister of Defence, member of SSC. Since May 1999, Min-
ister of National Security.
4. Nicolae Tăbăcaru, Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs (July 1997–Nov.2000), ambas-
sador of the RM in Germany (Feb. 2001–Oct. 2003).
5. Mihai Manoli, Minister of Finance (Dec. 1999/Apr. 2001–Feb. 2002).
6. Vladimir Ţurcan, Minister of Internal Aﬀairs (Dec. 1999–March 2001).
7. Ion Coropcean, Head of the General Staﬀ. Invested since 1998.
8. Boris Gamurari, Minister of Defence (May 1999–March 2001).
9. Constantin Antoci, Director General of the Department for Civil Protection 
and Emergencies (July 1999–June 2001).
10. Mihai Plămădeală, Councillor to the President of the RM, SSC Secretary. (June 
1998–Feb. 2000).
The modiﬁcation of SSC composition points out the ﬂuctuations in the political
ﬁght for power.
Key-Issues Faced by the State at That Stage 
Enhancement of Internal Political Instability. The period of time from February
1997 to (March) September 2001 was the most unstable from a political viewpoint. 
The succession of four governments during a four-year period conﬁrms this fact. The
Ciubuc I period was the most stable form the political perspective; it was dominated by 
President Petru Lucinschi.
The situation changed after the parliamentary elections held on the 22nd of March 
1998, which generated the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms (ADR). The algorithm
for sharing the power levers among the representatives of the ruling coalition, estab-
lished by the ADR, was from the beginning conceived as a temporary phenomenon, as 
a ﬁeld for manoeuvre for the future election and it did not comply with its name. The
situation was also aggravated by the actions undertaken by President Petru Lucinschi 
in order to subordinate the legislative body.
The confrontation culminated with amendments to the Constitution of the Re-
public of Moldova, operated by the Parliament. According to those amendments, the 
President of the Republic of Moldova had to be elected by the legislative body. The
attempts of Petru Lucinschi to remain on the water-line of Moldavian politics ended 
with the victory of the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova at the anticipated 
elections held in March 2001.
Intense Depreciation of the National Currency. The depreciation of the national cur-
rency was the most visible event in the Moldavian economy. In October-November 1998, 
the currency rapidly depreciated from 4,8 lei to 9,6 lei to one USA dollar. The authori-
ties explained the devaluation by the Russian ﬁnancial crisis. Meanwhile, the crisis un-
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leashed in August 1998, but, up to November, the Moldavian authorities did not take any 
visible steps to neutralize/annihilate the negative eﬀects of the Russian crisis (not just on
the national currency, but on the economy, in general). In November 1999, after several
descents and ascents, the Moldavian leu was rated at 12 units for one USA dollar.
Renunciation by the Republic of Moldova of its Economic Sovereignty in Favour of the 
Occupation Regime of the Transnistria. The Transnistrian conﬂict remained the major 
issue of the political agenda. Being the President of the Moldavian Parliament, Petru 
Lucinschi criticized the refusal of President Mircea Snegur to sign the Memorandum 
on the Normalization of the Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnis-
tria, which legitimized the separatist regime and its control on the Eastern area of the 
Republic of Moldova.
In February 1997, Petru Lucinschi opted for the deployment of Russian troops on 
the territory of the Republic of Moldova. On the 8th of May 1997, in Moscow, the Mem-
orandum on the Normalization of the Relations between the Republic of Moldova and 
Transnistria was signed. As a result, the separatist regime which controlled the Eastern 
area of the Republic of Moldova was granted prerogatives as a federal entity. Neverthe-
less, the results of the 1998 parliamentary elections reduced to some extent the élan of 
Tiraspol regime legitimization.
The OSCE meeting held in Istanbul in 1999 issued a document in which Russia
committed to withdraw its troops and ammunition before the end of 2002. The en-
deavours of President Petru Lucinschi came down to signing the above-mentioned 
document, alongside other members of the OSCE. The provisions of the OSCE meet-
ing documents responded to the geopolitical interests of the USA and of many West-
ern countries, although they had also been promoted by the oﬃcial of the Moldavian
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs.
Corruption and Military Security. As far as the system of military security of the 
Republic of Moldova is concerned, the major event was the sale of a large lot of military 
equipment and ammunition to the United States of America. On the one hand, the 
transaction was a failure from the viewpoint of proﬁt and of economic advantage, and it
violated the legislation of the Republic of Moldova, including criminal law. On the other 
hand, it harmed considerably the military security of the country. By their actions, the 
supreme authorities seriously weakened the country’s military capacity, considering the 
circumstances of the separatist conﬂict and of the foreign military presence.
The Demographic Collapse. The demographic situation worsened considerably dur-
ing the period under consideration. The majors reasons for the demographic problems
were massive emigration and the decrease in the birth rate. Massive emigration of a 
large share of the labour force was caused by the social-economic situation in the coun-
try. The birth rate was regressive, because of the economic situation as well as due to
the moral crisis faced by society.
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Energy Insecurity. The energy sector of the Republic of Moldova was seriously af-
fected at this stage. The energy dependence of the country was several times con-
ﬁrmed by the suspension of its energy supply. In addition to the foreign monopoly and
the energy dependence of the country, the energy sector also faced poor management 
of the system and of its components. The transfer of a part of the country’s electric
networks from the state’s ownership to a foreign company did not solve the problems 
related to energy security of the Republic of Moldova. On the contrary, the energy seg-
ment of national security became more vulnerable.
Role and Inﬂuence of the Supreme Security Council  
at The Stage under Consideration 
There is no available information concerning the SSC work at this stage. There is no
data about security issues raised by the SSC, nor about the overlooked issues. There is
no information about the decisions made by the Council no about the quality of their 
execution.
The developments of the Transnistrian conﬂict did not approach the settlement of
the conﬂict, but marked a new stage in the recognition of the separatist regime and in
abolition of the concept of the state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The way to deal with other essential issues – the sale of military equipment and
ammunition, the economic situation and the migration of the population, the demo-
graphic situation, the situation in energy sector – reveals a small share of the large 
amount of harm caused to the national security of the Republic of Moldova.
Taking into account the above-mentioned developments and the fulﬁlment of SSC
responsibilities, the Council’s activities can be qualiﬁed as negative.
D. Fourth Stage: 2001 – present; (Voronin period)
At this stage, the Supreme Security Council undertook sporadic actions aimed at 
solving problems related to some speciﬁc ﬁelds of national security. It focused on such
security ﬁelds as: military security (reform of the National Army, loss of ammunition
and deﬁcient discipline, ensuring border security, participation in post-conﬂict opera-
tions); political security (the Transnistrian issue, ﬁghting against terrorism); economic
security (the relationship between banks on both sides of the Nistru river, supply of oil 
products, bread crisis, money laundering, the situation of civil aviation), social secu-
rity (traﬃc in human beings, traﬃc in drugs), environmental security (development of
an environmental protection programme), etc.
The SSC composition (according to Decree no. 237-III of 19.09.2001):
1. Vladimir Voronin, President of RM (4th of April 2001–4th of April 2005);
2. Vasile Tarlev, Prime-Minister (19th of April 2001–23rd of April 2005); 
3. Maria Postoico, Head of Law Committee (22nd of March 2001–March 2005);
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4. Iurie Stoicov, Head of National Security Committee (22nd of March 2001–
March 2005); 
5. Victor Gaiciuc, Minister of Defence (19th of April 2001–October 2004); 
6. Nicolae Dudău, Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs (1st -7th of September 2001–
6th-13th of February 2004); 
7. Vasile Drăgănel, Minister Internal Aﬀairs (19th of April 2001–25th-28th of 
February 2002);
8. Mihail Manoli, Minister of Finance (December 1999; 19th of April 2001–
1st-8th of February 2002);
9. Valeriu Pasat, Director of Information and Security Service (Nov. 
2000-Dec. 2001, since February 2004 – Councillor to Ciu-
bais);
10. Anatolie Bantuș, Head of the Department for Emergency Situations; 
11. Ion Coropcean, Head of the General Staﬀ (May 2001–May 2005, re-elected);
12. Valeriu Gurbulea, Head of SSC Service (July 2001–19 Feb. 2004).
Composition of the Supreme Security Council (according to Decree no. 1824-III of 
14.05.2004):
1. Vladimir Voronin, President of RM (4th of April 2005);
2. Marian Lupu, Minister of Economy (July 2003–March 2005), Presi-
dent of the Parliament of RM (24th of March 2005);
3. Eugenia Ostapciuc, President of the Parliament of RM (March 2001–March 
2005), head of the majority parliamentary faction (Apr. 
2005);
4. Vasile Tarlev, Prime-Minister (19th of April 2005); 
5. Iurie Stoicov, Head of the National Security Committee (March 2005);
6. Gheorghe Duca, President of the Academy of Sciences (19th of April 
2005);
7. Leonid Talmaci, Governor of the National Bank of Moldova (June 1991–
to present);
8. Andrei Stratan, Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs (19th of April 2005);
9. Zinaida Grecianîi, Minister of Finance (19th of April 2005);
10. Gheorghe Papuc, Minister Internal Aﬀairs (19th of April 2005), 
11. Ion Ursu, Director of Information and Security Service (Decem-
ber 2001-to present);
12. Filip Beșleaga, Head of the Department for Emergency Situations;
13. Valentin Mejinschi, Director of the CFOCC (April 2004);
14. Valeriu Balaban, General Prosecutor (December 2003), 
15. Gheorghe Tabunșic, Governor of the Gagauzian TAU (19th of April 2005).
16. Ion Morei, Head of SSC Service (20th of February 2004-to present).
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During the period 2001-2005, a number of changes were made within the govern-
ment. As far as the SSC is concerned, no changes have been reported. We can assume 
that changes within the SSC composition were made in parallel with changes within 
the government or other structures of the state security system.
Issues Examined by the Supreme Security Council
The period 2001-2005 is the only period of SSC activity about which there is in-
formation available. During this period, the SSC mainly undertook sporadic actions 
aimed at solving problems related to some speciﬁc ﬁelds of national security.
Fighting against Coruption. Considering the ﬁght against corruption, the SSC de-
cided on the 25th of January 2002 to set up the Centre for Fighting against Economic 
Crimes and Corruption (CFECC). CFECC is subordinate to the Head of State. Since 
the establishment of this Centre, corruption has not suﬀered signiﬁcant diminution.
The decision to set up such a Centre was mainly intended to enhance the government’s
image, and less to ﬁght against this scourge. Fighting against corruption requires a
systemic approach on the level of society as a whole.
Sector of Civil Aviation. After the SSC examined the situation in the ﬁeld of civil
aviation (31.07.2002, 15.10.2003), the AIRMOLDOVA Company became state-owned. 
The quality of such a transformation was visible late in 2004, when serious gaps were re-
vealed in the company’s work and some members of its administration were arrested.
Environment Protection. The SCC examined the situation in the ﬁeld of environmen-
tal protection and the main directions aimed at ensuring environmental security. The
output was a National Programme for Ensuring Environmental Security (25.01.2002). 
SSC has also dealt with forest patrimony. 
Oil Products Market. SSC intervention in the oil products market aimed at ﬁghting
against smuggling of oil products and at inﬂuencing on the price of oil products. The
Government has undertaken a number of measures intended to stop smuggling: regula-
ting the way of importing oil products, and equipping service stations with cash desks.
Army Reform. According to the declarations of the Moldavian authorities, army 
reforms are aimed at modernization. The major reform element is the establishment of
a professional army, i.e. a contract-based service. Meanwhile, the Concept of Defence 
has not been deﬁned yet; neither has the provision for military equipment.
Human Traﬃcking. Fighting against traﬃc of human beings was proclaimed as a 
task of all bodies in charge of law observance. Nevertheless, as in many other ﬁelds,
there is not a systemic approach on the level of society as a whole.
Bread Crisis. The poor wheat harvest and the risk of increase in bread prices, with an
imminence of social discontentment, led the country’s authorities to submit this issue to 
SSC examination. As a result, there were wheat imports and interventions in the activities 
of the largest bakery – “Franzeluţa” (the administration of the enterprise was dismissed).
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Fighting against Organized Crime. The actions aimed at ﬁghting against organized
crime were reduced to arresting and sentencing the chiefs of the underworld. Given the 
complex structure of the underworld, such actions turned out ineﬃcient. The “legal”
segment (formed and led by representatives of state and administrative structures) has 
not been aﬀected.
Participation of the Units of the National Army in Post-Conﬂict Operations in Iraq.
The decision for Moldavian military units to participate in post-conﬂict operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq was a political decision aimed at supporting the USA’s actions 
focused on “ﬁghting” against “terrorism”, or at eliminating the regimes of the respec-
tive states which are not loyal enough to the USA. There were no threats to the national
security of the Republic of Moldova which would impose the intervention of the Mol-
davian troops. So, the decision to send troops was intended to obtain some political 
beneﬁts for the country (for instance, getting American support in regaining the terri-
tory in the Eastern area under Russian occupation) and for the political regime.
The Transnistrian Conﬂict. The situation in the Eastern area of the Republic of
Moldova was examined after the separatist regime undertook actions against Moldavian
schools of the area in order to destabilize the state of aﬀairs from the perspective of the
Transnistrian conﬂict. The SSC also examined the relationship between banks of Tran-
snistria, on the one hand, and banks of Moldova and of foreign countries, on the other 
hand. The School crisis was partially overlooked by Moldavian authorities, but there are
no other examples of actions (plans of actions) aimed at the country’s reintegration.
Role and Inﬂuence of the Supreme Security Council  
at the Stage under Consideration 
The SSC activities have several major aspects. Among SSC activities, there are ac-
tions focused on preventing events and planning some actions of state bodies intended 
to protect the national interests of the Republic of Moldova: for example, developments 
of the Transnistrian conﬂict, in particular, the issues related to “ Kozak Memorandum” 
and the ones related to the period succeeding its rejection. This category could also
include the reform the army, the development of the Strategy for Fighting against Cor-
ruption, the situation in the ﬁeld of civil aviation, the development of the Strategy for
Environmental Protection (preservation of forests), etc.
As far as SSC activities are concerned, the reactions to some developments should 
also be identiﬁed: the bread crisis, the situation on the oil market, the participation of
the units of the national army in peacekeeping operations (the latter was a reaction to 
an event to which the Moldavian authorities could not have any lever of inﬂuence), and 
neutralization of the heads of the underworld.
There are gaps concerning the execution of the largest share of issues examined by
the SSC: the reform of the national army and military legacy, the bread crisis, the si-
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tuation in the ﬁeld of civil aviation, the situation on the oil market, and ﬁghting against
traﬃc in human beings.
In addition to the above-mentioned gaps concerning the execution of SSC deci-
sions, it should also be mentioned that most issues examined by the SSC, including the 
ones related to preventing and planning, are isolated and concern generally only one 
segment of the system of national security.
During the stage under consideration, the SSC did not tackle such issues as the 
street protests that occurred in winter-spring 2002 and 2003, or the conﬂict concern-
ing inspection before expedition (SGS).
II.  Inﬂuence of the Internal and External Political Contexts  
on the Activities and the Decisions Taken  
by the Supreme Security Council 
1. Identiﬁcation of the Co-ordinates of the Political Context
The internal political context in the Republic of Moldova is to a large extent de-
termined by the internal political process which involves diﬀerent informal inter-
est groups using both formal and informal ways of acting. Formal actions take place 
through political structures, while informal actions occur in the appointment of ex-
ponents of interest groups to important state positions. The latter can occur either
directly, by the means of administrative decisions taken by the exponents appointed 
previously, or by the means of diﬀerent political structures, including by the competi-
tors in the political arena.
The following co-ordinates serving to circumscribe with suﬃcient precision the
political process in the Republic of Moldova during the period under consideration – 
1991-2005 – have been identiﬁed:
1. the level of control over the execution of power;
2. the President’s personality.
The above-mentioned two dimensions are in fact the internal factors which inﬂu-
ence SSC activities: the level of control over the execution of power reveals the level of 
confrontation for power or for inﬂuence ower power. The President makes decisions
within the Supreme Security Council. The impact of external factors on his decisions
depends much on the President’s personality and on the forces which support the Pres-
ident or inﬂuence him.
The following co-ordinates serving to circumscribe with suﬃcient precision the
external political process which impacts the political situation in the Republic of 
Moldova have been identiﬁed:
1. developments of the Transnistrian issue; 
2. activities of the Commonwealth of Independent States; 
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3. collaboration with international ﬁnancial bodies (in particular, with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and with the World Bank);
4. integration into the European Union;
5. ﬁghting against terrorism;
6. relationship with the United States of America.
The above-mentioned dimensions are the external political factors which exerted
the largest share of inﬂuence on SSC activities.
The separatist regime of Tiraspol is a factor of permanent inﬂuence on the political
process under way in the Republic of Moldova. Such an inﬂuence, by its availability,
plays the role of object of national security of the Republic of Moldova; by its actions 
intended to maintain the separatist regime, focused against the Republic of Moldova, 
it plays the role of subject.
The collaboration with international ﬁnancial institutions is an external element
which inﬂuences/has inﬂuenced directly the economy, respectively, the political proc-
ess and SSC activities. The quality of the relationship between the Moldavian authori-
ties and the above-mentioned institutions determines and has determined the devel-
opments in the ﬁeld of economy, including from the viewpoint of national security of
the Republic of Moldova.
The quality of the Moldavian membership to the Commonwealth of Independent
States has had an important inﬂuence on the political processes occurring within the
period 1991-2000. During this period, the above-mentioned regional structure, parti-
cularly the Russian leadership, had a strong impact on Moldavian political develop-
ments, including the ones focused on the Transnistrian conﬂict settlement.
Throughout the last three years, such an impact was exterted by European struc-
tures. The United States, whose presence in the post-Soviet space is more intense with-
in the “ﬁght” against terrorism, is another important element.
2. Internal Political Context
A. The level of Control on Power Execution
The development of the internal political situation can be divided into two large pe-
riods, distinct from the viewpoints of the category of participants in the political proc-
ess and of the levers of the execution of power. The ﬁrst period is April, 1990 – March
2001; the second one – March 2001 to present.
The ﬁrst period was marked by the confrontation between various nomenclature 
groups of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union/Communist Party of Moldova 
which after (a) the liberalization of the political regime in the USSR, (b) the elimina-
tion of the state ownership regime, without establishing any coherent alternative and 
(c) the geopolitical disintegration of the USSR, had, in both form and extent, diﬀerent
79
beneﬁts from the results of the above-mentioned three processes, ﬁnding themselves
in adversary camps.
As a result, a series of informal groups emerged: (1) local administrative nomencla-
ture, whose exponent was Mircea Snegur, (2) local industrial nomenclature, headed by 
Andrei Sangheli, (3) “national” nomenclature formed by the party’s protégés coming 
from the system of culture, of education and of social sciences, focused initially on the 
People’s Front, and then on other political structures detached from it, (4) union-level 
nomenclature headed by Petru Lucinschi.
Several categories of political inﬂuence levers used by the participants in the politi-
cal process characterize this period. Among the most popular were: (a) street protests, 
(b) inter-personal intrigues used as a means to eliminate real or imaginary opponents 
who held control positions or had the power to inﬂuence high-level decisions, (c) in-
formal negotiation between real decision-makers, regardless of their political position, 
the results of the negotiations being directly formulated in legislative documents (for 
example, the amendments to the Privatization Law, operated in 1994, and the set of 
associated documents, the establishment of the “Gagauzian” administrative-territorial 
autonomy, the documents concluded with the separatist regime, etc.).
During the ﬁrst period, the political state power was successively under the control 
of such groups. The period included the following sub-periods:
First sub-period: April 1990-December 1992. It was visibly dominated by the na-
tional nomenclature group which shared some ﬁelds of inﬂuence with the local no-
menclature group This sub-period can also be called the “Snegur-I” sub-period, when
President Mircea Snegur relied on the People’s Front of Moldova, being in the same 
time directly and, sometimes, brutally, inﬂuenced by its proponents.
In the beginning, President Mircea Snegur enjoyed the support of the legislative 
body, controlled by its unionist right wing. The Parliament shortly became the arena
of confrontation between the Front’s representatives and all its other members. So, in-
stead of being a legislative body, the Parliament transformed into an arena of political 
disputes. The composition of the Supreme Security Council was at that time dominated
by proponents of the People’s Front of Moldova: 7 in 12 SSC members were the Front’s 
representatives, three members represented Mirea Snegur, one was a technocrat and 
one was a representative of Russian secret services.
Second sub-period: 24.12.1992-July 1995. In the context of parallel separatist devel-
opments in the Gagauzian area and in Transnistria, President Mircea Snegur gradually 
moved closer to the Agrarians and accepted a foreign policy vector focused on the Com-
monwealth of Independent States. As a result, he broke his relations with the leadership 
of the legislative body. On the 4th of February 1993, Petru Lucinschi became President 
of the Parliament. Shortly after, the Law on Parliamentary Election was passed and the
date of the new election was established (10.08.1993). Before establishing this date, the 
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deputies had rejected the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (07.07.1993) and adopted the Privatizaton Programme(12.03.1993).
Political confrontation occured after the election held in February 1994, which
was a mechanism to marginalize the unionists and to prepare for the 1996 presiden-
tial election. Parliamentary elections revealed the main candidates for the Presidency 
of the Republic of Moldova. The lapse of time leading up to the presidential election
was marked by diﬀerent methods of confrontation among them (i.e. street protests in
spring 1995 against the “Moldavian” language).
The “Snegur-II” sub-period was characterized by the absence of the Front’s repre-
sentatives in the SSC’s structure. They had been replaced with elements called “Agra-
rians”. Among them, there were representatives of the industrial nomenclature (Sang-
heli, Calmoi, Creangă) and proponents of the union-focused nomenclature (Lucinschi). 
Nevertheless, most SSC members (5 in 9 members) could be qualiﬁed as supporters of
Mircea Snegur and of his policy. 
Third sub-period: July 1995-January 1997. Its main characteristic was the cessation 
of SSC activities. Because of the intensity of political confrontation between the major 
power holders – the President, Prime-Minister and President of the Parliament – the SSC 
could not function. Andrei Sangheli and Petru Lucinschi gradually took over the levers 
of the country’s leadership. In order to keep his positions and to regain the lost means of 
inﬂuence, President Mircea Snegur attempted to set up a new political structure.
Fourth sub-period: January 1997-March 1998. The election of Petru Lucinshci as
Head of State was followed by his attempts to take control of the legislative body. The
President’s attempts to subordinate the Parliament destabilized the political situation 
in the country. The Supreme Security Council was dominated by the new President
Petru Lucinschi. This lapse of time could be qualiﬁed as the sub-period of union-fo-
cused nomenclature: 7 in 8 members of the SSC were promoted by President Petru 
Lucinschi and they represented his interests.
Fifth sub-period: March 1998-March 1999. The direct outcome of the 1998 parlia-
mentary election was the ”Alliance for Democracy and Reforms” algorithm – an inef-
ﬁcient, destabilizing, temporary structure. Shortly after, the legislative body became
an element of confrontation with President Petru Lucinschi. The confrontation caused
a legislative reform which put the election of the President of the Republic of Moldova 
under the Parliament’s competence and led to anticipated parliamentary elections.
The Parliamentary elections held in 1998 somehow aﬀected the positions of Presi-
dent Petru Lucinschi. They resulted in the establishment of the Alliance for Democracy
and Reforms (ADR). Two ADR representatives were members of the Supreme Security 
Council. Nevertheless, the inﬂuence of Petru Lucinschi remained major, because four
in seven SSC members represented his team.
Sixth sub-period: March 1999-December 1999. The positions of President Petru
Lucinschi within the SSC kept weakening. Half of the SSC members, including 
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Prime-Minister Ion Sturza, represented another group. That group derived from the
ADR and could be considered as the group of the new nomenclature.
Seventh sub-period: December 1999-March 2001. During this sub-period, the 
group of union-focused nomenclature again took control of the SSC. The Council was
absolutely dominated by President Lucinschi and by people from his environment.
The second period was characterized by (a) the emergence in the political confron-
tation of a new actor, who diﬀered considerably from the participants of the previous
period and (b) the use of new levers of inﬂuence levers and of levers to exert political
power.
The Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova is the only political party with
adherents all over the country, practically in all localities, in all ethnic-cultural com-
ponents of the Moldavian society. The members of this party are characterized by a
high level of discipline, incomparable to the lack of discipline within other parties, ex-
cept, perhaps, the People’s Christian-Democratic Party (the new name of the People’s 
Front of Moldova). No other party has reached such characteristics and succeeded to 
get such a broad support of the electorate.
The emergence of a new player with such “combat” characteristics determined the
radical reconﬁguration of the political process. The new participant in this process has
made all former participants form a coalition against it. Moreover, the impact of such 
levers as “inter-personal intrigues” and “street pressure” lowered considerably. On the 
other hand, a new category of political levers emerged – the parliamentary ﬁght among
factions with a distinct political identity. The parliamentary faction became, for the
ﬁrst time in the history of the Republic of Moldova, a lever of political inﬂuence. Politi-
cal discourse reached an analysable level, acquiring elements of political responsibility. 
The negotiations between powers became partially formal, i.e. the public opinion was
aware of their course.
The second period started with the crushing victory of the Communist Party in 
the 2001 parliamentary elections. This period can be divided into two sub-periods.
Eighth sub-period (March 2001-November 2003) and ninth sub-period (Novem-
ber 2003-to present): This can be called the Voronin period and can be divided into
two sub-periods. Both sub-periods of the Voronin period have been dominated by the 
personality of President Vladimir Voronin. The SSC is exclusively formed of members
of the ruling party or of members of the government voted in by the communists. The
Communist Party is a well-organized party whose structure covers the whole country.
The Parliamentary majority obtained after the elections held on the 25th of the Feb-
ruary allowed the Communist Party to concentrate its inﬂuence on legislative and ex-
ecutive state power. It was a positive, stabilizing factor. For the ﬁrst time since the proc-
lamation of the independence of the Republic of Moldova, the state power (executive 
and legislative) was taken by one political party which did not need to set an alliance 
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or to gather diﬀerent factions under the umbrella of one party (like the Democrat-
ic-Agrarian Party).
During the period 2001-2005, a number of destabilizing events occurred. They were
generated by the political actions of the opposition, so, it was a natural political pro-
cess. Among the destabilizing events were the protests occurring in winter, spring and 
November 2003.
The developments of the Transnistrian issue have determined the division of the
Voronin period into two sub-periods. Since early in the ’90s, the Transnistrian issue, 
in particular its armed stage, inﬂuenced essentially the political developments in the
Republic of Moldova. The Transnistrian issue has played a determining role for the
distribution of forces on the political stage as well as for the identiﬁcation of the foreign
policy vector of the Republic of Moldova.
B. The President’s Personality
During the period 1991-2005, the function of President of the Republic of Moldova 
was held by three personalities: Mircea Snegur, Petru Lucinschi and Vladimir Voronin.
Mircea Snegur. As a Head of State, Mircea Snegur did not enjoy the support of any 
political or public structure. Inclined to be inﬂuenced (especially by circumstances),
the ﬁrst President of the Republic of Moldova, under the pressure of then-current de-
velopments, attempted to search for political allies. Mircea Snegur was voted as Presi-
dent by a legislative body dominated by the People’s Front. During the armed Tran-
snistrian conﬂict. President Snegur very easily ceded to the pressure exerted by Russia.
To remain in his position, Mircea Snegur joined the agrarian camp. Later on, when 
the agrarian camp dissolved, President Snegur joined again the unionist wing, coming 
back to the respective political discourse.
Mircea Snegur lacked the skills to evaluate correctly the state of aﬀairs and lacked
the strategic thinking required to promote the country’s national interests. President 
Mircea Snegur acted spontaneously under the pressure of circumstances and neglected 
the country’s interests. The ﬁrst President was able to change his decisions after the ﬁrst
failure. Mircea Snegur was indecisive, inclined to be inﬂuenced; he let events lead him.
Petru Lucinschi. Unlike Mircea Snegur, Petru Lucinschi permanently attempted to 
set up circumstances favourable to himself. Like Mircea Snegur, Petru Lucinschi did 
not have a political party, but attempted to found one – the Alliance for Democratic 
and Prosperous Moldova (“Rândunica”). President Petru Lucinschi used nomenclature 
methods for promoting his personal political interests (not the country’s ones). His 
accession to the ﬁrst ranks of the Moldavian policy and his election as President of
the Republic of Moldova conﬁrmed the above. Coming from the top level of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union, Petru Lucinschi had quite close relations with old 
structures and with their representatives from the post-soviet space and from Western 
countries.
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Vladimir Voronin. This is the ﬁrst President of the Republic of Moldova who has led
a political party. Through his party (a quite well-organized one), Vladimir Voronin can
control the legislative body, the government and the situation throughout the country’s 
territorial units. Despite the fact that he is a party leader, President Vladimir Voronin 
does not hesitate to appoint decision-makers from outside the Communist Party and 
to undertake staﬀ modiﬁcations, if necessary.
Unlike Mircea Snegur, President Vladimir Voronin is consistent in achieving po-
litical goals. His approach to the Transnistrian issues conﬁrms it: in order to solve
the problem in favour of the Republic of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin has changed his 
strategic political priorities.
C. Inﬂuence of the Developments of the Internal Political Context  
     on the Supreme Security Council Activities
First, the developments of the internal political context circumscribed by two co-or-
dinates – the level of control over the execution of power and the President’s persona-
lity – have directly inﬂuenced the (a) nominal and (b) functional composition of the
Supreme Security Council.
Second: SSC capacity to function, at least for meetings, has also been inﬂuenced by
the vicissitudes of the inﬁghting.
Third, internal policy aspects of the issues included on the SSC agenda reﬂect mostly
the conjuncture of the political confrontation, the need to suppress internal politi-
cal and economic adversaries, less their relevance to national security. Thus, the SSC
has often been used as a tool for political confrontation between diﬀerent political
groups.
Fourth, full involvement of political players in inﬁghting has essentially marginal-
ized the statutory concerns of the SSC for internal national security.
Fifth, the internal political instability, the attempts to use the Supreme Security 
Council for inadequate goals, as a tool for internal political confrontation, instead of 
for solving the problems of national security, has undermined the need for SSC de-
velopment aimed at enlarging its operational functions and at transforming it into an 
eﬀective tool of the national security system.
Thus, the internal political context has strongly discouraged SSC activities, essen-
tially depriving this body from the institutional possibilities required to keep its im-
munity to the echoes and sinuosities of inﬁghting.
3. External Political Context
A. The Issue of Separatism. The developments of the Transnistrian issue during 
the period 1991-2003 were marked by the chronic impotency of the Moldavian 
political leadership to make qualitative steps towards the settlement of the con-
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ﬂict. Within this period, the separatist regime which was permanently present
on the right bank of the Nistru river, focused on the destabilization of the politi-
cal situation. Qualitative endeavours have been undertaken by the Communist 
government during the last two years. 
B. Russian Vector: the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) was and still is a failed project. Russia, the main ini-
tiator and the motor of this structure, was not able to generate ideas that make 
possible the integration of former soviet republics. Moscow has treated the CIS as 
a tool for maintaining its inﬂuence in post-soviet space. CIS activities have been
reduced to signing some documents without any practical inﬂuence.
C. The European Vector: the European Union. European issues have lately be-
come priorities of the Moldavian political agenda. On the other hand, the Con-
cept of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Moldova adopted in 1995 proclaimed 
the collaboration with the CIS as a priority. The modiﬁcation of the CIS vec-
tor was determined by that organization’s ineﬃciency. The CIS did not provide
the Republic of Moldova with viable mechanisms for solving its problems (in 
particular, the Transnistrian issue). The relationship between the Republic of
Moldova and the European Union is framed by the Action Plan and by the new 
neighbourhood policy. 
D. The American Vector: Terrorism. The events that occurred on the 11th of Sep-
tember 2001 in New York inﬂuenced the developments of events throughout the
world. The situation in the Republic of Moldova has been touched by this inﬂu-
ence, as well. NATO enlargement and the direct intervention of the United States 
of America in post-soviet space are among the results of those events. The rela-
tionship between the Republic of Moldova and the United States has changed. The
USA is now more actively involved in dealing with problems faced by the Republic 
of Moldova (especially the Transnistrian issue). The Republic of Moldova directly
took part in post-conﬂict operations in Iraq.
E. International Economic Organizations. The Republic of Moldova established
relations with international ﬁnancial organizations – the International Mone-
tary Fund and the World Bank– shortly after the proclamation of its independ-
ence. In 1992, our country became a member of the above-mentioned ﬁnancial
bodies. Throughout the period 1992-2001, collaboration with the IMF and the
World Bank was framed by an ineﬃcient economic policy and by the increase
in the ﬁnancial dependence of the Republic of Moldova on these bodies. On
the other hand, the collaboration with the IMF and with the World Bank had 
positive outcomes during the period 2001-2005, when the Republic of Moldova 
fulﬁlled its reimbursement obligations without requesting the ﬁnancial assist-
ance of these ﬁnancial bodies.
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Inﬂuence of the Development of the External Political Context  
on the Supreme Security Council Activities
The external political factor had a direct and often favourable inﬂuence on SSC, from
the viewpoint of the institutional maturity activities. In fact, while the impact of internal 
factors on national security was examined by the SSC sporadically, even marginally, the 
impact of external factors enjoyed a larger examination, although insuﬃcient.
The SSC has never served as a tool for political confrontation from the external per-
spective. Such a fact excluded all attempts to use it against its purpose. Most external 
security issues included in the SSC agenda have been formulated adequately from the 
perspective of national security concerns, unlike most internal security issues exam-
ined by the SSC. 
III. The Eﬀects of the Supreme Security Council Activities  
on Various Fields of Responsibility 
1. Identiﬁcation of the Fields of Responsibility  
    of the Supreme Security Council 
A. Fields of Responsibility
The security of a human community is aﬀected by ﬁve major sectors:
– military; 
– political; 
– economic;
– social;
– environmental.
According to the legislation of the Republic of Moldova, the Supreme Security 
Council has the following ﬁelds of responsibility:
1. Ensuring military security: – Military defence of the state against internal and 
external threats by the means of promoting the defence policy, and setting up Armed 
Forces that are able to reject a possible armed aggression (p. 8 of the Parliament deci-
sion on the approval of the Concept of National Security of the Republic of Moldova, 
no. 445-XIII of 05.05.1995). Points 8 and 9 of the Parliament decision to approve the 
Concept of National Security comprises some elements related to national security. The
Regulation of the Supreme Security Council (article 3, paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6) also con-
cerns the issue of ensuring national security.
2. Ensuring political security: Protecting the sovereignty, independence and territo-
rial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, its constitutional regime, and its economic, 
technical-scientiﬁc and defensive potential (point 6 of the Parliament decision to ap-
prove the Concept of National Security of the Republic of Moldova, no. 445-XIII of 
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05.05.1995). Elimination of the causes and of the conditions that favour crimes and 
other contraventions, preventing, interrupting and investigating them, as well as car-
rying out justice (point 7 of the Parliament decision to approve the Concept of National 
Security of the Republic of Moldova, no. 445-XIII of 05.05.1995). SSC Regulation pro-
vides for the Council’s prerogative to examine draft decisions concerning the modiﬁ-
cation of the Concept of Foreign Policy (article 3, paragraph 3).
3. Ensuring economic security. Point 6 of the Parliament’s decision to approve the 
Concept of National Security provides for the protection of economic potential.
4. Ensuring social security: Point 9 of the Parliament’s decision to approve the Con-
cept of National Security provides for the protection of the population, of material and 
cultural values against the eﬀects of emergency situations (natural and environment
calamities, accidents, catastrophes, epiphytes, epizooties), as well as against modern 
destruction means.
5. Ensuring environmental protection: Protection of the population, of material and 
cultural values against the eﬀects of emergency situations (natural and environmental
calamities, accidents, catastrophes, epiphytes, epizooties), as well as against modern 
destruction means (point 9 of the Parliament’s decision to approve the Concept of Na-
tional Security of the Republic of Moldova, no. 445-XIII of 05.05.1995). 
Article 3 of the Regulation of the Supreme Security Council sets the Council’s 
prerogative to provide to the President of the Republic of Moldova consultations on 
national security matters (art. 3/1) and recommendations on foreign and home state 
policy matters (art. 3/2). According to the Regulation, the Council is in charge of the 
monitoring of the execution of decrees and decisions taken by the President of the Re-
public of Moldova in national security matters (art. 3/7).
B. Spheres which Should Be Included within the Fields  
     of Responsibility of the Supreme Security Council 
The legislation of the Republic of Moldova concerning national security, including
the Concept of National Security, covers all security components – military, political, 
economic, social and environmental. Nevertheless, most security segments are not suf-
ﬁciently tackled to respond to the requirements of national security. Some of them are
only superﬁcially dealt with.
Military security. Among the components of national security, military security is 
the only one that enjoys a more or less complete legislative coverage. The legislation
tackles diﬀerent matters concerning military organization and the supply of resources
for the fulﬁllment of missions. On the other hand, the potential sources of threats and
the changes intended to make possible their re-evaluation are overlooked.
Political security. Ensuring political security implies protecting the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, and its constitu-
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tional regime. The legislation overlooks an important element of political security –
the ideological element. To ﬁll this gap, the Concept of National Security (2004) was 
developed – a document which does not reﬂect reality and does not comply with the
national interests; moreover, if it enters into force, the Concept could be an attempt on 
the people’s sovereignty and on the national security.
Economic security: The Concept of the National Policy of the Republic of Moldova
provides for the protection of the country’s economic potential. Such a term is quite 
ambiguous, as it is not obvious what economic potential means. There are no provisions
concerning the need to ensure access to resources, to funds and to markets in order to 
maintain a strategic level of the nation’s economic capacity, an acceptable level of the 
state’s social welfare and the power required to adequately fulﬁll its deﬁning functions.
Social security. The Concept of National Security approaches tangentially the issue
of ensuring social security – it concerns the protection of cultural values against the 
eﬀects of emergency situations. The legislation totally lacks a frame intended to protect
traditional values (language, culture, cultural, religious and historical identity) which 
support the existence of such a geopolitical entity as the Republic of Moldova; it also 
lacks provisions concerning the limits of the development of such values.
Environmental security. According to the legislation in force, environmental se-
curity implies the intervention of state structures in the event of emergencies. There
is no policy intended to ensure environmental security from external and internal 
perspectives.
2. Crises and Responsibilities: 1991-2005
A. Military Security
Crises and responsibilities related to military security: The issues related to ensuring
the military security of the state were raised by Moldavian authorities immediately 
after the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Moldova. On the 15th of Oc-
tober 1991, the Supreme Security Council examined the issue of setting up the national 
army, but six months later, the units of the National Army did not have the capacity 
adequately respond to the developments of the Transnistrian conﬂict. This fact was
conﬁrmed both by the participants in the armed conﬂict and by the declaration of the
Minister of Defence Costaș in the press of that time1.
Military actions aimed at defending the territorial integrity and the independence 
of the Republic of Moldova did not reach a logical end – settlement of the separatist 
conﬂict. The authorities of the Republic of Moldova did not succeed in ensuring the
integrity and the independence of the country by means of armed methods and did 
1 “Sfatul Ţării” newspaper, January, 22, 1992.
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not do anything to mobilize the other components of national security (political, eco-
nomic and social) during the armed stage of the conﬂict.
After the armed conﬂict, military security issues and the capacities of the National
Army were raised again in 1997, in parallel with the MIG transaction. In autumn 1997, 
Moldavian authorities sold to the United States of America twenty-one MIG-29 com-
bat planes for USD 40 million, as well as military equipment. That transaction caused
serious material damage to the Republic of Moldova (as it had received more advanta-
geous oﬀers) and aﬀected the military capacity of the National Army. Regardless of the
fact that the country was facing a separatist conﬂict, the most eﬃcient combat unit of 
the National Army was dissolved.
Within the period 2001-2005, the situation of the National Army was constantly on 
the SSC agenda (10 in 23 meetings). The SSC mainly focused on the reform of the Na-
tional Army and on the management of combat resources available to military units. 
On the one hand, the Republic of Moldova accused the separatist regime of traﬃc in
arms, but on the other hand, there has been illegal sale of ammunition of the National 
Army. 
B. Political security
Crises and responsibilities related to political security: The Transnistrian conﬂict is
the major expression of political security matters.
 During the period 1991-2002, the Supreme Security Council adopted an inade-
quate approach to the Transnistrian issue and to its developments. The SSC activities
were unsatisfactory both from the perspective of some aspects of the conﬂict and of
the Transnistrian conﬂict in general, as a national security matter. It was conﬁrmed by
the incapacity to avoid the outbreak of armed conﬂict, on the one hand, and to ensure
the logical end of military actions, on the other hand. Moldavian leaders turned out 
to be unable to ensure the territorial integrity and the independence of the country by 
the means of armed methods and did not do anything to mobilize other components 
of national security (political, economic, social) during the armed conﬂict. Further
endeavours aimed at conﬂict settlement were reduced to political actions (of low eﬃ-
ciency), overlooking military, economic, and social components.
The cessation of the armed conﬂict cannot not be accepted as a positive result, be-
cause it did not solve the problems of territorial integrity and of independence of the 
Republic of Moldova. A part of the Moldavian territory remains outside the limits of 
the constitutional coverage of Chișinău authorities, being under the control of an ag-
gressive separatist regime.
Within the period 1993-1997, the “endeavours” of the authorities of the Republic 
of Moldova focused on the Transnistrian conﬂict settlement were reduced to some
steps towards legitimizing the separatist regime. On the 7th of February 1996, Chișinău 
recognized the right of the separatists to conduct external economic activities and to 
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use the customs stamps of the Republic of Moldova. The Protocol of the 11th of March 
1996 concerning the Issues of Mutual Agreement recognized the separatist regime as a 
result of recognizing its prerogatives: having a fundamental law, adopting laws, having 
symbols, establishing external contacts in economic, cultural, and technical-scientiﬁc
ﬁelds (in other ﬁelds, they needed the consent of Chișinău authorities).
In February 1997, President Petru Lucinschi opted for the deployment of Russian 
troops on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. In Moscow on the 8th of May 1997, 
the Memorandum on the Basis for the Normalization of Relations between the Republic 
of Moldova and Transnistria was signed. The memorandum provided for vesting the
separatist regime which controls the Eastern area of the Republic of Moldova with 
prerogatives similar to the ones of a federal entity. 
The approach to the Transnistrian conﬂict proposed by President Vladimir Vo-
ronin is the only possible solution focused on ensuring the national security of the 
Republic of Moldova. It is supposed to be complemented by a set of measures intended 
to strengthen the expected results. The developments concerning the Kozak Memo-
randum and the problem of the Moldavian schools of the Eastern area of the Republic 
of Moldova are framed by such an approach.
Alongside with the Transnistrian issue, street protests unleashed by students also 
aﬀected the political stability in the Republic of Moldova. The protests were particu-
larly intense in autumn 1992, in spring 1995 and in spring 2003. Each wave of protests 
was impregnated with political characteristics.
During the period 1991-2001, the political situation in the Republic of Moldova was 
determined by political confrontation at the level of political elites. The subjects of such
confrontations wanted to accede to political power or, at least, to gain a higher level of 
inﬂuence over political power, in order to solve their personal problems. Such confron-
tations culminated with the parliamentary crisis of 2000 and with the modiﬁcation of
the mechanism of election of the President of the Republic of Moldova. 
C. Economic Security
Crises and responsibilities related to economic security: During the ’90s, the econ-
omy of the Republic of Moldova passed through a deep crisis. The economic situation
had a negative impact on the whole system of national security.
The privatization process was one of the most important elements of the economic
developments of that time. Privatization issues were for the ﬁrst time examined by the
Supreme Security Council on the 7th of May 1992, in full swing of the Transnistrian 
conﬂict. The privatization process was launched in summer 1993, when the Parliament
approved the list of objects to be privatized. The direct outcomes of the privatization
were: aggravation of the economic crisis, the crash of most enterprises and of many 
branches of the economy, and the enrichment of a limited group of people.
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Economic developments were to a large extent determined by the collaboration of 
the Republic of Moldova with international ﬁnancial institutions: the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund. The enhanced level of intervention of these institu-
tions in Moldavian economic policies allowed them to set the directions for the na-
tional economy. The results were soon visible. At present, the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank hold eﬃcient tools for intervention into the decision-making
process which is under way inside the Moldavian leadership.
Energy crises occurring in summer 1992 and in spring 2000 revealed repeatedly the 
vulnerability of the Republic of Moldova in the energy sector. The non-fulﬁlment by the
Republic of Moldova of its ﬁnancial obligations was invoked as the reason for the cessa-
tion of the supply of electric energy (1998) and of natural gas (2000). Because of the ineﬃ-
cient management of the energy sector, Moldova-gaz company merged with GAZPROM 
(a Russian state-owned company). The perpetuation of Russia’s monopoly over the Mol-
davian energy sector increases considerably the dependence of the Republic of Moldova 
on the Russian Federation. No concrete steps undertaken by the Moldavian authorities 
in order to eliminate the problem of energy dependence have been reported.
In 2000, the Republic of Moldova sold to the Spanish company “Union Fenosa” 
three networks of energy distribution: RED Centru, RED Sud and RED Chișinău. As 
a result of this transaction, the government lost control of the largest share of energy 
distribution networks. Taking into consideration the situation on the gas and oil mar-
kets, as well as the energy supply problems and the situation in Transnistria, it can be 
assumed that the Republic of Moldova has extrem problems in the energy sector.
D. Social Security
Crises and responsibilities related to social security: Since the proclamation of its 
independence, the Republic of Moldova did not undertake any steps or political ac-
tions focused on strengthening its social security.
This essential segment of national security is practically not covered by the legisla-
tion. There is only one document that tackles some issues related to social security –
the Concept of National Policy, adopted in 2004. At the same time, this document is a 
visible threat to the national security of the Republic of Moldova. It does not have any 
provisions concerning such traditional elements as the language, the culture, the faith, 
or the traditions which identify Moldavians as a founding and constituent identity of 
the state. There are no provisions concerning the identiﬁcation of ethnic minorities.
The threat consists in the fact that the document is placed within a political frame,
instead of being placed within the frame of ensuring the state’s national security.
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E. Environmental Security
Crises and responsibilities related to environmental security: Moldavian authorities 
did not pay much attention to this security segment. 
Environment security matters have been twice in the limelight – in 1998 and in 
2002 – when non-governmental organizations unleashed vehement protests against 
the transportation of radioactive waste from the nuclear station of Kozlodui (Bulgaria) 
to Russia via the Republic of Moldova. The protests did not hinder the Moldavian au-
thorities from operating legislative modiﬁcations in order to allow the transportation
of such waste (2002). 
From the external perspective, there was only one achievement – the signature of 
Kyoto Agreement and its ratiﬁcation by the Parliament.
3. Evaluation of the Eﬀects of the Supreme Security Council’s Activities 
    by Fields and by Stages 
From the perspective of the national security and state security concepts as deﬁned
by the legislation of the Republic of Moldova, it can be assumed that throughout 15 
years of independence, the Supreme Security Council did not undertake any measures 
to ensure eﬃciently the national security of the country and of the state. The legislation
of the Republic of Moldova does not provide a complete approach to the concept of na-
tional security (The Concept of National Security of the Republic of Moldova). It mainly 
concerns the protection of the person, of the society and of the state, of their rights and 
interests, set by the Constitution and other laws, against external and internal threats.
The threats listed in the Concept concern the military sector of the national secu-
rity more than the political sector. Social, economic and environmental sectors are 
only invoked in the context of physical threats against them. The Concept does not
deal with the fundamental segments of national security and with their essence. 
At present, the Republic of Moldova is very vulnerable to political, military, eco-
nomic and social threats and dangers. 
The political system of the Republic of Moldova is dominated, especially in the
second stage of development of the internal political process, by external (Western) 
factors that determine the directions to be followed by the country. The latest elections
or energy dependence can conﬁrm the above. The National Army is obsolete from
technical, organizational (structure, all levels of military training, etc.), ideological 
and moral viewpoints.
The economic segment of the security is aﬀected by the structure of the economy,
by corruption and nepotism, by the lack of protection against negative inﬂuences com-
ing from the world’s markets, etc. 
The social sector is deprived from a frame for preservation and development of
such traditional elements as the language, the culture, the identity and the cultural 
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traditions. At present, the state keeps its distance from the social segment of national 
security which is now handled by diﬀerent subjects who are strangers to the identiﬁca-
tion elements of the Moldavians.
The above-mentioned facts conﬁrm the dependence of the Republic of Moldova on
external factors and subjects from the perspective of ensuring national security or its 
existence.
The involvement of external elements in ensuring national security can be reduced
to guaranteeing the existence of the subject of international law – the Republic of Mol-
dova – and it is far from the concept of “national security”. If matters do not change 
and the Republic of Moldova does not become the major element in ensuring its own 
security, the state will no doubt disappear in favour of other regional geopolitical ac-
tors, which are more dexterous, more consistent, and more concerned about their in-
terests and values.
IV. Motivations and Objectives of the Supreme Security Council 
Reforms, Evaluation of Decision-Making Practices,  
Analysis of the Present Situation
1. Identiﬁcation of the Motivations and of the Objectives  
    of the Supreme Security Council’s Reforms 
A. Analysis of the Conceptual-Legal Frame  
     for the Supreme Security Council’s Activities
The Concept of National Security is the central element of the conceptual-legal frame 
of SSC activities. The Concept of National Security (Parliament Decree no. 445-XIII
of the 5th of May 1995) deﬁnes national security as the protection of the person, of the 
society and of the state, of their rights and interests, set by the Constitution and other 
laws of the Republic of Moldova, against external and internal threats. The document
deﬁnes the threat to national security as the intention of hostile forces, under any form, 
or as environmental, technical and other factors, whose intervention or inﬂuence can be
a threat to the person, the society and the state.
The Concept of National Security focuses on the neutralization of violent actions 
(directly exteriorized) aimed at the state, the society, and/or the person. Violent ac-
tions can be caused by hostile forces and by technogenical factors.
The formula “the intention of hostile forces under any form” of the deﬁnition of
threat to national security is determined by the structure of national security as pre-
sented in the Concept of National Security and by its deﬁnition.
The Concept of National Security of the Republic of Moldova aims at four security
sectors (components) intended to guarantee national security: 
93
1. State Security.
2. Public Security.
3. Military Security.
4. Civil Security.
The objects of guaranteeing state security (according to the Concept of National Se-
curity) are subversive and informative actions of secret services and of foreign organi-
zations as well as criminal attempts of some groups and individuals on the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, on its constitutional 
regime, on its economic, technical-scientiﬁc and defensive potential, and on the legiti-
mate rights and interests of the people (the same deﬁnition is provided by the Law on
State Security nr. 618-XIII of the 31st of October 1995).
According to the Concept and the Law on State Security, secret services, foreign 
organizations, and groups of people are the main bearers of threats to national secu-
rity, while their actions aimed against the state are subversive, indirect. Ensuring state 
security is the responsibility of the Information and Security Service, State Protection 
and Guard Service, Border Guard Troops and military secret bodies.
The largest share of threats to state security are exteriorized actions of threat bea-
rers: actions which contribute to the unleashing of military actions against the coun-
try or of a civil war; military actions; actions that encourage extraordinary events in 
transport, in telecommunications, toward economic entities and vital objects, and es-
pionage; actions aimed at the violent remove of legal authorities, etc. (art. 4 of the Law 
on State Security).
Threats in the ﬁelds of information and information technologies, economy, ideol-
ogy and culture are not listed in the law, although they imply an enormous level of 
danger. The developments at the international level have repeatedly revealed that such
actions aimed against a state, a society and a citizen can have disastrous eﬀects on sev-
eral countries, comparable to the eﬀects of a total war.
The bodies listed in the Law on State Security cannot ensure the system of state se-
curity. They are intended to counteract the actions aimed against the state, speciﬁc to
the period up to the ’80s of the 20th century. Such actions are broadly used at present, 
too. On the other hand, a number of information, economic, ideological-cultural ac-
tions, etc., totally ignored by the legislation of the Republic of Moldova, play an in-
creasing role, too.
Ensuring public security. The Concept of National Security deﬁnes public security
as a basic component of the security of the Republic of Moldova. 
Public security aims to eliminate the reasons and the conditions that encourage 
crimes and contraventions, to prevent, interrupt and investigate them, and to carry 
out justice. The Concept of National Security provides that such a goal can be achieved
as a result of the implementation of a system of state and non-state law-based political, 
social, economic, legal and organizational measures.
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Such an approach to public security is the result of the emphasis on the “force” com-
ponent in ensuring national security. According to the deﬁnition formulated in the
Concept of National Security, public security is a prior segment of the security of the 
Republic of Moldova. A number of structures of the major ﬁelds of social life – policy,
economy, etc. – are involved in ensuring public security. Thus, public security has prac-
tically become one of the priorities of state structures from the respective social ﬁelds.
Ensuring military security: According to the Concept of National Security, military 
security aims at ensuring military defence of the country against external and internal 
military threats by the means of promoting the defence policy, and setting up armed 
forces able to reject a possible military aggression. Military security is the object of the 
Military Doctrine of the Republic of Moldova and of the Concept of Military Reform.
According to the legislation of the Republic of Moldova, military security is the 
only sector of national security that enjoys a more or less complex approach. Some 
vulnerable elements can be identiﬁed from the perspective of military planning and
resources. 
Ensuring civil security: The Concept of National Security deﬁnes civil security as
a system of state activities and measures, implemented either at peace or in war time, 
aimed at ensuring the protection of the people, of material and cultural values against 
the eﬀects of emergency situations, as well as against modern means of destruction.
Ensuring environmental security circumscribes a series of measures undertaken by 
the state against possible violence which could threaten peoples’ lives and could cause 
material damage. 
B. Present Frame of the National Security 
The security of human communities is aﬀected by factors coming from ﬁve main
sectors: 
Military security – concerns the double interaction of the state’s capacities – of 
armed oﬀense and defense – and the states’ perception of the other states’ intentions.
Political security concerns the organizational stability of the state, of the system of 
government and of the ideology that legitimizes them.
Economic security involves the access to the resources, funds and markets required 
to maintain an acceptable level of fulﬁlment of national security functions, for the
people’s welfare and for the economic power (including international competitiveness) 
of the national economy, of the state, and of the country.
Social security concerns the capacity to support, within the limits of acceptable de-
velopments, the traditional elements of language, culture, identity, cultural and reli-
gious values.
Environmental security aims at preserving the local and global biosphere as an es-
sential support on which depend all people’s actions. 
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C. Comparison of the Responsibilities under the Present Conceptual  
     and Legal Frame to the Fields of National Security 
The doctrine focused on violent threats is the determining element of the system of 
national security of the Republic of Moldova, resulting from its legislation. The doc-
trine is tackled in the Concept of National Security and in the structure of the national 
security of the Republic of Moldova. The doctrine determines the deﬁnition and the
object of each segment of the present system of national security – state, public, mili-
tary and civil security.
The present system comprises components which are not related to national secu-
rity, but implicitlyrelated to public and civil security. Both civil and public security 
involve a series of factors concerning various components of national security (social, 
environmental).
The Concept of National Security is obsolete and incomplete. Military security is
the single sector of national security tackled in the Concept.
The way of emergence in the Concept and in other legal documents of elements
related to other components of national security – political, economic, social, environ-
mental – makes us admit the practical inexistence of such sectors within the system of 
national security of the Republic of Moldova. Elements of political, economic, social and 
environmental security have been included in the Doctrine Focused on Violent Threats.
The present Concept of National Security makes us conclude that the Republic of
Moldova can be aﬀected by numerous political, economic, social, and environmental
threats, without having a conceptual-legal basis for the neutralization of such threats. 
There is no legal basis concerning the actions of state bodies and structures aimed at
guaranteeing national security of the Republic of Moldova.
The Concept of National Security is in fact a threat to the security of the Republic
of Moldova, because of: – the lack of recognition of some threats to national secu-
rity; – the lack of a legal-organizational basis allowing the state to ﬁght the threats to
the security of the Republic of Moldova; – the negative eﬀects of such a “lack” on the
security segments stipulated in the legislation – as far as the Republic of Moldova is 
concerned, on military security.
D. Evaluation of Present Activities of the Supreme Security Council 
The available information and the deductions from the analysis lead to the conclu-
sion that there is neither a strategic nor an operational or current plan of SSC activities. 
It practically excludes the availability of any managerial technique.
The lack of such a plan reveals both the lack of a national strategy for national secu-
rity development and of a country strategy, in general. Because of the lack of a country 
strategy, it is impossible to deﬁne a real concept of national security intended to ensure
the survival of a state – the Republic of Moldova – as a tool for promoting the interests 
and for protecting the authentic values of the Moldavian people. 
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The available data concerning the ways that SSC members prepare for SSC meetings
reveal that most decisions are not taken after the debates of SSC members, but outside
the meetings. At meetings, they simply establish the level of acceptance by diﬀerent SSC
members of the proposed solution or make declarations related to some problems.
The decisions made by the Supreme Security Council are not subject to a plenary
previous expertise, nor to geopolitical, or diplomatic, cultural, ﬁnancial, or technical
(logistic) viewpoints. The decisions are mainly indicative, generating ambiguous inter-
pretations concerning their execution.
Regardless of the unordinary eﬀorts of the staﬀ of the SSC Service, and because of
the Council’s totally inadequate structure compared to its tasks and to the tasks of na-
tional security, in general, it is practically impossible to issue eﬀective decisions. Such
a fact reduces considerably the eﬃciency of the SSC and its functions.
E. Motivations for the Reform of the Supreme Security Council 
The central motivation for SCC reform is enhancing the quality of the national
security of the Republic of Moldova by state authorities.
The structure of the bodies in charge of ensuring national security is ineﬃcient as 
it does not cover totally the set of issues related to the concept of national security (not 
as deﬁned by the legislation of the Republic of Moldova, but a concept which would
respond to the reality and to the threats to security). At present, national security is 
ensured by the means of force structures (not enough, especially, on the military seg-
ment) and there is no concern for economic, social, or partially political components.
The Supreme Security Council does not co-ordinate the activities of state structures
in charge of some components of national security. The SSC does not respond to the
threats to national security of the Republic of Moldova and does not cover by its activi-
ties all the segments of the concept of national security. 
To reach an eﬃcient level of operation of the system, there is a strong need for co-or-
dination by the Supreme Security Council of all national security segments and of the 
activities of all bodies that are in charge of some distinct components of security. Most 
issues and actions are related to some speciﬁc security sector, but both issues and actions
also aﬀect the other segments of national security (some are more and other aﬀected
than others). The major task in dealing with security issues is to avoid negative inﬂuence
on the other ﬁelds of security and to contribute to strengthening national security.
F. General Objective (the Mission of Reforms)
The reforms should focus on the establishment of a functional system, intended to
guarantee national security in the following ﬁelds: political, military, economic, social,
cultural, spiritual, and environmental. The Supreme Security Council should be the
centre of co-ordination of this system.
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V. The Eﬃciency of the Supreme Security Council  
in Relevant Situations 
1. Identiﬁcation of Crisis Situations Faced by the Country and the State  
    since the Establishment of the Supreme Security Council to Present: 
– the separatist issue and the armed Transnistrian conﬂict. The separatist issue
originated in the process of disintegration of the USSR. Since the proclamation 
of independence to the present, the Transnistrian issue has not been settled and 
remains on the agenda of political authorities. The Transnistrian issue serves as
an incentive for other fundamental issues faced by the Republic of Moldova.
– privatization; the privatization process has enormously damaged the national 
economy of the Republic of Moldova. Its main results were the destruction of 
the country’s productive potential and the enrichment of some circles. 
– social-economic situation. Since 1991, economic crisis has been the main charac-
teristic of the Republic of Moldova. The main reason for the crisis and, especial-
ly, for its perpetuation, was the country’s political leadership. The incompetence
of the leadership to deal with the economic crisis was complemented by ill-will. 
The “eﬀorts” of the leadership directly hit the largest share of the population,
who have reached the limits of their survival, and served as a permanent desta-
bilizing factor. The socio-economic situation of the state has directly impacted
the national security of the Republic of Moldova.
– 1995 street protests (against teaching Moldavian language in educational institu-
tions). The protests were unleashed early in March by the students of the State
University of Moldova as a reaction to the decision of the Rector Gheorghe Ru-
snac to replace the courses of Romanian language and of History of Romanians 
with the courses of Moldavian language and History of Moldova. Their protests
were supported by most higher educational institutions and lycees of Chișinău.
– MIG issue: In autumn 1997, the authorities of the Republic of Moldova sold to 
the United States of America twenty-one combat aircrafts MIG-29 for USD 40
million, as well as military equipment. The transaction caused serious material
damage to the Republic of Moldova (as the country had received other more 
advantageous oﬀers) and aﬀected the military capacity of the National Army.
Despite the fact that the country faced a separatist conﬂict, the most eﬃcient
combat unit of the National Army was dissolved.
– energy crisis. Energy crises occurring in summer 1998 and in spring 2000 have 
revealed repeatedly the vulnerability of the Republic of Moldova in the energy 
sector. Non-fulﬁlment of its ﬁnancial obligations by the Republic of Moldova
was invoked as the reason for cessation of electric energy (1998) and the natural 
gas (2000) supply. Because of the deﬁcient management of the energy sector,
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Moldova-gaz company merged with the GAZPROM Russian state-owned com-
pany. The Russian monopoly of the energy sector of the Republic of Moldova
has caused an increase in the level of dependence of the Republic of Moldova on 
the Russian Federation.
– reform of the system of state administration (June 2000). The reform was the out-
come of the confrontation between Petru Lucinschi, President of the Republic 
of Moldova, and the Parliament. This confrontation destabilized the political
situation in the country and drew the attention of foreign bodies. According to 
the modiﬁcations approved by the Parliament in June 2000, the President of the
Republic of Moldova is elected by the legislative body. 
– government crisis and anticipated parliamentary elections (December 2000). This
was the follow-up to the confrontation between the Parliament and President 
Petru Lucinschi. The fractioning of the legislative body and the actions aimed at
the anticipated elections undertaken by Petru Lucinschi caused the dissolution 
of the Parliament and the declaration of anticipated parliamentary elections.
– street protests against the compulsory study of the Russian language (winter-spring 
2003). The decision to declare the Russian language as a compulsory subject in
the primary school curriculum caused the outbreak of street protests. Their in-
tensity raised in winter-spring 2003, when protesters added political claims and 
demanded the Government’s dismissal and anticipated elections. 
– Kozak memorandum (November 2003). The memorandum submitted by Russia
was the ﬁrst document supposed to lead to the ﬁnal settlement of the Tran-
snistrian conﬂict. The document was aimed at the legalization of the separatist
administration and at vesting it with the prerogative to set the directions for the 
country’s development. 
– bread crisis (spring 2004). The rise in the price of bread led the supreme state
authorities to intervene in this ﬁeld. The largest bakeries were subject to controls
followed by arrests and criminal investigations. The bread crisis revealed that
the Ministry of Agriculture does not fulﬁll its obligation to ensure the country’s
food security. 
– crisis of Moldavian schools (June 2004). The crisis of the Moldavian schools of
the Eastern area of the Republic of Moldova was the result of provoking ac-
tions of the separatists versus the position adopted by Chișinău authorities in 
the Transnistrian issue. Taking into account the resources and the capacities 
held by the political authorities of the Republic of Moldova when the crisis un-
leashed, their actions can be considered as adequate to the national interests of 
the Republic of Moldova.
– The Concept of National Policy: This document issued by the Parliament is a vis-
ible threat to the national security of the Republic of Moldova. The document
lacks any provision concerning such traditional elements as the language, the 
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culture, the faith, the traditions which identify the Moldavians as a founding 
and a constituent identity of the state. The chapter related to ethnic minorities
also lacks identiﬁcation provisions. The threat of the document comes from the
fact that it is placed within a political frame work, instead of being placed within 
the frame of state social security. 
– loss of ammunition (September 2004). The loss of a lot of ammunition of the
stocks of the National Army occurred when the Moldavian authorities accused 
the Transnistrian separatists of illicit trade in arms and of supplying arms to 
the Caucasian region of the Russian Federation. The crisis of ammunition was
preceded by active debates on the Concept of Reorganization and Moderniza-
tion of the National Army.
2. Identiﬁcation of Crisis Situations Debated at the Meetings  
    of the Supreme Security Council
Bread crisis (spring 2004). The bread crisis was debated at two meetings of the Su-
preme Security Council. On the 28th of February 2004, the SSC examined the situ-
ation of the bread market and the legality of state bodies and economic entities in 
this ﬁeld. According to the decisions made by the SSC, the concerned bodies got the
task to undertake measures to improve the situation in this ﬁeld. In addition to this,
disciplinary and penal sanctions were imposed on a number of decision-makers. The
SSC meeting held on the 27th of April 2004 focused again on the situation of the bread 
market and evaluated the implementation of the decision made at the meeting of the 
28th of February. New tasks were set. The previous decision had been executed partially.
Nothing was done to execute the following tasks: developing a law on cereals and bread 
products, improving legislation concerning joint stock companies, and penalizing the 
people who inspected the “Franzeluţa” Joint Stock Company. 
Loss of ammunition (September 2004). The SSC meeting held on the 14th of October 
2004 focused on the following issues: military discipline, level of criminality, integrity 
of the military patrimony, of arms and of ammunition of the National Army, the le-
gitimacy and the security of ﬂights in the air space of the country. As the situation in
all the above-mentioned ﬁelds was qualiﬁed as deplorable, the SSC decided to penalize
the concerned people; new tasks aimed at improving the situation were set.
Most crises have been dealt with in a superﬁcial way. Although some issues related
to the crises have been examined by the leadership, including by the Supreme Security 
Council, and some problems have been solved, the ways of approaching them were 
incomplete and did not really ensure security.
A number of essential issues concerning the system of national security have not 
been examined by the Supreme Security Council (for example, the MIG transaction, 
the Concept of National Policy) or have been superﬁcially examined (for example, pri-
vatization issues).
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When problems and crises aﬀecting national security were raised and decisions fos-
tering the situation were made, it can be assumed that there were/are other centres which 
make decisions concerning national security matters. Taking into account that the deci-
sion power belongs to the President, it can also be assumed that such centres can be placed 
both inside the SSC and outside it, within circles which are close to the President.
3. Pointing Out Why Some Crisis Situations Have Not Been Examined  
    by the Supreme Security Council or Have Been Examined  
    Superﬁcially (Symbolically)
Overlooking some national security matters by the Supreme Security Council can 
be explained by the Council’s way of functioning.
SSC meetings are convoked by the President and by the SSC Service, the latter being 
in charge of the technical aspects of the meetings. The President convenes the Supreme
Security Council in the event of an emergency situation. Or, the President convenes the 
SSC if there is need for actions to defend the country’s interests.
The SSC Service monitors and evaluates the processes and informs the Supreme
Security Council, if required. The major sources of information for the SSC Service are
the data provided by the ministries and other state structures (such information does 
not reﬂect the reality and is not functional!).
The Service does not have the capacity to draw a realistic picture of national securi-
ty, to identify present and possible threats to the security of the Republic of Moldova.
The availability of circles that “overlap” in their examination of the visible problems
concerning national security has been and still is one of the main reasons that keeps 
the SSC from eﬀectively dealing with such problems.
4. Evaluation of the Supreme Security Council Eﬃciency in Dealing  
    with Crisis Situations (by identiﬁed situations);
Early in the ’90s, the SSC dealt in an unsatisfactory way with the Transnistrian issue. 
Since the beginning of the conﬂict, the Republic of Moldova has lost control of a part of
its territory in favour of a group of separatists and its further endeavours have resulted 
in the perpetuation of a separatist regime in the Eastern area of the country and its de 
facto recognition.
The actions aimed at conﬂict settlement undertaken since 2001 led to a qualitative
leap, due to pointing out the real reasons of the conﬂict and to its institutionalization,
as a result of involving new subjects in the settlement process. The steps undertaken
by the Moldavian authorities have been marked by continuity. Nevertheless, the posi-
tion of the Republic of Moldova remains quite vulnerable (because of the quality of 
the segments of the security system: military, economic, social, political). The level of
dependence on external subjects remains very high.
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The actions undertaken within the context of bread crisis, including the ones aimed
at the situation at the Franzeluţa bakery, focused on the neutralization of the deﬁcit of
wheat and on lowering the prices of bread. A series of administrative and legal meas-
ures were undertaken in order to take control of this branch. Nevertheless, no steps 
were undertaken to avoid such a crisis in the future. 
The participation of Moldavian military units in peace-keeping operations in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq were in fact political actions intended to enhance the quality of the 
relationship between the Republic of Moldova and the United States of America and 
to ensure support for the Moldavian authorities in dealing with some problems. Oth-
erwise, no military threat has inﬂuenced the Republic of Moldova to send its troops to
the above-mentioned states.
IV. Proposals Aimed at the Optimization of the Supreme Security 
Council’s Activities:
The goal of the changes: the SSC must become the central element for strategic
co-ordination of the national security system; the SSC must become a collegial and 
depolitized body.
1. Speciﬁcation of the Mission of the Supreme Security Council  
    and of its Staﬀ
The Supreme Security Council is the central state body whose object is the national
security of the Republic of Moldova. To ensure the country’s national security, the 
Supreme Security Council focuses on preventing threats to national security and on 
neutralizing crisis situations that can be a threat to the national security of the Repu-
blic of Moldova.
2. Objectives of the Reform of the Supreme Security Council  
    and of Its Staﬀ
The objectives aim at:
1) Transformation of the Supreme Security Council into a body with decision and 
control power in the ﬁeld of national security;
2) SSC depolitization;
3) Renunciation of the present approach to security matters and adoption of a real 
concept. (see above).
The Staﬀ of the Supreme Security Council must ensure totally (a) the technical
aspects of SSC activities and (b) expertise aspects – a complex substantiation of draft
decisions, including participation with consultative vote at SSC meetings (its perma-
nent bureau).
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SSC Staﬀ cannot be recruited or replaced like any other public servants. Recruit-
ment and dismissal principles, similar to the ones established for the State Board for 
Movables, should be adapted and applied for the SSC staﬀ.
3. The Fields of Competence of the Supreme Security Council  
    and of Its Staﬀ
Military, political, economic, social and environmental security. Military security 
concerns the double interaction of the state’s capacities of armed oﬀense and defense
and the state’s perception of the intentions of other states. 
Political security concerns the organizational stability of the state, of the system of 
government and of the ideology which legitimizes them. 
Economic security concerns the access to resources, funds and markets required to 
maintain an acceptable level of the state’s welfare and power.
Social security concerns the capacity to support, under the limits of acceptable de-
velopments, the traditional elements of language, culture, identity, cultural and reli-
gious traditions. 
Environmental security implies the preservation of the local and global biosphere, 
as an essential support for all activities conducted by the people. 
4. Functions and Tasks of the Supreme Security Council and of Its Staﬀ
The functions of the Supreme Security Council:
1) co-ordinating the activities of state structures in charge of ensuring the com-
ponents of national security. The SSC must unify of all the activities focused on
ensuring the national security of the Republic of Moldova; 
2) undertaking actions intended to prevent threats to national security;
3) undertaking actions intended to overcome crisis situations that can cause 
threats to the national security of the Republic of Moldova; 
4) exerting control over the execution of SSC decisions.
The functions of the Staﬀ of the Supreme Security Council:
1) planning the actions intended to preserve and to strengthen the capacities of 
national security; 
2) monitoring the situation in the ﬁeld of national security,
3) monitoring the implementation of SSC decisions.
4) monitoring the reports submitted by ministerial and other state structures; 
5) developing the programme of SSC activities; 
6) informing daily the President of the Republic of Moldova about the develop-
ments in the national security sector. 
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5. Levers of Inﬂuence of the Supreme Security Council  
    on the Fields under Its Competence 
A lever of SSC inﬂuence could be the “rotation” of the SSC personnel (of the ex-
perts) within ministerial structures.
6. Structure of the Supreme Security Council and of Its Staﬀ
The Supreme Security Council has two components:
– Permanent Bureau of the Supreme Security Council;
– Staﬀ (Secretariat) of the Supreme Security Council.
The members of the ﬁrst component – the permanent bureau – are:
1. President of the Republic of Moldova; 
2. Secretary of the Supreme Security Council; 
3. President of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova; 
4. Prime-Minister of the Republic of Moldova;
5. Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs;
6. Director of the Information and Security Service;
7. Minister of Internal Aﬀairs;
8. Minister of Defence;
9. General Prosecutor of the Republic of Moldova;
10. Minister of Culture;
11. Minister of Economy; 
12. Minister of Finance.
The SSC Staﬀ is led by the Council’s Secretary. The second component of the Su-
preme Security Council has two subdivisions: 
– the Monitoring subdivision focuses on: monitoring the execution of SSC deci-
sions, monitoring the internal component of national security, monitoring the 
external component of national security.
– the Planning subdivision has the prior function of identifying the major direc-
tions of activities to ensure national security and of developing plans intended 
to achieve such directions.
Depending on the issues to be examined by the Supreme Security Council, minis-
ters or other public oﬃcials can be invited to SSC meetings.
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ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES  
OF THE SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL
(Organizational management analysis)
Viorel CIUBOTARU
1. Organizational structure, rules and methods of organization
1.1. Organizational components of the Supreme Security Council  
       and its Service. 
The Supreme Security Council operates according to the provisions of the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Moldova, the Law on state security, Supreme Security Council 
regulations and other legislative acts. According to SSC regulations (adopted on Octo-
ber 08, 1997) the SSC is composed of the Council chairman and members. The mem-
bership of the Council is established by the decree of the President of the Republic of 
Moldova. In addition to the members appointed by Presidential decree (prime minis-
ter, minister of defense, minister of internal aﬀairs, minister of foreign aﬀairs, director
of the Information and Security Service, chief of General Staﬀ, president of the Civil
Protection and Emergency Situations Department and the secretary of SSC), the head 
of state “can appoint as members of the SSC any other high-level oﬃcials”.
Thus, by the decree of the President Vladimir Voronin nr. 1824-III from May 24,
2004, as members of the SSC were also appointed the Chairman of the Parliament, 
Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on National Defense, Security 
and Public Order, Chairman of the Academy of Sciences, Governor of the National 
Bank, minister of Economy, General Director of the Center for Economic Crimes and 
Corruption Fight, the Attorney-General, and the Governor of the Autonomous Ter-
ritorial Unit “Gagauz-yeri”. The SSC Service is led by the Secretary of the SSC Service,
and the members of the SSC Service are appointed by the President of the Republic of 
Moldova. At present, besides the SSC Secretary, there are also three experts and a sec-
retary adviser in the SSC Service.
In terms of functional structure, the two elements of the SSC – Council and Ser-
vice – are very diﬀerent from one another with regard to the competence and relevance
of their members. Among the appointed members of the Supreme Security Council 
there are oﬃcials whose legal competencies do not correspond to the legal status of the
SSC or entail other aspects of security beside those established by regulations: Chair-
man of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on National Defense, Security and 
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Public Order, Chairman of the Academy of Sciences, Governor of the National Bank, 
minister of Economy, General Director of the Center for Economic Crimes and the 
Fight Against Corruption, the Attorney-General, and the Governor of the Autono-
mous Territorial Unit “Gagauz-yeri”. The actual structure of the Council is explained
by the necessity of minimal coverage of human and professional abilities necessary for 
the eﬃcient activity of the SSC.
SSC functions and competencies 
According to SSC Regulations, the Supreme Security Council is a consultative body, 
which analyses and monitors the activity of ministries and departments in the ﬁeld of
national security and presents to the President of the Republic of Moldova recommen-
dations concerning the problems of internal and foreign policy with regard to national 
security protection.
The SSC Regulations, like other legislative acts – National security concept, Law 
on state security – regulate actions regarding the prevention and control of “violent” 
threats to the national security of the Republic of Moldova. The regulations stipulate
that the SSC presents recommendations on national security issues (art. 1 of the SSC 
Regulations) to the President of the Republic of Moldova, though most of the compe-
tencies established by the Regulations refer to military security and prompt reactions 
to emergency situations. The wide spectrum of issues concerning military security
starts with the examination of the Military Doctrine and procedures for declaring war 
and extends up to regulations concerning collaboration with other states (art. 3 para. 
3/i) and strategic infrastructure protection.
Among the SSC’s competencies there is also the examination of “drafts of deci-
sions regarding modiﬁcations and additions to the National Security Concept, Mili-
tary Doctrine and Foreign Policy Concept” (art. 3 al. 3/a). The Regulations concern-
ing the examination of the Foreign Policy Concept within this “ framework of powers” 
subordinate the foreign policy segment of the Republic of Moldova to military aspects 
of national security and develop the excessive “militarization” of the SSC activity and 
of the national security system.
The analysis and monitoring of the activity of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry
of Foreign Aﬀairs, Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs, Information and Security Service,
Civil Protection and Emergency Situations Department, and other governmental in-
stitutions from the SSC list of competencies (art. 3 para.6) are carried out during the 
working sessions of the Council and depend on the problem under consideration. The
analytical quality of materials for discussion depends on two basic factors: the level of 
professional skills of the members and the competence and resources of the SSC Serv-
ice. On these two factors, especially on the competence of the SSC Service, depend the 
examination of the “implementation of decrees and other decisions of the President of 
the Republic of Moldova regarding diﬀerent issues of national policy” (art. 3 para. 7).
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The competencies of the SSC Service do not allow us to qualify the activity of this
structure as corresponding to the main goal of the Supreme Security Council. The regu-
lation provision stating “the examination of information and materials concerning na-
tional security problems” is too vague and general to stimulate an eﬃcient improvement
of the SSC Service activity. Not only the missions established by SSC Regulations, but 
also the SSC Service structure serve as evidence of this fact. The Service doesn’t possess
the necessary capacities to organize the monitoring and analysis of the issues concern-
ing national security. The possibilities of the Service are limited to day-to-day organiza-
tion of Council activities and monitoring of the implementation of SSC decisions.
1.2. Incoherence and contradictions
Contradictions and incoherence among the norms that regulate the SSC and Serv-
ice activity reduce the eﬃciency of the structure as a whole and in certain conditions
can represent a danger to national security.
Thus, the Supreme Security Council analyses the activity of the ministries and de-
partments in the sphere of national security protection (the state’s internal and foreign 
policy), though the Regulations neither exactly deﬁne the comprehensive list of these
institutions, nor stipulate the areas of national security, methods, terms, or designate 
the oﬃcial person who would have the charge of supervising and analyzing the activi-
ties of state agencies in the sphere of national security protection. The SSC Regulations
do not provide any directions concerning the periodicity of reports presented by heads 
of the governmental institutions, concerning the structure and content of the reports, 
the executive oﬃcial who would have the charge of developing, presenting and guaran-
teening truthfulness of the information.
The National Security Concept (NSC) of the Republic of Moldova, endorsed by the
Decision of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova nr. 445-XIII from May 5, 1995 
provides that the SSC acts within the legal framework established by an organic law 
passed by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. At the same time, according to 
the Law on national defense, nr.345-XV from July 25, 2003, which came into force on 
September 19, 2003, the SSC Regulations are approved by the President of the Republic 
of Moldova.
According to the Law on National Defense passed on March 17, 1992, the President 
of the Republic of Moldova has full responsibility for the defense capacity of the state 
and military capacities of the armed forces. At the same time, according to the deci-
sion of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova from June 6, 1995 concerning the 
Military Doctrine of the Republic of Moldova, the responsibilities for the state military 
security, improvement and development of the armed forces are carried out by the 
President together with the Parliament and the Government.
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1.3. The degree of correspondence of the SSC structure and its Service  
        to functions and missions established by their regulations
The SSC competencies, taking into consideration the norms coming from the Re-
public of Moldova’ legislation, are restrictive. These competencies are based on the
military component of national security and protection of public order. Other com-
ponents of national security, such as political, economic, social and ecological aspects, 
are taken into account insuﬃciently. State institutions having as an object of their ac-
tivity some legal aspects concerning political, economic, social and ecological security 
do not provide in their internal regulations any actions concerning national security 
protection.
There are no provisions concerning the ideological component of social security
in the legislation of the Republic of Moldova. There are also no provisions concerning
social security (ideology) and actions directed to grant it in the Council’s and other 
state institutions’ attributions.
The actual structure of the SSC Service does not correspond to the functions speci-
ﬁed in the SSC Regulations. The SSC Service activity is practically limited to the orga-
nization of SSC meetings. The clause of the SSC Regulations (ch. IV, art. 8/b) about the
fact that the Service’s function is “to examine the information and materials concerning 
national security issues” is not carried out.
The main factors that cause poor information ﬂows to the SSC Service are the fol-
lowing:
• There is a lack of legal regulations that would establish an eﬃcient mechanism
of information exchange;
• The structure and components of the Service do not allow eﬃcient information
distribution;
• The structure of information distribution. At present, the main information
sources of the SSC Service are the reports presented by ministries and other 
state institutions. This fact creates certain dependence of the SSC Service and
respectively of the Council itself on the information received from the govern-
ment and state structures. Thus, it implies a signiﬁcant decrease in the degree of
objectivity of information as well as of the subsequent SSC decisions.
2. The SSC Service’s functional structure and decision-making ability
2.1. SSC Secretary’s role, functions and prerogatives
According to the SSC Regulations the President of the Republic of Moldova can 
appoint as the SSC Secretary only a civilian. SSC Secretarial combines the post of the 
SSC Service director and the post of the Councilor to the President of the Republic of 
Moldova on national security issues.
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The SSC’s Service coordination of the state agencies’ activity is limited to drafting,
by common agreement, of decrees concerning the implementation of the Council’s pro-
posals (art. 12). The SSC Secretary does not have the prerogatives which allow him to
follow the implementation of the SSC decisions or to intervene in any manner when the 
implementation meets diﬃculties or demands collaboration of certain state structures.
The SSC Secretary’s activity is determined mostly by the SSC Secretary’s profession-
al abilities and at the same time the boundaries of intervention of the SSC Secretary are 
determined by the intervention ability of the Service. In addition, the Secretary cannot 
intervene in the Service formation and in the deﬁnition of its functions.
2.2. SSC Secretary’s capacity of inﬂuence
According to the Supreme Security Council’s and the SSC Service’s functioning 
mechanism, the SSC Secretary introduces issues into the SSC agenda. It can also deny 
the SSC Service proposals of convocation. Naturally, this situation is not valid in cases 
when the decision to convene a meeting is made by the President of the Republic of 
Moldova.
As SSC Service director, the SSC Secretary controls the monitoring of the imple-
mentation of the Supreme Security Council’s decisions. At the same time, the Supreme 
Security Council Secretary, as a councilor of the President of the Republic of Moldova, 
may intervene alongside the President in case problems demanding eﬀective interven-
tion appear and the degree of danger or impact on national security of these problems 
do not demand the convocation of the SSC. The SSC Secretary is responsible for solv-
ing this problem.
Certain crisis situations serve as a motive for granting extra-regulations power to 
the SSC Secretary. The power granted to the SSC Secretary is not clearly deﬁned. If it is
granted to him as an even SSC Secretary then it means that the critical emergency con-
cerns national security, though it is solved outside the frames of the SSC. The criteria
which determine the fact that the issue is not examined in the frames of the SSC, but 
directly by the SSC Secretary by the President’s instructions are not known as well.
Thus, the SSC Secretary’s ability to exert inﬂuens is wider than the attributions
reﬂected in article 12 of the SSC Regulations which are to govern the SSC Service, to
work in common agreement with the departmental bodies of the decree projects con-
cerning the realization of SSC proposals, and the fulﬁllment of duties of councilor.
2.3. SSC apparatus role and inﬂuence
The SSC Service monitors the issues covered by the SSC terms of reference, though
there are no clear criteria that determine what issue is in the SSC competence. (“Issues 
in the SSC competence” presents us again with the fact that there is no systematic exa-
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mination of the issues concerning national security in SSC activity; these problems 
selectively apply to SSC “competence” selectively).
A problem can be put on the SSC agenda thanks to certain evolutions around it and 
if the SSC expert believes that the situation is worth being examined by the SSC. The
SSC Secretary makes the decision to add the proposal to the SSC agenda. It is obvious 
that this mechanism does not provide for a certain periodicity in the examination of 
national security issues.
In the frames of fulﬁlling its functions, the SSC Service (including its members)
can request information from ministries and other state structures for information 
distribution and in order to prepare for meetings.
SSC Service inﬂuence consists in pertinent documenting of (a) the proposals for
the agenda and (b) of the issues passed for the agenda and now are under elaboration, 
because on the documenting quality depends both the formulation of the issue (and 
the resolution entered on approval) and the entering of the issue on the agenda.
2.4. Human recourses policy within the SSC
In the SSC Regulations all the staﬀ requirements are limited to exercising the duties
of the Supreme Security Council.
Taking into account the SSC Service sphere of activity and degree of inﬂuence over
the Supreme Security Council decisions, we can aﬃrm that the formulation of certain
obligatory demands of the candidates is necessary or at least similar demands should 
not be ignored while employing a candidate. These factors – professional, psychologi-
cal, moral, civil and other qualities – can inﬂuence not only the quality of the work
done by the Service employment but on the evolution of certain aspects concerning 
national security or on national security as a whole.
Alongside with the professional and psychological qualities, candidates employed 
by the SSC Service should be bearers of national values, which they ought to protect by 
means of the realization of national security politics. Their political convictions should
be based on the values of social (ideological) security.
Any deviation of the employee from the fundamental national values of the social 
(ideological) aspect presents a danger to the Republic of Moldova’s national security 
and the expert in charge should naturally be relieved of his post in the SSC structure.
The staﬀ recruitment for the SSC Service does not diﬀer from the customary prac-
tice (the imperfect one) of the recruitment of public employees in the superior state 
bodies.
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2.5. The attribution of the SSC Apparatus’ staﬀ
At the present moment every main SSC Service consultant, including the Secretary, 
monitors the activity of a certain segment of national security (in the current Regula-
tions formulation), including ministries and specialized state structures. Several ex-
perts can analyze a complex problem involving multiple issues.
Subordinate structures, aﬃliated societies and subsidiaries
In legal terms, the SSC is a consultative body and no state structure can be subordi-
nate to it. There are no norms in legislation that provide for the aﬃliation or subordi-
nation of certain state bodies. However, the SSC is the only body that has as the object 
of its activity the Republic of Moldova’s national security, and other state structures are 
responsible only for certain elements of the Republic of Moldova’s security.
Aﬃliated structures are all the state structures of the national security system: Min-
istry of internal aﬀairs, Ministry of Defense, Information and Security Service, Anticor-
ruption and Economic Crime Control Center, Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Civil Protec-
tion and Emergency Situations Department, State Guard and Protection Service, Border 
Troops Department, degrees of jurisdiction, Prosecuting magistrate bodies, transport 
infrastructure security bodies, environmental protection bodies. As supporting struc-
tures, they can serve any organization or person not involved in the national security 
system, coming with relevant initiatives for national security system improvement.
There is no speciﬁcation in the legislation about the structure and the quality of
relations between the SSC and other state structures. The only current Regulations
stipulation is the provision by the SSC Service that SSC conduct activity eﬃciently. SSC
Service doesn’t have direct and eﬃcient levers by means of which it can implement SSC
decisions or promote national security politics. The SSC Service can only analyze the
evolution of certain security problems and the implementation of SSC decisions and 
in case the decision is not implemented, the SSC Service should make a report. At the 
same time, legal norms do not provide regulations that can oblige the state aﬃliated or
subsidiary structures to oﬀer the SSC Service the requested information.
Common spheres of competence and the object of relations between 
the SSC or its apparatus with diﬀerent subordinate structures,  
aﬃliated societies and subsidiaries
Military security is the only domain of national security in common with other 
state bodies. Being more precise, military security is the only domain entirely exam-
ined in the legislation of the Republic of Moldova concerning national security.
Amongst other components of national security only political security is consid-
ered relatively modestly, in terms of neutralization of threats towards the constitution-
al regime. The main gap concerning national security is in its ideological component.
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Economic, social and environmental protection security were examined within the 
necessary limits of the provision of military security and combat against violent mena-
ces to the Republic of Moldova.
The objective of relations between the SSC Service and other relevant bodies consists of:
a) data concerning the present state and history of the (sub)domains in the SSC 
responsibility;
b) data concerning the implementation of decisions made by the SSC or other bo-
dies.
According to the National Security (NS) Concept, the following can contribute to 
the provision of national security by means of directly or indirectly advancing to the 
SSC proposals concerning legislation improvement, or the models and means of secu-
rity provision: the state bodies system with duties in the domain of security provision, 
companies, institutions and organizations, public associations or citizens.
There are no cases when companies, institutions and organizations, or public as-
sociations of persons hale contributed to the provision national security by means of 
directly or indirectly advancing to the SSC proposals. (Sometimes, the proposals are 
advanced by means of mass media, but there have been no cases when those proposals 
have been examined by the SSC).
3. Operative analysis of the SSC Service activity
3.1. Decision-planning and decision-making mechanisms
Identiﬁcation and evaluation of the stages of the decision-making process
At the ﬁrst stage, the SSC Service collects the information and monitors the pre-
vious SSC decisions’ implementation and results, as well as identiﬁes and formulates
issues concerning national security. Analysis and evaluation of the issues is made tak-
ing into consideration the potential risk and relevance (emergency case or crisis) that 
is characteristic to the national security problems. SSC Experts advance the proposals 
concerning the examination of certain problems in the purview of the SSC, when they 
consider that the evolution of the situation concerning this issue demands the Coun-
cil’s intervention. The direct addressee of the experts’ (or expert’s) initiative is the SSC
Secretary, who analyses proposals and decides whether they will beput on the Council’s 
agenda. The ﬁnal variant of the SSC meeting’s agenda is established by the President
of the Republic of Moldova who can refuse the Secretary’s proposals and advance new 
issues for examination. It’s obvious that the SSC has no plan of activity nor  systematic 
consideration of national security problems. The majority of the problems worked over
by the decision-implementation mechanism are concerned with current critical prob-
lems. The decision is considered and passed unanimously by the Council members.
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Informational circuitries
The SSC Service is the institution that gathers information, processes it and presents
the results to the Council. The main sources of information are the state structures,
which oﬀer the Service, on one hand, information concerning the evaluation of na-
tional security, and on the other hand, information concerning the  implementation 
of SSC decision. The mechanism of informing the SSC is inadequate. For at least two
reasons the information oﬀered by the state structures cannot be regarded as objective.
First of all, state structures are quite tendentious in the appreciation of their own activ-
ity, and secondly, based on only one source of information it is impossible to create an 
objective account of reality.
Practice of putting the issues on the agenda
The Security Council hasn’t got a plan of activity for a speciﬁed time – the period
of presidential mandate plan, annual plan and the term plan. The decisions made con-
cerning putting issues on the SSC agenda are spontaneous and made ad hoc. The SSC
Service Regulations do not oﬀer any criterion or models for putting issues concerning
national security on the Council’s agenda. There are four identiﬁed sources of issue
formulation for the agenda:
• The President of the Republic of Moldova;
• the SSC Secretary;
• SSC Service members;
• Any other institution able to formally contact the SSC Secretary.
The Council's meetings are convened on the President of the Republic of Moldova’s
initiative who, in his turn, is informed by and consults with the SSC Service concern-
ing certain situations or events they consider exceptional or critical. The calling of
emergency SSC meetings is an exclusive prerogative of the President of the Republic 
of Moldova.
The decision to put issues on the agenda made by SSC Secretary in charge depends
on how critical or grave is the situation. If the President approves the agenda, the SSC 
Service starts to prepare the issues and to inform the Council members.
Data base used to prepare issues put on the SSC agenda
In their everyday activity the SSC Service experts use the following types of data 
bases:
• data concerning the present state and history of the (sub)domains of SSC re-
sponsibility;
• data concerning the course of the implementation of decisions made by the SSC 
or other bodies.
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In both cases the SSC Service interpellates the relevant structures
According to the type of data base the SSC Service information sources subdivide 
into two groups: the institutions responsible for the implementation of SSC decisions 
and the institutions whose activity is in direct or indirect connection with one of the 
domains of SSC responsibility. The access to the data bases is not provided by legisla-
tion. The SSC Service receives the requested information for its eﬃcient activity from
the aﬃliated bodies of the Council: the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs, Ministry of De-
fense, Information and Security Service, Anticorruption and Economic Crime Con-
trol Center, Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Civil Protection and Emergency Situations
Department, SPSS, Frontier Troops Department, degrees of jurisdiction, Prosecuting 
magistracy bodies, transport infrastructure security bodies, and environmental pro-
tection bodies.
Due to such factors as institutional bureaucratization, and the tendency to overes-
timate needs and to underestimate abilities, the information oﬀered by the state struc-
tures often suﬀers shortcomings that distort reality. There is an interesting fact that in 
the frames of the state structures (ministries, departments etc.), except the Informa-
tion and Security Service, there are no specialized services that can analyze and work 
on the initial information.
Information processing
In the condition of the lack of a framework for regulation of the relations between 
the SSC and other state agencies, and of a common informational system between 
these institutions, the initial information processing demands more eﬀorts from SSC
Service experts. Each of the 3 Service experts is responsible for a particular domain or 
group of domains, which he or she should permanently monitor.
Substantiation basis used to motivate decisions and develop  
and implement solutions
There is no precise substantiation framework used to develop decisions and solu-
tions concerning security problems. We can deduce from the available information 
that the main substantiation arguments are legal ones that are adjusted to the current 
political interests. Such a consideration implies immediate results concerning current 
political interests. The current result has the priority, to the detriment of the strategic
view which itself contravenes the national security concept. While the national secu-
rity problem implies more aspects to be considered than just current legal and politi-
cal ones, the formulation of a solution adequate to the current and potential security 
provocations can not be made without considering historical, cultural, geopolitical, 
social, economic, and ethical factors in the decision-making process.
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Participation in the formulation of issues and implementation of decisions
SSC Service experts analyze the problems concerning national security and ad-
vance to the SSC Secretary  proposals for the examination of some issues. For every 
issue, the person assigned responsibility for that issue is either a member of the Coun-
cil or a competent person invited to the SSC meeting. In the process of issue formula-
tion, only aﬃliated structures of the SSC are allowed to take part indirectly. These
structures are, the Ministry of internal aﬀairs, Ministry of Defense, Information and
Security Service, Anticorruption and Economic Crime Control Center, Ministry of 
foreign aﬀairs, Civil Protection and Emergency Situations Department, SPSS, Frontier
Troops Department, degrees of jurisdiction, Prosecuting magistracy bodies, transport 
infrastructure security bodies, and environmental protection bodies.
The modalities of informing SSC members concerning  
the issues on the agenda
There is no speciﬁc modality for convening the SSC members. The members are in-
formed by telephone by the SSC Service referent. The procedure of informing the SSC
members about the issues on the agenda is to hand over the sets of documents and the 
agenda itself to each member of the Council the week before the meeting takes place. 
In case of emergency meetings, the members of the Council are informed about the 
issues on the agenda in an emergency order.
The way of proceeding and documenting the SSC meetings
SSC meetings can be divided into two categories: i) ordinary meetings, which take 
place once a month and ii) extraordinary meetings called ad hoc in critical situations, 
emergency cases or for other current problems what require an emergency solution. 
Based on the discussions taking place during the SSC meeting, the SSC Service referent 
records the minutes of the meeting, which are consequently handed over to members 
of the Council for conﬁrmation.
3.2. Prerogatives, mechanisms, rules and processes of coordination
   Identiﬁcation of the domains and object of coordination
Taking into account the concept of the Republic of Moldova’s national security, in-
cluding the elements mentioned in the working regulations of certain state structures 
(Information and Security Service, Ministry of internal aﬀairs, Ministry of Defense), we
can aﬃrm that the SSC on one hand and the military structures on the other have com-
mon spheres of competence in the military and political segments of national security.
Problems concerning other aspects of national security: economic and ecologic do-
mains (excluding social security) were under the SSC’s consideration. The state struc-
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tures’ regulations what concern the above domains do not refer to issues of national 
security.
Prerogatives, mechanisms, rules and processes of coordination
The Supreme Security Council does not have the ability to coordinate the activity of
all the structures meant to provide national security for the Republic of Moldova. The
SSC is a consultative body and the heads of the state structures are interested in operat-
ing of their own institutions, and within the state institutions there are no services to 
deal with the coordination of relevant domains of national security.
The coordination of State structures’ activity as the subjects of the provision of state 
security must be in the SSC Service’s competence. The activity of the Service in this
sphere should be directed at two main elements.
One element is the coordination of activity of the structures involved in solving 
a speciﬁc problem concerning national security, or the structures involved in a whole
series of provision for security issues. The ﬁrst of these 2 components is limited in time
and becomes useless once the speciﬁc problem is solved, though it is still under the SSC
Service’s consideration for a period of time. The second component doesn’t depend on
time and can disappear only together with the state system and sovereignty. Even if 
national security problems were totally eliminated (utopia!), the activity for the provi-
sion of national security must be continued.
The second element in the coordination of activity for the provision of national
security is logistics and strategic planning. The term logistics implies the SSC Service
mechanism of gathering information received by state structures. The SSC Service uses
the gathered information in the elaboration of action plans for current problem solving 
and in readjusting already existing plans the aim of which is the exercise of a series of 
directions in order to provide national security. The information oﬀered by the state
structures is just a part of the total informational volume which the SSC Service ought 
to possess in order to develop eﬃcient state security provision plans.
The coordination of action between diﬀerent structures is necessary to solve each
problem concerning national security by common eﬀorts. The Supreme Security Coun-
cil is a coordinating institution of diﬀerent elements that provide national security. The
importance of the SSC consists in the level of representativeness of the members of this 
structure. Although the current organizational structure of the Council and the SSC 
Service is not able to provide eﬃcient collaboration of all of its elements that are meant
to solve concrete problems, it also cannot coordinate the national security system as a 
whole. The coordination with other bodies should be centered upon two essential ele-
ments. The ﬁrst consists of the presentation of a list of necessary actions which should
be taken into consideration when making a decision and the possible consequences in 
case the decision is not made. A similar list can be presented by every party interested 
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in solving a certain problem, and the SSC Service could systematize all the elements, 
presenting the result of its work to the SSC.
Another essential element of the coordination mechanism consists of oﬀering a list
of every structure (ministry, department, service, etc.) interested in solving a certain 
problem connected with national security. The list should contain the concrete propos-
als for solving this problem.
3.3. Implementation mechanisms and control mechanisms
   Mechanisms for decision implementation
Each decision made by the SSC has a person responsible for its implementation. Those
who execute the decisions are members of the Council. It is a common practice that the 
appointed person responsible is the minister or the head of a service, department, center, 
etc., and should be one whose competence includes solving the problem on the agenda. 
There are cases when several state institutions are involved in solving one problem.
The implementation of decisions is monitored by the SSC Service. In the relation
“SSC Service – the structure responsible for the implementation of decisions”, the re-
sponsibilities of the ﬁrst are limited to the monitoring of decision implementation. The
mechanisms which would make possible certain interventions from the direction of 
the SSC Service in the process of decision implementation are not stipulated by regu-
lating norms.
Evaluation of the implementation mechanisms
In order to evaluate the mechanisms of decision implementation, it is natural to 
refer to evaluation criteria similar to those of management activities, such as eﬃciency,
eﬀectiveness, and the terms and systematic character of implementation. Implementa-
tion mechanisms do not diﬀer very much from administrative mechanisms. The main
diﬀerence between SSC decisions and common administrative circulars is the fact that
the ﬁrst are conﬁrmed directly by the President and their implementation is directly
monitored by the President of the Republic of Moldova.
Such a consideration of the implementation of SSC decisions increases the degree of 
implementation of decisions of a certain type, namely those considering current issues 
(e.g. the measures to combat leaders of the criminal world, the case with the “Fran-
zeluta”, Joint-stock company, the situations concerning illegal construction, etc.). At 
the same time, the problems what require thorough and long-term consideration suﬀer
from major shortcomings at the stage of their implementation. The reasons for such
state of things are, on the one hand, the impossibility for the President to monitor the ef-
ﬁciency of decision implementation (it is beyond his physical, psychic, and professional
possibilities) and, on the other hand, the lack of an eﬃcient mechanism to monitor deci-
sion implementation monitoring by the SSC Service.
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Another reason for ineﬃciency in decision implementation is the consideration of
the majority of national security problems separately from the entire national security 
context. This fact leads to an increase in expenses for solving problems which means
they are usually solved for their own sake – a fact that usually generates new problems.
Mechanisms (levers and procedures) of control (monitoring  
and setting right) of the decisions implementation
The SSC service experts monitor the implementation of decisions by the institutions
appointed responsible for it. There are no sanctions stipulated for the non-execution
of SSC decisions in the legislation and in practice. Based on the information received 
from the institutions responsible, Service experts report on the process of the execu-
tion of the decisions made at the SSC meeting. The monitoring report of the execution
of decisions is presented to the President of the state only when the decision is executed 
unwillingly by the institution responsible.
The execution of SSC decisions is controlled by the President of the Republic of
Moldova and by the SSC Service.
4. The practical role of the SSC in the provision of national security
4.1.  Identiﬁcation of the place of the SSC in the provision  
   of national security 
In such a complex domain as national security on which the very existence of the 
Republic of Moldova depends, the politics of the state are very modest and are limited 
only to the events and to the monitoring of security phenomena. In spite the fact that 
the Supreme Security Council is meant to provide the national security of the Republic 
of Moldova, the actual legislative framework of the regulation of the national security 
state policy is considerably underdeveloped, especially where it refers to the legislative 
framework of the SSC’s functional activity.
The national security of a state represents a complex system of relations between
the state bodies responsible for providing state security. That is why national security
can be eﬃciently provided only by the common eﬀorts of all the elements of the sys-
tem. Being the nucleus of this system, the SSC must provide good conditions for the 
course of actions concerning the provision of security. Unfortunately, at the moment 
the SSC is rather a body of purely technical assistance to  certain of the President’s cur-
rent aspects of activity. Its functions are limited to the statement of facts and to some 
current recommendations formulation. The national security system of the Republic
of Moldova is more a sphere of current actions dealing with the elimination of the 
results of fatal events and phenomena than a strategic domain dealing with the preclu-
sion and prevention of potential risks to national security.
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4.2. Identiﬁcation of the type and the contents of the relations between 
        the SSC and other components of the national security  
        provision system
The relations between the SSC and other components of the national security sys-
tem consist of information concerning the provision of national security. Within this 
informational system, the SSC Service is the information receiver, and the state organs 
are the information transmitters. The direction of the information ﬂow is practically
unilateral.
4.3. Evaluation of the practical role of the SSC  
        in the national security provision system
The Supreme Security Council represents the only body of the national security
system which has national security as its object. The SSC activity within the national
security system can be evaluated as unsatisfactory. After 14 years of independence the
Republic of Moldova is confronting numerous problems concerning security: territo-
rial, military, social, economic and cultural problems. During this period none of the 
major problems concerning security was solved, and the existence of the Republic of 
Moldova as a state is balanced precariously between the inﬂuence of the great powers
of the world.
The SSC, using its components and resources, was to consider national security
problems of the Republic of Moldova and to serve as a generator of national security 
system reformation. The main causes of deﬁciency of the SSC activity in this period
are: the lack of an adequate legal framework, inadequate structure of the Council and 
the SSC Service, and the lack of a conceptual framework what would cover all the prob-
lems concerning national security.
The actual way of organization and activity of the Supreme Security Council of
the Republic of Moldova does not correspond to the Republic of Moldova’s national 
security interests. The Council is beyond the provocations directed to the Republic of
Moldova national security and the evolutions which take place on the international 
arena. Thus, it cannot adequately cope with those provocations. The SSC activity is pre-
dominantly directed at solving imminent crises and strategically, it lacks a long-term 
consideration of the issues (spheres) of security as component parts of the national se-
curity of the Republic of Moldova. The legislation according to which the SSC activates
comprises only several isolated elements of national security, and ignores such spheres 
as economic, social, ecologic, cultural and spiritual, which are elements of political 
security. The actual organizational structure of the supreme Security Council doesn’t
permit it to act as a central element of the national security system, to consolidate this 
system and make it functional.
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5. Reserves and imperatives for improvement
5.1. Challenges for improvement of SSC activity
Room for improvement
The actual SSC structure, especially the SSC Service, is not only compatible with
provocations directed to the national security, and with the imperatives for further 
SSN ediﬁcation, but also with the objectives and functions of SSC regulations. Thus,
room for improvement is lacking absolutely. In this situation it is possible to speak only 
about the improvement of the current SSC Service activity by means of introducing 
standard techniques of operation management. The methods of strategic management
are inapplicable to the actual SSC structure.
Imperatives for improvement
The Supreme Security Council should represent the central element in the national
security system. To achieve that it is necessary to surpass the actual state and to create 
an eﬃcient Council which can unite around it the entire national security provision
system. The SSC should represent a connecting link of all the dispersed elements which
form the national security system.
The SSC reform pursues the transformation of the Council into a body which can
appropriately and eﬃciently react to the actual and eventual provocations directed at
the Republic of Moldova. The Supreme Security Council should become the main or-
ganizational and functional element of the security system of the Republic of Moldova. 
The essential aim of the re-formation is to transform the Supreme Security Council
into the fundamental element of a single united system of national security which 
would include all the elements of national security: military, political, economic, social 
and ecological security.
One important element of transformation is the development of a new Concept of 
national security. Giving up the doctrine concentrated on violent dangers and construc-
tion of a new concept that would correspond to the national interests is an essential 
aspect in the SSC institutional (structural and conceptual) and the entire national se-
curity system re-formation.
In order to surpass the actual state of  the SSC, the expansion of the SSC Service 
expert’s authority concerning control  over the execution of decisions and concerning 
intervention in the execution of SSC decisions is welcomed.
The proposals for the reformation of the SSC are a part of a package meant to trans-
form the Council into a body able to meet the national security interests of the Repub-
lic of Moldova. The SSC re-formation package should include conceptual innovations
as well as legislative ones. The national security Concept must cover ﬁve basic factors:
political, military, economic, social and environmental security. Thus, not only the
re-formation of the national security Concept as a fundamental document of the pro-
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vision of national security should be the undertaken, but also the re-formation of every 
sphere of security and of national structures. National security system reformation 
should include legislative interventions in order to specify the role and responsibilities 
of each state body in the sphere of national security provision.
5.2. The aspects of SSC and SSC Service re-formation
The re-formation of the Supreme Security Council would cover the following two
spheres:
1) Functional and organizational sphere;
2) Professional and values sphere.
Functional and organizational dimension
The functional and organizational aspect of the transformations follows the refor-
mation of the methods and mechanisms of the organization of Council activity as well 
as of the system of relations with the state structures responsible for certain national 
security spheres or elements.
The Supreme Security Council is formed by two substructures:
1) The Council itself (actual, eventual and SSC Permanent Oﬃce) and
2) the SSC Service.
The Council consists of (i) persons in charge and (ii) invited experts, who only have
the right to consultative suﬀrage. The SSC Service is formed by engaged consultants.
The persons in charge are divided in their turn into (a) the Council oﬃce mem-
bers and (b) permanent members appointed (and removed) by the President dwing 
his mandate. The oﬃce members are the President of the Republic of Moldova, the
Prime-minister, minister of the internal aﬀairs, director of the Information and Se-
curity Service, minister of Defense, minister of external aﬀairs, minister of Economy,
minister of Culture, and head of the Emergency state Department. Only the President 
of the Republic of Moldova has the right to appoint the SSC’s invited members.
Also, the President in charge appoints invited experts as SSC members during the 
period exceeding his mandate. He cannot remove those Council experts-members 
whose personal mandate hasn’t expired yet, even if they were appointed by the former 
president.
The Supreme Security Council Consultants form the SSC Service. The SSC activity
is coordinated by the SSC Secretary who is also a permanent member of the Supreme 
Security Council. Each consultant is responsible for one of those seven domains which 
form the national security system: cultural and spiritual, social, political, economic, 
technological, ecological, and military. Each consultant has his or her own deputy. 
Along with these seven experts a global, regional and local events forecasting expert 
will activate within the SSC Service.
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The Service Consultants will systematically consider information in order to iden-
tify problems and dangerous situations. The substantiation of the proposed solutions
will be in accordance with the national security Concept regulations and the speciﬁc
exogenous factors (historical, geopolitical, constitutional, legal, cultural, moral and 
ethical, economical and social ones). Based on the analysis of facts, values and argu-
ments of the critical situations and on the estimation of potential risks, the Service 
consultants will formulate proposals for overcoming critical situations or suggestions 
on avoiding and minimizing security dangers. These recommendations will be includ-
ed in the SSC meetings’ agenda for consultation purposes. In order to increase the 
eﬃciency of the Council’s activity, it is very important to undertake certain structural
changes. The Council’s Permanent Oﬃce should have a stable membership, leaving the
possibility to get interested outside persons to take part in a certain problem concern-
ing the competence of the institution they represent (for institutions not represented 
in the SSC).
The SSC Service consultants as well as the invited experts as Council members will
be appointed for 7 years and won’t be removed together with the changing of politi-
cal power in the country. After these 7 years the experts will be eventually proposed
to stay for another 7 years. The Service consultants’ activity concerns two functional
components: the monitoring of the situation in the national security sphere and action 
planning (for diﬀerent periods) in order to provide national security. Thus, the SSC
Service is formed by 2 components: the monitoring department and the strategic plan-
ning department. The consultants oﬀer in an obligatory way the alternative solutions
to those advanced by the state structures.
The action planning for the provision of national security will be made according
to long term, medium term and short term strategic planning. The minimum amount
of time of Service activity planning will be 1 month. Another functional component of 
the planning department is the coordination of state structure activity concerning the 
provision of state security.
The monitoring department exercises control over SSC decision implementation;
monitoring of the Parliament and Government activity (or other governmental struc-
tures) on the level of decision or implementation of law projects, etc.; and monitoring 
of economic, social, and ecological development. Within the process of SSC improve-
ment it is necessary to identify alternative information sources along with the oﬃcial
(state) ones. Such sources can be ﬁrst of all national and foreign mass communication
media, reports and studies of the public bodies (foreign NGOs should be included in 
the bodies whose concern is the provision of national security). 
The SSC Service is authorized to request from the state structures any information
concerning the sphere of national security provision. The SSC Service consultants and
the Council experts as well as any other members of the Council are granted free ac-
cess to the state archives.
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In order to reinforce the SSC administrative abilities it is necessary to delegate to the 
state structures the experts who would administer the solving of problems concerning 
internal national security. These experts will be appointed by the SSC and the post in
the ministries and departments must not be lower than vice-minister of the respective 
deputy director. These persons in charge should have a specialized consultant namely
in the speciﬁc aspects of national security and who would be appointed by a majority
vote of ²/₃ of the SSC members. Except the SSC members, the SSC Service consultants 
take part in the Council meetings with only a consultative vote. Only unanimous is-
sues can be put to the vote. The decision is conﬁrmed by the President of the Republic
of Moldova who takes the full responsibility of his decisions. 
Professional, civic and moral sphere
The professional aspect involves the SSC members’ and employees’ professional 
qualities. In order to be engaged and appointed as members of the SSC, the candidates 
must be known (formally or informally) as professionals. The Service consultants and
Council members must obligatorily speak the state language, because the SSC docu-
ments and works cannot be translated in order to avoid the possibility of leakage of 
information. Every person within the SSC should have a clear and active civic posi-
tion, without contradictions and which expresses and aﬃrms the fundamental values
of the people of the Republic of Moldova as well as the values necessary for the provi-
sion of eﬃcient integration of other ethno-cultural groups of the Moldovan society.
The SSC members and the SSC Service employees should have been born on the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Moldova and have been living for the last 15 years on the 
territory of the state. None of the persons within the SSC is allowed to have a double 
citizenship. The SSC members and employees cannot have a criminal record, cannot
be exposed in amoral behavior, including that which would ruin the bases of a model 
family and solidarity.
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HISTORY OF REGULATION
A. Before 1989
Not longer after its establishment as a unitary and sovereign state within its natural
borders, in December 1918, Romania went through a massive and comprehensive re-
organization. An important moment was the adoption of a new Constitution in 1923, 
which was considered one of the most modern in Europe at that time, as an expres-
sion of the great ambitions that had animated the Romanian political elite during those 
years. The Constitution stated in art. 122: “A Superior Council of National Defense will 
be established to be responsible, on a permanent basis, for the measures necessary to or-
ganize the national defense”. As a result, on March 14th, 1924, the Parliament passed the 
Law on organization of the Superior Council of National Defense. According to this law, 
the role of the Superior Council of National Defense was to “examine, coordinate and 
ﬁnd solutions to all matters pertaining to the national defense”. Although the role of the 
Council was so generously formulated, one can notice that the duties of this structure 
had in fact been primarily to synthesize information and, under certain circumstances, 
to coordinate, rather than to “ﬁnd solutions” to matters of national defense, which may 
even include, in certain cases, powers of operational command. This is the complete
opposite of the situation drawn by the post-1990 legislation, which stated the role of the 
Supreme Council of National Defense (SCND) mainly in terms of synthesizing infor-
mation and of coordination. A closer look at the actual powers of the Council clearly 
shows that it has rather a role of command or a role of “ﬁnding solutions”, if one is to put
it in the terms of the 1924 law. Another observation about the 1924 law is that it does not 
stipulate the powers of the Superior Council of National Defense. These were speciﬁed,
in a general manner, in the Rules of implementation of the law, which were promulgated 
by Royal Decree, six months after the law entered into force.
The Superior Council of National Defense was composed of the President of Coun-
cil of Ministers (as President), the Heir to the Throne of Romania (when he reached the
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age of majority), the Minister of War, the Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs, the Minister of
Trade and Industry, the Minister of Communications, the Minister of Public Works, 
the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Public Health, 
the Minister of Internal Aﬀairs, and a representative of the Army Superior Council
(possessing a consultative-only vote). A rapid examination of the membership of the 
Superior Council of National Defense displays an almost perfect overlapping with the 
Government. Out of the 12 members of the Council, with the exception of the Heir to 
the Throne and of the representative of the Army Superior Council, the members of the
SCND are also members of the Government. This impression of a perfect counterpart
to the Government is strengthened by the provisions of art. 2, paragraph. 2: “Apart 
from the Superior Council of National Defense, a permanent delegation composed of the 
ministers of the relevant departments will operate to satisfy the needs of the army related 
to the respective departments.”
It is also worthy of note that art. 1, paragraph 2 of the 1924 law states: “The decisions
of the Superior Council of National Defense are mandatory and engage the responsibility 
of the respective Minister, following the conﬁrmation of the Council of Ministers”. This
provision is a clear indication of the role of the Superior Council of National Defense 
as a structure subordinated to the Government.
The Council was required by law to be summoned by its President “mandatory, at 
least twice a year” (in March and September, as the law stated), its working meetings 
were secret and its records were kept in an archive that was secret as well. The matters
on the agenda were researched and prepared in advance by a “studies committee”, com-
posed of representatives of the ministries whose heads were members of the Council, 
as well as other experts appointed by the Ministry of War. The studies committees were 
always led by the Chief of the Romanian General Staﬀ.
The Council was assisted by a secretariat operating within the Romanian General
Staﬀ and led by an oﬃcer appointed by Royal Decree upon a proposal from the Army
Superior Council. This secretariat had three main functions: to centralize the issues
submitted to the Council for decision-making, or to the studies committee for research; 
to notify the interested departments about the decisions made by the Council and to 
follow-up on the implementation of these decisions. The mission of decision imple-
mentation monitoring should be noted. 
The 1924 law was supplemented by a set of Regulations regarding the implementa-
tion of the law on the Superior Council of National Defense, which was promulgated 
by Royal Decree on 17 September 1924. In our opinion, these implementation rules 
went beyond the mere implementation of the law by exceeding its provisions at times. 
This was the case from the very ﬁrst article, which spelled out the role of the Council
in a more speciﬁc and articulate manner. Thus, the Council’s role was to “examine and 
decide on all matters related to the national defense that require coordination among 
several ministries”, to “coordinate the eﬀorts and keep the balance between all the needs
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of the country, by providing the army with the desired military strength and with all the 
necessary means”, “to create and maintain the links between the ministries in order to 
ensure that the needs of the army are met”, “to study in peace time all the issues related to 
the defense of the country and to decide on the appropriate means to achieve it” (art. 1 of 
the Regulations). This makes clear the fact that the Council at that time played the role
of a coordination structure having a marked inter-ministerial nature and was estab-
lished to maintain an adequate level of national defense capabilities. These regulations
were formulated in a more speciﬁc way than the text of the law and this is the reason
why they sometimes exceeded its literal provisions.
On the other hand, one can notice the precise formulation featured by these Regu-
lations, which regulated in detail the procedures for the summons and operation of 
the Council and of its two subordinated structures: the studies committee and the 
secretariat.
Also noteworthy is the relation that the King (deﬁned in the 1923 Constitution
as the “head of the armed forces” in art. 88, paragraph 10) had with the Council. The
1924 law and its rules of implementation contain only one provision concerning the 
King. Both legal documents state that “His Majesty, the King, may summon the Council 
whenever he deems necessary, in which case he will chair the meetings”. The law did not
elaborate on the role of the President of the Council in such cases, but corroborating 
the provisions of both documents with the fact that the decisions of the Council could 
not enter into force without the subsequent sanction of the Government, the President 
of the Council of Ministers still remained part of the Superior Council of Defense 
without exerting its presidency. 
The 1938 Constitution, according to which the King was granted almost discretion-
ary powers, did not provide a structure like the one analyzed in this paper. 
This was also the case with the ﬁrst two communist Constitutions, in 1948 and
1952. Under these constitutional arrangements, the entire responsibility for national 
defense rested with the Government that, according to the 1952 Constitution, could 
organize under its authority any kind of “services” dealing with any type of problems.
Under the 1965 Constitution, the executive responsibility for national defense rest-
ed with the Defense Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania, which was led by 
the President of the Republic that was a newly introduced position. The SRR Defense
Council issued decisions concerning the organization of defense, which were manda-
tory for the Council of Ministers. Law 5/1969 provided the legal basis for the organiza-
tion and operation of the SRR Defense Council. 
This law clearly states even in its preamble two fundamental features that deﬁne the
nature and the role of the Defense Council. Firstly, the purpose of the Defense Coun-
cil was to “examine, coordinate, and ﬁnd solutions to the main problems in the ﬁeld of
national defense and security, both in peace and war time”. Secondly, the law details the 
subordination of the Council: “[The Council] is accountable for its whole activity to the
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Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and to the Great National As-
sembly, and to the Council of State, between its sessions”. One should remember that, at 
that time, Romania was under a constitutional system proclaiming that the Romanian 
Communist Party was “the single political force of the entire people” playing “the role of 
the leading force”. Art. 1 of Law 5/1969 deﬁnes the Defense Council as a “deliberative 
body” and art. 6 states that its activity complies with “the principle of collective work 
and leadership”, a tenet that was both vague and ineﬃcient, but kept in high esteem by
the propaganda of that time.
The Council could be summoned only by its President at least twice a year and made
decisions by simple majority vote openly cast by its members. According to the law, the 
Defense Council was composed of: president (the secretary general of the Commu-
nist Party), members (the president of the Council of Ministers, the minister of armed 
forces, the president of the State Security Council, the minister of internal aﬀairs, the
minister of foreign aﬀairs, the president of the State Planning Committee, other mem-
bers nominated by the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and ap-
pointed by decrees of the Council of State), and a secretary (the Chief of General Staﬀ).
According to Decree 295/1968 on the establishment, organization and operation of the 
State Security Council, the president of this structure, who was in fact the person in 
command of the secret service of communist Romania, which was mostly undertaking 
activities of political police, had a rank of minister and was a member of the Govern-
ment. This was decided following the changes that occurred in the relations between the
power groups at that time, after Nicolae Ceausescu acceded to the top position of the
Romanian state. Thus, it was decided that the security structures would be subordinated
both to the Government and to the Communist Party. Prior to that moment, the Roma-
nian “Securitate” had operated almost as a separate power of the state.
The main roles of the Defense Council were: to deﬁne the “ fundamental conception 
of defense system of the SRR”; to approve the measures concerning general organization 
of the armed forces, the plans for mobilization and use of resources during war, and 
the measures of “operative preparation” of the national territory; to consider reports 
from ministers and heads of departments regarding national security; to examine and 
propose to the Great National Assembly and the Council of State the declaration of 
the “state of necessity, of mobilization and of the state of war” and to directly lead the 
military operations during war times.
B. After 1989
The Supreme Council of National Defense (SCND) was established under this title,
immediately after the fall of the Ceausescu regime in December 1989. One of the ﬁrst
tendencies of the new authorities, which responded to a radicalized opposition caused 
by the violent nature of the regime change, was to completely eliminate the commu-
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nist power structures, including by their formal abolition and by avoiding the use of 
infamous words such as “security” in the title of the new structures. In this spirit, the 
new authorities installed immediately after December 1989 decided to eliminate the
Defense Council under its communist form and dissolve without delay the State Secu-
rity Department, the political police of the Ceausescu regime also bearing the ominous 
legacy of the years of terror during the Gheorghiu-Dej regime. In search for histori-
cal and democratic legitimacy, the newly established bodies often received names that
echoed their counterparts in the interwar period of the Romanian democracy. As the 
title of the institution analyzed in this paper was the “Superior Council of National De-
fense” during the ‘20s and ‘30s, the title of its post communist counterpart was slightly 
changed to the “Supreme Council of National Defense” (SCND).
In December 1990, even before the ﬁrst post communist Constitution was adopted,
the Parliament passed Law 39 regarding the establishment, organization and operation 
of the SCND. Law 39/1990 , subsequently abrogated by Law 415/2002, established an 
SCND composed of 8 members (the minister of industry and trade, the minister of 
defense, the minister of foreign aﬀairs, the minister of internal aﬀairs, the head of the
Political Analysis Department of the Presidency, the director of the Romanian Intel-
ligence Service (RIS), the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS), and the 
chief of General Staﬀ) and led by the President of Romania, as a chair, and by the Prime
Minister, as a deputy chair. Given that this law was adopted prior to the 1991 Consti-
tution and that it was supposed to be implemented during a period of constitutional 
void (the communist Constitution from 1965 had been abolished de facto in Decem-
ber 1989), the law-makers did not pay enough attention to a precise deﬁnition of the
constitutional nature of the SCND. Instead of deﬁning its position within the system
of state powers, the law-makers only deﬁned the SCND by its ascribed role. Thus, Law
39/1990 states in its ﬁrst article that the SCND is established “ for the purpose of organ-
izing and coordinating the activities related to the national defense and security of the 
state both in peace and war times”. Although the SCND was deﬁned as a kind of gen-
eral administrator of the activities related to defense and “national security”, its actual 
prerogatives rather suggested the proﬁle of an authority with full powers. According to
Law 39/1990, the SCND essentially had three categories of powers:
1. to initiate documents for the approval of the Parliament (the doctrine of national 
defense, the structure of the national defense system, the declaration of the state of 
war, cease of hostilities, armistice agreements and the cease of states of conﬂict);
2. to make decisions on the general organization of the armed forces and of other 
components of the national defense system, the measures of defense when Ro-
mania is attacked, the deployment and redeployment of the grand units on the 
national territory, the plan for the mobilization of the national economy during 
the ﬁrst year of war, prognosis studies on the organization of production of mili-
tary equipments, long-term programs for providing army equipments and sup-
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plies, the plan of cooperation between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry 
of Internal Aﬀairs regarding the “surveillance and defense of important objectives 
on the national territory, maintaining and restoring the legal order”, the draft in-
ternational treaties and agreements in the ﬁeld of national defense, etc).
The third type of prerogatives of the SCND granted by this law cannot be easily cat-
egorized. The legal text states: “[the SCND] analyzes the situations susceptible to make 
necessary the declaration of the state of emergency as well as the declaration of partial or 
general mobilization”. It should be noted that, according to the ambiguous legislation in 
force in 1990, both the declaration of the state of emergency and of the partial or general 
mobilization fell under the responsibility of other structures of the state, and this is the 
reason why the lawmaker stated that the SCND “analyzes” these situations without giv-
ing any indication about what role these analyses were to play. 
As far as organization and operation are concerned, the provisions of Law 39/1990 
were not much diﬀerent from the ones regulating the SCND of today (Law 415/2002).
The SCND had a secretariat organized within the Presidency of Romania, it was sum-
moned on a quarterly basis or as needed, by its President or by one third of its members 
and needed a quorum of two thirds of its members to make decisions. However, diﬀer-
ences are visible in the decision-making procedures: while the 2002 law provides for 
consensus decision-making, the 1990 law stipulates the open simple majority vote as a 
decision-making rule. The 1990 law also states that “the president of the SCND coordi-
nates and guides the entire activity of the council”; in the absence of the president, these 
prerogatives were assumed by the vice-president. 
It is also noteworthy the legal provision according to which the “decisions made by 
the SCND are compulsory for all Romanian citizens, as well as for all the institutions 
and units that they refer to”. If judged against the democratic standards to which Ro-
mania adheres nowadays, such a legal provision would be inadmissible today, because 
the SCND substituted a legislative body by an erga omnes extension of the obligatory 
character of its decisions. 
According to Law 39/1990, the SCND had the obligation to present an annual re-
port or, to report to the Parliament whenever requested. It is noteworthy that the 1990 
Law states that the annual report and any other reports were to be presented in front 
of the legislative body by one of the SCND members. Therefore, neither the SCND
president, nor the vice-president were obliged to give the Parliament an explanation of 
their activity at the top of the SCND. 
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THE SYSTEM OF LAW 415/2002
Law 415/2002 on the organization and operation of the Supreme Council of Na-
tional Defense deﬁnes this body as “the autonomous administrative authority in charge, 
according to the Constitution, of the organization and the unitary coordination of the ac-
tivities that concern national defense and security” (Art. 1). It should be noted that the 
2002 law, still in force at present, preceded the constitutional amendments adopted in 
2003 and it reﬂects the provisions of the 1991 Constitution.
The 1991 Constitution stated in Art. 118: “the Supreme Council of National Defense 
organizes and unitarily coordinates the activities that concern the national defense and 
security”. This makes clear that the 2002 law literally reproduced the constitutional
text in force at the time when it was passed by the Parliament. Deﬁning the SCND
as an “autonomous administrative authority” also has constitutional roots. Thus, the
article pertaining to the SCND was part of section 1 (“Specialized central public ad-
ministration”) within Chapter V (“Public Administration”) of the Constitution in force 
at the time when Law 415 was passed. Its nature of an “autonomous administrative 
authority” clearly stands out by corroborating the constitutional provisions mentioned 
above with Art. 115(2) of the same Constitution, which provides for the possibility of 
specialized bodies of the central public administration to be organized either under 
the authority of the Government and its ministries, or as “autonomous administrative 
authorities”. Anyhow, it clearly results from the provisions of the Constitution and of 
the organic law that the intention of the law-makers was to render the SCND autono-
mous from the Government, even though this is impossible for practical reasons, as 
will be emphasized later in this paper. 
The Romanian Constitution as modiﬁed in 2003 stipulates in Art. 119: “The Supreme
Council of National Defense organizes and unitarily coordinates the activities concerning 
national defense and security, the participation in maintaining international security and 
in collective defense within military alliance systems, as well as the participation in peace 
keeping and peace reestablishing operations”. A comparison of the two constitutional 
provisions related to the SCND makes clear that the one in the 2003 Constitution is 
more comprehensive and substantive and better adjusted to the security needs of the 
Romania of today, as a member of an active military alliance and prospective member 
of a pan-continental Union with a high degree of integration, a Union that, among other 
things, seeks to integrate the foreign and defense policies of its members. For these rea-
sons, these new constitutional provisions should be followed by a new law regarding the 
organization and operation of the SCND, as a matter of urgency.
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SCND and the Parliament
According to the same Law 415/2002, “the activity of the SCND is submitted to par-
liamentary examination and veriﬁcation” (Art. 2). The phrase “examination and veri-
ﬁcation” indicates a form of parliamentary control which is both strict and, above all, 
total. However, the law promptly stipulates that the only way the Parliament can control 
the SCND is by examinations of the SCND activity reports. These reports are to be ob-
ligatorily submitted on an annual basis or “at any time deemed necessary”, at the request 
of the specialized Standing Committees of the Parliament. The latter formulation is
obviously vague, since, in general, impersonal phrases like “as deemed necessary”, “as 
ascertained” or “as decided”, without specifying who deems necessary, ascertains or de-
cides, leaves room for idle and muddled practices. The SCND reports are to be submit-
ted in a joint meeting of the two Chambers (as per Art. 2 in Law 415 corroborated with 
Art. 62, paragraph. 2(f) of the 1991 Constitution). From these provisions it follows that 
no aspects involving classiﬁed information can be examined during these meetings.
Given that working with this type of information lies at the very core of SCND activity, 
can easily conclude that the parliamentary control can only be superﬁcial one, even
though it is literally deﬁned as “examination and veriﬁcation”.
An alternative type of parliamentary control over the SCND has developed in ac-
tual practice, which can be more appropriately termed as parliamentary control over 
individual members of the SCND as opposed to control over the institution of SCND 
in its entirety. According to the law, the SCND is primarily composed of members of 
the Government and also of heads of the intelligence services. Both the members of the 
Government and the heads of the intelligence services are placed under parliamentary 
control in virtue of their respective oﬃcial positions. Since they are members of the
SCND also in virtue of their oﬃcial positions, it follows that they can be checked by
the relevant Standing Committees also for their activity within the Defense Council. 
An SCND meeting held on February 28, 2005 illustrates this point. This meeting was
summoned by President Traian Basescu to discuss the possibility of changing the na-
tional security strategy in order for it to allow Romania to participate, together with 
other allied states, in preemptive military actions. As this issue is no less controversial 
in Romania than it is at the international level, the opposition reacted without delay 
by criticizing the President’s proposal and using the means of parliamentary control at 
their disposal. As the opposition has the chairmanship of the Foreign Aﬀairs Stand-
ing Committee in the Senate, this committee called the Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs
to explain during a hearing what happened at the SCND meeting and his position on 
the issue under debate. Thus, the Parliament used a normal constitutional procedure
to exert its control over the Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs, in his capacity as a member of
the Government, but also in relation with his activity within the SCND, the end result 
being a form of control over the SCND. 
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However, in our opinion, there is no rigorous parliamentary control over the activ-
ity of the SCND, even though this conclusion might be tempered by the features of 
the constitutional and political framework in force. If judged against the standards of 
a parliamentary republic, the control exerted by the Romanian Parliament over the 
SCND is almost inexistent, while according to the standards of a presidential repub-
lic, the same control may seem satisfactory. As the majority of experts are in agree-
ment that Romania is a “semi-presidential” republic, which may also be interpreted 
as “semi-parliamentary”, the practice and the constitutional underpinnings of parlia-
mentary control over the SCND can be most appropriately assessed against general 
democratic criteria. One such criteria, in this case, can be the importance that the 
SCND itself attaches to this control, namely to the submission of its annual reports 
to the Parliament. What is noteworthy in this regard is that in practice the person 
presenting the report in front of the Parliament is the SNDC secretary, who has a State 
Adviser level in the presidential administration, equivalent to state secretary. One may 
deem that the President of Romania, who is also the President of the SCND (or the 
Vice-president of the SCND, in the absence of the President) should present the report, 
since they are the oﬃcials who lead this body and are responsible for its activities. The
fact that the presentation of the SCND report is delegated by the President to the secre-
tary general indicates not only that the President considers this report a mere formality 
(here the Members of Parliament have their own responsibility as they approve the 
report without going into much detail), but also that each party involved considers the 
parliamentary control as having little political signiﬁcance.
SCND and the Government
Although there is no legal text to deﬁne it in exact terms, the rapport between the
SCND and the Government is described in several legal norms. Law 415/2002 provides 
for two main categories of such rapports. 
First, there is a relation of subordination introduced by the unequivocal formula-
tion of Art. 3, which states that SCND decisions are “mandatory for the institutions of 
the central public administration and for the public institutions to which they refer”. This
relation of subordination is emphasized again in the second clause, which stipulates 
that these authorities “are responsible, under conditions established by law” for the 
implementation of the Council’s decisions. 
Second, there is a relation of coordination and collaboration resulting from the 
fact that most members of the SCND are also members of the Government. According 
to Art. 5 of Law 415/2002, the SCND is composed of ten members, out of which six 
are ministers (ministers of defense, internal aﬀairs, foreign aﬀairs, justice, industry,
and ﬁnance), two are directors of intelligence services (directors of the Romanian In-
telligence Service and of the Foreign Intelligence Service), the Chief of the Defense 
132
Staﬀ, and the presidential adviser for national security. The President of Romania is the
president and the Prime Minister is the vice-president of the SCND. Since most SCND 
members are also ministers in the Government, and the head of the Government is 
also the vice-president of the SCND, it follows that the activity of the SCND is govern-
mental at its core. At any rate, there are many arguments for the SCND to be consid-
ered as a part of the executive branch: its composition, its subordination to the Presi-
dent (one of the two peaks of the executive branch in Romania), and the chapter in the 
Constitution where the provisions related to the SCND are located, all these presum-
ably are the most convincing arguments. The impression of a “monolithic” presence of
the Government ministers in the SCND is strengthened by the fact that, according to 
Art. 7 para. 3 of the law, any propositions from the ministers who are members of the 
SCND must be approved by the Prime Minister before being included in the SCND 
agenda. However, the agenda of the SCND meetings is decided by the President “after
consultations with the Vice-president”, as the Law states. Given that no input from 
the ministries can be included on the SCND agenda without prior endorsement of the 
Prime Minister, it follows that the Prime Minister’s role in setting the SCND agenda is 
not only a consultative one, but rather a decisive one. 
However, in order to counterweigh the majority which the members of the Govern-
ment have in the SCND, the Law stipulates that the decisions of the SCND are to be 
made “by consensus”, and the Council is legally assembled in the presence of at least 
two thirds of its members, i.e. seven persons. It should be noted that, according to 
the Law, the President of Romania (the SCND President) and the Prime Minster (the 
SCND Vice-president) are not counted among the SCND members.
The SCND meetings
The SCND is summoned either by its President (the President of Romania) or by
one third of its members (i.e. 4 members). It is noteworthy that, according to the Law, 
the Prime Minister cannot summon the SCND by him or herself or together with other 
members, even though the SCND can be summoned by four members of the Govern-
ment who are also members of the SCND. Since the rule of the Prime Minister’s prior 
endorsement only applies to the documents to be included on the SCND agenda, it 
follows that an SCND meeting may be summoned by four SCND members, provided 
they are members of the Government, without the approval of the Prime Minister. This
can be considered as a procedural loophole which should be addressed in the future, 
by explicitly including the Prime Minister, who also serves as the Vice-president of the 
Council, among the members of the SCND. 
The Law states that the SCND meetings are secret. They are chaired by the SCND
President or, in his absence, by the Vice-president. In case a member cannot partici-
pate, he or she can be represented, without the right to vote, by his or her legal substi-
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tute. That is, a minister can be represented by a secretary of state; the intelligence serv-
ice director can be represented by his or her deputy directors; the Chief of the General 
Staﬀ can be represented by his or her Deputy; and the presidential security adviser can
be replaced by the subordinated adviser of state. All these substitutes may represent the 
absentees in the meetings, but they may not vote. 
The SCND meetings can also be attended by invited guests. The range of possible
invited guests is broad, as the legal provisions are quite wide-ranging: representatives 
of the Parliament (in our interpretation, this category may include not only mem-
bers of Parliament but also other oﬃcials who can represent it), representatives of the
central and local administration, of nongovernmental organizations, of other public 
institutions responsible for national defense and security, and of the civil society at 
large. These categories of persons should meet two conditions to be invited to attend
the SCND meetings. The law stipulates a substantive condition: their presence “being 
necessary in rapport with the issues on the agenda”; and a formal condition: their pres-
ence being authorized by the SCND president. In our interpretation, the law allows 
any SCND member and the vice-president to have the initiative of inviting a guest, but 
the president has the ﬁnal decision. The SCND president may also invite any person
from the above categories to attend a meeting, provided that such a presence is relevant 
to the issues on the working agenda. It is also noteworthy that there is a potential for 
confusion as the law uses two diﬀerent phrases: “working agenda” (agenda de lucru) in 
Art. 9 and “agenda” (ordinea de zi) in Art. 7. In our opinion, “working agenda” should 
be understood as a perfect synonym of “agenda”; otherwise the SCND can hold its 
meetings using two diﬀerent types of preparatory documents, out of which only the
“agenda” has an applicable legal procedure. According to the Law, the internal proce-
dures of the SCND are stipulated in a set of Regulations adopted by SCND decision.
The SCND Secretariat
According to the law, the “SCND has a Secretariat”. The Secretariat, whose compe-
tencies, organization and operation procedures are set out by SCND decision, operates 
within the Presidential Administration and is “coordinated” by the SCND Secretary. 
The SCND Secretary is appointed by the President of Romania and has the rank of
state adviser within the Presidential Administration. 
The SCND decision regulating the competencies, organization and operations of
the Secretariat, which still is in force, was adopted in the SCND meeting on February 
2nd, 2003. According to its competencies deﬁned by this decision, the Secretariat plays
two main roles:
a) To organize the SCND meetings;
b) To be an interface between the SCND/its president and public institutions in 
charge of national security issues.
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Regarding the organization of the SCND meetings, the Secretariat:
• drafts the agenda of the meeting, submits it to the President for approval, and
distributes it to the participants;
• according to the agenda, centralizes the working documents prepared by the 
relevant state agencies on the topics to be discussed and ensures that copies are 
available for each SCND member; 
• takes care of the proper organization of the SCND meetings, including the 
preparation of the meeting room with all technical supports;
• ensures that the SCND meetings are recorded on magnetic support;
• drafts the minutes of the meeting (a transcript of the recorded discussions),
which are checked and signed by the SCND Secretary;
• drafts the adopted decisions, submits them for signing to the SCND president,
and sends them in full or abridged form to the beneﬁciary institutions or to the
Oﬃcial Journal (if the law requires their publication);
• produces the protocol of the meeting and ensures that all SCND members 
signed it;
• keeps track of the SCND decisions and of all the documents discussed during 
the meetings;
• ensures the drafting, copying, management, handling, preservation/destruc-
tion, archival and transport of all classiﬁed documents and information within
the National Security Department of the Presidential Administration.
With regard to its “interface” role, the Secretariat has three main competencies:
1. It receives and manages documents and information coming to the SCND from 
the public institutions. The regulations clearly state that the Secretariat is in charge of
checking, analyzing and commenting on these documents in order to present them to 
the President or to make them available for debate within the SCND, according to the 
law. Thus, the Secretariat is the structure that evaluates and submits relevant proposals
regarding documents which are fundamental for the national security and their de-
velopment falls under the responsibility of the SCND, such as: the strategy of national 
security, the strategy of defense, the strategy of public order and national security, 
but also other current reports and measures that the SCND takes into consideration. 
The Regulations give a clear formulation of the general competency of the Secretariat:
“it keeps the president and the members of the SCND permanently informed about the 
problems of national security of Romania”. These provisions make clear that any infor-
mation coming to the SCND is processed by the Secretariat.
2. It drafts documents. The most important documents are the annual activity
report of the SCND and the annual report that the SCND must submit to the Parlia-
ment, according to the law. The Secretariat is also responsible for drafting the ap-
provals for the draft laws which require such approval, and expresses a legal opinion
on any document submitted for the attention of the SCND. At the same time, the 
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Secretariat suggests solutions for the problems raised by reports and memoranda sub-
mitted to the SCND.
3. It monitors the implementation of the SCND decisions. In this sense, the Sec-
retariat submits reports to every SCND meeting on the implementation of decisions 
adopted by the previous meetings. The SCND Secretariat is an interdepartmental
structure, which achieves its responsibilities in connection with other public agencies 
in charge with national security matters. 
The Secretariat operates within the Presidential Administration and is composed
of two compartments, one in charge of “expert analysis and drafting of the SCND docu-
ments” and the other in charge of “organization, planning and monitoring of the imple-
mentation of the SCND decisions”. According to the last SCND decision, the Secretariat 
employs ten permanent staﬀ. The Secretariat is coordinated by the SNDC secretary,
who also is a counselor in the President’s Administration, which means he or she is 
appointed by the president of Romania. The Secretariat is ruled by its chief, appointed
by the presidential counselor for national security at the SNDC secretary’s proposal. 
In this way the SNDC Secretariat is, from one side, a part of the National Security 
and Public Order Department within the Presidency, led by a presidential counselor, 
but having autonomy fully dedicated to SNDC activities. One of the SNDC members 
declared for us during the research interviews we conducted within this study: “The
SNDC is a virtual institution. It exists as a reality only through its secretariat”. We quot-
ed this opinion because we consider it relevant for our attempt to show as precisely as 
possible the role played by the secretariat in the SNDC activity.
The Secretariat personnel are mostly military: eight of ten have a military rank and
only two are civilian. With the exception of one civilian, all the Secretariat personnel 
are composed of persons temporary transferred from other public agencies (two from 
the Ministry of Defense, including the head of the Secretariat, one to three persons 
from the Ministry of Administration and Internal Aﬀairs, 1-3 from the Romanian
Intelligence Service where 2 of them are colonels, 1-2 from the Foreign Intelligence 
Service where both are colonels, one from the Presidential Administration, and one 
from the Special Telecommunications Service. 
The duties of the SCND
According to Law 415/2002, the Council has four main categories of duties:
– analyzes documents related to national security and constitutional order and 
submits them for debate and approval to other public institutions; 
– approves certain documents and measures of the same kind;
– coordinates certain activities related to Romania’s integration in the European 
and Euro-Atlantic security structures;
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– nominates and dismisses holders of certain positions, in special cases provided 
for by law.
Within the ﬁrst category of competencies, analyzing, debating and approval of some 
documents concerning national security and law enforcement to other state agencies, 
SNDC acts as follows:
a) initiates the drafts for:
– Romanian national security strategy
– Romanian military strategy
– Public Order and National Safety strategy in rapport with the authorized 
agencies’ responsibilities
– data, information and evaluation presented by (requested from) the intelli-
gence services and other structures with duties in the national security area
b) responds to the President’s requests and analyzes the drafts for:
– initiation of the state of siege (stare de asediu) or of the state of urgency
– declaration of the partial or general deployment of the armed forces
– responding to an armed aggression against the country
– declaring and stopping the state of war
– initiation, postponing or stopping of military actions
c) endorses the normative acts drafts initiated or issued by the Government on
national security issues which refer to:
– general organization of the armed forces and other agencies that have na-
tional security duties
– organization of the function of the armed forces and other institutions ha-
ving national security responsibilities
– organization and functioning of the SNDC
– preparation of the population, economy and territory for defense
– budgetary allocations to the ministries and institutions with responsibilities 
in security, public order and national safety 
– conditions for entering, transiting or presence of foreign troops on the terri-
tory of Romania
– assignment approval of high-ranking personnel whose status level corre-
sponds to the rank of lieutenant-general, vice-admiral or higher.
Within the second category of competences, those to approve some documents, the 
SNDC has the exclusive responsibility for:
• determining the basic guidelines for international relations that concern na-
tional security 
• drafts of international treaties and agreements having direct impact on, or re-
lated to national security
• relations to be established between national institutions and agencies having 
national security responsibilities with similar institutions abroad 
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• recruiting policy for military institutions during peace time
• armed forces action plans for passing to the state of emergency, mobilization, or 
war time and operational missions 
• action plans for cases when the state of mobilization or war time are declared 
• action plans for cases when the state of siege or state of emergency are declared
• national economy mobilization draft plan and state budget draft for the ﬁrst
year of war 
• population preparedness for defense and veriﬁcation plans including exercises
and mobilization practices
• recruits distribution quota for the institutions with national security responsi-
bilities 
• goals for territory preparation according to the operational needs for national 
defense system forces 
• determining inventory and levels of mobilization stocks 
• multi-annual programs regarding equipment supply for national defense sys-
tem forces 
• militarization, as the law requires, of economic agents whose activity is directly 
connected to the supply of resources for defense needs 
• joint intervention plans of the Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of 
Internal Aﬀairs units for limiting or eliminating the eﬀects of disasters on the
national territory
• regulations for special telecommunication networks and systems
• organizational structure and responsibilities of the General Headquarter 
• creation of the post of Military Commander subordinated to the General Head-
quarter and determining his attributions for unitary command during war time
• determining the list of infrastructure and high-ranking oﬃcials to be protected
by the Protection and Guard Service, the norms and rules concerning antiter-
rorist protection 
• reports and information concerning national security and presented by heads of 
public administration institutions
• general plans concerning information requests from institutions and agencies 
with national security responsibilities 
• main activities guidelines and leading actions necessary to neutralize national 
security threats 
• structure, organization, personnel and regulations of the Romanian Intelligence 
Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, Special Telecommunications Service, and 
Protection and Guard Service 
• operational expenses addressed to national security needs 
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• norms concerning planning, recording, utilization, justiﬁcation, and control of
operational expenses for the intelligence services activities concerning national 
security 
• reports concerning budget execution of operational expenses after approving
relevant agencies activity reports.
The SNDC also „monitors” the process of armed forces’ adaptation to NATO re-
quirements, which means it has a role to follow closely this process. As a consequence, 
the SNDC could „formulate recomendations in accordance with NATO staqndards”. 
THE REGULATIONS REGARDING SCND FUNCTIONING 
According to the provisions of Art. 10 of Law 415/2002, the SCND adopted Deci-
sion nr. 3 on February 10, 2003, which approved the Regulations regarding its own 
operations. These regulations were meant to formulate the details of the SCND opera-
tions, in accordance with the legal framework. The Regulations explain and apply the
provisions of the law and focus on the SCND meetings by giving details on what hap-
pens before, during and after these meetings.
Thus, the Regulations state that the SCND can also be summoned “at the initiative 
of at least four of its members” (Art. 1, para. 2), which translates into a clear procedure 
the legal provision referring to the right of “one third” of the members to summon a 
meeting. 
The agenda of the meeting is set by the President, after consultations with the
Vice-president, based on a draft proposed by the SCND Secretary. At the ﬁrst quar-
terly meeting in a year, the Secretary has the obligation to present a report on how the 
action plan for the previous year was implemented, and the SCND must analyze its 
activity report on the past year, which shall be presented during a joint session of the 
Parliament, according to the law. During each quarterly meeting the Secretary also 
has the obligation to make a presentation on the implementation of decisions which 
have deadlines before the date of the meeting, and of decisions to be implemented in 
the next quarter. 
The meetings are recorded on magnetic support and transcripts are produced. The
SCND Secretary signs the transcripts for conformity and the documents are archived 
together with the magnetic support. Based on these transcripts, the Secretariat drafts
a meeting protocol, which includes the conclusions of the debates and the decisions 
made and is signed by the Secretary, the members who attended the meeting, and the 
President. The Secretariat drafts the decisions in accordance with the transcripts and
forwards them to those concerned and, if needed, to the Oﬃcial Journal (Monitorul 
Oﬁcial) for publication, no later than ten days from the date of the meeting. 
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These Regulations contain a provision which may raise question marks about its
consistence with the letter and the spirit of law 415/2002. Thus, Art. 2 para. 2 states
that “between two meetings, in order for urgent issues to be solved, the Council makes 
decisions by obtaining the individual endorsement of its members”. By corroborating 
this provision with Art. 1 (19) of SCND Decision 4 of February 10, 2003 on the com-
petencies, organization and functioning of the SCND, which states that the Secretariat 
“drafts decisions between meetings in order for urgent issues to be solved and submits
them to the members of the Council to approve and sign them”, it clearly follows that the 
SCND can also make decisions outside its meetings. 
In fact, the SCND carries out its activities in accordance with an annual action 
plan. This plan is prepared at the beginning of each year by the Secretariat based on
proposals from the SCND members and directives from the President. Once approved 
by the President, the plan is disseminated to each member of the SCND and becomes 
the reference document on which the agenda of the meetings will be drawn up.
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION
Domestic and external political developments after 2002 have imposed adjust-
ments to the institutions and procedures of the national security system. These are the
three main events that directly aﬀected Romania over the past three years by requiring
changes to the national security legal framework: 
• Romania’s involvement in the ﬁght against terrorism, together with the United
States and its allies
• Threats to Romania’s security and to the international stability in general be-
coming more diverse
• Romania’s adherence to NATO.
Under the inﬂuence of these three factors, the SCND has received new competen-
cies and the existing ones, listed by Law 415/2002 have been further speciﬁed. How-
ever, the new competencies have not led to a real clariﬁcation of the nature and role of
the SCND among the institutions that compose the overall system of national security. 
In our opinion, adding new competencies to the SCND had its source rather in dispa-
rate intuitions about what the SCND should be, than in a policy evaluation assumed 
by the highest political level about what the SCND should become within the general 
context of the Romanian central administration.
In what follows, the main pieces of legislation pertaining to the SCND are brieﬂy
presented. 
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Law 535/2004 on preventing and combating terrorism
This law establishes the National System on Preventing and Combating Terrorism
(NSPCT) constituted with the participation of several public institutions and authori-
ties, under the coordination of the Romanian Intelligence Service through a Center 
for Antiterrorist Operative Coordination (CAOC) created within the Romanian In-
telligence Service precisely to ensure this coordination. The structure, personnel and
internal regulations of the CAOC are submitted to the SCND for approval. The public
institutions and authorities composing the NSPCT operate according to their speciﬁc
competencies outlined in a General Protocol of NSPCT Organization and Operation. 
This Protocol enters into force after it is approved by the SCND. The NSPCT experts
have the obligation to submit a report to the SCND on the implementation of the Pro-
tocol at least every six months, according to the law (Art. 13, para. 3). 
Regarding the actions against terrorism, the law introduces the notion of “contra 
terrorist intervention”, which takes place during or after terrorist acts. According to
Law 535/2004, the SCND “authorizes the execution of contra terrorist intervention”. 
Contra terrorist interventions must be implemented in accordance with a methodol-
ogy developed by the Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS), which is also approved by 
the SCND (Art. 12, para. 2). In this case, the SCND operates like a crisis group, but 
it is not exempt from continuing to observe the internal procedures set by law. More 
speciﬁcally, contra terrorist intervention is approved by a structure composed by the
Minister of Finance, Minister of Industry, and the Chief of General Staﬀ. In our opin-
ion, the bureaucratic complexity of this approval may have daunting consequences by 
aﬀecting the speed of reaction in case of a terrorist act.
Law 477/2003 on preparation for defense  
of the national economy and territory
This law sets “the measures and actions to be carried out in time of peace in order to 
utilize the economic and human potential of the country to meet the needs for defense and 
ensure the continuity of economic and social activities in case of mobilization and war.” 
The Government is the main party responsible for the implementation of these meas-
ures. However, the SCND plays a major role in planning and setting the magnitude of 
these actions meant to prepare for defense of the national economy and territory. 
Thus, the Government has the obligation to implement the measures decided by
the SCND in this area (Art. 3), which is in fact an application of the general principle 
stipulated by Law 415/2002 on the organization and operation of the SCND, according 
to which the decisions of the Council are mandatory for the public authorities they 
refer to. Moreover, the Government has the obligation to submit for SCND approval 
the draft plan for the mobilization of the national economy for defense, the draft pro-
gram containing the objectives of “operative preparation” of the national territory for 
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defense, and the draft state budget for war. The SCND plays an important role not only
in the approval of these plans and budgets, but also in their implementation. Although 
the Parliament makes the actual decision that these plans and budgets be implement-
ed, the SCND is the only public authority that can ask the Legislative body to make 
such a decision (Art. 11, para. 3). 
The SCND is the only public authority that sets the limits of the mobilization reserves,
including supplies of raw materials, equipments and other products with a long manu-
facturing cycle, which are needed by the institutions responsible for national defense, 
national security and public order. The practical details of how these reserves are consti-
tuted are set by the Government, but within the framework decided by the SCND.
Law 42/2004 on participation of the armed forces  
in missions outside the territory of the Romanian state
This law provides for several types of missions outside the national territory in
which the Romanian armed forces can participate: 
a) collective defense
b) peace supporting operations 
c) humanitarian assistance
d) coalition
e) joint exercises
f) individual
g) ceremonial
The SCND has a leading role in decision-making related to the ﬁrst four types of
missions. Before the June 30 of each year, the SCND must “analyze and decide” on pro-
posals presented by the Ministry of Defense on forces and means to be used during the 
next year for these types of missions. Based on this SCND decision, the Government 
allocates the necessary resources in the state budget. 
The decision to send Romanian troops on such missions is made by the President of
Romania, the SCND having only a consultative role in this respect. The decision-mak-
ing chain is the following: the Prime Minister proposes participation in missions 
abroad; the President consults the SCND, makes the decision and informs the Parlia-
ment about this decision in no later than ﬁve days. If the operation and deployment
is not required by an international treaty to which Romania is a party, then the mere 
information is not suﬃcient, but the President has the obligation to ask the permission
from the Parliament for the troops to be sent on a mission abroad. 
Law 473/2004 on defense planning 
This law stipulates that defense planning is based on two fundamental documents:
the Government Program and the National Defense Strategy. The Government Pro-
gram is adopted in the joint plenary session of the Romanian Parliament when a new 
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Government is invested in oﬃce, while the National Defense Strategy is submitted by the
President to the Parliament for debate and approval no later than six months after the
President is sworn in. In order to implement the provisions of the Government Program 
and the National Defense Strategy, the Ministry of National Defense prepares a Defense 
White Book, a “defense planning document at the departmental level”, as the law deﬁnes
it. This document must be adopted by the Parliament six months after the new Govern-
ment receives the conﬁdence vote. Until the Defense White Book is submitted to the
Parliament for debate, it must be ﬁrst “endorsed by the Government” and then “approved 
by the SCND”. Based on the National Defense Strategy, the Defense White Book, and the 
NATO Ministerial Directive, the Ministry of National Defense must prepare the Mili-
tary Strategy no later than three months after the Defense White Book is adopted. The
Military Strategy is adopted by the Government after it is approved by the SCND.
When compared with the other defense-related pieces of legislation, this law seems 
particularly confusing as far the SCND role, nature, and relations with other institu-
tions of the central administration are concerned. Thus, the most important defense
planning document (National Defense Strategy) is initiated and submitted to the Par-
liament by the President. According to the law, the SCND has no formal role in the 
preparation of this document, even though one may suppose that, as a matter of fact, 
the President prepares the Strategy in the SCND or at least he works closely with impor-
tant SCND members to prepare this document. The law only gives the SCND the right
to approve a document issued by the Ministry of National Defense (i.e. the Defense 
White Book), after this document is approved by the Government and before it is dis-
cussed in the Parliament. As regards the implementation of the Defense White Book, 
the Ministry of National Defense elaborates the Military Strategy, which is adopted by 
the Government, but only after it is develops by the SCND. The confusion is related
to the inconsistent position of the SCND in relation to the Government, as the SCND 
seems sometimes subordinated to the Government in its approval competencies, but 
some other times the opposite seems true. Moreover, the SCND approvals are mostly 
“for conformity”, and the Council seems to lack any formal role in the preparation of 
these fundamental documents related to national security. 
Other relevant legislation 
Law 604/2003 enacting the Government Emergency Ordinance 63/2003 on the or-
ganization and functioning of the Ministry of Administration and Internal Aﬀairs
stipulates in Art. 4 that the MAIA “is responsible to the Parliament, the SCND and the 
Government for how it applies the provisions of the Constitution, of other legislation, 
and of the international treaties to which Romania is a party”. 
A similar provision can be found in the Government Emergency Ordinance 14/
2001 on the organization and operation of the Ministry of National Defense: “MND 
is responsible to the Parliament, the SCND and the Government for how it applies the 
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provisions of the Constitution, of other legislation, and of the international treaties to 
which Romania is a party”.
The fact that the SCND is listed among the authorities to whom the MAIA and the
MND are responsible seems inappropriate. First, because the heads of these ministries 
are also members of the SCND, i.e. the structure that keeps them responsible; second, 
because the SCND does not have any competency of political control over the activity 
of these ministries. In our opinion, a better solution would have been that the MAIA 
and MND were responsible for their activity to the President of Romania, who is the 
supreme chief of the armed forces and the guarantor of the balanced activity of state 
authorities. 
Law 218/2002 on the organization and functioning of the Police stipulates that the 
Romanian Police can organize intelligence operations in accordance with the orders 
of the Minister of Internal Aﬀairs. The Minister of Internal Aﬀairs has the obligation
to submit a report to the SCND and to the specialized standing committees of the Par-
liament on an annual basis or whenever necessary. This report refers to “intelligence 
activities and the funds used for this purpose” (Art. 33, para. 3). Thus, the SCND was
granted a role of control over the intelligence activities carried out by the Romanian 
Police, given that the SCND receives these reports and the law does not distinguish 
between the reports submitted by the Minister of Internal Aﬀairs to the SCND and the
reports submitted to the relevant Standing Committees of the Parliament. 
Law 191/1998 on the organization and operation of the Protection and Guard Serv-
ice stipulates that the PGS activity, as an “agency specialized in protection of high-rank-
ing oﬃcials, Romanian and foreign, their families and residences”, is “organized and 
coordinated by the SCND” (Art. 1, para. 1 corroborated with Art. 3, para.1). The SCND
also has an important role in appointing the head of this service; the President ap-
points the head of the PGS following nominations made by the SCND.
Law 92/1996 on the organization and operation of the Special Telecommunications 
Service also stipulates that the activity of this service is “organized and coordinated by 
the SCND” (Art. 3). The head of the STS is nominated by the SCND President and ap-
pointed by the SCND.
Law 1/1998 on the organization and operation of the Foreign Intelligence Service 
grants the SCND a very important role in the activity of this institution. The FIS activ-
ity is “organized and coordinated by the SCND” (Art. 2, para. 1) and the FIS Director 
must report to the SCND on an annual basis or whenever necessary. The FIS Director
is appointed by the SCND following nomination by the President of Romania.
Law 42/1992 on the organization and operation of the Romanian Intelligence Serv-
ice, modiﬁed by Government Emergency Ordinance 72/2002 stipulates that the SCND
shall set the general rules according to which the planning, recording, utilization, jus-
tiﬁcation, and control of operational expenses for activities of intelligence services wiil
be carried out (Art. 42, para. 4).
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Government Decision 83/2005 on the organization and operation of the Ministry 
of Justice, corroborated with Government Decision 637/2004 provides that the Protec-
tion and Anticorruption General Directorate operates within the Ministry of Justice in 
accordance with internal regulations approved by the Minister of Justice, after having
been previously approved by the SCND. 
Law 24/2000 on the norms of legislative technique for drafting new legislation,
modiﬁed by Law 198/2004, stipulates that “the documents that contain the reasons for 
new draft legislation must contain references to approval from the Legislative Council
and, as appropriate, the SCND, the Court of Accounts, and the Economic and Social 
Council” (Art. 29, para. 4).
PRACTICAL ASPECTS
The SCND meetings are always summoned by the President. It has never happened
that a group of SCND members has made use of their right to summon an SCND 
meeting. Summoning can also take place on an emergency basis. For example, on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, a few minutes after the terrorist attack on Washington, D.C. and New
York, President Iliescu gave an order to the SCND secretary to summon the Council in 
90 minutes. Thus, the Council gathered under a regime of emergency to examine the
situation. Similarly, in 1999, when the structures of the Romanian state were put in se-
vere danger by a domestic crisis named mineriada (“miners’ riot”), the SCND rapidly 
gathered to make major decisions. 
The number of meetings varies from year to year according to the existing prob-
lems faced by Romania. For example, the years 2002 and 2003 were an intensive time 
as Romania was preparing to receive the invitation to join NATO at the Prague Sum-
mit and due to the war in Iraq. During these years, the SCND convened on a monthly 
basis and even twice a month at certain times. The average duration of an SCND meet-
ing is 4-5 hours. In general, there are 20-30 topics on the agenda. Routine topics such 
as appointments, promotions or approvals of draft laws are ﬁrst voted on rapidly. Then
the issues that need indepth debates are discussed. Usually topics are considered in 
the order they are listed on the agenda. After listening to all viewpoints and asking
questions, the President proposes a solution, usually the solution that emerged from 
the debate. The SCND members usually approve the solution by reaching consensus.
So far, there has been no instance when a decision put forth by the President did not 
receive the consensus of the members. 
As a rule, the SCND does not act as a crisis cell. Thus, during the war in Iraq, which
took place during the Iliescu administration, a crisis cell was established at the Roma-
nian Presidency following a previous SCND decision. Since the SCND had known in 
advance the date when the war was to start, the crisis cell could be put in place three 
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days before the initial attack and could be fully operational from the very beginning of 
the hostilities. In the recent case of the Romanian journalists kidnapped in Iraq, dur-
ing the Basescu administration, the crisis cell led by the President was not part of the 
SCND or of its secretariat, even though the crisis cell included persons from institu-
tions that are represented in the SCND and even full members of the SCND. 
Each institution represented in the SCND has its own procedures for dealing with 
SCND-related matters, such as the implementation of decisions or submission of oﬃ-
cial information, propositions, and viewpoints to the SCND. For example, the Minis-
try of Internal Aﬀairs employs an oﬃcer working in Minster’s staﬀ to deal with SCND
issues. SCND decisions for which the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs is responsible are
discussed in the Management Board of the Ministry and assigned for implementation 
to the adequate agencies in the Ministry. That structure reports to the Minister or
the Management Board, which further inform the SCND. In the Foreign Intelligence 
Service, the oﬃcer responsible for liaising with the SCND is employed by the Legal
Directorate. At this stage, there is a serious concern for the FIS to assure the legality of 
its activities so it has the obligation to perform a legality check of all its activities. 
CHALLENGES 
The IPP experts conducting research for this report interviewed numerous persons
whose activity is related to the SCND. Persons from state agencies who are represented 
in the SCND and persons who have been SCND members in the past shared their ex-
periences and thoughts regarding the Council. As we have agreed with the participants 
in these interviews to observe the Chatham House1 rules, the main ideas and informa-
tion on SCND will be highlighted in what follows, without attributing a particular po-
sition to its respective source. Unsurprisingly, the views expressed by our respondents 
have been diverse and sometimes contradicting to each other. We have also eliminated 
any references to speciﬁc persons and circumstances, and our interviewees’ assess-
ments of each other’s activities, as we are solely interested in giving an account of the 
institution and its procedures, and in an improvement of its performance within the 
context of the present threats to national security and of the consolidation of Roma-
nian democracy. 
1 The Chatham House rule stipulates that the participants in a meeting may make public use of any
information revealed during that meeting, but they are not allowed to disclose the identity and 
the institutional aﬃliation neither of the source of this information nor of the other participants.
This rule was named after the prestigious British institution, Chatham House, one of the most
important debate forums for international relations issues, which introduced this rule for the dis-
cussions organized since 1912, in order to encourage the sincerity of the debates and to facilitate 
the circulation of ideas and information.
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1. The SCND should be a place for strategic analysis at the highest level and should
approach security-related issues to the greatest extent. The SCND should be a forum of
debate assisting the President in making correct decisions. 
2. The SCND should be the “dome” under which the intelligence community should
perform. The SCND is the main beneﬁciary of intelligence delivered by specialized
agencies. As a result, the SCND should operate like “a reception and distribution desk” 
for other executive agencies and the population at large.
3. The SCND should mainly develop a mechanism of management for crisis situa-
tions.
4. The SCND should develop its own capacity of analysis and follow up on the sub-
sequent implementation of its decisions.
5. The SCND prerogatives should be revised: it should not have the prerogative to
approve the structure of the armed forces as the SCND does not have the required 
expertise. It simply gives a formal endorsement of the work of the experts from the 
General Staﬀ and Ministry of Defense.
6. As the SCND includes the Minister of Finance in its new structure, it should also 
stipulate how the implementation of its decisions is to be ﬁnanced.
7. The SCND should operate like a board of advisers in concord with the Presi-
dent, while the President should not consider the SCND as an executive agency (a 
mini-government), but as a structure assisting him in making decisions related to na-
tional security.
8. The SCND should develop a control capacity given that many state agencies “are
responsible to the SCND” for their activities.
9. The SCND should have two main categories of prerogatives: strategic and tacti-
cal; it should build its structure around this “strategic – tactical” binomial.
10. After receiving reports on the implementation of its decisions from subordinat-
ed structures, the SCND never gives feedback on these reports. This lack of feedback
is frustrating.
11. The way that the SCND operates is too militarized.
12. Most of our interviewees favored a reform of the SCND and its transformation 
into an agency similar to the U.S. National Security Council
13. Many reservations were expressed as to the SCND membership. More often, it
has been argued that the presence of the Chief of General Staﬀ is redundant given that
the Minister of Defense is also a member. The presence of both as full-ﬂedged members
gives them equal status despite one being subordinated to the other. Similarly, it has 
been argued that the presence of the presidential security adviser is also redundant, 
given that the President is a SCND member. According to his function description, 
the advisor cannot cumulate an advisory role in the Presidential Administration and 
an executive role in the SCND, which operates like a sort of “crisis cabinet”. On other 
hand, in order to have the activity of the SCND better integrated with the activity of 
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the Presidential Administration, it has been argued that the presidential security ad-
viser should directly assume the coordination of the SCND secretariat. It has also been 
suggested that the SCND should include the Minister of Transport and the Minister 
of Telecommunication.
14. The SCND operates well overall compared to the general level of the Romanian
public administration. Some aspects of its activity need reconsideration and adjust-
ments, primarily with regard to harmonizing some legal provisions, but no major re-
form is necessary.
15. The SCND is and should remain a mechanism of shared responsibility.
16. The SCND should be a more eﬀective mechanism of civil control over the mili-
tary, but its present way of operation practically makes it an instrument leading to 
concentration of powers into one man’s hands.
17. The SCND is and should remain a “virtual institution”.
18. The SCND only has a preventive role: it should neither be mistaken for a crisis
cell, nor transformed into one.
19. Its name should be changed to better reﬂect what it actually does. The name
most frequently proposed was National Security Council or National Council for Se-
curity. The former is of American inspiration, while the latter is more adapted to a
European vision. 
The main question suggested by the opinions expressed by our interviewees is
whether or not a reform of the SCND is necessary? Obviously, there are two diﬀerent
views on this issue: there are advocates of the reform, many of whom want to see it 
rapidly implemented, but also there are opponents to the reform, who argue that only 
small adjustments are needed.
There are two lines of thought among those who favor the change. According to the
ﬁrst viewpoint, the SCND should retain general strategic and tactical competencies, 
and should have a role of analysis and prevention. The second viewpoint favors a 
rather operative role, enabling it to deal with situations of crisis. What is important 
is a clariﬁcation of the SCND mandate, of the expectations one should have from this 
agency, and of the ways it can best achieve its constitutional role. In terms of institu-
tional design for SCND, there are several options to choose from:
– an operative agency assisting presidential decision-making;
– an advisory board, a group of senior oﬃcials advising the President;
– a debate forum meant to provide the President with a broad perspective over 
security issues in order for him to make the best informed decisions;
– an agency with shared responsibility, where all members are jointly responsible 
together with the President for their activity.
There have been many debates recently over the opportunity of an “intelligence
community” being established. According to the law, intelligence services in Romania 
have diﬀerent areas of competency and diﬀerent ﬁelds of work. However, all these ser-
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vices serve a common purpose: defending national security, protecting Romanian citi-
zens, consolidating the rule of law. The establishment of an intelligence community is
mainly justiﬁed by the reason that all intelligence services seek the same goal, but also
by the fact that the security threats facing Romania become more diverse, complex and 
sophisticated as Romania consolidates its status of a NATO member and approaches 
the status of joining EU. 
Obviously, it is necessary to clarify the relation between the SCND and this intel-
ligence community. The almost unanimous opinion of the interviewed experts was
that the best place for the intelligence community is within the SCND or as close as 
possible to this agency, given that the SCND is the main beneﬁciary of intelligence
from the relevant services. Thus, the dominant view is that the head of the intelligence
community should be a member of the SCND. 
On other hand, the mechanisms of parliamentary control over the activities of the 
intelligence community should be put in place. This control can be implemented either
by strengthening the parliamentary control over the SCND or by establishing special 
parliamentary mechanisms dedicated to the intelligence community. 
The IPP experts working for this project recommend the establishment of a standing
committee in charge of the control of the entire community of intelligence services, which 
can operate in subcommittees dedicated to the control of each intelligence service. 
CONCLUSIONS
1. The National Intelligence Community
The research and drafting of this report were carried out in a period dominated by
the debate over the establishment of a National Intelligence Community (NIC). This
topic has been advanced for public debate by the President of Romania and widely dis-
cussed both within the strategic community and by the mass media. Not surprisingly, 
the NIC was one of the main topics of the interviews carried out with representatives 
of agencies relevant to the SCND, including the intelligence services. In general, the 
public debate concerning the NIC boils down to the question “Who runs the NIC?” 
While the answer to this question is very important to the conﬁguration of power in
Romania, it is far from exhausting a subject of such complexity. 
With only one exception, interviewed experts agreed that the establishment of the 
National Intelligence Community is necessary. The main reasons are the need for the
coordination of speciﬁc activities carried out by the intelligence services, on the one
hand, and the need for corroboration and synthesis of intelligence gathered by the 
various services at their speciﬁc level of competence on the other hand. Organized
crime, terrorism, and other threats to national security have complex manifestations 
that require responses of comparable complexity. As the available intelligence about 
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threats to the national security becomes more varied, ampler, and more sophisticated, 
there is a clear need for a bureaucratically eﬃcient way of turning this intelligence to
good account. Moreover, the intelligence services expected to become part of the NIC 
do already collaborate with each other. At present, this collaboration relies on a pro-
tocol signed by the directors of these services and this protocol is generally observed. 
From this standpoint, the NIC does not bring about an innovation, but it would rather 
conﬁrm and cement a form of collaboration already in place.
The singular opinion against the establishment of the NIC based itself on the argu-
ment that such a structure would put all national intelligence capabilities under a sin-
gle command, which would concentrate too much power in the hands of one person. It 
also espoused the idea that “competition on the intelligence market” is beneﬁcial. The
counterargument to this opinion was that the present legal framework already gives 
the President the coordination of intelligence services and that, in actual fact, the NIC 
would not add anything to the presidential powers. 
With regard to the institutional placement of the NIC, there was a unanimous 
opinion that the SCND is the most appropriate framework for this new structure. The
main argument stems from the constitutional provisions, which assign the SCND the 
task to “organize and coordinate” all activities related to national security, but also 
from the practical consideration that the SCND is the main beneﬁciary of intelligence
coming from the relevant services. 
2. The Supreme Council for National Defense 
The need for a reform of the SCND was unanimously accepted. However, a major
obstacle to this reform was identiﬁed even in the present constitutional arrangements.
The semi-presidential/semi-parliamentary system established by the Romanian Con-
stitution seems to having been designed with the issue of power sharing in mind rather 
than as a solution for an eﬃcient exercise of power. “The ambiguity of our Republic”,
as one of our interviewed experts well put it, leads to competition between the Presi-
dential Administration and the Government for the position of head of the executive 
power. Thus, the SCND appears to some as a mini-government at the President’s dis-
posal and to others only as a debate forum meant to provide the President with various 
perspectives on major issues of national security. The SCND is also perceived as a kind
of “crisis cell” or “strategic unit of rapid reaction”. 
At any rate, this constitutional ambiguity leaves ample room for political tensions, 
which could be found within almost all administrations since 1991 (for example, the 
crisis involving President Emil Constantinescu and Prime Minister Radu Vasile, Presi-
dent Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister Adrian Nastase, but also, at the present day, Presi-
dent Traian Basescu and Prime Minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu). These tensions
prove that the balance of power at the top of the executive branch is far from being 
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adequately designed. The present constitutional arrangement leaves the President with
too much room for maneuver, so that the power of the SCND varies with the political 
temper of the President, but also with the political and personal “chemistry” of the 
relationship between President and Prime Minister.
As long as there will not be a clear cut option between a presidential and a parlia-
mentary republic, a precise outline of the responsibilities and hierarchy of command 
related to matters of national security will remain a diﬃcult task. However, given that
changing the constitutional framework is a strenuous and complex operation, the pre-
ferred option seems to become the reform of the SCND within the current constitu-
tional framework. 
In the same vein, it has been emphasized that the establishment of the NIC is the 
best opportunity for a far-reaching reform of the SCND. The reform of the SCND,
regardless of the speciﬁc form it will take, will involve major readjustments at the top
of the national security system. Moreover, there is a long-lasting dissatisfaction of the 
practitioners with some legal provisions in force, such as the National Security Law 
enacted in 1992, which became outdated from many standpoints. A new legal package 
establishing a new institutional setting of national security, which would make the 
SCND the core of strategic debates, is highly desirable and much overdue. 
Interviewed experts highlighted that any reform of the SCND should include the 
establishment of a working apparatus within the SCND able to eﬀectively achieve the
legal tasks of the Council. Thus, much emphasis was put on the establishment of a
SCND group of experts (mostly civilian) who would be able to advance their own ar-
guments and points of view, to carry out control activities at the security agencies that 
are responsible to the SCND according to the law, and, more generally, to eﬀectively
implement the legal competencies of the SCND. If the SCND is to become a full-scale 
public institution, it must become more than a Secretariat used for arranging meet-
ings. In this sense, it has been stressed that the present practice of staﬃng the SCND by
temporary transfer of personnel from the agencies represented in Council is far from 
satisfactory. The SCND should establish and use an expertise of its own.
Another critical aspect of the SCND reform consists in redesigning its mechanisms 
of accountability to the Parliament. All experts agreed on the point that the current 
system of parliamentary control over the SCND is both ineﬃcient and superﬁcial. The 
relevant standing committees have neither the expertise nor the required resources 
to exert a signiﬁcant control of the intelligence services and this situation must be
remedied in order to accommodate the increased powers of the intelligence services 
to be expected after their planned grouping into a National Intelligence Community.
It is the duty of the Parliament to permanently keep a vigilant eye on the operations of 
these services in order to prevent them from any transgression of the legal framework 
and compel them to serve their intended purpose: the national security of Romania. 
All participants have acknowledged that there is an urgent need for a strict parliamen-
151
tary control over a reformed SCND, including the National Intelligence Community. 
Developing and putting into place an eﬀective system of parliamentary control is an
integral part of the reform that this Council needs. 
3. The recommendations of the Institute for Public Policy
The reform of the Supreme Council for National Defense is necessary and this re-
form should be as comprehensive as possible. 
There are divergent views among the IPP experts as to the subordination and con-
trol of the activities of a National Intelligence Community; as a result, there are also dif-
ferent opinions about how the SCND should eventually be organized. Notwithstand-
ing these diﬀerences, the IPP experts are in agreement that the reform of the SCND
should include:
– an improved legal framework: a viable option may be a new legal package on 
national security, which would include a new law on national security, a law 
on the establishment of the National Intelligence Community together with 
laws on the operations of every intelligence service that will become part of this 
Community, a new law on the SCND and a new law on defense planning;
– restructuring the SCND mostly in order to equip it with an increased capacity 
of independent analysis (this can be done at ﬁrst by expanding the organiza-
tional chart and recruiting civilian personnel with adequate expertise), on the 
one hand, and with an increased capacity of control and coordination of all the 
component parts of the national security system, on the other hand;
– ensuring a real and eﬀective parliamentary control over the activity of the 
Council as a whole but also over its component institutions. In this sense, the 
optimal option would be an integrated control setup (the standing committee 
for the SCND control operating in sub-committees dedicated to every SCND 
segment).
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18. Law 415/2002 on the organization and operations of the Supreme Council for 
National Defense.
19. The regulations for the operations of the Supreme Council for National Defense,
approved by SCND Decision 3/2003. 
20. The competencies, organization and operations of the Secretariat of the Supreme
Council for National Defense, approved by SCND Decision 4/2003.
21. Law 477/2003 on the preparation for defense of the national economy and terri-
tory.
22. Law 604/2003 on the enactment of Government Emergency Ordinance 63/2003 
on the organization and operations of the Ministry of Administration and 
Home Aﬀairs.
23. Law 42/2004 on the participation of the armed forces in missions outside the 
territory of the Romanian State.
24. Law 473/2004 on defense planning. 
25. Law 535/2004 on preventing and combating terrorism.
26. Government Decision 83/2005 on the organization and operations of the Minis-
try of Justice.
153
NOTE
The authors of this research would like to thank all interviewed experts for being
so kind to answer our questions and for the ideas, suggestions and views which they 
shared with us in a spirit of openness and sincerity. Their names cannot be made public
as the interviews were conducted according to the Chatham House rules. However, we 
can indicate the institutions these experts are aﬃliated with: Romanian Intelligence
Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Ad-
ministration and Home Aﬀairs, and Presidential Administration. We are also grateful
to the management of the Institute for Defense Policy Studies and Military History 
for sharing with us valuable information and for their constant feedback during our 
research. We have received a highly signiﬁcant support for the completion of this report
from Army General (four stars) Constantin Degeratu, State Adviser to the President of 
Romania and from General (r.) Viorel Bârloiu, Secretary of the Supreme Council for 
National Defense, to whom the authors would like to express their special gratitude.
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MODEL
ROMANIA  
SUPREME COUNCIL  
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 
DECISION
on the activity performed by the Ministry of National Defense in the year of 2003 
and the objectives for the present year
In accordance with Article 4, (f), item 20 of Law nr. 415/2002,  
on the organization and functioning of the Supreme Council of National Defense
THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE DECIDES:
Single Article: approves the report of the Minister of national defense as regards the 
activity performed by the Ministry of National Defense during the year 2003 presented 
by the letter nr. S.G 1985, from 07.04.2004 and the objectives that will be accomplished 
in the year 2004 according to the present decision.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF COUNTRY DEFENSE
The decision was adopted during the session of the Supreme Council of National
Defense from 15.04.2004
Bucharest,
Nr. 12
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Annex
Objectives that are to be accomplished by the army  
in the year of 2004
The fundamental objective of the Army is to constitute the continuity of the process
of reorganization, operationalization and modernization of military structures.
Simultaneously, with the gradual increase of the level of interoperability of the 
forces aimed at collective defense within the Alliance, there will be created agencies 
of modulating, supple and eﬃcient forces capable of accomplishing missions on the
national territory or abroad, within any operation theatre, independently or in within 
groups of multinational forces.
In order to accomplish the fundamental objective the following steps will be un-
dertaken:
A. In the ﬁeld of defense policy:
1. Development of the strategic and military proﬁle of Romania within the North
Atlantic Alliance in respect to the participation and transformation of NATO, 
deﬁnition of a new regional proﬁle of security and development of cooperation
and assistance in this ﬁeld, in the zone of the Black Sea and the Caucasus;
2. Conﬁguration of an active proﬁle of actions for the participation within the
European Policy of Security and Defense (EPSD) and the new institutions and 
processes in the ﬁeld of defense suggested within the framework of the drafts
of the Constitutional Treaty of the EU and Security Strategy of the EU;
3. Development of the component of analysis and strategic evaluation at the 
level of the Ministry of National Defense; evaluation of the politico-military 
implications of the process of complete qualiﬁcation of the Romanian Army;
4. Launching of the process of redeﬁnition of the mechanisms of planning de-
fense in accordance with the existent procedures at the level of the North-At-
lantic Alliance.
B. In the ﬁeld of human resources:
1. By the end of semester III/2004, to adjust the normative framework to 
NATO requirements (modiﬁcation of the Law on the status of military staﬀ,
adoption by the law of the status of military personnel  and professional 
non-commissioned oﬃcers, revision of the Guide to military career, etc.);
2. Improvement of human resources management by implementing the man-
agement of individual career that would guarantee the transparency, cor-
rectness and equal chances in promoting military staﬀ; by the end of this
year to introduce the guide of promoting the civil staﬀ in the army;
3. Continuation of army reduction and reorganization simultaneously with 
assuring the measures of social protection to the discharged staﬀ;
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4. Continuation of adjusting the military education system and training the 
army staﬀ to NATO strategies, doctrines, procedures and standards;
C. In the ﬁeld of modernization programs and acquisitions:
1. Modernization of army equipment by purchasing equipments necessary for 
the activation of some military structures designated in the “Objective Force 
2007”, as well as for supporting the forces participating in the operations led 
by NATO;
2. Continuity of the improvement of national legislation in the ﬁeld of public
acquisitions for defense with practices existent in NATO member states; a 
more eﬃcient substantiating and spending of allocated funds;
3. Support for the process of reorganization and modernization of the defense 
industry, ampliﬁcation of the participation in international cooperation in
the ﬁeld of armaments and activities of standardization and codiﬁcation
with NATO agencies and procedures;
4. Improvement of the activity of assessing the equipment, outmoded goods 
and army assets that is to excess in the process of reorganization.
D. In the ﬁnancial-accounting ﬁeld:
1. Improvement of the management of the ﬁnancial-accounting activity in
accordance with the principles, techniques and procedures covered within 
NATO standardization agreements;
2. Modernization and correlation of the system of remuneration and social 
protection of the military and civilian staﬀ;
3. Increase of the role of army ﬁnance and budgets, assurance of a qualiﬁed
administration of the army assets;
E. In the ﬁeld of control and evaluation of the military structures:
1. Organization and accomplishment of the evaluations of the stage of launch-
ing the established programs, processes and projects that are carried out in 
the army in order to accomplish the objectives from the V MAP cycle;
2. Improvement of the conceptual framework regarding the system control 
and evaluation of the military agencies;
3. Assurance of observance by army agencies of the speciﬁc normative laws
and acts.
F. In the ﬁeld of internal audit:
1. Assimilation of modern techniques and instruments of investigation and 
evaluation as regards the operational and ﬁnancial risks of organizations as
well as the ways of their elimination;
2. Increase of audit eﬃciency so that each military unit carries it out at least
once in two years;
3. Auditing, since the very draft stage, of the programs of medium-term army con-
stitution, modernization and preparation, of the annual plans of army moder-
nization and preparation, as well as of the budgetary and legal commitment.
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R E P O R T
of the Supreme Council of National Defense
on the activity performed during the year 2004
In the year 2004 Romania continued the process of reform and modernization as 
regards the accomplishment of the conditions for the conclusion of negotiations with 
the European Union, thus responding to the requirements of the new status of NATO 
member state.
In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the law in force, the 
Supreme Council of National Defense acted in order to fulﬁll the objectives stipulated
by the Strategy of National Security in order to assure state independence and terri-
torial integration, guarantee fundamental democratic rights and liberties, safety and 
protection of citizens including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities 
according to the European standards in the ﬁeld.
Within the framework of the meetings of the Council there have been analyzed 
concepts, strategies, and plans of activity, reports, notiﬁcations, draft laws, regulations
and other normative acts. The adopted decisions became compulsory for public ad-
ministration authorities and institutions with specialized attributions and  aimed at 
maintaining internal political stability, combating corruption and social marginaliza-
tion, consolidation of legal state institutions, aﬃrmation of national identity as well as
the engagement supported at the diplomatic level by assuming the responsibilities ac-
quired as a NATO member, active participation in the administration of regional and 
global crises, permanent connection to mechanisms of international cooperation.
The adopted decisions are the ones from the annex. Most of them have been ac-
complished or are in the process of accomplishment. The decision have not yet been
ﬁnalized in stipulated terms, especially the decisions regarding the programs of mod-
ernizing the institutions bearing responsibilities in the ﬁeld of national security due to
the total lack of provision with solicited ﬁnancial funds.
The unitary coordination of the activities regarding country defense and national
security aimed at developing the territorial infrastructure and assessing the geostrate-
gic position of Romania, optimization of response capacity in accordance with NATO 
requirements and standards, continuity of institutional reform, active participation in 
actions of international cooperation aimed at combating transborder terrorism and 
organized crime, as well as the ﬁght against corruption, fraud and money laundering.
The activity of the Council concentrated  
on the following ﬁelds of action:
a) The status of Romania within the North-Atlantic Alliance and adherence to
the European Union constituted one of the basic priorities in the activity of the Coun-
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cil during the year of 2004 that determined the adoption of some decisions as regards: 
the promotion of Transatlantic dialog; maintaining of coherence and complementa-
rity among the developments within the framework of NATO and developments in the 
matter of European policy of security and defense; supplying the Alliance with politi-
cal, economic, military and other kind of resources with respect to accomplishing its 
objectives and missions; supporting the coherent and transparent development of the 
NATO-EU relations aimed at developing the capacities at the level of the two organiza-
tions, as well as their openness for collaboration with states in the course of adherence.
In this respect, the Council has analyzed the subjects from the agenda of the Sum-
mit from Istanbul. Beginning with NATO priorities and the perspective of the summit, 
as well as with the general and speciﬁc responsibilities and interests of Romania within
the framework of the Alliance, the Council decided that the Ministry of External Af-
fairs and the Ministry of National Defense are to ﬁnalize the detailed suggestions to
all subjects mentioned in the agenda, to establish ways of participation in the debates 
within NATO, as well as within the consultations with the Allies in order to support us 
in projecting the strategic proﬁle of Romania.
During the last annual session were approved the objectives, assignments and 
means in the ﬁeld of national security resulting from the reunion in Istanbul, and it
was considered that the planned actions underline the decision of Romania to continue 
and ﬁnalize the reform processes as part of the strategy of reorganization of the Ro-
manian society. In this respect, there were approved the strategic objectives and means 
necessary for assuring the participation of Romania in the activity of the integrated 
political and military committees and agencies of the Alliance.
Moreover, the necessity was outlined for ampliﬁcation of the politico-military
actions aimed at increasing the contribution of our country in the consolidation of 
Transatlantic relation, as well as the aﬃrmation of the new proﬁle of Romania on the
European stage.
In addition, the members of the Council considered that the ﬁrst informal reunion
at the high level of the Alliance after the Summit from Istanbul undertaken in Poiana
Brasov by means of substantial discussions on agenda regarding the stage and issues in 
enforcing the adopted decisions by the Alliance in Istanbul, aﬃrmed itself as a major
event that, by the suggested ideas and solutions, will mark the next NATO activity.
In this respect, Romania declared in public the support of adopting by the head 
of state and the Government of the External Political Directives of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization that stipulates the inclusion of operational planning aimed 
at directing the national contributions in the missions of the Alliance. The Council
mentioned that a long-term strategy of planning the assignments and objectives of 
the Alliance might assure the predictability in decision-making and overall picture of 
transformation of the Alliance.
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During the debates within the meetings of the Council there were analyzed and ap-
proved the Concept and general provisions as regards the logistic and infrastructural 
facilities that will be placed at the disposal of the troops of the allies and partners, the 
continuation of the process of reform and reorganization of the military capacities 
during the period of 2004-2012, and of the defense industry in accordance with the 
new status of Romania as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance.
At the requirements of the international organizations, the members of the Council 
approved the oﬀers of Romania to participate with eﬀectives and equipment within
the response forces of NATO under the leadership of the Headquarters for Operations 
in Europe with general staﬀ in order to engage some functions in the Headquarters
of the Multinational Force in Iraq and Afghanistan under the leadership of the Cen-
tral Headquarters of the USA, as well as within the framework of the project “Teams 
for Reconstructions of the Provinces” lead by Great Britain in the province  of Maz-
ar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan.
Periodically, members of the Council analyzed and evaluated the stage of accom-
plishment of the adopted measures that aimed at the responsibilities assumed by Ro-
mania as a member of the Alliance and active participant in the development of se-
curity on the continent of Europe under the conditions of ampliﬁcation of terrorist
threats and instability in diﬀerent “sensitive” regions of the globe.
In 2004, Romania, in its approach to accomplishing the strategic objective adher-
ence to the European Union from 1 January 2007 continued to adopt measures neces-
sary for the implementation of the community acquis and accomplishment of the as-
signments assumed in the process of negotiation. Within the sessions, members of the 
Council were constantly informed a regarding the stage of integration. It represented a 
strategic objective with direct inﬂuence upon national security as well.
In this respect, the Council adopted decisions in order to support the national ob-
jectives of preparing the integration of Romania in the European Union taking into 
consideration the vulnerabilities and the risk factors that might aggravate the process 
of integration, the strategies for medium and long term development of the relations of 
our country with West European countries, the political objectives and the draft of the
strategic plan of promoting political, economic and security interests in the relations 
of Romania with future member states of the European Union, and the force structure 
which our state can place at the disposal of the Union.
Moreover, the Council analyzed the priorities resulting from the Report on the sit-
uation in the country for the year of 2004 of the European Commission and approved 
the general framework of actions of the Government and other responsible  institu-
tions with the purpose of concentrating the eﬀorts of the whole Romanian society in
order to apply the recommendations of the West-European experts. The Council also
approved conclusion of the negotiations with the European Commission by the end of 
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the year of 2004 and accomplishment of the strategic objective of integration of Roma-
nia, beginning with the year of 2007, into the European Union.
b) Politico-military evolutions on the international level and the basic orienta-
tion in the ﬁeld of relations regarding national security constituted the main points 
on the working agenda of the Council. The decisions adopted in this respect referred to
the position of the Romanian diplomacy toward the politico-military evolutions in the 
zone of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Western Balkans, the strategy and objectives of 
collaboration of our country with the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Republic of 
Moldova, the development of strategic partnership Romania – USA and the placement 
of some American military bases on the national territory, as well as the negotiation of 
some agreements between our country and other states regarding the ﬁelds related or
tangential to national security regarding this issue.
Members of the Council stated that it is to Romania’s advantage that the border of 
the Euro-Atlantic community based upon democracy and security does not to stop 
on the eastern border of the country. In this respect, the Council analyzed the vulner-
abilities and risk factors that might burden the process of integration of Romania into 
the European Union.
In addition, the Council been evaluated the contribution of Romania in the sphere 
of the European policy of security and defense within the framework of performing of 
the prerogatives of the Presidency of the Security Council of the United Nations Or-
ganization by our country last year in July. In this respect, the politico-diplomatic ob-
jectives were approved and the actions stipulated by Romania as regards the assurance 
of a constructive and substantial contribution to maintaining peace and international 
security and the aﬃrmation of our country’s proﬁle as regards promoting the dialog,
preventive diplomacy and pragmatism in terms of regional-global interdependency.
c) Improvement of the legislative framework on national security. In this re-
spect, the Council endorsed and approved the drafts of some doctrinal documents and
normative acts promoted by the structures of the national defense system such as the 
White Chart of national security and defense. The national doctrine of information
on security, the National Strategy of Civil Protection, the Strategy of the Ministry of 
Administration and Interior of accomplishing public order and safety in the urban and 
rural areas aimed at increasing the safety of the citizen and preventing street crime 
during the period 2005-2007.
Moreover, the Council endorsed bills on the provention and combating of terror-
ism, the national System of crisis management, civil protection, defense against out-
breaks of ﬁre, defense planning, status of military personnel and professional non-
commissioned oﬃcers, organization and functioning of the Police Force of Romania
and national archives.
As regards these projects, the specialized institutions have been assigned to im-
prove their contents with the observations of the members of the Council and to pass 
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all the stages of the proceedings in order to be forwarded for the analysis of the Gov-
ernment and further for the approval of the Parliament of Romania.
Another document that has been analyzed and approved is the General Coopera-
tion Protocol on the information activity aimed at national security that delimits the 
competences and functioning of the horizontal relations among services in accordance 
with the requirements of the Chapter of Justice and Internal Aﬀairs negotiated with
the European Union.
The protocol establishes the ﬁelds of performing the attributions by each service
or information agency, clariﬁes the principles of activity and cooperation in this ﬁeld
as well as the ways of resource streamlining aimed at obtaining and exploiting the 
information.
The analyzed bills and other normative acts endorsed or approved by the Council
in the year of 2004 have been adjusted to the European and Euro-Atlantic standards, 
this fact representing an important contribution to the general eﬀort of intensifying
the process of concluding the reorganization, modernization and reform process in 
which our country is engaged.
d) Fight against corruption, organized crime, traﬃcking in drugs, goods and
human beings constituted an important subject of debate in the Council meetings in 
the year 2004.
Taking into account the fact that the phenomenon of corruption has a direct impact 
upon the economic and social development, that it destroys potential beneﬁts of the
free market, causes distortions to the rules of the market economy and diminishes the 
capacity of state bodies in its prevention and combating, the Council recommended 
to the Government and the specialized institutions to initiate programs of actions 
aimed at enforcing the legislative provisions for combating and preventing corruption, 
organized transborder crime, frauds and money laundering. In cooperation with the 
civil society activities were initiated aimed at prevention and reduction of crime com-
mitted violently and in order to increase the degree of civic safety.
Special importance has been attributed to the program of institutional brother-
hood in accordance with European standards in order to contribute in this way to the 
improvement of police cooperation and the ﬁght against organized crime, participa-
tion in the activities, programs and initiatives of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern 
Europe, in the ﬁeld of combating organized transborder crime, promotion of a coher-
ent policy of counteracting the conventional risks in the region, decrease of corruption 
acts, of shadow economy, tax evasion, smuggling and money laundering, as well as 
hardening the sanctions against those who commit such actions.
It can be stated that the activity of prevention and counteraction of corruption, 
organized crime, traﬃcking in drugs, goods and human beings has had a rather assert-
ing character without performing an action of prevention and may present negative 
eﬀects upon persons or collectives if the legislation in force is not being observed.
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By means of specialized agencies an operative monitoring has been accomplished of 
the activity zones and sectors with potentially touched by the ﬁeld of organized crime.
Periodically, members of the Council have been informed as regards the actions 
of preventing and combating organized crime and corruption and have established 
measures for constituting integrated, coherent and coordinating systems, mechanisms 
and procedures that would support the ﬁght against these phenomena in cooperation
with similar agencies from European and other states.
The Strategy of the National Anticorruption Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃce constitutes
one of the important concerns of the Council, focusing in 2004 upon its institutional 
development. The general Protocol of cooperation regarding the information activities
aimed at national security induces the aspects related to engagement of information 
services in the enforcement of the legislation, especially regarding combating fraud, 
corruption and money laundering as well.
e) With respect to the provisions of the Strategy on National Security, the Council 
concerned itself with the coordination of the activity of Ministries and Institutions 
with responsibilities in the ﬁeld determining the revision of some concepts regarding 
their role in assuring public order, defense and national safety, as well as the missions 
they are to accomplish.
The opinion of the specialists is that, under the present conditions, war does not
represent an immediate threat any more, but there may be an ampliﬁcation of asym-
metric risks that refer mainly to the expansion of terrorist networks and activities, of 
transnational organized crime, economic-ﬁnancial crime, illegal transborder traﬃck-
ing in human beings, drugs, radioactive and strategic materials, armament and muni-
tions, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
In order to combat these phenomena, the agencies with responsibilities in the ﬁeld
of national security were forced to improve and diversify the employment missions 
and rules.
Moreover, in accordance with the requirements of the Committee of analysis and 
Defense of Alliance, the Council has analyzed the force structure that is to be accom-
plished by Romania during the planned period of 2005-2010 and the oﬀer to partici-
pate with eﬀectives and equipment within the reaction force of NATO under the lead-
ership of the Commandment for operations in Europe, as well as the participation of 
Romania in core agencies of the North-Atlantic Alliance.
In this respect, the Council approved the Plan-Framework and the modiﬁcations
to it as regards launching the process of army reorganization and modernization in 
the year 2004 as well as the Structure of forces – “Army of Romania 2012”. The imple-
mentation of the objectives and measures established in these programs will assure the 
accomplishment of national defense within the framework of collective defense of the 
North Atlantic Alliance, the increase of the eﬃciency in accomplishing the speciﬁc
missions in peaceful times, in situations of crisis and war, as well as the accomplish-
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ment of some dislocating ﬁghting and supporting forces able to react operatively in
situations of internal and external crises and to participate in multinational operations 
in accordance with the commitments assumed by Romania as a NATO member and 
signatory of international security agreements.
In the year 2004, the participation requirements of the Romanian military person-
nel in international missions of peace stabilization in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq 
were higher if compared to other years, the fact that led the Council to inform itself 
periodically regarding the measures undertaken in order to accomplish the compat-
ibility and interoperability with services of military information of the member states 
of NATO  and with the information agencies of the Alliance recommending as well 
their continuity in accordance with the approved programs. 
The Council has analyzed the way of implementing the joint Concept of action of
the structures of the Ministry of Administration and Interiors aimed at assuring pub-
lic order and the increase of the degree of safety of the citizen, as well as the Program of 
the Ministry of National Defense on operative preparation of the territory for defense 
during the period 2005-2008. Within the same framework, the Protocol on coopera-
tion between the Ministry of Administration and Interior and the Ministry of National 
Defense has been approved in order to accomplish together other missions in peaceful 
times and in critical situations and the necessary measures to be accomplished so that 
Romania can participate actively in the integrated System of joint defense.
The process of reforming the institutions of the national defense system resulted in
the reduction of eﬀectives and the diminution of the level of military equipment, reor-
ganization and re-dimensioning of their mobilization reserves. Under the new condi-
tions, the activity of preparing the reservists continued as far as the funds allocated by 
the budget allowed and in accordance with the approved plans.
The additional funds of the defense budget are to be directed to a greater extent to
technical and logistic equipment of the subunits that take part in the peacekeeping 
missions in accordance with the standards existing at the level of the Alliance.
Members of the Council stated that in the year 2004, the Ministries and institutions 
with responsibilities in the ﬁeld of country defense and national security by assessing
the conclusions of the dialog undertaken permanently with the leading agencies of 
NATO and with those of the European security as well as of the results of the evalua-
tion of expert teams of the Alliance, improved the eﬃciency of the actions and meas-
ures of institutional and functional reform of the military agencies, thus contributing 
to fulﬁlling the objectives imposed on our country with the purpose of integration in
the European Union.
f) Analysis of the state and activities of the institutions with responsibilities in the 
ﬁeld of national security. The Council stated that the prevention and the counteraction
of risks and threats that could aﬀect national security stipulate intensiﬁcation of eﬀorts
with the purpose of the accomplishment of measures of combating transborder infrac-
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tions, illegal migration, traﬃcking and use of drugs, end of illegal production and selling
of alcohol and any other infractions that aﬀect public order and security of the citizen.
In addition, there have been analyzed and approved the directions of action aimed 
at the prevention, identiﬁcation and counteraction of risks and threats to national se-
curity determined by the manifested forms of corruption. Measures have been initi-
ated aimed at combating eﬃciently this phenomenon, as well as actions aimed at the
discovery and research of abuses and unlawful acts committed in the ﬁelds of privati-
zation, control activity of strategic exports, assurance of economic, ﬁnancial-banking 
and energetic security of the country.
Moreover, it has been stated that the liberalization of the borders assured, on the one 
hand, the possibility of moving the population and its access to knowledge and dialog 
and, on the other hand, favored a series of acts belonging to organized crime such as 
proliferation of terrorists and organized crime, drugs, armament and military tech-
nologies and nuclear networks, as well as actions of non-authorized penetration of the 
informational and banking, misinformation and information manipulation systems.
Consequently, the Council approved some modiﬁcations regarding the organiza-
tional structures of the information systems, regulations on their organization and 
functioning, as well as the general Protocol of cooperation on information activity for 
national security.
In order to inform correctly its members, during each meeting of the Council are 
presented reports, synthesis and notiﬁcations regarding the evolution of the potential
external and internal risk factors and their inﬂuence upon national security. The Min-
istry of Administration and Interior, and the institutions with duties in the ﬁeld have
been required to intensify their eﬀorts in order to continue ﬁrm implementation of the
action measures with the purpose of maintaining public order in the urban and rural 
regions, security of the citizen and prevention of street crime.
g) The Council oﬀered itself to intensify the speciﬁc measures in the ﬁght against
international terrorism and to direct external relations toward accomplishing the 
security objectives of Romania.
As a result of analyzing the terrorist attacks from the year 2004, it has been stated 
that neo-terrorism reached an extremely dangerous level. Asymmetric threats were 
especially prominent. Their prevention and combating imposes the adoption of new
evaluation means, as well as speciﬁc methods of counteraction. The phenomenon led
to the accomplishment of an international coalition to which Romania adhered from 
the ﬁrst moment and which focuses the states with the same primary objective on the
ﬁght against terrorism.
Under the conditions of worsening of the situation in Iraq and launching the ac-
tions of the Coalition for the stabilization of the zone, the Council analyzed the action 
to be undertaken by our country on the economic, political and military level aimed 
at the participation of Romania in the multinational force, recommended to be im-
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plemented by the Government. In accordance with the legal provisions, the President 
of Romania informed permanently the Parliament regarding the participation of the 
armed forces in such actions.
Consequences of clashes from Iraq over the evolution of the political process in this 
country and the situations of the Romanians present in the zone, as well as the conse-
quences of crises determined by terrorist attacks from various regions of the world have 
determined the Council to authorize the creation of the National system of terrorist alert, 
similar to the one existing in NATO and the European Union, with the main mission of 
undertaking steps to prevent and limit the aftermath of terrorist attacks.
In addition, the National system of crisis management was established and the In-
tegrated Informatics System was streamlined. These have oﬀered the possibility of data
exchange among agencies of the national defense system and the Council approved 
sending to specialized agencies a questionnaire on available rapid international assist-
ance and inventory containing national capabilities for immediate response in case of 
use of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons against civil population.
Based on the information presented by the Minister of National Defense, members of 
the Council have appreciated the activity of military personnel and Romanian civilians 
who are taking part in the operations of stabilization and establishing of a climate of 
security and remaking state agencies from this country.  It was considered that Romania 
has to get involved continuously alongside the Coalition states in the process of training 
Iraqi specialists, in the activities of humanitarian assistance and the participation of 
Romanian companies in the economic rebuilding of the commercial basis of Iraq.
Under the conditions of escalation of a terrorist threat in Europe, the Council ana-
lyzed, during a special meeting, the inﬂuence of this phenomenon over the evolution
of the international political-military situation, as well as the consequences for our 
country.  
On this occasion, the Council approved the measures proposed by the Government 
for the prevention and combating of some terrorist threats on the territory of Romania, 
protection of Romanian citizens staying in the countries from the regions with a high 
level of terrorist risk, of diplomatic missions staﬀ, as well as their withdrawal in cases
of need.   
At the same time, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, and the Ministry 
of National Defense were requested to apply measures providing security and protec-
tion of strategic objects, state agencies, foreign embassies and diplomatic missions, of 
providing calm and security of citizens; and the Romanian Information Service and 
the Foreign Information Service were requested to amplify information exchange with 
foreign partner services, especially those of NATO member states in order to acquire 
data on threats to national security.  
In addition, the Ministry of Transports, Constructions and Tourism, Ministry of 
Economy and Commerce, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology 
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and Ministry of Health have analyzed and, carried out speciﬁc measures to prevent
and combat all categories of terrorist manifestations and the cooperation protocols 
signed among agencies from the National system of preventing and combating terror-
ism were reviewed and discussed during the Council’s meetings.  
Throughout the year were approved draft treaties and international agreements in
the sphere of national security or those having common aspects in this sphere, initi-
ated by agencies bearing responsibility in the sphere of national safety. 
h) The Government has analyzed draft budgets for 2005 in order to provide re-
sources and the necessary infrastructure essential for the protection of public order 
and national safety. It has been considered that the level of oﬀered funds corresponds
to the needs of continuing structural reforms in these spheres according to the pro-
grams approved by the government, as well as the normative acts and commitments to 
NATO and the European Union.  
In addition, the Council analyzed the state of equipment and operability of technol-
ogies from the endowment of the Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Adminis-
tration and Interior, and the Service of Special Telecommunications.  Special attention 
was given to the level of equipment, especially with special telecommunications and 
informatics, but also to the aspects of continuity or discontinuity of holding some pro-
grams and norm reviewing in accordance with the requirements and standards of the 
North-Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.
In this context, the Council also analyzed the expediency of using funds allotted 
by international ﬁnancial bodies for the development of some economic, social and
infrastructural programs meant for national security, recommending the provision of 
transparency and legitimacy of applying the stipulations of the approved agreements 
and accords.   
The Council has also analyzed aspects of ﬁnancial safety of the country, population
health, situation in agriculture, as well as the quality of the environment.  
The Government was recommended to undertake a range of measures to hold a
systematic program of growth of forested areas and protective belts, performing hy-
dro-technical works necessary for the prevention of ﬂoods and droughts, elaborating
risk maps of areas that are subject to ﬂoods and landslides, up-dating plans of defense
against ﬂoods, localities’ water supply, promoting renewable energy sources and the
program of nuclear energy, carrying out the necessary legal and institutional frame-
work for environmental issues caused by enterprises, including the mining ones that 
are in operational shut-down, as well as deposits of hazardous waste.  
i) A constant concern of the Council represented the readiness of economy and 
reserve for defense in accordance with the new legal defense provisions and the pre-
viously adopted programs in this sphere. For this purpose, the Council analyzed the 
stage of restructuring the defense industry, load of production capacities in this sector, 
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structure and orders proposed for 2005, and established measures of settling these is-
sues in accordance with Romania’s current status as a NATO member. 
It has been considered, that during the last four years, the industrial production of 
the defense sector had a tendency to rise, and the Council concluded that it is also nec-
essary to maintain that tendency in 2005. In addition, the program of re-dimensioning 
certain production capacities is to be carried out in accordance with the requirements 
of the agencies of the national defense system and foreign beneﬁciaries.  
The Government has been recommended to initiate a dialog with international ar-
mament organizations and NATO equipment agencies in order to establish oppor-
tunities of cooperation, association, partnerships or investment for our own defense 
industry, to disaﬀect and assess production capacities that have no future, and in 2005,
to continue the application of the approved restructuring programs and the privatiza-
tion of all economic entities from the defense industry with a majority state capital that 
are under the authority of the Ministry of Economy and Commerce.  
Besides, based on the provisions of the new law that refer to the readiness of the ter-
ritory and economy for defense, adjusted to similar systems of NATO member states, 
the Council approved the plan of verifying the stage of population and economy readi-
ness for defense in 2005, annual readiness of army reserve, plan of mobilization of the 
national economy for the state of war, restructuring and re-dimensioning programs of 
mobilization reserves and the annual plan of reservist training. 
In this framework, the Council has analyzed the possibilities of the Romanian 
economy to meet the requirements of agencies of the national defense system and has 
approved the plan containing objectives of operative readiness of the territory for de-
fense in the period 2005-2008.
j) Under the conditions when the protection of classiﬁed national and NATO in-
formation represents an integral part of the commitments assumed by Romania in the 
Calendar of reforms for the adherence to the North Atlantic Alliance, the Council has 
been permanently informed of the way of application of speciﬁc attributions by minis-
tries and agencies having attributions in the ﬁeld.  
In the context, the Council analyzed the implementation by the Bureau of the Nation-
al Registry of State Secret Information of ways of protecting classiﬁed NATO informa-
tion at the end of the adherence process of Romania to the North Atlantic Alliance and 
priorities were set in accordance with the recommendations of the Alliance in the ﬁeld.
The Council considers that the new institutional system and the standards aﬃliated
with this ﬁeld assure an eﬃcient implementation of the necessary measures in order to 
carry out protection of classiﬁed information and respond to Euro-Atlantic exigencies,
realities and interests of Romanian society. 
From this perspective, the activities held in 2004 by the specialized state agencies 
in the enforcement of legal provisions have assured the protection of Romania’s infor-
mational values ad of free citizen access to public information. 
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In addition, there have been approved the proposals of agreement negotiation be-
tween the Government of Romania and the governments of NATO member states re-
ferring to reciprocal protection of classiﬁed information.   
k) According to the competences and attributions granted by law in 2004 the Coun-
cil approved the appointment and advancement in rank, participation in the exam 
for promotion to the rank of general, as well as some aspects of social security of 
military personnel.  
Every situation has been analyzed, taking into account ﬁeld legal provisions and
strict accomplishment of restructuring, re-dimensioning and operating objectives of 
agencies of the national defense system. The normative framework promoted by min-
istries and military agencies based on the stipulation of Law 80/1995 on the status of 
military personnel and of the Guide to military carrier can be compared to the one 
practiced in NATO member state armies that are applying new philosophies and strat-
egies of carrier promotion.  
In addition, military agencies have set up an eﬃcient criteria system of selecting
and re-training personnel through courses, as well as rank promotion and sending on 
international missions based on the criteria of competence and professionalism.
The Council has been permanently informed of the main social issues of active, re-
served and retired personnel regarding payment of salaries, military pensions, housing 
issues, providing medical assistance and recreation, rest and recovery conditions. It 
has been considered that these issues are to be in the attention of decision-makers from 
ministries and agencies from the ﬁelds of defense, public order and national safety and
the Government has been recommended to perform their settlement on the occasion 
of adopting or modifying normative acts in the ﬁeld.
l) During the Council’s meetings other issues have been analyzed referring to the 
organization and coordination of activities concerning defense, public order and na-
tional safety, adopting the necessary decisions corresponding to the approached ﬁelds.
* * *
The Supreme Council of National Defense considers that in 2005 the activity of
state agencies bearing responsibilities in the sphere of national security should provide 
the necessary conditions for integration into the European Union as a priority and, 
at the same time, as an essential condition for aﬃrming and promoting its national
interests at the regional and global level.  
NATO membership and that of a future EU member oﬀers Romania optimal con-
ditions for economic and social development, determining, at the same time, the re-
sponsible involvement of our country in accomplishing missions and policies of NATO 
and the European Union, intensiﬁcation of contribution to peacekeeping and stability
worldwide, in counteracting new terrorist threats, proliferation of weapons of mass 
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destruction, traﬃcking in drugs and human beings, thus responding to the new chal-
lenges of modern life.
The activities listed in the program of the Council for 2005 refer to eﬀort coordina-
tion for reaching national consensus as regards Romania’s security interests, deepen-
ing justice reform, strengthening the mechanisms of observance and enforcement, and 
prevention and combating of corruption. 
A part of the topics oﬀered for discussion to the members of the Council were
aimed at providing mechanisms of competitive and functional development of the Ro-
manian economy, improving living standards of the population, providing measures 
for the protection of natural resources and the environment, supporting Romanian 
communities from abroad, as well as assessing the potential of collaboration with these 
in order to promote national interests.   
The Council will also act for the intensiﬁcation of consolidation eﬀorts of Transat-
lantic relations, of NATO’s role in projecting security outside the Euro-Atlantic Area, 
including combating terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.    
In 2005, Romania will also contribute to the strengthening of the European policy 
of security and defense in accordance with NATO transformation process, of good 
neighborhood relations and regional cooperation, as well as the complete adjustment 
of the national security system to the speciﬁc mechanisms of NATO and the EU.    
The Council has decided upon the initiation of certain measures that would deter-
mine the reduction of internal vulnerability concerning diﬃculties of an economic, ﬁ-
nancial and social character, reduction of shadow economy insisting on the preventive 
side, rather than just stating the phenomenon through activities of raising awareness 
of the population in the spirit of eliminating economic-ﬁnancial and tax crime.   
At the same time, the Activity Program of SCCD for 2005 stipulates measures and 
actions for the reform of public administration, streamlining of cooperation between 
agencies engaged in the ﬁght against corruption, fraud and money laundering, preven-
tion and combating of the phenomena of smuggling, clandestine migration and human 
traﬃcking, increase of traﬃcking and illegal use of drugs and narcotic substances, as
well as the reduction of the aftermath of natural, technological, ecological or complex 
disasters, and of the degradation of the environment.
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THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
AS A DECISION-MAKING TOOL IN UKRAINE
Victor CHIUMAK
International Centre for Policy Studies
Kiev, Ukraine
Introduction
Having a speciﬁc importance for every European state, the development and im-
plementation of the national security strategy is even more important for the countries 
undergoing the period of transition. The success of this process is a necessary prereq-
uisite for a sustainable economic development and an index for fulﬁlling the necessary
conditions for a complete integration into the European Community.
Throughout the last decade national security and defense in many parts of South
East Europe have been the subject of some important modiﬁcations. The eﬀorts to 
transform its inﬂuence so that its culture, nature and activity will be in concordance
with the criteria of democracy they are functioning in proved to be very diﬃcult in
these processes of transformation. 
Transformation, especially in South East Europe, is a very comprehensive process 
including many interdependent spheres. On close inspection we will ascertain that 
transformation processes have, de facto, a major inﬂuence over all aspects of activity of
the existent institutions and require a competent guidance in order to ensure success 
in this process. In order to make all transformation processes successful it is important 
to identify three signiﬁcant factors of success in the process of leadership as such:
• providing a ﬁrm and operative leadership of transformation processes;
• providing a high level of legitimacy; 
• providing a clear-cut spectrum of the transformation process – organizing cul-
ture, traditions and style of government, ethnic and gender make-up, as well as 
other factors. 
Transformation processes in the sphere of security and defense include four basic 
spheres:
• Cultural transformation. It includes: the transformation of the culture of a secu-
rity institution, leadership, management, administrative nature of the institu-
tion; as well as of the traditions and system of values underlying this institution.
• Human Transformation. It signiﬁes the transformation of ethnic, regional and
gender make-up of the institution, as well as of its human resources. 
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• Political Transformation. This process assures the fact that the behavior and na-
ture of any institution corresponds to the political peculiarities of the democrati-
cally system it is placed in – acknowledging the principle of society’s supremacy, 
setting up some special mechanisms of control and supervision, observing prin-
ciples and practices of transparency and evidence, etc. 
• Organizational transformation. This is a process with a much more technical
content within which the examined institution changes its “dimensions” and 
structure, administration and management depending on the necessity of 
streamlining expenditures, as well as the necessity of improving and streamlin-
ing the services rendered. 
It is extremely diﬃcult to implement fully such complex transformation process-
es, a fact demonstrated by the reforms carried out in the security sector in Moldova, 
Ukraine, and partially in Romania. Priority changes, limited means and resources, 
lack of skills and experience, poor quality administration and management, as well as 
the absolute novelty of the reform areas may complicate considerably the accomplish-
ment of these initiatives. The reform process of the security sector in many countries
of South East Europe, especially in those with an authoritarian or violent past, requires 
a clear and integrated transformation strategy that will guarantee the irreversibility of 
this process. 
There is no standard process under the title of “security sector transformation”. The
experience and the initial positions diﬀer from country to country. However, in most
cases, the transformation of the security sector takes place as a consequence of the end 
of the “Cold War” and the disintegration of the system typical for that period. Despite 
the fact that the period of “cold war” was extremely dangerous and often illogical, it
assured, however, most world countries with a more or less clear structure on which 
the security and defense policy used to be based. During that period the states could be 
members of a formal alliance, could oﬀer territory and infrastructure to the disloca-
tion of the military base or opt just for political assistance and support. In other cases, 
the security and defense policy of some states aimed at keeping them out of any alli-
ances. Some states, regardless of their geographical position, avoided the consequences 
of the Cold War. All these already belong to the past.
The objective characteristics of security (for instance, the need for enlargement of
the security area for a more eﬃcient counteraction of terrorism) are able to give a strong
impulse to the members of the North Atlantic Alliance in supporting the ambitious sce-
nario of enlargement. As an alternative, the better and closer relations of collaboration 
between the West and Russia, which appeared due to the terrorist threats, may inﬂuence
the perspectives of a further expansion of NATO. The relation between the two expan-
sion processes (NATO and EU) is reﬂected in the thesis dominating in Western Europe
as well as in the Central and Eastern Europe and according to which for the stability 
of Europe itself it is necessary to, at least, oﬀer the countries of Central, Eastern and
172
Southern Europe the perspective of adherence to either NATO or the European Union. 
Due to these reasons, the reevaluation of the role of the North Atlantic Alliance that is 
on the agenda of the American policy raises the European Security and Defense Policy 
to a level of extreme importance and priority for the candidate countries.
1. Historical development of the security system and the evolution 
of the National Security and Defense Council
The Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine1 (further CNSDU) was 
created in July 1992 during the mandate of President L. Kravchuk. During that period 
it was exclusively a counselling structure with a rather limited prerogative spectrum, 
referring especially to the development of an analytical informative activity related to 
national security issues. The role of the Council was radically modiﬁed to enlarge its
duties and responsibilities, to enrich its activity content and to gain inﬂuence upon
political processes within the country after the election of Leonid Kuchma as the Presi-
dent of Ukraine and the appointment of Vladimir Gorbulin, in October 1994, as the 
Secretary of the Council. During the same year, the Decree “On the Regulations of the 
Council of National Security within the Presidency of Ukraine”2, was signed as well as 
the main normative document of the Council – “CNSDU Regulations”. This document
mentions that the Council is a collegial organ within the Presidency of Ukraine that 
undertakes the organization and coordination activity on national security. Under the 
competence sphere of CNSDU falls the analysis of the development tendencies in the 
internal and external political situation, the elaboration of the contents of the strategy 
and state programs of national security policy, the multilateral evaluation of the even-
tual and real threats addressed to the national interests of Ukraine, the examination 
of the most important issues related to national security as well as the development 
of recommendations for the President regarding respective decision making, the or-
ganization of interaction among departments and eﬀort coordination of the executive
power bodies in the ﬁeld of national security.
Together with the appointment as the Secretary of the Council of Vladimir Gor-
bulin, nicknamed groundlessly “the grey cardinal” who enjoys the trust of Leonid 
Kuchma and who actually connected to himself almost all informational ﬂows coming
towards the head of state, CNSDU became the centre of making most important politi-
cal decisions. During this period, almost all state problems of major importance are 
coordinated with the Secretary of the Council. Since October 1994, CNSDU subordi-
1 Рада Національної Безпеки і Оборони України (РНБОУ).
2 Указ «Про положення про Раду національної безпеки при Президенті України».
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nates to itself the National Institute of Strategic Research (activated since March 1992) 
that is an institution of scientiﬁc research in analytical assistance and prognosis of the
activity of the President of Ukraine, who assures the accomplishment of the scientiﬁc
researches in the geopolitical ﬁeld, of the socio-political, state legal, politico-military
and spiritual development of Ukraine. The general administration of the institute is
carried out by the Secretary of the National Security Council. In addition, since De-
cember 1994, besides the Council the Commission on nuclear policy and ecological 
security issues began its activity. 
In 1999 in the function of Secretary of the CNSDU was appointed the ex prime-min-
ister of Ukraine, the army general (four star general) Evghenii Marchuk. Beginning 
with this appointment, the role of the Council was gradually reduced in the process 
of state decision making and carrying out of coordination among departments in the 
key spheres of state activity. In addition, the inﬂuence of the Secretary of the Council
upon the President of the country was reduced as well. During this period, the CNSDU 
appeared more often in the role of “ﬁreﬁghter” and was used to straighten out critical
situations (“Kolchuga Scandal”) or took on the role of an “inspector for the investiga-
tion of exceptional cases” (tragedy from Skniliv). 
The years 2002-2003 were, on the one hand, a testing period for Ukrainian-American
relations and, on the other hand, an assessment of the Council’s abilities to react to criti-
cal situations and solve scandals in external policy. A vivid example in this respect was 
the case of the illegal delivery from the territory of Ukraine to Iraq of the radiolocation 
stations “Kolchuga”. Consequently, this threatened more than just Ukraine’s relations 
with the United States. Ukraine’s possibility to conclude important contracts on the 
armament market and the credibility of the Ukrainian system of control over exports 
were questioned, but also, in a larger context, an important (or, for many years, even 
irreparable) blow was dealt to the prestige of Ukraine itself on the international arena. 
Fortunately, the secretary of CNSDU E. Marchuk and his deputy I. Smeshko managed 
to straighten out the extremely dangerous situation and as a “reward” for the ameliora-
tion of the relations with the United States, a decision was adopted to send a Ukrainian 
peacekeeping contingent to assure stability in Iraq in order to implement the respective 
decision of the CNSDU supported by the Supreme Rada of Ukraine (Ukraine’s legisla-
tive body – translator’s note).
In September 2003 Vladimir Radchenko was appointed the Secretary of the 
CNSDU. The level of participation of the Council in the state decision-making proc-
ess during his appointment remained approximately at the same level as during the 
functioning of E. Marchuk as the Secretary of the Council. Meanwhile, it was during 
this period that the Council was forced to react to such extremely complex threats to 
the national security of Ukraine as, for instance, overcoming the critical situation re-
lated to building a dam towards the isle of Tuzla belonging to Ukraine by the Russian 
Federation. Among the merits of Victor Radchenko can also be mentioned the signiﬁ-
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cant stirring to activity of an important mechanism of solving common problems in 
the security sector – systematic gatherings of the Secretaries of Security Councils in 
accordance with the collaboration protocols among the CNSDU Apparatus and the 
apparatuses of Security Councils of Russia, Georgia and Poland. In December 2003, 
by the Decree of the President of Ukraine alongside the CNSDU, the Institute of Na-
tional Security Issues Research3 was created. Its main functions are to elaborate some 
scientiﬁcally grounded proposals regarding the assurance of national security and
the analysis of the international experience in this ﬁeld; to provide the President of
Ukraine, the CNSDU, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine with conceptual and 
informational-analytical materials related to national security issues; to forecast and 
assess the possible internal and external threats to national security; to elaborate pro-
posals regarding their prevention and neutralization; and to solve the most important 
economic, political, ecological and other problems that can cause the appearance of 
such dangers and threats.
According to the Decree of the President of Ukraine entitled “On some organiza-
tional issues of the activity of the Council of National Security and Defense “ from 8 
February 2005, Petro Poroshenko was appointed to the function of the Secretary of the 
Council. Poroshenko was one of thepersons close to Victor Yuschenko during the “or-
ange revolution”. In accordance with the same decree, the Secretary of the CNSDU was 
empowered with additional functions and authority. Thus, he was allowed to initiate
the convocation of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine in order to examine urgently 
the problems related to the accomplishment of CNSDU decisions; to take part in the 
Government sessions with the right to vote consultatively; to raise for discussion the 
issue of bringing to account persons with high level administrative functions after the
results of public controls regarding the implementations of Council decisions; to ap-
point candidates for top positions in the legal bodies, Armed Forces and other military 
formations of Ukraine in which the appointment is made in accordance with the de-
cision of the President of Ukraine; to submit for the examination of the President of 
Ukraine proposals regarding the candidates for the position of judges, members of the 
Supreme Commission of Qualiﬁcation of Judges whose function is related to the pre-
rogatives of the President of Ukraine; to endorse proposals regarding the candidates 
for the state bodies whose activity is related to assuring national security and defense 
of Ukraine, the appointment being also done by the President of Ukraine, etc. Leaving 
aside this survey, and the issues related to constitutionality or non-constitutionality 
of empowering the Secretary with such prerogatives, we will just mention that we are 
dealing with an important increase in the inﬂuence of the Secretary regarding political
3 Інститут проблем національної безпеки.
175
decision making and control over implementation as well as the determination of the 
staﬀ policy in the top structures of the state power.
Notwithstanding the fact that the time of appointment of Petro Poroshenko in the 
function of Secretary was short, he manifested himself as a very active state personality 
and a highly qualiﬁed professional. The number of meetings convened by the Council,
the importance of the issues examined, and the number of initiatives submitted by 
the CNSDU in one way or another are impressive. Among them are the initiatives of 
solving the Transnistrian conﬂict (it is diﬃcult to underestimate in this context the
importance of personal meetings of the Secretary of the CNSDU and the President of 
the Republic of Moldova Vladimir Voronin, with key-personalities of the European 
Union, etc.) and those related to refresh the activity of GUUAM, the issue of withdraw-
ing the Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent from Iraq, the control over the observation 
of real estate legislation, the launching of administrative reforms, the issue of energetic 
security of the state, the problem of adherence of Ukraine to the World Trade Organi-
zation and collaboration with Russia within the Common Economic Space, etc. 
2. The role of the CNSDU in the formulation and implementation  
of the strategies assuring national interests 
Analyzing the role and the place of the CNSDU in the structure of national security 
structure, it is necessary, ﬁrst, to stop at one of the responsibilities of the Council: the
examination during the CNSDU sessions of the issues related to determination of the 
strategic national interests of Ukraine, of the conceptual approaches and ways of na-
tional security and defense in the political, economic, social, military, scientiﬁc-tech-
nological, ecological, informational and other ﬁelds. In this respect, the most impor-
tant document that is under the permanent attention of the CNSDU is the Apparatus 
of the National Security Strategy of Ukraine. It is a concrete and pragmatic document 
having the character of a program that establishes the most important points of pro-
spective support in all ﬁelds of internal and external policy; outlines the main proﬁles
in the implementation of national interests of crucial importance of the country; and 
aims to assure the security of the person, society and state in case of internal and ex-
ternal conﬂicts in all ﬁelds of activity in Ukraine. As the ex-Secretary of CNSDU E.
Marchuk precisely mentioned – “The Strategy must determine the geopolitical and
alternative objectives and consequences of geopolitical decisions of Ukraine, the struc-
ture of the threats and provocations to state national interests for the next decades and 
most importantly – must formulate precisely the strategic directions and priorities of 
the policy in the determined ﬁelds of national security”.
The importance of this document is the fact that the examination of the issues relat-
ed to the development and implementation of state policy in the ﬁeld of national secu-
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rity represents the cornerstone of state administration. The National Security Strategy
of Ukraine is to be seen as a directive state document determining the practice of state 
policy at a high level in the security sector and all conceptual documents of a lower 
level are to result from this Strategy. 
This document was developed under the supervision and coordination of the
Council of National Security and Defense, was approved by the President of Ukraine 
and was presented by him to the Supreme Rada.
The practical role of the CNSDU within the process of developed of this docu-
ment consists in the integration of economic resources and demographic potential; of 
the industrial possibilities and ﬁnancial limits of the country; of the ideological and
moral factors; of the activities on the internal and external level; and of the social, 
ecological and scientiﬁc-technological parameters that would correspond to political
requirements during peace and war time. These latter would be based upon taking into
account the long-term state interests and not just upon current factor and they would 
integrate the military elements with the diplomatic and economic ones, as well as other 
important elements. In other words, it is the Council that outlines the general contour 
of the programs of implementation, brings to life national priority interests, and is re-
sponsible for the unity, concordance and correlation of all elements of national security 
established by the Strategy.
One of the important prerequisites for the eﬃcient implementation of the Strategy
is the formation of an integrated complex of national interests, priorities and goals; the 
formation of a national consensus regarding these interests and priorities; as well as the 
coordination of eﬀorts of the executive and legislative branches of the power (especially
by initiating the elaboration of the respective normative documents and documents 
related to national security and defense issues) in accomplishing the established objec-
tives – and in this respect it is also diﬃcult to overestimate the role of the CNSDU.
One of the important elements in the CNSDU’s responsibilities (according to para-
graph 1 article 4 from the Ukrainian “Law on the Council of National Security and 
Defense of Ukraine”) is the development and examination within the sessions of the 
Council of the political, economic, social, military, scientiﬁc-technological, ecological,
informational and other actions depending on the level of real and potential threats to 
the national interests of Ukraine. An example of accomplishment of these prerogatives 
by the Council are the CNSDU sessions carried out in the period of 2003-2005 related 
to far-reaching issues as follows:
• “On imperative measures of counteracting the danger of violation of territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine as a result of building the dam towards the 
isle of Tuzla by the Russian Federation.” (October 2003)
• “On the mission of solving the dispute with Romania concerning the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea” 
(September 2004)
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• “On the situation of the Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent in Iraq” (Septem-
ber 2004)
• “On the development of relations with NATO and the results of summit joint 
sessions of the Ukraine-NATO Commission from June 29, 2004” (July 2004)
• “On withdrawing the Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent from the Republic of 
Iraq” (March 2005)
• “On the participation of Ukraine in the settlement of the situation in Transnis-
tria and the measures regarding the assurance of national interests accomplish-
ment in this region” (May 2005), etc.
3. External political challenges in CNSDU activity
Analyzing the place of CNSDU within the national security system and within the 
process of elaboration of the state strategic course, we cannot but mention the preroga-
tives of the Council within the ﬁeld of adopting decisions on external policy. The ex-
ternal side of security tackled by the Council stipulates the creation of some favorable 
conditions for the development of the state under modern conditions, the defense of 
the territorial integrity of the country, of its political and social structure from external 
threats and the accomplishment of national Ukrainian interests on the international 
arena. In this respect external, diplomatic and military means are applied.
Together with the approval in June 1996 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the conﬁr-
mation of the constitutional function of coordination and control over the activity of 
the executive bodies, as well as the adoption of decisions of external policy, modiﬁed
cardinally the distribution of prerogatives in this extremely important ﬁeld in favor of
the Council. Thus, in accordance with the Ukrainian “Law on the Council of National
Security and Defense of Ukraine” from 5 March 1998, one of its new functions was 
determined by the proposal of the President of Ukraine regarding the achieving of the 
main objectives of the external policy in the ﬁeld of national security and defense.
This modiﬁcation transformed objectively the Secretary of the Council, one of his
deputies (the one dealing with the supervision of the aspects of external policy of na-
tional security) and the CNSDU Apparatus into active actors in the process of external 
policy. As a result, within the structure of CNSDU were created the Department of 
external policy issues of national security, its main goal being the coordination and 
control over the activity of the executive bodies, the Ministry of External Aﬀairs in the
ﬁrst place and the assistance oﬀered to the President of Ukraine in accomplishing his
prerogatives in the area of external policy. 
At the moment, the CNSDU and its Apparatus carry out their activity in the ﬁeld
of external policy in the most important directions of national security and defense of 
our state. In Particular, the Council maintains under its ﬁeld a large spectrum of issues
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related to the integration of Ukraine into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures; 
its activity within the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe and CIS; the development of the 
relationships of our state with NATO and the European Union; and the profound stra-
tegic relations with the USA, Russia and other states important for us from the point 
of view of our national interests.
The ﬁeld of competence of the CNSDU also extends over the legal settlement of
the state border of Ukraine; peacekeeping activity, including the ex-Yugoslavia, Sierra 
Leone, and Iraq; solving the problems related to stationing of the Black Sea Navy on 
the territory of Ukraine; control over armament and disarmament; observation of 
non-proliferation regimes; participation of our country in the development of a new 
architecture of the European security; maintenance of stability and security in the 
Black Sea region; technical-military collaboration with foreign states; relations with 
“problematic” countries and transfer of double destination technologies; activity with-
in GUUAM and other regional organizations, etc.
A real examination of the CNSDU’s capacity to react to critical situations threat-
ening the national security of Ukraine was the case of building the dam towards the 
Ukrainian isle of Tuzla by the Russian Federation in September – October 2003 with-
out coordination with the Ukraine, after which there was a jeopardy for violating the
border of our country in the region of the Straits of Kerch.
According to the opinion of the Ukrainian experts the real goal of the Russian side 
of building this dam was the uniﬁcation of the Russian territory with the isle of Tuzla
as it used to be until 1925, which would allow the Russian Federation to claim this 
part of the Ukrainian territory. On the other hand, by carrying out further engineer-
ing works, the Russian side aimed to artiﬁcially “erode” the Ukrainian isle because
the building of the dam had as a consequence the increase of the maritime streams 
towards the isle. In both cases, these actions aimed at changing to the beneﬁt of Russia
the state borderline, and could inﬂuence radically the process of delimitation of mari-
time waters into the Azov Sea and the Straits of Kerch, being followed by ecological 
consequences as well. 
From the very beginning of the tension in the dam building zone the CNSDU appa-
ratus, in close cooperation with the Ministry of External Aﬀairs and the coast Guard
Service of Ukraine, took an active part in the development of mechanisms that would 
straighten out the crisis. In accordance with its prerogatives, the Council Apparatus 
examined in emergency regime all the existent information and assessed the jeop-
ardy to national security arising from the actions of the Russian party in the Straits of 
Kerch. Within the CNSDU Apparatus there was created an Anti-crisis Centre under 
the supervision of the Deputy Secretary who used to deal with permanent monitoring 
of the critical situation, coordination of the actions of the law enforcement agencies 
of Ukraine with the aim of preventing the violation by the Russian party of the state 
borderline of Ukraine.
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According to the conclusions of the Council Apparatus regarding the high level 
of threats to the national interests of Ukraine the decision was adopted to convene a 
CNSDU session on this topic. 
The CNSDU administration (Secretary and Deputies) negotiated with the admin-
istration of the Security Council of the Russian Federation in order to elucidate the 
intentions of the Russian party and to provide support in the urgent solving of the 
problem at the interdepartmental level. While negotiating, the Russian party expressed 
worry regarding the situation created after the building of the dam towards Tuzla. It
was emphasized that by no means could the situation be allowed to degradate into a 
military confrontation, which could take place if the Russian party violated the state 
border of Ukraine.
In October 2003 a CNSDU session was convened immediately. During the session 
the situation concerning Tuzla was examined with the appreciation of the actions of 
the Russian party and the approval of the decision of the Council in accordance with 
which separate assignments were set to respective Ministries and Departments. Thus,
for instance, one assignment was to take immediate measures in order to exclude the 
construction by the Russian party of the dam on the territory of Ukraine in the region 
of Tuzla, to assure an adequate security regime of the state border of Ukraine in this 
region, and to assure a permanent supervision over the hydrological situation in the 
region of the Straits of Kerch. 
In the process of the execution of the CNSDU’s decision, the Supreme Rada of Ukraine 
was informed about the essence of the critical situation in Tuzla as well as the threats to 
the national security of our state that appeared as a result of the unilateral actions of the 
Russian Federation. During the session of the Supreme Rada on 14 October 2003 was 
presented the report of the Deputy Secretary of the CNSDU P. Shatcovski who informed 
the Members of the Parliament regarding the character of the threats to the national 
security of Ukraine and the actions undertaken by the executive bodies in order to mini-
mize them. As a result of the session of the Supreme Rada were adopted the respective 
appeals of the Ukrainian Parliament to the State Duma of the Russian Federation and the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
In conclusion, it is necessary to mention that the role of the CNSDU and its Appara-
tus during the “Tuzla Crisis” was indeed a key one. It is their involvement that allowed 
the prevention of further building of the dam across the state borderline of Ukraine and 
the avoidance of a dangerous precedent when such important principles as the respect 
of territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders between the two states that could 
be jeopardized by some unilateral actions undertaken by one of the parties. As a result 
of the CNSDU’s eﬀorts in regulating the crisis, Ukraine not only managed to keep Tuzla
as an integral part of its national territory, but also eliminated the danger of a military 
confrontation between Ukraine and the Russian Federation and kept as much as pos-
sible a high level of strategic partnership between the two states.
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The conclusions drawn after the “Tuzla Crisis” served as the basis for the develop-
ment by the CNSDU Apparatus of a series of reports and notices addressed to the 
President of Ukraine and of analytical materials regarding new tendencies in the re-
lationships between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as well as perspectives of 
delimitation of territorial waters in the Azov Sea and the Straits of Kerch.
A sensitive aspect of the Ukrainian-Russian relations that are always under the at-
tention of the CNSDU are the problems related to the stationing of the Black Sea Navy 
of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine. The unwillingness of the Rus-
sian Federation to observe the legislation of Ukraine and to fulﬁll precisely the provi-
sions of the basic agreements regarding the problems of dislocation of the Black Sea 
Navy of the Russian Federation (the accomplishment of which is extremely important 
for Ukraine) may create conditions that make it impossible to withdraw this navy from 
the territory of Ukraine after the signing in 2017 of the action term of the basic agree-
ments between Ukraine and the Russian Federation regarding the problems of Navy in 
the Black Sea from 28 May 1997. 
Therefore, for several years there has been an evaluation of the infrastructure, real
estate and lots granted on lease to the Russian Federation for the needs of the Black 
Sea Navy of the Russian Federation aimed at establishing lease relations in a strict 
accordance with the legislation of Ukraine. This process is complicated by the fact of
non-authorized use of the lots and infrastructure objects that are not within the Agree-
ment on sharing the property of the Navy, which can be considered as illegal seizure.
The problem of transmitting the navy and hydrographical means of assuring the
security of maritime navigation in Crimea to Ukraine remains still unsolved. Due to 
these considerations, Ukraine has no possibility to fulﬁll the international assign-
ments assumed regarding the assurance of maritime navigation security in its own 
territorial waters.
In addition, of signiﬁcant importance is the use by the Russian Federation of the
dislocation of its military forces in the city of Sevastopol aimed at consolidating its 
positions and image in the Crimea, as for instance the informational space of the Au-
tonomous Republic of Crimea: the use of pro-Russian mass media means to inﬂuence
public opinion, creation and maintaining of the image of Sevastopol as a city of Rus-
sian origin, the existence of which would be impossible without the navy of the Rus-
sian Federation and the status of which will be kept by the Russians regardless of the 
position of state authorities. 
In order to solve these problems, as well as those related to the dislocation of the 
Black Sea Navy of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, the CNSDU 
Apparatus repeatedly submitted reports and analytical materials to the President of 
Ukraine, L. Kuchma. However, due to the lack of political will of the country’s leader-
ship of that period, no decisions for the practical solving of these problems were taken. 
Possibly, during the following period the whole complex of problems related to the sta-
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tioning of the navy of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine will become 
the subject for some special CNSDU meetings.
As an important instrument of inﬂuence from the side of the CNSDU Apparatus
and Secretary upon the issue of solving the most acute problems in the relations be-
tween Ukraine and the Russian Federation is the Russian-Ukrainian Interstate Com-
mission (the so-called Yuschenko-Putin Commission), formed recently. The coordina-
tion of the activity of this commission is assigned to the CNSDU Secretary and the 
Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. The aim of this Commis-
sion is to become an eﬃcient mechanism of solving existent bilateral problems. In this
respect, within its competence were set the issues of economic cooperation (especially 
issues of commercial-economic cooperation, of the energetic-oil complex, of the in-
dustrial policy, of the agro-industrial complex, property issues, technical-scientiﬁc co-
operation, collaboration in the ﬁeld of aeronautics and space, ﬁnance and loan issues),
as well as issues of political cooperation in the humanitarian and security ﬁelds.
Another area of activity in the ﬁeld of external policy that has a direct inﬂuence
upon the national security and defense of Ukraine are the issues of the relations be-
tween Ukraine and Romania. Since the declaration of independence by Ukraine, the 
issues of Romanian-Ukrainian relations are among the most diﬃcult for our state.
The spectrum of Romanian-Ukrainian discrepancies upon which the CNSDU and its
Apparatus focus their attention is very large. Among these is the issue of reestablish-
ing the shipping canal “The Danube – The Black Sea” through the branch of Bystroye
from the delta of Danube and the issues raised as the result of the activities of Romania 
with a negative anthropogenic impact, especially in the permanent contamination of 
the border waters of Ukraine with noxious substances. The list of discrepancies is to be
added with the issue of delimitation of the continental plateau and the exclusive eco-
nomic zones of Ukraine and Romania at the Black Sea, the issue that reached the UN 
Court of Justice after the unilateral address of the Romanian party to this international
institution in September 2004. The issue of ﬁnalizing the constructions of the indus-
trial complex for enriching ferriferous mineral deposits from Krivoy Rog, as well as the 
extremely sensitive issue for both parties related to the situation of national minorities 
is also in the attention of the Council.
The special attention of the Council Apparatus was impelled by some negative ten-
dencies manifested during the process of negotiations with Romania regarding the 
sharing of territorial waters in the Black Sea. Their evaluation allowed the organization
of two CNSDU sessions and the development of respective Decrees of the President 
of Ukraine (regarding the stimulation of the role of Ukraine during the Romanian – 
Ukrainian negotiations on these issues and the adequate protection of the rights and 
interests of Ukraine by the UN International Court of Justice’s examination of the ﬁle
on the delimitation of the continental plateau and the exclusive economic zones of the 
two states on the Black Sea).
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In order to coordinate the activities of the state power bodies of Ukraine on this 
issue, a highly qualiﬁed interdepartmental working Group was created, aimed at as-
suring the submission of the rights and interests of Ukraine in the UN International 
Court of Justice, which included a representative of the CNSDU.
An extremely sensitive issue in Ukrainian-Romanian relations that is under the 
attention of the CNSDU and its Apparatus is the one related to the construction by 
Ukraine of the shipping canal in the delta of the Danube, as well as the cases of nega-
tive inﬂuence of the anthropogenic activity of Romania over the ecological situation
in Ukraine.
A special attention was paid by the CNSDU Apparatus to the control over the ful-
ﬁllment of the decrees of the President of Ukraine related to the biological Reserva-
tion from the Danube and the reestablishment of the tonnage shipping route “The
Danube – The Black Sea”. Thus, during the year 2004 – the ﬁrst half of the year 2005,
the Apparatus of the Council assured the accomplishment of the mission empowered 
by the President of the State regarding the creation of the biological Reservation of the 
Danube and the building of the shipping canal The Danube – The Black Sea.
Within this context, a complex and intense activity has been carried out by the 
Apparatus of the Council in order to defend the national interests of our state in the 
relations with Romania after the decision adopted by the Government of Ukraine to
re-establish the shipping canal The Danube – The Black Sea. Anticipating the nega-
tive reaction of Romania to the loss of monopoly upon an important ﬂuvial artery,
in March 2004 proposals were submitted to the President of Ukraine regarding the 
organization of support for this project through of external policy.
Due to this fact, it became highly possible to neutralize the consequences of a 
far-reaching informational campaign declared by the Romanian side. Romania did 
not manage to gain total support from the UN ecological organizations and the Euro-
pean Union regarding the accusations of our state of violating the requirements of the 
international law provisions regards environmental protection.
The CNSDU Apparatus also maintains control over the issues related to the dan-
gerous eﬀects of the anthropogenic activity of Romania, especially the permanent con-
tamination of the border waters of Ukraine with noxious substances such as hard met-
als and cyanide. During the years 2000-2004 only, due to actions of the Romanian side, 
nine exceptional cases of this kind were registered that led to the contamination of the 
river Danube and trans-border eﬀects. Consequently, there have been important dam-
ages to the ﬂora and fauna of the Romanian part as well as to the Ukrainian part of the
biological Reservation of the Danube. Within this context, analytical materials and re-
spective recommendations of the CNSDU Apparatus were submitted to the President 
of Ukraine regarding the issues of defending the national interests in this ﬁeld.
In conclusion, it is necessary to mention that, notwithstanding the likelihood of the 
relatively unimportant transformation in the nearest future of the problematic aspects 
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of the Romanian-Ukrainian relations in a dangerous conﬂict situation, the CNSDU
Apparatus is ready to take them from a hypothetical level to a real level of threats to 
the national security of the state and is ready to take adequate measures to prevent the 
negative evolution of the situation.
4. The role of the CNSDU in Euro-Atlantic integration
The importance of the role of the CNSDU and its Apparatus in the processes of
Euro-Atlantic integration is undoubtful. The adoption in 2002 by the Supreme Rada of
the political decision on the prospective accession of Ukraine to NATO became a turn-
ing point in the relations between our state and the North-Atlantic Alliance. This fact
was a logical step behind the transformation of the block from a military-political or-
ganization into a political-military one, the globalization of the international security 
space after the events of 11 September 2001, and the accomplishment of the strategy
of NATO enlargement to the East. This decision is extremely important for the future
of Ukraine as a European state and a regional leader due to the fact that it established 
deﬁnitely the internal political priorities and the external political objectives. It also
put on the agenda before the state bodies the complicated and, at the same time, con-
crete missions regarding the Euro-Atlantic integration and put an end to the hesitation 
and long-term undetermined situation.
By the adoption of this strategic decision, Ukraine was involved actively in the de-
velopment of the common European security system, the refusal of the participation 
in which would objectively make our state ﬁnd itself on the outskirts of the European
procedures of integration. The active participation of the Apparatus of the Council,
consisting of the examination, evaluation, interdepartmental coordination and analyt-
ical assistance of the respective initiatives, as well as of the coordination of the actions 
of all ministries and departments involved in European integration, at the summit of 
NATO in Prague contributed to the adoption of the General Plan of Action and the 
Individual Plan of Action for the year 2003. Further, the Individual Plans of Action for 
the years 2004 and 2005 were adopted, which, to a certain degree, are close to the Plan 
of Action for the adherence to the alliance. The very participation of the Council of
National Security and Defense made it possible to carry out the Defense Evaluation, to 
develop the Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine for the period until 2015, to develop 
joint Ukraine-NATO actions, and to re-train the eﬀective force of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine in accordance with NATO standards.
In April 2005, the summit in Vilnius took place. It became a turning point for a 
qualitatively new stage in the relation between Ukraine and the Alliance – The Intensi-
ﬁed Dialog with the primary subject focused upon the accomplishment of the adher-
ence aspirations of Ukraine and the respective forms of action. The concept regarding
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“The deepening of Ukraine-NATO cooperation relations: prospective short-term ac-
tions” adopted in Vilnius includes the consolidation of democratic institutions, activi-
sation of political dialog, collaboration in the reform of the defense and security sector, 
increase and control of the eﬀort in the ﬁeld of political dialog, extension of assistance
in settling the issues related to the economic consequences of the military reform. The
implementation of this concept is under the permanent attention of the Apparatus of 
the Council.
Taking into account the fact that the Intensiﬁed Dialog constitutes the ﬁrst stage in
the oﬃcial preparation for entering the Alliance, the CNSDU began an intense activity
regarding the implementation of the objectives adopted in Vilnius.
Thus, according to the decision of the Council of National Security and Defense of
Ukraine from 14 March 2005 “On the reform principles of the system of the state cen-
tral administrative bodies” a complex reform of the whole administrative system was 
initiated that aimed at deepening the level of structural and content transformation of 
the security sector of our state.
In this respect, it is necessary to mention the expertise activity of the specialists 
from the CNSDU Apparatus in preparing the sessions of the joint Ukraine-NATO 
Working Group Concerning the issues of military reform. Another decision examined 
by the CNSDU Apparatus was to provide this joint Working Group with the planning 
and coordination prerogatives of the process of reorganization of the whole security 
and defense sector of Ukraine. In this case, its main functions would be depicting the 
fundamental issues dominating in the real situation in the defense sector of Ukraine 
and developing an integrated strategy of reforming the security sector and overcom-
ing the advanced issues “with diﬀerent speeds” of the respective state institutions by
means of their organizational and content transformations.
A better understanding by the high NATO representatives of the attitude of the 
Ukrainian state towards the new dimensions of European security and the accomplish-
ments of Ukraine toward European integration are favored also by the multiple meetings 
of the CNSDU Secretary with his Deputies and the leadership of the Alliance.
5. The CNSDU in settling the “frozen conﬂicts” and participation  
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in peacekeeping operations
The role of the CNSDU is very important in accomplishing the most signiﬁcant initia-
tives of Ukraine in the ﬁeld of external policy. Thus, on 13 May 2005 under the presidency
of the President of Ukraine V. Yuschenko, a session of the Council on National Security 
and Defense of Ukraine took place during which a number of issues related to activat-
ing the participation of Ukraine in settling the situation in Transnistria were examined. 
The most important result of the session was the elaboration of Ukrainian proposals as
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regards the ways of solving the Transnistrian conﬂict announced by the President of
Ukraine on 22 April 2005 during the summit of GUUAM states in Chisinau.
In addition, a complex of actions were approved regarding the assurance of the in-
terests of our state in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, especially 
regarding the defense of the rights and liberties of the Ukrainian citizens in the conﬂict
region, adequate assurance of our economic interests in Moldova, opening on the terri-
tory of this country of additional counseling oﬃces and cultural centers, creation of nec-
essary conditions for the national-cultural development of the Ukrainian community in 
Moldova, including the free functioning of the Ukrainian language, etc.
This session of the Council was preceded by an intense coordination activity of the
Ukrainian coordination plan for settlement of the Transnistrian issue with all the inter-
ested parts. In this respect the Secretary of the CNSDU had a series of meetings with the 
leadership of the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria. Due to the activities undertaken, 
the Ukrainian initiatives on the regulation of the conﬂict were positively appreciated by
the Chairman-in-Oﬃce of the OSCE Jan Kubis, the special representative of the Euro-
pean Union on Moldovan issues Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, and other high oﬃcials.
The CNSDU Apparatus constantly analyses the issues of placement of the Ukrain-
ian peacekeeping contingent in Iraq. Thus, in April 2004 sessions of the Council were
organized regarding as regards the speciﬁc character of the presence in Iraq of the
peacekeeping forces with the stabilization mission and measures of reinforcement of 
the security of the Ukrainian peace-keeping contingent. According to the results of 
these sessions, the Council conﬁrmed the continuity of the position of Ukraine’s par-
ticipation within the Stabilization Forces in Iraq within the limits of the commitments 
established by “The Memorandum of understanding among the Ministry of Defense of
Ukraine, the US Department of Defense and the Ministry of National Defense of the 
Republic of Poland on the subordination order within the multinational division (Cen-
tral South) from the Stabilization Forces in Iraq and due issues” and recommended the 
development of necessary activities concerning the enforcement of the security of the 
eﬀective Ukrainian contingent of the peacekeeping troops in Iraq.
In September 2004 a series of sessions of the Council were organized on maintain-
ing the Ukrainian peace-keeping contingent in Iraq. In accordance with the results 
of these sessions a complex of actions were determined regarding the gradual with-
drawal of the Ukrainian military formations from the territory of Iraq.
In March 2005, the Council of National Security and Defense made the decision to 
remove the Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent from the Republic of Iraq according to 
which, in April 2005, the President of Ukraine issued the proper decree.
In addition, in order to accomplish the separate decision of the President of Ukraine 
in March 2005 the Ukrainian delegation led by the CNSDU Secretary visited the Re-
public of Iraq. During the visit, together with the Multinational Force Commandment 
from Iraq, the order to withdraw the Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent and the for-
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mat of further presence of Ukraine on the territory of Iraq were coordinated. Issues 
related to the collaboration with the Transit Government of the Republic of Iraq in 
economic, military, technical-military and humanitarian ﬁelds were also discussed.
As a result of the negotiations, the delegations of Ukraine and the Republic of Iraq 
signed a Memorandum of agreement concerning the prospects of the development of 
the technical-military collaboration.
In addition to the issues related to the withdrawal from Iraq of the Ukrainian peace-
keeping contingent and the format of the further presence of Ukraine in that country, 
during the last year the CNSDU also adopted decisions to approve sending the Ukrain-
ian peacekeeping contingent on other missions. These included the participation of
Ukraine in the UN Forces monitoring the observance of the agreements of hostility ces-
sations and withdrawal of the Israeli and Syrian military troops from the contact line, 
and the participation of Ukraine in the UN Operation in Burundi. The CNSDU further
authorized the access to the territory of Ukraine of the military subunits of other states 
for the participation in the joint military applications with the military subunits of the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine carried out within the international military collaboration.
At the moment, the Apparatus of the Council continues the monitoring of the ac-
tivities of the Ukrainian military contingents, analyses permanently the political-mil-
itary and social-political situation in the districts where they are engaged in accom-
plishing peacekeeping missions.
6. Control and coordination of the activity of the law enforcement 
agencies and counteraction of terrorism by the CNSDU
An important aspect of the activity of the CNSDU and its Apparatus is the con-
trol and coordination of the activity of the law enforcement agencies to combat inter-
national terrorism, illegal migration, trans-border crime, illegal drug circulation and 
corruption.
In 2004 a CNSDU session was organized regarding the state program of the activi-
ties counteract terrorism for the years 2003-2005, the elaboration of which was carried 
out in accordance with the special disposal of the President of Ukraine with the active 
participation of the Council Apparatus.
In order to improve the action capacities of the state bodies in combating terrorism 
during the months of November 2003 and September 2004, the Council Apparatus 
assured the preparation and development of the interdepartmental sessions on this 
subject.
The Secretary of the CNSDU participates regularly in diﬀerent international ac-
tivities based on the issue of combating terrorism, inclusively during the quadrilateral 
sessions of the Secretaries of the Security Councils of Byelorussia, Ukraine, Russian 
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Federation and Poland concerning the coordination of eﬀorts in combating interna-
tional terrorism, illegal migration and trans-border crime.
A special attention is also paid by the Council Apparatus to the legislative frame-
work of anti-terrorist activities. For instance, the experts within the CNSDU Apparatus 
revised twice the draft of the Ukrainian Draft “Law on combating terrorism” and sub-
mitted the respective comments and proposals to the Supreme Rada of Ukraine.
Within the framework of cooperation with the qualiﬁed institutions an examina-
tion of the situation and issues related to the organization of eﬃcient counteraction
of the most dangerous forms of illegal migration from the country were carried out. 
In order to raise awareness of the real situation in this ﬁeld, meetings were organized
with the specialists responsible for the actions in this ﬁeld within the framework of the
Administration of the President of Ukraine, State Frontier Guard Service, Ministry of 
Internal Aﬀairs, other qualiﬁed Ministries and departments. The President of Ukraine
is being regularly informed about the situation on counteracting of illegal migration 
by state bodies.
Taking into account the tendencies of worsening the threats towards the national 
security of the state that are related to illegal drug traﬃcking during the ﬁrst semester
of the year 2005, CNSDU sessions were organized on this issue. As a result, a complex 
of actions were developed concerning the improvement of the state system of counter-
acting illegal drug traﬃcking.
In accordance with the order of the President of Ukraine on carrying out the control 
over the accomplishment of the Decrees of the President of Ukraine “On the system 
of actions regarding the neutralization of reasons and conditions favoring the appear-
ance of criminal phenomena and corruption” from 9 February 2004, “On the decision 
of the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine from 25 April 2002”, “On 
the enforcement of state frontier security of Ukraine regarding the international ef-
forts to combat terrorism, illegal traﬃcking and narcotic substance traﬃcking” from
11 June 2002, the CNSDU Apparatus organized a systematic presentation of the activ-
ity reports by the state institutions engaged in the enforcement of these Decrees with 
the aim of analysis and generalization. The respective conclusions are being regularly
submitted to the President of Ukraine. 
7. The CNSDU, democratic control over the Armed Forces  
and budgetary processes  
(control capacities over budgetary priorities)
Finalizing the examination of the CNSDU’s role in the security sector and defense, 
it is necessary to pay special attention to its responsibilities in the ﬁeld of civil and
democratic control over state military structure and law enforcement agencies. It is ax-
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iomatic that for any contemporary state an eﬀective civil control over power bodies is
a necessity, a condition of power’s transparency and responsibility, and an instrument 
of protection against abuses and of ensuring human rights. Civil control is not limited 
exclusively to military structures of enforcement. It covers broader ﬁelds – from opera-
tive actions and policy in the ﬁeld of armament to establishing the budget of power
structures and of social guarantees for military personnel. 
According to Article 14 of the Ukrainian “Law on democratic control over state mil-
itary structure and law enforcement agencies”, the CNSDU is a body exerting such a 
control. One of the main directions of activity of the Council Apparatus in the ﬁeld of
defense is preparing analytical-informational materials, proposals and decision drafts
according to the Council’s prerogatives that refer to the basis of Ukraine’s military policy, 
contemporary conditions and military reform. In particular, the Council exerts control 
over the implementation of reform programs of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, of other mili-
tary formations and of Ukraine’s industrial-military complex, and of the provision of 
their adequate ﬁnancing. In the sight of the CNSDU are also the issues of social adapta-
tion and professional re-training of military personnel who are to be discharged from 
the Armed Forces or put in reserve, settling issues of exempting the Ministry of Defense 
regarding the retaining of surplus military equipment and armament, infrastructural 
facilities, as well as of military sites that are vacated during the process of reducing the 
Armed Forces, etc.
In April 2004, these issues were examined during a special meeting of the CNSDU 
that was dedicated to the realization of reforming Ukraine’s Armed Forces and to the 
social protection of military personnel and members of their families. 
In the process of preparing materials for the Council’s meetings an economic-ﬁ-
nancial analysis of substantiation was carried out of the Ukrainian Draft “Law on the
reform of the Armed Forces” (further passed on June 14, 2005 by the Supreme Rada of 
Ukraine entitled “The Law on assuring social security of the discharged military per-
sonnel and their family members due to the reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”), 
of the Plan of reducing the eﬀectives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by the end of
2005, of the conversion issues of military objectives, social adaptation and professional 
re-training of discharged military personnel released from the Armed Forces or put in 
reserve, of inadequacies in providing military personnel with pensions, the volume of 
supplementary ﬁnancing to assure the reform’s activities was evaluated, and the imple-
mentation was monitored of other actions according to the Council’s decisions. 
Great attention is paid to the matter of adequate ﬁnancing of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine in the activity of the apparatus. That is why a systematic monitoring of the
situation of ﬁnancing the Defense Ministry of Ukraine is carried out, as well as the
control on the enforcement of Decrees of the President of Ukraine, and the control on 
the enforcement of Decrees of the President of Ukraine on State Budget expenditures 
for assuring the needs of Ukraine’s Defense Ministry. 
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In order to settle the matter of raising expenditures of the Main Intelligence De-
partment of the Defense Ministry for 2005 addresses of the CNSDU Secretary to the 
Prime Minister of Ukraine were repared. According to the results of these addresses, 
the Ministry of Finance received the mission of taking into account the proposals for-
warded during the development of proposals for the Draft State Budget of Ukraine
2005 that was later on partially achieved. 
In order to analyze the situation in the ﬁeld of assuring state security, the CNSDU
Apparatus on a yearly basis carries out constant monitoring of the enforcement of the 
Ukrainian “Law on the State Budget” regarding Ukraine’s expenditures in the military 
sphere, as well as the programs of quartering military personnel, discharged persons 
or those put in reserve and their family members; the Programs of social adaptation 
and professional re-training of military personnel discharged or reserved in the period 
up to 2005; the Program of converting former military facilities during the reform of 
the Armed Forces and other military formations. 
Based on the results of these evaluations, informational-analytical notes and pro-
posals of the CNSDU are developed and addressed to the Defense Ministry of Ukraine, 
National Coordination Center and State Commission on the issues of reform and de-
velopment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations, armaments 
and military equipment. 
An important aspect of civil control over the system of the state military structure, 
according to the Ukrainian “Law on the Council of National Security and Defense of 
Ukraine”, is the prerogative of the CNSDU in the ﬁeld of development and examina-
tion during its meetings of Ukraine’s “Draft Law on the State Budget” analyzing sepa-
rately every article referring to the assurance of Ukraine’s national security, as well as 
of the issue of material, ﬁnancial, personnel, organizational and other types of support,
and of carrying out activities in the ﬁeld of national security and defense.
If we were to analyze the activity of the Council in this sphere during the last years, 
we would ascertain that until 2002 the CNSDU in fact did not examine the Draft Budg-
et of Defense. In the last three years, the situation radically changed and currently, the 
Council is an active participant in the Budgetary Planning process. Concomitantly, 
without taking into account the undoubtful wording of CNSDU prerogatives regard-
ing the control on budgetary priorities, the real situation sometimes does not corre-
spond to the law’s stipulations. Thus, for example in 2003, in spite of the decision of
the CNSDU that was approved by the respective Decree of the President of Ukraine 
and that provided the allotment of 6,4 bln. Ukrainian Hrivnas introduced in “Defense” 
chapter of the State Budget 2004, in the Law on the State Budget that was approved by 
the Supreme Rada at the request of the Government, this sum was reduced by approxi-
mately one billion Hrivnas. 
At the end of 2004, the Apparatus of the CNSDU in cooperation with the ministries 
and other respective central institutions of the executive power examined issues on 
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expenditures from the state budget regarding the assurance of national security and 
defense of Ukraine for 2005. Taking into account the scope of the reform processes of 
the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine planned for 2005, meet-
ings of the Council were held on the issue of ﬁnancing the necessities of defense for the
respective year. 
8. Reserves and imperatives for improvement. Suggestions
The analysis of the national security system of our state demonstrates the fact that
the Council of National Security of Ukraine is a key element of this system and one 
of the most important participants in the political process. The Council is not only
a coordinating body of national security and defense issues, but frequently appears 
as a body that initiates political decisions by forwarding respective proposals to the 
President of Ukraine on achieving basic objectives of internal and external policy in 
the ﬁeld of national security and defense. During the second term of President Leonid
Kuchma this body lost to a certain extent some of its importance, becoming limited 
only to the function of an instrument giving political approval to separate decisions of 
the President of Ukraine, which was a rare case. 
At the same time, after the “orange revolution” and coming to power of a new lead-
ership we have noticed a cardinal re-establishing of the CNSDU’s role in the process of 
making strategic decisions in the ﬁeld of national security, in the extension of preroga-
tives of the Council’s Secretary, and in the increase of eﬃciency of the decisions made
by the Council. Not uselessly, commenting on the structural changes he was planning 
to carry out in the ﬁrst days of his presidential term, Victor Yuschenko stressed the fact
that his purpose was to obtain a clear, well-structured and eﬃcient system of making
and implementing decisions, and the CNSDU in this context will play the role of a 
“crossing where various systems of power encounter”. 
In order to provide adequate settlement of the issues of national security and state 
defense signiﬁcant attention is currently paid to security issues. In this context, the
CNSDU itself is undergoing reform. In the new political conditions, the role of the 
CNSDU has signiﬁcantly increased, and the prerogatives it was assigned exceed by far
the framework of prerogatives of a deliberative body. We may state that the CNSDU 
has gained characteristics that are typical of Western specialized bodies that are re-
sponsible for security issues in the broad meaning of this term (such as the US National 
Security Agency). This fact demonstrates that the state leadership undertakes maxi-
mum eﬀorts to organize state administration work in the security sector at a high level,
and Ukraine will gain an adequate capacity of reaction to various internal and external 
challenges to state security. 
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The achievement of this objective is also supported by a cardinal reform of the sys-
tem of central bodies of state executive power. Thus, for example, according to the deci-
sion of the CNSDU from March 14, 2005 “On the reform of the system of central bod-
ies of state executive power” the Interdepartmental Commission on the reform issues 
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military formations and the military-industrial 
complex were created within the CNSDU. 
It is necessary to mention the participation of the Council in intelligence reform. 
In the new conditions that have emerged after the victory of the “orange revolution”
the necessity has arisen of identifying a new model of activity of intelligence services 
that would provide not only a radical re-distribution of intelligence and counter-intel-
ligence activity, but also a change of activity format of the counter-intelligence service 
simultaneously with depriving it of prerogatives typical of a law enforcement agency. 
Therefore, the Interdepartmental Commission on the reform issues of law enforcement
agencies was created within the CNSDU. 
It is this element of the security sector that requires direct civil and democratic 
control, the strengthening of which will favor the balance and understanding between 
the power and the state.
The success of reforming Ukraine’s security sector will depend, to a great extent, on
the fulﬁllment by our country of the following objectives:
– Developing an incorporated strategy of adjusting all elements of the security 
sector to common European norms and standards that will be included in the 
new Strategy of National Security of Ukraine. 
– Establishing, at an adequate level, the necessary forces and means of state bodies 
that are responsible for national security in order to neutralize modern chal-
lenges and threats with the exclusion of interdepartmental doubling. 
– Introducing the respective changes into the national legislation and other nor-
mative acts on the functions and missions of all component parts of the state 
military structure. 
– Providing an adequate realization of reforming processes (ﬁnancial, techni-
cal-material, etc.). 
Thus, the reorganization of the security and defense sector is, currently, one of the
priority directions and, at the same time, an index of the CNSDU’s eﬃciency. A suc-
cessful realization of the reforms in this ﬁeld will allow the acceleration of reforming
the other ﬁelds of the state public ﬁeld.
Recently, the activity of the CNSDU and its apparatus has signiﬁcantly promoted
the collaborative relations between Ukraine and NATO to an absolutely new qualita-
tive level by establishing new objectives of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, as well 
as deepening international military and technical-military collaboration, intensifying 
the participation of Ukraine in peacekeeping operations, etc. 
192
Taking into consideration the priorities set by the President of Ukraine, ﬁrst and
foremost should be the issues of settling Russian-Ukrainian collaboration, re-estab-
lishing the spirit of mutual trust and of a high level of cooperation. 
In addition, the streamlining of the Council’s functioning is planned, especially 
by increasing the role of the CNSDU in the activity of normative regulation through 
a more active participation of the CNSDU and its Apparatus in the development and 
coordination of normative and legislative bills on issues dealing directly with national 
security. An intensiﬁcation of the informational policy of the CNSDU is planned, as
well as the move from practice of reaction-response to critical and threatening situa-
tions to national security of our state towards a system founded on preventing such 
situations. 
9. Legal Framework of CNSDU – realities and perspectives 
The Council of National Security and Defense was created in accordance with the
Decree of the President of Ukraine in 1992 as a consultative-deliberative body within 
the Presidency of Ukraine as a component part of the system of state executive bod-
ies. It existed within this competence until 1994 when, again in accordance with the 
Decree of the President of Ukraine, the Council was empowered to carry out organi-
zational and coordination prerogatives. The oﬀer of some coordination prerogatives
together with carrying out some activities to create an adequate informational assur-
ance system made it possible for the Council and its Apparatus to act much more eﬃ-
ciently, to tackle much more complex and diﬃcult issues of state activity. In addition,
respective limitations have also been experienced due to the fact that the status of the 
Council was established at the level of presidential decrees, whilst its activity actually 
had an inﬂuence upon the actions of the President of Ukraine, the Government, law
enforcement agencies, etc., themselves and objectively needed to be stipulated at the 
constitutional and legislative level.
The ﬁrst attempt to establish adequately the status of the Council of National Secu-
rity and its position within the system of state bodies of Ukraine was the conclusion in 
1995 of the Constitutional Agreement between the Supreme Rada and the President of 
Ukraine by which the President of Ukraine was empowered to carry out the function 
of guarantor of national security of Ukraine and Head of the National Security Coun-
cil of Ukraine. This issue is approached in a much more detail in the Constitution of
Ukraine of 1996.
• First, a new state body – the Council of National Security and Defense of 
Ukraine – has actually been constitutionalized in it. It inherited the functions 
of the two previous structures – The Council of Defense and The Council of
National Security.
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• Second, the constitution established the main objectives of this body – coordi-
nation and control over the activity of executive bodies in the ﬁeld of national
security and defense.
• Third, in the very text of the Constitution have been established the main prin-
ciples of CNSDU formation and, ﬁnally, the Constitution contains direct indi-
cations abouth the elaboration of a special law that would determine the func-
tions and prerogatives of the Council.
Thus, at the present time the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine
is a specialized state body with constitutional status that is an organic part of the sys-
tem of presidential power and its task is to assure the accomplishment of one of the 
most important constitutional functions of the President – to guarantee independence 
and national security of the state.
Functions and Prerogatives
In its activity, the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine is led by the 
Constitution of Ukraine, the Ukrainian “Law on the Council of National Security and 
Defense of Ukraine”, the Decrees of the President of Ukraine and the Laws of Ukraine.
Article 107 of the Constitution of Ukraine establishes: “The Council of National
Security and Defense of Ukraine is a body with the function of coordinating the issues 
of national security and defense by the President of Ukraine. The Council of National
Security and Defense of Ukraine coordinates and controls the activity of the executive 
bodies in the ﬁeld of national security and defense.”
Under the term “national security and defense” we ought to understand the ﬁeld
of activity that is related to prevention, depiction and counteraction of the events that 
endanger destructively the stability and the existence itself of the state and its citizens, 
of the important public and state institutions.
The Constitution establishes that the CNSDU is the body that coordinates the ac-
tivity of the state bodies on issues of security and defense. Even though the Law does 
not establish the main objectives of the CNSDU, in accordance with the main content 
of the activities, they are as follows:
1. Determination of priorities and national interests of vital importance for Ukraine.
2. Determination of internal and external threats towards national security and 
defense of Ukraine.
3. Development of the strategy and programs to assure national security and de-
fense.
4. Coordination of the activity of state administration bodies in the process of 
planning and accomplishment of the implementation of the adopted decisions. 
5. Improvement of the system of assurance of the national security of Ukraine.
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6. Anticipation of the results of the decisions of the state bodies on issues of inter-
nal and external policy.
7. Development of proposals addressed to the President of Ukraine with the aim 
of adopting decisions in the security sector assurance of the citizens, society and 
state. 
In accordance with the Ukrainian “Law on the Council of National Security and 
Defense of Ukraine” (from 5 March 1998 nr. 183/98-BP), its main responsibilities are 
the following:
1. To submit proposals to the President of Ukraine regarding the accomplishment 
of main activities in internal and external policy.
2. To coordinate and enact control over the activity of the executive bodies in the 
ﬁeld of national security and defense during peace.
3. To coordinate and enact control over the activity of the executive bodies in the 
ﬁeld of national security and defense during war, in exceptional situations and
in case of critical situations that jeopardize the national security of Ukraine.
The analysis of these responsibilities allows us to state that the legislative power has
limited the functioning capacities of the Council exclusively to two ﬁelds: to control
over the activity of executive bodies during peace and during some special periods 
(war time, special legal regime of the exceptional situation, critical situations). How-
ever, performing its duties, the Council introduced into this model another duty and 
perhaps, the most important one.
We are dealing with the responsibility of strategic planning and forecasting. The
reasonableness of such a statement is presented by the prerogatives of the Council 
stipulated in Article 4 of “the Law on the Council of National Security and Defense of 
Ukraine”. Thus, item 1 of this article stipulates that the Council, in accordance with
its responsibilities debates and examines at its meetings the issues that, in accordance 
with the Constitution and Legislation in force, attribute themselves to the ﬁeld of na-
tional security and defense. The Council then submits to the President the proposals
regarding:
• Establishment of the national interests of strategic character of Ukraine, of 
conceptual approaches and main directions in assuring national security and 
defense in the political, economic, social, military, scientiﬁc-technological, eco-
logical, etc. ﬁelds
• Projects of state programs, doctrines, Ukrainian laws, decrees of the President 
of Ukraine, Directives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine, international treaties, other acts and documents with normative char-
acter on issues of national security and improvement of the system of assurance 
of national security and defense, creation, re-organization and abrogation of the 
executive bodies in this ﬁeld.
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• Activities with political, economic, social, military, scientiﬁc-technological,
ecological and other character in accordance with the eventual and real threats 
to the national interests of Ukraine.
The mentioned responsibilities of the Council are accomplished de facto by the activi-
ty of the Council and its Apparatus, as well as by the assistance and consultative bodies.
Taking into account the fact that the top function of the CNSDU is performed by 
the President of Ukraine and the Council itself is a body the activity of which aims to 
accomplishing the responsibilities of the President in the ﬁeld of national security and
defense, its functions and missions are accomplished exclusively by the prerogative of 
the President to preside at the sessions of the Council.
Thus, the President of Ukraine:
– directs the activity and performs the general conduct of the activity of the 
Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine;
Through this responsibility we refer to the establishment by the President of the main
strategic issues in internal and external policy that aﬀect the interests of national secu-
rity and defense of Ukraine and over which the attention and the activity of the Council 
and its Apparatus are to be concentrated.
– approves the prospective and current working plans of the activity of the Coun-
cil of National Security and Defense of Ukraine, the time and order of carrying 
out the meetings;
The very establishment of political priorities of security and defense should be re-
ﬂected in planning the activity of the Council. The number and intensity with which the
meetings of the Council are carried out represent a qualitative criterion of appreciation 
of the weight of the Council within the constitutional system of the state bodies.
– presides over the meetings of the Council of National Security and Defense of 
Ukraine;
This norm stipulates personal responsibility of the President for the functioning of the
Council, the impossibility, in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine, to delegate 
his duties to someone else and makes impossible the activity of the Council in the absence 
of the President of State during its meetings.
– authorizes (empowers) the members of the Council of National Security and De-
fense to act to fulﬁll the responsibilities with which the Council is empowered.
The accomplishment of the coordination function of the Council and namely the
function of collaboration and coordination of its actions by the participants of the policy 
in the security sector and defense is accomplished by means of issuing by the President of 
orders – authorizations (empowerments) and their fulﬁllment.
– examines the reports of the Secretary of the Council of National Security and 
Defense on the accomplishment of the decisions of the Council and, if neces-
sary, submits the issue regarding the degree of fulﬁllment of the decisions of the
Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine to its sessions.
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Permanent control over the execution of the decisions of the CNSDU and the assign-
ments of the President to the members of the Council is carried out by the Secretary of the 
Council and the degree of their implementation is reported to the President of Ukraine. 
If necessary, the President of Ukraine may submit the examination of these issues to the 
session of the Council in order to observe the accomplishment of the decisions, assign-
ments and results or to improve the situation related to the fulﬁllment of the decisions
and hearing of the responsible persons.
The accomplishment of the functions of the Council of National Security and De-
fense and the fulﬁllment of its responsibilities are carried out as well by accomplish-
ing the prerogatives of the members of the Council. Thus, in accordance with Article
12 of the Legislation, members of the Council of National Security and Defense of 
Ukraine:
– suggest to the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine the exami-
nation of any issue that is within its competence;
Taking into consideration the structure of the CNSDU, the right to suggest the ex-
amination of any issues that are within its competence by the members of the Council 
is a possibility to accomplish the duties of the Council as well as of the state institutions 
which they represent. Thus, the issues that may be suggested for examination within
the meetings of the Council cover all eventual threats to national security in any ﬁeld of
public interest.
– carry out the preliminary investigation of the issues and participate in their 
examination within the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine;
The adoption of the decisions by the Council is possible only on the condition of a
thorough, calculated and balanced preparation of the decisions by all members and par-
ticipants in this process. Due to these reasons, participation in the process of develop-
ment of decisions of the Council by its members allows the deﬁnition of the most favora-
ble decisions, even at the preparation stage.
– introduce amendments and proposals, vote on the issues examined by the 
Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine;
This provision establishes certain procedures of issue examination and deci-
sion-making by the Council.
– if necessary, they express separate opinions regarding the draft decisions of the
Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine;
The procedural norms stipulate the possibility for each member of the Council to
express a separate opinion regarding the issues discussed, and this should be reﬂected
in the decision.
– participate in planning the activity of the Council of National Security and De-
fense of Ukraine;
The participation in planning of the activity of the CNSDU of its members is one of
the mechanisms of coordinating the activity of the institutions of state administration 
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which they represent with the aim of determining the priorities in the ﬁeld of national
security and defense.
– coordinate and control, within the limits of their functional responsibilities, 
the accomplishment of the decisions of the Council of National Security and 
Defense.
Taking into consideration the fact that the CNSDU is represented by all leaders of 
all power branches, the accomplishment of the coordination and control function by 
the CNSDU is carried on as well by means of mechanisms related to the activity of the 
respective legislative, executive, supervision, and judicial institutions.
In addition, the fulﬁllment of CNSDU responsibilities is carried out by accomplish-
ing the prerogatives of the CNSDU Secretary. At the legislative level, the status of the 
Secretary of the CNSDU and the mission “of assuring the organization of the activity 
and the accomplishment of CNSDU decisions” is established by Article 7 of the Leg-
islation and the prerogatives, actually rather limited, are stipulated in Article 13. In 
accordance with these norms, the Secretary:
1. develops proposals on the current and prospective planning of the activity of 
the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine;
2. submits for examination to the President of Ukraine the draft decrees on the
enforcement of the decisions of the Council of National Security and Defense of 
Ukraine, including the proposals and recommendations for accomplishing the 
main activities of internal and external policy in the ﬁeld of national security
and defense;
3. organizes the activity related to the preparation and running of the meetings of 
the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine, as well as the control 
over the fulﬁllment of the adopted decisions;
4. informs the President of Ukraine and members of the Council of National Se-
curity and Defense of Ukraine about the degree of accomplishment of the deci-
sions adopted by the Council;
5. coordinates the activity of the working and consultative bodies of the Council 
of National Security and Defense of Ukraine;
6. with the authorization of the President of the Council of National Security and 
Defense of Ukraine, represents the position of the Council of National Security 
and Defense of Ukraine in the Supreme Rada of Ukraine, in the relations with 
the executive bodies and local self-administration bodies, with political parties, 
public organizations, mass media and international organizations.
In the eﬀort to create an eﬃcient body for accomplishing the constitutional pre-
rogatives of the President, Mr. Victor Yuschenko by his Decree nr. 208/2005 of Feb-
ruary 8, 2005 stipulated the mechanisms of activity of the Secretary of the CNSDU 
and enlarged signiﬁcantly his functional prerogatives by oﬀering him the possibility of
inﬂuencing to a certain extent the accomplishment of the functions of the President of
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Ukraine. In addition to the prerogatives stipulated by law, the Secretary of the Council 
has been empowered with 13 additional prerogatives that can be grouped into the fol-
lowing areas of inﬂuence:
First – the right to have an inﬂuence upon the decisions of executive power. Thus,
in accordance with item 3 of the Decree, the CNSDU Secretary received the possibility 
of inﬂuencing the establishment of the agenda of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine
(CMU) by “initiating an urgent examination by the CMU of the issues related to the 
accomplishment of the decisions of the CNSDU”, to take part in the sessions of the 
CMU with the right of consultative vote, to assign tasks to central executive bodies, to 
control their fulﬁllment and to require accounts and reports.
Second – the assurance of accomplishing the prerogatives of the President on issues 
of national security and defense by “coordinating the respective draft acts of the Presi-
dent of Ukraine”. Thus, another procedure has been introduced of countersigning all
decisions of the President in the area of national security and defense by the Secretary 
of the CNSDU.
Third – the possibility of inﬂuencing the accomplishment by the President of in-
vestiture and staﬀ functions. This inﬂuence has been reﬂected in the prerogatives of
the Secretary of the Council regarding the coordination and submission of proposals 
about the appointment in leading positions in all “force structures”, the appointment 
that is made by the President of Ukraine, the coordination of candidates for leading 
positions in all state bodies, whose activity is related to assuring national security and 
defense. Moreover, the judicial force has found itself under the inﬂuence as well. Thus,
it is the Secretary of the CNSDU who was oﬀered the right “to submit for examination
the proposals…, regarding the candidates for the position of judges, members of the 
Supreme Court of Justice and members of the Supreme Commission of Attestation of 
Judges of Ukraine, whose appointment is made by the President of Ukraine”.
Taking into account the fact that the respective Decrees in the staﬀ area are pre-
pared by the Secretary Oﬃce of the President, there arises the question related to the
possibility of practical accomplishment of these prerogatives by the Secretary of the 
CNSDU. 
Consequently, the status of the Secretary has been raised within the general politi-
cal context and in relationship with the CNSDU itself. Thus, in accordance with the
Decree of the President, the Secretary has the right to sign the decisions of the Council 
and run the meetings of the CNSDU in the absence of the President. This and other
prerogatives of the Secretary are indisputable considering the norms stipulated in Ar-
ticle 19 and 106 of the Constitution that are to be referred to below.
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Structure
The Head of the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine is the Presi-
dent of Ukraine. The structure of the CNSDU comprises ex oﬃcio:
• Prime Minister of Ukraine;
• Minister of External Aﬀairs of Ukraine;
• Minister of Defense of Ukraine;
• Minister of Internal Aﬀairs of Ukraine;
• Head of the Security Service of Ukraine;
• The Speaker of the Supreme Rada, with his agreement.
The Nominal Structure of the Council is determined  
by the President of Ukraine
At the moment the nominal structure of the Council is approved by the Decree of 
the President of Ukraine of February 8, 2005. Besides the persons that are members in 
accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine in the structure of the Council there have 
been included the Chief of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, President of the National 
Bank (with his agreement), as well as the General Prosecutor of Ukraine, Secretary of 
State and Secretary of the CNSDU. At the moment, the total number of members of the 
Council constitutes twelve persons.
The number of temporary members of the CNSDU was diﬀerent during diﬀerent
periods of independence of Ukraine, depending upon the present political options and 
due to the methods of political favoritism that was wide spread during the Presidency 
of Leonid Kuchma. During the last years, beginning with Decree nr. 605 of the Presi-
dent of July 7, 2001 a certain continuity is observed regarding the inclusion into the 
structure of the Council of the Chief of the Apparatus of the President, Ministers of 
Finance, Economy, Exceptional Situations, the Chief of the State Committee on issues 
of state border guards, the Chief of the General Staﬀ of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
and the President of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The last to be in-
cluded in the structure of the Council in 2004 was the Chief of the External Informa-
tion Service of Ukraine. During the whole of this period only the persons performing 
the respective functions were changed.
In our opinion, the decisive factor in the issue of determining the nominal structure 
of the CNSDU might be the principle of “responsibility for the counteraction of the 
determined threats towards national security” and solving the strategic medium-term 
problems of far-reaching perspective that are faced by the state.
Taking into consideration the fact that the principles mentioned above and Article 
7 of the Legislation of Ukraine “On the bases of national security” (number 964-IV 
of June 19, 2003) that establishes the dangers and threats towards national security of 
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Ukraine in clearly deﬁned ﬁelds of state activity, the division of responsibilities with
the aim of counteracting threats has been accomplished as follows:
In the ﬁeld of external policy:
• threat towards state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, territorial 
claims on the part of other states;
• attempts of intrusion into the internal aﬀairs of Ukraine on the part of other
states;
• politico-military instability, regional and local wars (conﬂicts) in diﬀerent parts
of the world and, in the ﬁrst place, near the borders of Ukraine;
The responsibility for the counteraction of these threats is within the competence
of the Ministry of External Aﬀairs, the Security Service of Ukraine and the Service of
External Information.
In the ﬁeld of state security:
• Informational-subversive activity of foreign special services;
• threats and attempts on the part of some separate groups or persons towards 
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic, technical-scientiﬁc and de-
fense potential of Ukraine, the rights and liberties of citizens;
• spread of corruption among state bodies, intergrowth of business and policy, 
organized criminal activities;
• criminal activity directed against the peace and security of humanity, in the 
ﬁrst place, the spread of terrorism;
• threat of using, in terrorist purposes, nuclear and other kinds of facilities on the 
territory of Ukraine;
• possibility for illegal introduction on the territory of the country of weapons, 
munitions, explosive substances and means of mass destruction, radioactive 
and narcotic substances;
• attempts to create and activate of illegal paramilitary formations and attempts 
to use, in the interest of certain forces, the actions of military formations and 
legal bodies of the state;
• separatism manifestations, attempts to create autonomous formations in ac-
cordance with ethnic criteria in separate regions of Ukraine.
The responsibility for the counteraction of these threats is assigned to the Ministry
of Internal Aﬀairs and Security Service of Ukraine.
In the military ﬁeld and in the ﬁeld of state border security of Ukraine:
• proliferation of arms of mass destruction and means launching those arms;
• reduced eﬃciency of the existent structures and mechanisms of international
security and global stability;
• Illegal migration;
• possibility for the involvement of Ukraine in regional military conﬂicts or in
situations of confrontation with other states;
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• deploying by other states near the borders of Ukraine of forced groups and ar-
maments that undermine the balance of established forces;
• dangerous reduction of the level of provision with military and special technol-
ogy and arms of new generation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and other mili-
tary formations that might provoke the reduction of their combat capacities;
• hesitation in the implementation and insuﬃcient ﬁnancial assurance of the pro-
grams to reform the military organizations and the industrial-military complex 
of Ukraine;
• accumulation, without any need, of an important quantity of military technol-
ogy, armaments and old, outdated, explosive substances;
• non-ﬁnalizing of the legal regulation and insuﬃcient equipment of the state
border of Ukraine;
• insuﬃcient level of social protection of the military staﬀ, citizens discharged
from the military service and members of their families;
The counteraction of these threats is within the competence of the Ministry of Ex-
ternal Aﬀairs, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and
the State Frontier Guard Service of Ukraine.
In the ﬁeld of external policy:
• violation by the state bodies and bodies of local administration of the Constitu-
tion and Legislation of Ukraine, of the rights and liberties of the person and of 
the citizen, including during the electoral campaign, the lack of eﬃciency of
the control over the observance of the Constitution’s requirements and lack of 
respect of the Legislation of Ukraine;
• possibility for breaking out of some conﬂicts in the ﬁeld of inter-ethnic and
inter-confessional relations, radicalization and manifestation of extremism in 
the activity of some associates of national minorities and religious communi-
ties;
• threat presented by the manifestation of separatism in some regions of Ukraine;
• structural and functional imbalance of the political system, incapacity of some 
component parts of the system to react operatively to the threats towards na-
tional security;
The threats in this ﬁeld have a suﬃciently large and complex character and their
counteraction is on behalf of a wide range of executive bodies and undoubtedly of 
the judicial branch of Ukraine. Generally, the area of responsibility might be shared 
among the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU) in the person of the Ministry of 
Internal Aﬀairs, the Ministry of Justice, the State Cabinet on migration issues and the
judicial bodies of Ukraine in the re-establishment of the rights and liberties of the per-
son and the citizen that have been undermined.
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In the economic ﬁeld:
• a signiﬁcant reduction of the Gross Domestic Product; diminution of invest-
ment and innovation activity, of the technical and technical-scientiﬁc potential,
reduction of research in important strategic directions of innovation develop-
ment;
• degradation of the state regulation and control system in the economic ﬁeld;
• instability in the legal regulation of relations in the economic ﬁeld, including
the state ﬁnancial (tax) policy;
• lack of an eﬀective program of preventing ﬁnancial crises;
• increase in credit risks;
• a critical situation in the main production funds in the industrial branches, the 
agro-industrial complex and the systems of life insurance;
• aggravation of the issue of maintaining the adequate technical situation of the 
nuclear facilities on the territory of Ukraine;
• insuﬃciency in the rate of reproduction processes and overcoming the struc-
tural deformation in economy;
• critical dependence of the national economy on the conjuncture of foreign mar-
kets; reduced rates in the process of enlarging the internal market;
• irrational structure of exports with a preponderance of raw material and re-
duced range of production with a high level of added value;
• major dependence of the state on loans, reaching critical points in internal and 
external state loans;
• dangerous increase for the economic independence of Ukraine of the percent-
age of foreign capital in the strategic ﬁelds of the economy;
• ineﬃciency of the antimonopolistic policy and of the mechanisms of state regu-
lation of natural monopolies that complicate the creation of competitive envi-
ronments in economy;
• a critical situation in the provision of the population with foodstuﬀs;
• ineﬃcient use of energy resources, an ineﬃcient rate of diversifying the supply-
ing sources and the lack of an active policy of energy provision that endangers 
the energy security of the state;
• “shadowing” of the national economy;
• predomination in the activity of the leading structures of personal, corporative 
and regional interests over the national ones.
In the social and humanitarian ﬁelds:
• lack of correspondance of the programs of reforming the economy of the country 
and the results of their implementation with the determined social priorities;
• ineﬃciency of the state policy regarding the increase in the incomes of the citi-
zens, of overcoming poverty, and of the balanced productive utilization of the 
labor forces of the active population;
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• crisis in the system of health protection and social protection of the population 
and, consequently, the danger of worsening the health of the population, spread 
of drug abuse, alcoholism and social diseases;
• aggravation of the demographic crisis;
• decrease in the possibility of receiving a qualitative education by the representa-
tives of the socially vulnerable strata of the society;
• manifestation of a moral and spiritual degradation of the society;
• increase of the level of lack of supervision over children and minors, of care as-
sistance and vagrancy.
The counteraction of the threats in the economic, social and humanitarian ﬁeld is
totally based upon the corresponding subdivisions of the Government, an essential 
role that is to be played by the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy and Issues of 
European Integration and the National Bank of Ukraine.
In the scientiﬁc-technological ﬁeld:
• reduction of the scientiﬁc-technological lagging of Ukraine behind developed
countries;
• ineﬃciency of the innovational policy promoted by the state, of the mechanisms
stimulating innovative activities;
• low competition capacity of Ukrainian products;
• sub-development of the internal market of the products of high technology and 
the lack of its eﬃcient protection from the external technical and technological
expansion;
• diminution of the internal demand in technical-scientiﬁc staﬀ preparation for
scientiﬁc, projection, technology institutions and enterprises of high technol-
ogy; the insuﬃcient level of salary payment in the technical-scientiﬁc ﬁeld, de-
crease of its prestige, ineﬃciency of the protection mechanisms of intellectual
property;
• exodus of qualiﬁed scientists, specialists and labor forces beyond the bounda-
ries of Ukraine.
The correct evaluation and organization of counteraction of these threats repre-
sents the mission of the Ministry of Science and Education and National Academy of 
Sciences of Ukraine.
In the ecological ﬁeld:
• signiﬁcant anthropogenic detriment and overloading of technical character of
the territory of Ukraine, the increased risk of the appearance of exceptional 
situations of a technical and natural character;
• irrational and exhaustive usage of natural resources and mineral resources with 
regeneration capacity as well as those that do not have such a capacity;
• persistence of negative social-ecological consequences of the catastrophe of 
Chernobyl;
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• aggravation of the ecological situation of the aquatic basins, of the issue of 
trans-border contamination and diminution of the quality of water;
• aggravation of the technical situation of the hydro-technical systems of the falls 
of the accumulation reservoirs on the Dnepr river;
• uncontrolled import to Ukraine of dangerous technologies, substances, materi-
als and plants with genetic mutations, of incipients of diseases dangerous for 
people, animals, plants and organisms, usage of plants, organisms, substances 
and derivative products with genetic mutations without the necessary ecologi-
cal substantiation;
• ineﬃciency of the activities of overcoming the negative consequences of military
actions and other dangerous activities from the ecological point of view;
• persistence of dangers of a technical character, including nuclear and biological 
dangers; persistens of terrorism;
• intensiﬁcation of the inﬂuence of negative genetic eﬀects in microorganism sub-
systems, especially of the organisms with genetic mutations, and of biological 
technologies;
• distressing and reduced eﬃciency of the complexes of utilization of toxic and
ecologically hazardous wastes.
Undoubtedly, the counteraction of the threats towards ecological security is within 
the priority of the Ministry of Exceptional Situations and the Ministry of Ecology and 
Natural Resources.
In the informational ﬁeld:
• manifestations that limit the liberty of expression and access of citizens to infor-
mation:
• promotion by mass media of the culture of cruelty, violation, and pornogra-
phy;
• crime and terrorism by means of computerized networks;
• disclosure of information that is classiﬁed as a state secret or another type of
secret in accordance with the legislation, as well as conﬁdential information
that is state property or aims at assuring the national needs and interests of the 
society and the state;
• eﬀorts of manipulating the public opinion, especially by spreading erroneous,
incomplete or tendentious information.
The informational ﬁeld is a very sensitive mechanism the running of which is made
by the state institutions as well as by the whole society. Due to these reasons the coun-
teraction of the threats in this ﬁeld may be attributed to the Ministry of Transporta-
tions and Communications, the State Committee on Television and Broadcasting as 
well as by the National Council on issues of television and broadcasting.
Such a structure of the CNSDU, remaining rather compact (16 persons), from 
the professional point of view covers all the existent and eventual threats towards 
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national security and has the possibility of adopting independently fundamental 
decisions in almost all issues put within its competence.
Thus, generalizing these conclusions we will reach the integrated structure of the
CNSDU. Taking into consideration the fact that the position of the Ministries “of econom-
ic character” within the Council might be expressed by the Prime-minister of Ukraine, 
alongside the persons who have already been included into its structure it is possible and 
necessary to introduce the Chief of the External information Service, the Chief of the 
State Border Guard Service (External Security and border defense are ﬁelds of national
security, the responsibility for which is put within the charge of the President of Ukraine 
in accordance with the Constitution. Due to these reasons it is logical and necessary for 
these interests to be presented independently by the leaders of these institutions that, 
in the meanwhile, as leaders of informational structures have the right to inform di-
rectly the President of Ukraine on issues within their competence.), the President of the 
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the Chief of the National Committee on 
Television and Broadcasting.
Structure
The structure of the Council of National Security and Defense comprises the Ap-
paratus of the Council the activity of which is regulated by Decree nr. 927/96 of the 
President of Ukraine of October 4, 1996 “on the Apparatus of the Council of National 
Security and Defense of Ukraine” with further modiﬁcations (Decrees nr. 673/97 of
the President of July 24, 1997; nr. 980/98 of September 4, 1998; number 62/2000 of 
January 13, 2000; number 41/2001 of January 24, 2001). Unfortunately, the other four 
Decrees of the President were issued under the note “not for publishing”, a fact that 
makes their examination impossible in this work.
In accordance with this Decree, the Regulation of the Apparatus of the CNSDU was 
approved establishing its legal status, main missions and responsibilities.
Thus, the Apparatus of the Council was established as a body of executive power 
that assures the activity of the Council of National Security of Ukraine. This interpre-
tation is rather contradictory from the point of view of including the Apparatus in the 
system of executive power. In the situation when the Council is not subordinated, does 
not submit reports and is not controlled by a superior body in the system of executive 
power – the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine – we cannot state that this body is part of 
the executive branch. 
The main mission of the Apparatus as the main body of information and analysis
of the CNSDU is to prepare informational-analytical materials, suggestions and draft
decision in accordance with the duties of the Council and its Secretary.
The Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine functions in accor-
dance with Article 8 of the Ukrainian “Law on the Council of National Security and 
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Defense of Ukraine” approved by Decree nr. 907/96 of the President of Ukraine of 
October 4, 1996.
The main responsibilities of the Apparatus are to prepare informational-analytical
materials, suggestions and draft decisions in accordance with the responsibilities of
the Council.
In this respect, the Apparatus of the CNSDU performs the following functions:
• collects, accumulates and processes information related to the condition and 
development of the situation of external and internal policy;
• develops prognosis as regards the modiﬁcations of the conditions and factors
that inﬂuence the situation in the ﬁeld of national security and defense;
• examines and evaluates potential and real threats towards national interests, 
establishes ways and means of their counteracting and localization;
• substantiates the priorities of external policy and external economic policy, mil-
itary, technical-military, nuclear, ecological, informational policies and other 
ﬁelds of the national security policy;
• coordinates the development of analytical and forecasting research of strategic, 
geopolitical, social-economic, legislative and other character in the ﬁeld of na-
tional security;
• analyses the activity in the ﬁeld of national security and defense of the executive
bodies within the duties of whom is the implementation of state policy in the 
ﬁelds of external policy, external economic policy, military and technical-mili-
tary policies; reviews the suggestions and recommendations with respect to the 
integrated assurance of national interests, as well as the conclusions regarding 
the drafts of legal acts and international agreements on these issues of Ukraine;
• assures the permanent monitoring of the situation and the process of imple-
mentation of the state concepts and programs, legal acts and orders of the Presi-
dent of Ukraine on the issues of national security and defense;
• performs the organizational and methodological assurance of the activity of 
interdepartmental commissions and other consultative-deliberate bodies in the 
ﬁeld of national security and defense;
generalizes suggestions regarding:
• the improvement of the mechanisms of coordinating the activity of executive 
bodies in the ﬁeld of national security and defense;
• the improvement of the activity of legal bodies regarding the defense of the ter-
ritorial integrity of the country, the strengthening of state security and public 
order, increase of eﬃciency in combating crime, observance of human rights
and liberties;
• the drafts of military doctrine, of state concepts and programs regarding the
organization of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military formations of 
Ukraine, structures, number of eﬀective force and dislocation as regards the
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improvement of armaments and military techniques, of the attributions, organ-
ization and activity of the military bodies;
• the creation of interdepartmental commissions and other bodies in the ﬁeld of
national security and defense, their responsibilities and their personnel;
• the draft of the State Budget of Ukraine and reports of its accomplishment re-
garding the ﬁnancing of national security and defense;
• the structure of Ukrainian delegations and the directions for participating in 
international activities on issues of national security and defense, develops pro-
posals to the reports on their activity;
• performs other functions related to assuring the activity of the Council.
Thus, in accordance with Decree nr. 208/2005 of the President of Ukraine of Febru-
ary 8, 2005, the Council’s Apparatus assumed the responsibilities of the former Gen-
eral Department on the issues of judicial reform, activity of military formations and 
law enforcement agencies of the Administration of the President of Ukraine. 
Consequently, the Apparatus of the CNSDU was empowered to carry out the mis-
sion of assuring analytical, consultative, informational and organizational expertise of 
the exercise of presidential responsibilities:
• to control the activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Border Guard 
Service of Ukraine and other military formations created in accordance with 
the Legislation of Ukraine as well as the formations supervising them such as 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
• to perform state policy in the ﬁeld of national security and defense especially re-
garding technico-military collaboration and control over export, to strengthen 
the defense capacity of the state;
• to guarantee the observance of the Constitution and Legislation of Ukraine, the 
rights and liberties of citizens by legal bodies;
The CNSDU Apparatus has become responsible for assuring cooperation with the
military bodies and formations mentioned above, with justice and judicial bodies, as 
well as for assuring the coordination of the activities constituting a new judicial sys-
tem.
In order to assure the accomplishment of the mentioned attributions the CNSDU 
Apparatus has the following rights:
• to solicit the necessary information,
• to use the most diverse data bases and informational systems,
• to form groups of experts in order to examine concrete issues,
• to attract scientiﬁc workers, specialists, workers from the ministries and other
executive bodies.
The respective staﬀ members of the Apparatus of the Council have the right to take
part in the sessions of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine, Ministry Boards, other 
central executive bodies and interdepartmental commissions while examining the is-
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sues of national security and defense. Since the issue of Decree nr. 208 of the President 
of Ukraine of February 8, 2005, the Secretary of the CNSDU received the right to take 
part in the sessions of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine with the consultative right 
to vote. In practice, the Apparatus of the CNSDU processes in advance the materials 
prepared by the Secretary of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine for the sessions of the 
Government and prepares the position of the CNSDU Secretary on the issues related 
to national security and defense.
During the process of fulﬁlling its responsibilities, the Apparatus of the Council of
National Security and Defense of Ukraine cooperates with the respective Ministries 
and other central executive bodies, local bodies of state administration and local bod-
ies of public administration, as well as with scientiﬁc institutions.
The Apparatus of the Council is ensured with special physical and technical guard,
with respective means of governmental, special and departmental transmission.
The structure and the limitation of the eﬀective strength of the CNSDU Apparatus
is approved by Decrees of the President of Ukraine. The present structure is approved
by Decree nr. 1181/2003 of the President of Ukraine of October 15, 2003 (with modi-
ﬁcations introduced by Decrees nr. 194 of February 16, 2004, nr. 1306 of October 22,
2004, nr. 1477 of December 13, 2004).
The Structure of the CNSDU Apparatus:
Administration:
– Secretary of National Security and Defense of Ukraine
– First deputy Secretary of the Council
– Deputy Secretaries of the Council
– First deputy Chiefs of the Apparatus of the Council
– Deputy of the Apparatus of the Council
Subdivisions according to the ﬁelds of assurance of national security and defense:
– Department of external policy security 
– Department on issues of economic, social and ecological security
– Department on issues of internal and state security
– Department on issues of military security
– Legal Service
– Department of analytical assurance
– Departmental of informational assurance
– Department of technical-organizational assurance
– Council Secretary Service
– Expertise Commission
– Group of Counselors of the Council’s Secretary
– Control Division
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– Strategic Development Division
– First deputy Council Secretary Service
– The Service of the deputies of the Council’s Secretary
The administration of the Council’s Apparatus is performed by the Secretary of the
Council. He establishes the duties, obligations and responsibilities of the staﬀ members
of the Apparatus, and approves the estimate of the expenses of the Council’s Appara-
tus.
The administration of the CNSDU Apparatus as such is performed by the Chief of
the Council’s Apparatus.
The Chief of the Council’s Apparatus, two of his deputies, the ﬁrst assistant of the
Secretary of the Council, the chiefs of the separate divisions and subdivisions of the 
Council Apparatus are appointed and dismissed by the President of Ukraine at the 
suggestion of the Secretary of the Council. The other staﬀ members of the Council Ap-
paratus are appointed and dismissed by the Secretary of the Council.
The staﬀ members of the Council Apparatus are civil servants.
The military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military forma-
tions might be delegated in order to satisfy their military service, in the Apparatus 
of the Council at the request of the Secretary of the Council in an established order. 
In fact, within the Apparatus of the Council highly qualiﬁed specialists with higher
education and in most cases with a scientiﬁc degree an adequate experience are se-
lected. They are state oﬃcials and delegated military oﬃcers. The structure of these 
specialists is varied – military oﬃcers, lawyers, economists, ﬁnance experts, diplo-
mats, ecologists that act within the subdivisions of the Apparatus in accordance with 
their qualiﬁcation. The staﬀ members of the Council Apparatus might, in an order es-
tablished in advance, be decorated with state distinctions, appointed to senior ranks 
and degrees, etc.
The new changes in the duties of the Secretary of the Council, in accordance with
Decree nr. 208/2005 of the President of Ukraine of February 8, 2005, the liquidation 
of the Coordination Committee for combating corruption and organized crime by the 
President of Ukraine and the former General Division for judiciary reform issues, the 
activity of military bodies and law enforcement bodies that have previously been part 
of the Administration of the President, condition the need for re-examining the Regu-
lations on the Apparatus of the Council, of its structure and staﬀ limit.
Aﬃliated institutions
Within the CNSDU the following function as aﬃliated institutions: the National
Institute of International Security Issues within the Council of National Security and 
Defense of Ukraine; the Institute of National Security Issues within the Council of 
National Security and Defense of Ukraine, the Interdepartmental Centre of Scientiﬁc
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Research within the Coordination Committee for combating corruption and organ-
ized crime within the Presidency of Ukraine.
The National Institute for International Security Issues was created in accord-
ance with Decree nr. 173 “On the National Institute of International Security Issues” 
of the President of Ukraine of March 16, 2001. The Institute carries out fundamental
and applicative research in current issues of global and regional security, international 
relations and external policy, and research on the impact upon the evolution of the 
internal processes in Ukraine.
The main missions of the Institute are as follows:
– assurance of the President of Ukraine, of the Council of National Security and 
Defense of Ukraine, of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine with conceptual and 
informational-analytical materials on current issues regarding the evolution of 
international processes, as well as with scientiﬁcally fundamental suggestions
regarding the formation and implementation of the strategy of relations with 
the most important states in the world, important international organizations 
and alliances regarding decision-making at the state level in the ﬁelds of na-
tional security and external policy;
– development of forecast scenarios regarding the policy of the most important 
countries in the world in relation to Ukraine, its strategic friends and immedi-
ate neighbors;
– forecast of the coming out of tense situations or economic, political or social 
crises in Ukraine that might have a negative impact upon the processes of inte-
gration of Ukraine into the European and world community;
– expertise of the projects, normative acts and decisions at the state level on the 
issues of global and regional security;
– monitoring of the processes of evolution of political and military-political un-
ions and alliances, of the situation in the world conﬂict regions or regions with
conﬂict potential;
– analysis of the issues of informational security and the presence of Ukraine 
within global informational space;
– publishing and broadcasting of the results of scientiﬁc research that is carried
out under the tutorship of the Council of National Security and Defense of 
Ukraine.
In accordance with its missions, the Institute conducts thorough research in the 
following main areas:
– global security and European integration;
– international relations;
– regional and interregional relations;
– internal processes in the most important countries of the world;
– economic relations;
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– issues of developing international communication networks;
– issues of social-economic and demographic security;
– humanitarian relations;
– issues of military policy and security;
– relations within the informational sphere.
Forms of scientiﬁc-organizational activity:
– organization and conduct of fundamental scientiﬁc research and projects with
an applicative character;
– coordination of scientiﬁc research on the issues of international security that
are carried out by other scientiﬁc institutions;
– preparation of scientiﬁc staﬀ members by means of post-graduate courses;
– organization of scientiﬁc conferences, seminars and debates on the most impor-
tant issues of global and regional security;
– reviewing and publishing of the magazine “Strategic panorama”, of the analyti-
cal report on issues of international security, of monographs, collections, etc.;
– expertise of the drafts of the legislative and normative acts on security issues;
– development (including on a contractual basis) of forecasts of a scientiﬁc char-
acter;
– provision of scientiﬁc-methodological assistance to the specialized organiza-
tions, mobilization (counteraction) of scientiﬁc institutions and top specialists
with the aim of carrying out the most important research within the ﬁeld of
activity of the CNSDU and the Institute;
– analysis of the research and developments on the issues of interest in other 
countries.
The Institute collaborates with institutions from other countries and maintains re-
lations of a scientiﬁc character on the most important issues of international security,
exchanges the results of scientiﬁc research and specialists, and takes part in interna-
tional conferences, round table sessions and meetings as well.
Sources of ﬁnancing
The activity of the Institute is ﬁnanced from the State Budget of Ukraine. The deve-
lopment of the scientiﬁc projects that are carried on an agreement basis is ﬁnanced by
the public, private and state organizations of Ukraine and other countries.
The Institute for National Security Issues (INSI) is a state institution of scientiﬁc
research. The Institute was created with the purpose of assuring the development of the
scientiﬁc basis of national security, the increase of the level of scientiﬁc grounding and
the eﬃciency of the state policy regarding the defense of national interests of Ukraine
and with the purpose of guaranteeing the security of the person, society and state in 
proportion to internal and external threats in all ﬁelds of activity. Its purpose is also to
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improve the level of consultative-deliberative assurance of the activity of the President 
of Ukraine and the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine on this issues. 
Within its activity, the Institute bases its activity on the Constitution and the Legisla-
tion of Ukraine, the decrees and orders of the President of Ukraine, the decisions of the 
Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine, the decisions of the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine as well as the Statute (the Regulation) of the Institute. The Institute
is subordinated to the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine.
The main missions of the Institute are as follows:
– development of scientiﬁcally grounded suggestions regarding the assurance of
national security and the analysis of international experience of activity in this 
ﬁeld;
– assuring of the President of Ukraine, the Council of National Security and 
Defense of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine with conceptual and 
informational-analytical materials on issues of national security;
– forecast and evaluation of eventual internal and external threats towards na-
tional security, development of suggestions regarding their counteraction and 
neutralization, solving the most complex issues of economic, socio-political, ec-
ologic and other character that could generate the appearance of such threats;
– development and grounding of suggestions regarding the implementation in 
Ukraine of international standards and the most advanced international expe-
rience on the issues related to the research spheres of the Institute;
– creation of informational-analytical systems with the purpose of assisting high 
level administrative decisions;
– improvement of the qualiﬁcation of the specialists and experts on the issues of
national security.
In order to accomplish its missions, the Institute:
– develops drafts of the Strategy of National Security of Ukraine, of the concepts
and programs; develops drafts of scientiﬁc research; reviews the annual and
prospective topical plans of scientiﬁc research and ensures their accomplish-
ment; develops analytical reports, methodological materials and recommenda-
tions on issues of ensuring the eﬃciency of the process of implementing state
policy within the ﬁeld of national security;
– participates in the scientiﬁc-methodological and informational assurance of the
process of development and accomplishment of the programs of sustainable de-
velopment of Ukraine;
– collects, processes and generalizes the data and knowledge necessary for the 
accomplishment of the missions of the Institute, creates respective data, infor-
mational systems, and develops technologies for their usage;
– studies international experience and develops suggestions for its usage in 
Ukraine, maintains cooperative relations and collaborates with scientiﬁc and
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other kinds of institutions and organizations from abroad, with famous scien-
tists, creates joint scientiﬁc working groups, exchanges specialists as well as the
results of scientiﬁc research and publications;
– carries out scientiﬁc expertise of the results of the research accomplished by
other institutions and organizations, organizes scientiﬁc conferences, seminars
and meetings on issues related to their ﬁeld of activity;
– carries out editing, improvement and re-training activity for the specialists from 
the system of state administration bodies in the process of informing the popu-
lation regarding issues of national security and actions that are undertaken in 
order to settle them.
– coordinates the implementation of the results of the accomplished research.
In order to accomplish its missions, the Institute has the right:
1.  to solicit free presentation of the necessary information by the state bodies, 
institutions and organizations;
2.  to organize conferences, seminars, scientiﬁc gatherings, etc.;
3. to publish materials regarding the results of scientiﬁc and other kinds of re-
search;
4. to create branches of the Institute and other separate divisions and approve their 
statutes and regulations;
5. to perform other actions stipulated by the Legislation of Ukraine.
The general administration of the Institute is performed by the Secretary of the
Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine. The Institute is run by the Direc-
tor who is appointed and dismissed by the President of Ukraine at the suggestion of the 
Secretary of the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine.
At the moment of development of this survey, the statute of the Institute has not yet 
been ﬁnalized and the Institute itself is being reformed.
In accordance with Decree nr. 2005 of February 8, 2005 the Interdepartmental 
Center of Scientiﬁc Research also falls under CNSDU supervision. This Center was
created by the Committee on Coordination and Counteraction of Corruption and Or-
ganized Crime by the President of Ukraine with the purpose of assuring scientiﬁcally
its activities with respect to Decree nr. 714/94 of the President of Ukraine of December 
1, 1994, in accordance with the Ukrainian “Law on the organizational and legal bases 
of combating organized crime” with the aim of scientiﬁc assurance of combating or-
ganized crime and corruption.
In accordance with the Decree of the President of Ukraine, the main missions of 
the Centre are the following:
– generalization of the needs of the state in assuring scientiﬁc assistance for the
process of combating corruption and organized crime, coordination at the high 
state level of scientiﬁc research in the ﬁeld, determination of the ﬁelds for their
implementation, organization of experience exchange in this ﬁeld;
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– conducting, with own forces and with the assistance of famous scientists, special-
ists of legal bodies and other organizations, of scientiﬁc research on issues of com-
bating corruption and organized crime, development of analytical documents, 
forecasts, drafts of normative acts, suggestions and practical recommendations
regarding the tactics of the state and non-governmental bodies in this ﬁeld;
– study and research of the possibilities for implementation in Ukraine of the inter-
national experience in the ﬁeld of combating organized crime and corruption.
During the period after the issue of the Decree of the President, in accordance with
the its mission, the staﬀ members of the Interdepartmental Center of Scientiﬁc Re-
search focused their eﬀorts upon:
– conducting scientiﬁc research on the issues of combating organized crime and
corruption;
– accomplishment of the decisions of the Committee on coordinating the activi-
ties of combating corruption and crime by the President of Ukraine and the 
assignments stipulated by the President of the Committee on coordination;
– insurance of control on the accomplishment by the Ministries and Departments 
of the Decrees and Orders of the President of Ukraine in the ﬁeld of combating
organized crime, of the National Program of combating corruption, of the im-
plementation of the Legislation of Ukraine in this ﬁeld;
– insurance of the activity of the Committee on coordination of the activities of 
combating corruption and crime by the President of Ukraine;
– development of the drafts of legislative and normative acts as well as of the sug-
gestions regarding the improvement of the Legislation in force and the norma-
tive basis of issues of counteracting organized crime and corruption;
– implementation of the applicative results of the scientiﬁc and analytical re-
searches of the Centre within the activity of the special subdivisions of comba-
ting organized crime and corruption, of the law enforcement agencies and con-
trol bodies within the process of study of the institutions of higher education 
from the law enforcement system;
– development of practical recommendations regarding the combating of corrup-
tion and organized crime, etc.
As result of these missions and accomplishing the decision of the Committee on 
coordinating the activities of combating corruption and crime by the President of 
Ukraine, during the period of 1995-2000, with personal forces of the scientiﬁc staﬀ of
the Interdepartmental Center and with the engagement of the scientists from the area, 
of the specialists of the legal bodies and other organizations, study and research were 
carried out of the issues related to combating banditry, terrorism, racket, organized 
crime (especially in the external and banking economy), corruption, illegal migration, 
“contracted” murders, crimes related to the use of information technologies, etc.
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These activities served as scientiﬁc grounds for accomplishing some coordinated ac-
tivities of the law enforcement agencies and other state bodies in combating corruption 
and crime, as well as of the decisions related to the leadership of the Committee on coordi-
nation of the activities of combating corruption and crime by the President of Ukraine.
The Interdepartmental Center maintains cooperative relations with the represent-
atives of the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs of Ukraine within the Commonwealth of
Independent States, and the Embassies of Ukraine abroad. A close collaboration has 
been established with the Informational Centre within the Presidency of Ukraine, the 
Department of Computerized Informational Systems and Networks within the Secre-
tariat of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine, the Centre of Information and Documentation 
of the Council of Europe, V. I. Vernadskii National Library of Ukraine, and with nu-
merous Ministries and Departments, and Scientiﬁc and Educational Institutions. The
staﬀ members of the Interdepartmental Center regularly participate in conferences,
symposiums, international and republican seminars on issues in this ﬁeld.
This activity allows the monthly publishing of analytical information bulletin on
current issues for their practical use by the law enforcement agencies.
In accordance with Article 14 of the “Law on the Council of National Security and 
Defense of Ukraine”, in order to examine and solve the complex issues of an interde-
partmental character, to assure analytic-scientiﬁc and forecast assistance of the activ-
ity of the Council, in accordance with its decision, within the limits established by the 
State Budget of Ukraine, there can be created temporary interdepartmental working 
commissions and consultative bodies.
The functions and duties of these bodies are determined by separate regulations
that are approved by the President of Ukraine.
The analysis of the Legislation of Ukraine allows us to state that during the activity of
the CNSDU, in accordance with the Decrees of President Leonid Kuchma, as well as on the 
basis of the results of examining the respective issues within the meetings of the Council 
of National Security and Defense of Ukraine, four interdepartmental commissions have 
been created: The interdepartmental Commission on issues of scientiﬁc-technological
security (Decree nr. 1170/2001 of the President of December 3, 2001); the interdepart-
mental Commission on information policy and issues of information security (Decree nr. 
294/2001 of the President of Ukraine of May 7, 2001); and the Interdepartmental Com-
mission on issues of biological and genetic security (Decree nr. 672/2004 of the President 
of Ukraine of June 13, 2004). Some of the information about the activity and the results of 
creating these commissions were not found in accessible information sources.
President Victor Yuschenko by his Decree nr. 658/2005 of April 15, 2005 engaged 
the Secretary of the CNSDU in creating two more interdepartmental commissions: (1) 
on issues of reforming the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military formations and the 
military-industrial complex; (2) on issues of reforming the law enforcement agencies 
of Ukraine.
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The existence within the structure of the Council of National Security and De-
fense of Ukraine, beside its Apparatus, of the institutions and structures mentioned 
above, of temporary working bodies, allows us to state that from the point of view of 
its functions and prerogatives, the Council is able to adopt decisions on the basis of 
some scientiﬁc research and analytical forecast of the highest quality. The engagement
within these institutions of the highest intellectual potential of the country allows the 
transformation of the CNSDU into the main constitutional body of adopting the most 
important state decisions in all ﬁelds of national security and defense policy.
The CNSDU and the constitutional framework,  
the role of the CNSDU within diﬀerent constitutional systems  
(parliamentary, presidential, half-presidential), in cases of governmental 
and parliamentary coalitions, the eﬃciency of the CNSDU  
in a parliamentary state in case of a lack of parliamentary majority
The bodies, the competence of which coincides or is similar to the ones of the Coun-
cil of National Security and Defense of Ukraine, in many countries hold the role of 
the most active participants in the political process. They take part not only in the de-
velopment of suggestions addressed to the head of the state (the Government) but can 
be independent initiators of political decisions as well, or can even lead the country in 
a critical situation (such prerogatives are stipulated, for instance, for the Council of 
National Security of Poland). In Ukraine, during the period of the second mandate of 
President Leonid Kuchma, this body lost its importance, becoming just an instrument 
of public approval of the decisions of Leonid Kuchma and it met very seldom. At the 
moment, most experts foresee the re-establishment of the importance and authority of 
the CNSDU, especially taking into account the important number of personalities from 
the associates of Victor Yuschenko who aspire to independent political roles.
In the contemporary world, the importance and the functions of the Councils of 
National Security (CNS) in diﬀerent states are rather diﬀerent. The volume of preroga-
tives and the inﬂuence may transform the Council into the top state body. This situation
is characteristic, in the ﬁrst place, of the states that face complex, diﬃcult and threate-
ning provocations in many of the ﬁelds of state activity, and which have special strong
armies and services that inﬂuence directly the process of state administration (Turkey,
Pakistan, etc.). For instance, by July 2003 in Turkey, the CSN was the most important 
state body and the democratic reforms related to the intention of integration within the 
European union conditioned the introduction of constitutional modiﬁcations that have
limited the inﬂuence of the Council of national security during peace.
Within another model of constitutional organization, the Council of national se-
curity is rather a body of exceptional situations that, under normal conditions, seems 
to be in a conserved state (Hungary and some European states). There are also known
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cases when the Council functions in a regime similar to the one of an administra-
tive-bureacratic body that, in accordance with its missions and functions, is much 
closer to the executive system than to the political leadership. In such cases, the CNS 
is rather used as a kind of “refugee-storage” for the top oﬃcials during “disgrace pe-
riods”. We can observe examples of accomplishing such a model in the contemporary 
history of some states within the CIS.
Examining diﬀerent forms of CNS activity, we can also mention the example of
the Kingdom of Morocco where the council reigned by the king reunites the leaders 
of the political parties of this country beginning with the extreme right and including 
the local communists; and plays an important consolidating role within the political 
system of the country.
In general, the functions and the role of the Council of National Security (CNS) in 
the system of state power is determined by three main factors – the power of military 
and administrative structure of the state, the distance between the political leader-
ship of the state and military and governmental bureaucracy, and the level of chal-
lenges to the society and the state. The inﬂuence of national traditions cannot be usually
ignored, as well as the personal individual traits of the country’s top leadership.
At present, practically in all countries of the world, the CNS carries out three ba-
sic missions. First, it is a mechanism of forecasting and strategic planning; second, it 
represents a link between governmental, military bureaucracy and law enforcement 
agencies on the one hand, and the head of state and political circles on the other. Third,
the CNS is the administrative body in cases of emergency, and the institution that has 
to assure the adequate level of state governing in exceptional or critical situations.
The CNS can also settle other issues at the state level in addition to and during the
fulﬁllment of these basic functions. First of all, we are dealing with the assurance of
functioning of political mechanisms for preparing the most important state level deci-
sions in the sphere of national security. 
We cannot overlook another function of the CNS, namely that of activity coordina-
tion, interest granting and promotion of an adequate level and contents of reciprocal 
contacts between army leadership, intelligence services, law enforcement agencies and 
top levels of governmental bureaucracy. What is extremely important for a political 
democratic regime is that this process takes place through and with the assurance of 
control of civil leaders and state political leadership. This function currently obtains a
signiﬁcant importance under conditions of launching the reform of the Armed Forces,
law enforcement agencies, Security Service of Ukraine and creating a national intel-
ligence community decreed by the President of Ukraine. 
In general, the CNS is an element of a paramount importance in the system of civil and 
democratic control over the functioning of state military structure. It is diﬃcult to overes-
timate the importance of this mission, especially under conditions of realizing a cardinal 
reform of the Armed Forces, intelligence services and law enforcement agencies. 
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It is through the Council of National Security, the commissions created within it and 
other consultative bodies that the coordination of positions can be carried out, as well as 
the consensus on the most important issues of social development can be reached. The
CNS and, ﬁrst of all, its apparatus can play the role of a liaison body, a channel of intel-
lectual personnel exchange between the state and expert and academic communities to 
provide high quality expertise of state decisions. We would like to remind you that the 
principles of approaching these issues were developed at the end of 1990s. During the 
previous period, it was demonstrated that structures of scientiﬁc research and analyti-
cal forecast of the Councils of national security can play an extremely important role.
Last but not least, we would like to mention the following: within the framework 
of systems of presidential and presidential-parliamentary form of government, the CNS 
can be used as one of the basic inﬂuence levers of the head of state over the functioning
of state power, and also over state public life in general. The Council of National Security
and Defense of Ukraine is a single state body under the administration of the President 
of Ukraine, the existence and status of which are stipulated by the Constitution.
At the same time, it is necessary to mention that from January 1, 2006 the Ukrain-
ian “Law on the introduction of modiﬁcations in the Constitution of Ukraine”, or the
so-called “Constitutional reform” will come into eﬀect. After this, the CNSDU may
become the only constitutional body to carry out directly presidential prerogatives. 
According to this Law, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine receives the status of an ab-
solutely independent body of the executive power that is subordinated to and presents 
its reports exclusively to the Parliament. Even if the time limits of coming into eﬀect
of this law are postponed, very soon the obligatory redistribution of prerogatives from 
the President to the Prime Minister will be imposed, due to the fact that it will cor-
respond to the logic of the development of the Ukrainian state and transition to a 
parliamentary system. 
 At the same time, the role of the Prime Minister will increase in the decision-mak-
ing process within the CNSDU. According to “the Law on the Council of National Se-
curity and Defense of Ukraine” the decisions of the Council are adopted by at least two 
thirds of the votes. If, in accordance with the provisions of the existent Constitution, 
out of seven members of the CNSDU ex oﬃcio only the Speaker of the Supreme Rada
of Ukraine is not appointed by the President of Ukraine, then after the “constitutional
reform” comes into eﬀect two more members of the CNSDU will become formally
independent from the president’s decisions, namely the Prime Minister and Minister 
of Foreign Aﬀairs, who will be appointed by a parliamentarian majority. Particularly,
we will take into account the fact that the Minister of Internal Aﬀairs will be rather
dependent on the Prime Minister and the parliamentarian majority that will delegate 
him in the framework of the Government. 
Thus, the Prime Minister as a representative of a parliamentarian majority obtains
a greater inﬂuence over the process of making decisions by the CNSDU. As head of the
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Government and representative of the parliamentarian majority, the Prime Minister 
can control votes and decisions of Governmental ministers – he controls votes of the 
Speaker of the Supreme Rada, Minister of Internal Aﬀairs, Minister of Defense and
Head of the Security Service, who will also be appointed by the Parliament. In addition, 
according to Article 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine, all Decrees of the President, 
as well as those issued for the enforcement of CNSDU decisions are countersigned by 
the Prime Minister and a minister responsible for the enforcement of the correspond-
ing decisions. Thus, after the “constitutional reform” the CNSDU can become the only
constitutional mechanism of coordinating political positions of top state leaders who 
are, de facto, reciprocally not dependent – the President of Ukraine, Prime Minister 
and Speaker of the Supreme Rada. 
At the same time, we have to draw your attention to the danger of using the Council 
not for taking strategic decisions, but, ﬁrst, for accomplishing the president’s tactical
missions of a politico-economic nature. In case such a model is realized, the authority 
and eﬃciency of this body, and through it of the President of Ukraine, will soon be
devalued as a result of the tough competition coming from the Cabinet of Ministers 
and the Parliament. 
Practices of administration of the Council of National Security  
and Defense of Ukraine (analysis of structure and administration) 
1. The Process and practice of the CNSDU’s decision-making
In accordance with the practice of decision-making, the CNSDU is a board-based 
body. The order of making decisions is also set by the legislation. The CNSDU’s deci-
sions are adopted by at least two-thirds of the votes of its members. Members of the 
CNSDU vote personally. They are not allowed to delegate voting to other persons who
take part in the meetings of the Council.
In accordance with “the Law on the Council of National Security and Defense of 
Ukraine” the Speaker of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine can participate in the meetings 
of the CNSDU. He can oﬀer his opinion on the adopted decisions. His opinion is reg-
istered in the minutes of the meetings. 
At the same time, in accordance with Article 2 of Decree nr. 208 of the President 
of Ukraine of February 8, 2005 “On some aspects of the organization of the activity of 
the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine” the Speaker of the Supreme 
Rada of Ukraine (with his express consent) is included in the structure of the CNSDU. 
Thus, his vote is taken into account during decision-making.
At the invitation of the Head of the Council of National Security and Defense of 
Ukraine, the participants in the meetings of the Council can be the following: heads 
of commissions of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine, other parliamentarians, heads of 
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central bodies of the executive branch and other persons who are not members of the 
CNSDU. Such a practice exists in order to examine comprehensively the issue and to 
make eﬃcient and well-balanced decisions. Heads of specialized commissions of the
Supreme Rada of Ukraine are involved in order to participate in the activity of the 
Council – Commission on national security and defense, Commission on legal policy, 
Commission on combating organized crime and corruption, etc. 
During the examination of the issues of decision-making in concrete spheres – eco-
nomic, social, military, scientiﬁc-technological, ecological, information and others,
heads of the respective bodies of state executive power, scientiﬁc employees and spe-
cialists are invited to the meetings. 
In the practice of its activity, the CNSDU has repeatedly faced the necessity of mak-
ing urgent decisions on a certain subject. In that case, the coordination of the draft
decision is allowed without holding the meeting as such. 
The agenda is oﬀered to the Council’s examination by the President of Ukraine. The
initiation of various issues in the agenda is the prerogative of all subjects involved in the 
assurance of national security. Members of the CNSDU, as well as the parliamentarians 
and public organizations, can address the President or the Secretary of the Council with 
a request to examine certain issues at the Council’s meetings. Thus, one of the CNSDU’s
ﬁeld meetings was initiated by the Head of regional administration of Lvov, Mr. Petro
Oleinik. Mr. Oleinik had a meeting on these issues with the President and Secretary of 
the Council and oﬀered for the examination a range of issues important for a border
region – trans-border collaboration, preservation of the traditions and cultural heritage 
of the city of Lvov and the situation in the sphere of chemical industry.
As a rule, topics of the meetings are planned annually and stipulated in the Plan of 
meetings of the CNSDU that is approved by the President of Ukraine, a fact that allows 
the organization of activities at the level necessary for carrying out these meetings. On 
average, such meetings have been previously held at least once in two months. With the 
election of a new state administration, the CNSDU’s meetings are held twice a month. 
Emergency issues that have appeared due to exceptional situations, for example at 
the military range of Novobogdanovka, or due to the political need are held at extraor-
dinary meetings.
Basic organizational activities and general requirements regarding the materials 
that are prepared for holding the meetings, preparing the decisions of the Council of 
National Security and Defense and their coming into eﬀect are set by a special Regula-
tion that is approved by the decision of the Secretary of the CNSDU. 
In order to prepare the materials for the meetings of the CNSDU, working groups 
are set up by the ruling of the Secretary of the Council, as well as the time limits and 
main missions. The competence of the working group includes experts of the CNSDU
Apparatus and lower-level scientiﬁc institutions. In addition, representatives of execu-
tive, legislative and judicial power bodies, as well as those of independent institutions 
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and independent experts, etc. may be included (with their consent) in the above-men-
tioned group.
Working groups are usually headed by a deputy of the Secretary of the CNSDU, 
Head of the Council’s Apparatus, his deputies or a head of one of the departments 
of the Council’s Apparatus in accordance with the specialization. The responsibility
for organizational-technical assurance of the meeting is placed upon the head of the 
CNSDU’s Apparatus. 
A working group has the following missions: 
– to preliminarily analyze the issue that is being forwarded for examination dur-
ing a meeting of the CNSDU;
– to edit and forward requests to the respective bodies and organizations regard-
ing the presentation of informational-analytical materials on some aspects of 
the examined issues, as well as proposals on possible ways and mechanisms 
of assuring national interests, counteracting the identiﬁed threats to national
security and neutralizing the factors of their appearance;
– to analyze and generalize materials and proposals;
– to prepare an informative note for the meetings of the Council of National Se-
curity and Defense of Ukraine;
– to develop a draft decision of the Council of National Security and Defense of
Ukraine; 
– other activities related to the organization and assurance of meetings (establish-
ing the list of meeting participants and guests, preparing and sending out meet-
ing invitations, participating in copying and distributing the materials, prepar-
ing additional informational materials, etc.)
The duration of preparing the materials for the planned meetings of the CNSDU is
determined by the program of meetings, and the duration of preparing the materials for 
the extraordinary meetings varies depending on the consistency of the discussed issues. 
Materials prepared for the meetings of the CNSDU that are presented to the Presi-
dent and Council members include: the agenda, plan of meeting that includes the agen-
da, list of meeting participants indicating the position of both the Council members 
and guests, informative notes on each separate issue of the agenda, and the CNSDU 
draft decision. The working group also prepares theses of the report (speech) of the
President or the Secretary of the CNSDU and a press release. 
Materials prepared for the meeting of the CNSDU are documents of strict record 
and that is why printing, copying, keeping and returning of these is carried out and 
controlled in accordance with established regulations.
Informative notes on the issues that are discussed at a CNSDU meeting have an 
introduction, body and conclusion. The introduction contains subject matter and gen-
eral wording of the issue that is being examined by the Council, substantiation of the 
opportunity of its examining in the context of assuring national security and defense 
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or in the context of assuring Ukraine’s national interests. In case of a repeated exami-
nation of the issue, the introduction is to contain the evaluation of situational changes 
after the preliminary examination, present state and the results of enforcing prelimi-
nary decisions of the Council that were aimed at counteracting threats to national 
security in the given ﬁeld.
The body of the document is based on informational-analytical materials of the
executive power bodies and specialized institutions, as well as expertise evaluations 
received by the CNSDU Apparatus in the preparatory period of the meeting. The ma-
terials are structured on the most important spheres and aspects of the issues with the 
emphasis on real or potential threats to national security, of basic factors that have con-
ditioned their appearance, existence or evolution, etc. Special attention should be paid 
to the analysis of the state and eﬃciency of the legislative-normative framework, as well
as to the existent structure of state administration and regulation of processes in the ex-
amined sphere. As a rule, the body of the document is supplied with examples, relevant 
facts and data that are veriﬁed with the greatest attention. The materials should not
contain subjective or emotional assessments of the situation and activities of specialized 
bodies and responsible persons, as well as unveriﬁed data and information.
The closing part of the informative notes should contain generalizing conclusions
that logically emerge from the recommendations to the President of Ukraine and that 
are presented in the draft Decision of the Council of National Security and Defense of
Ukraine. 
The Draft Decision of the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine is
exposed, as a rule, in the following formula: „Having examined the complex of issues 
on (the examined topic or subject) the Council of National Security and Defense of 
Ukraine states (main conclusion of the examination)”. 
Further on, there should be exposed brieﬂy the most signiﬁcant threats to national
security in the ﬁeld under examination during the meeting, the most signiﬁcant draw-
backs and deﬁciencies of the state administration system, legislative regulations, enforce-
ment of previous decisions and legislative and normative acts in the given ﬁeld, etc.
The body of the Decision is formed based on the recommendations of the Council
of National Security and Defense of Ukraine concerning the compelling tasks and ac-
tivities and aims at removing the identiﬁed drawbacks, counteracting and neutralizing
threats. The tasks should be named as well as their executors and the time limits of the
actions. 
The note and draft Decision that are forwarded at the Council meeting must be coun-
tersigned by all members of the working group. In exceptional circumstances, it is al-
lowed that in cases of divergences regarding the conclusions and proposals a separate 
opinion may be oﬀered that, in its turn, is countersigned by the authors and attached to
the meeting’s materials. It is also allowed to inform and coordinate the informative note 
with the state administration central bodies and respective institutions. The draft deci-
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sion is not a subject to previous coordination (except by the persons responsible for its 
development) before the examination within the CNSDU meeting. The CNSDU decision
is signed by the Secretary of the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine.
After the meeting of the CNSDU and adoption of the Council’s Decision, the next
day it is forwarded to the President of Ukraine – the Head of the CNSDU for its putting 
into motion in accordance with Article 103 of the Constitution of Ukraine and Ar-
ticle 10 of the Ukrainian “Law on the Council of National Security and Defense of 
Ukraine”. The head (coordinator) of the working group preparing the materials for the
meeting of the CNSDU takes obligatory part in the development of the respective draft
Decree of the President of Ukraine. 
The development of the respective draft Decree is carried out in accordance with
the Regulation on the way of preparing and presenting draft decrees and directives of
the President of Ukraine, approved by Decree nr. 346/93 of the President of Ukraine of 
August 20, 1993 with the subsequent modiﬁcations.
2. Practices of enforcement, coordination and control
The decisional part of the decrees of the President of Ukraine through which CNS-
DU decisions are enforced, as a rule, contain a detailed enumeration of actions that are 
undertaken in order to settle an issue. The control over the enforcement of the decrees is
ascribed to the Secretary of the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine. 
In practice, state power bodies that are indicated in the decrees as responsible for the 
enforcement or organizing the accomplishment of missions, or, better to say, subjects 
of national security (the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, National Bank of Ukraine, 
Security Service of Ukraine, etc.) can issue their own decisions and delegate the ac-
complishment of certain missions, elaborate plans of actions and undertake other ac-
tivities in order to accomplish the missions stipulated by the Decree. 
Direct control over the enforcement of the Decree of the President of Ukraine on 
putting into motion the decision of the CNSDU Council is ascribed to the respective 
subdivision of the Council’s Apparatus in accordance with the sphere of specialization. 
The responsible subdivision carries out implementation of the decision and generalizes
information for the report of the Council’s Secretary. Usually, one draft of the letter
on the given issues is written out to the President of Ukraine. In terms of control, the 
state of enforcing the Decision is reported by the Council’s Secretary to the President of 
Ukraine. In case of need, a deﬁnite issue can be forwarded for re-examination within
the CNSDU and is included in the Plan of meetings of the Council. 
In case the actions established by the Decision were not carried out due to objective 
reasons, the respective subdivision of the Council’s Apparatus analyzes and general-
izes relevant information and suggests ways and actions of settling the issue. Relevant 
materials are prepared for the Secretary of the Council for the subsequent reporting to 
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the President of Ukraine. In case when the respective Decision was not carried out by 
state bodies or speciﬁc public oﬃcials due to subjective reasons a report is to be ﬁled to
the President of Ukraine. 
In order to carry out control on qualitative and timely enforcement of the deci-
sions adopted by the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine, control, 
inspection and supervision bodies functioning in the system of the executive power 
are involved. Namely, these are the Department of Revision and Control, General 
Prosecutor’s Oﬃce, State Fiscal Administration, ministers and other central bodies of
the executive power. 
3. Practical role of the CNSDU in the structure of national security  
    and defense system. Reserves and imperatives of modiﬁcation
The Ukrainian “Law on the bases of national security of Ukraine” establishes the
content notions of “national security”, “national interests” and subjects of national secu-
rity. The national security of Ukraine is assured through promotion of a well-grounded
and balanced state policy based on a clear-cut delimitation of prerogatives and coop-
eration of all subjects of the system of assuring national security. 
Implementation of state policy is possible due to the existence of a single board-based 
decision-making body, which, at the same time, carries out functions of coordination 
and control. At present, the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine in-
cludes heads from all branches of state power and has the possibility of involving nec-
essary experts in the process of preparing decisions. In this context, due to the reasons 
that the main subject represents national interests, i.e. material, intellectual and spir-
itual values of vital importance of the Ukrainian nation as a carrier of sovereignty and 
the only source of power in Ukraine, which also determines demands of the society 
and the state, and the realization of which guarantees state sovereignty of Ukraine and 
sustainable development, the position of the President of Ukraine Victor Yuschenko is 
absolutely logical who is trying consolidate around the idea of national security, in the 
ﬁrst place, all branches of state power as the most important and legitimate elements
of the state mechanism. 
Taking into account the universality of the issue of national security – it is always 
actual and requires development and constant updating, we should admit that cur-
rently of CNSDU must exist within the state also as a decision-making mechanism, as 
well as a mechanism of acquiring technologies and experience that are accumulated 
during the activity process. Evidently, it requires a constant improvement of the leg-
islative-normative basis, due to which the most justiﬁed and experience-based norms
remain in the normative framework. 
During the previous political regime, ﬂaws of the existent mechanisms, divergences
between the power branches on the most important issues, when each of them was 
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acting separately, created a situation when the CNSDU consisted only of the persons 
subordinated to the head of state. This fact undermined the legal authority of this body
because members of the board-based body can only hold and defend their own opinion 
in conditions of independence.
Present existence of the make up of the Council of heads of all state power branches, 
the National Bank and other constitutional bodies allow the Council to become eﬀec-
tively an eﬃcient institute of board-based decision-making, due to the fact that each
member of the Council can insist on defending his own position, thus taking eﬀective
and active part in assuring national security, which inﬂuences to a certain extent the
making of relevant decisions in this sphere. 
Legislative and imperative reserves of improvement
Currently, in our opinion, the process of CNSDU prerogative forming has not ﬁn-
ished yet. The Decree of the President of Ukraine who grants additional prerogatives to
the Council and the Secretary according to many experts is not perfect from the view-
point of corresponding to the Constitution of Ukraine. Even though the prerogatives of 
the Secretary are limited to the right of executing only those actions stipulated in the 
Decree that enforce “written acts and orders of the President of Ukraine or enforcing 
CNSDU decisions” (Paragraph 1, Item 3 of the Decree), the scope of these prerogatives 
is extended taking into account Paragraph 2, Article 19 of the Constitution of Ukraine. 
This legal provision stipulates that “state power bodies and local administration bodies,
as well as the responsible oﬃcials representing them are to act only in the limits of attri-
butions and the way established by the Constitution of Ukraine and Ukrainian legisla-
tion”. Thus, the Constitution strictly limits the way that state functions are carried out
and does not allow a detailed interpretation of state bodies’ prerogatives. A Presidential 
Decree is not a law, and prerogatives of the Secretary of the Council stipulated by Article 
13 of the Ukrainian “Law on the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine” 
from the point of view of meaning and volume do not correspond to the prerogatives 
stipulated by the Decree and are not listed completely. 
At the same time, we will take into account the fact that a group of parliamentar-
ians of Ukraine forwarded an interpellation to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine 
that is requested to rule whether this Decree does not contravene the Constitution and 
Ukrainian Legislation. 
Thus, admitting the constitutionality or non-constitutionality of the Decree will
determine the main directions of reform of the CNSDU. In case the Court decides 
that the decree does not contravene the Constitution, then the subsequent modiﬁca-
tions may follow the path of legally investing the Secretary with new prerogatives and 
mandates, as well as of adopting a new Regulation on the Council’s Apparatus with 
respective missions and prerogatives. In case the Decree is ruled unconstitutional, 
then there will emerge the issue of legislative conﬁrmation of the extended Council’s
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prerogatives. In any case, the only legitimate way of extending the attributions is the 
development and adoption of a new edition of the Ukrainian “Law on the Council of 
National Security and Defense of Ukraine”.
Proposals
Currently, the contents of the Ukrainian “Law on the Council of National Secu-
rity and Defense of Ukraine” does not correspond to the public relations existing de 
facto and require changes. The Law does not correspond to legislative acts of the same
level that have subsequently been passed – the “Law on the bases of national security 
of Ukraine” and Ukraine’s “Law on civil and democratic control of the state military 
structure and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine”. The structure of the Law has a
range of deﬁciencies and does not correspond to the requirements that similar acts
should abide by. 
An important issue is the eﬃcient functioning of the subjects providing national
security in the following ﬁelds:
– development and periodical review of the National Security Strategy of Ukraine. 
At present, it has not been approved yet and has to be created based on new prin-
ciples of external and internal policy, taking into account the political course of 
the new leadership with the involvement of all subjects; 
– creation of a normative-legislative basis necessary for eﬃcient functioning of
the system of providing national security;
– streamlining the organizational structure, complete provision with human re-
sources, as well as the ﬁnancial, material, technical and informational ones, and
other types of the system’s structural elements.
An important element of these functions that requires constant improvement and 
adequate provision is the continuous monitoring of the inﬂuence over Ukraine’s na-
tional security of the processes that occur in all ﬁelds: forecasting, identifying and
evaluating potential and real threats, destabilizing factors and conﬂicts, reasons of
their appearance; elaborating scientiﬁcally grounded proposals and recommendations
on adopting administrative decisions in order to protect national interests; preventing 
and neutralizing the inﬂuence of threats and destabilizing factors, etc.
Ideally, all state institutions are to undertake active eﬀorts for the realization of
these functions and improvement of the normative-legislative basis that is, in fact, the 
carrying out of constitutional norms. This is the purpose of the reforms that have been
launched by the new President of Ukraine. 
At present, the Council of National Security and Defense has a signiﬁcant develop-
ment potential as a body with a mission to consolidate the eﬀorts of all branches of
power in order to protect the state’s interests. It is a mechanism of complex, compre-
hensive and objective examination of the most acute issues of the state and society, a 
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board-based body for passing fundamental and balanced decisions during a creative 
and complex process. 
Among the deﬁnite problems requiring solution we would mention the structural
reform of the Council’s apparatus according to modern conditions, provision of an ef-
ﬁcient functioning of interdepartmental commissions within the CNSDU, as well as
of scientiﬁc institutions. Concerning the legislative-normative ﬁeld, we might mention
the improvement of legislation in the ﬁeld of national security and defense in accord-
ance with the requirements of the constitutional reform and new political course of 
the state leadership. We are dealing with the development of the National Security 
Strategy and the Concept of foreign policy of Ukraine. An urgent solution is required 
by the problem of Transnistria, the reform of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, the settlement 
of real estate issues, etc. 
The international collaboration of the Council of National Security and Defense
of Ukraine in the conditions of a consecutive development of the state has reached a 
qualitatively new level. During only the ﬁrst three months from the moment of res-
ignation of Mr. Petro Poroshenko from the position of the Council’s Secretary, eight 
events of paramount importance took place in the ﬁeld of international collaboration
(comparing to three activities of the same importance in 2004). We would like to men-
tion the meetings with the Secretary of the Council of National Security and Defense 
of Georgia Ghela Bejuashvili, Secretary of the Council of National Security of the Rus-
sian Federation Igor Ivanov, and head of the Bureau of national security of the Repub-
lic of Poland Eji Bar. The CNSDU Secretary took part in the International Summit on
democracy, terrorism and security that was held in March 2005 in Madrid. In April, 
the Secretary of the CNSDU had meetings with the leadership of Romania and the Re-
public of Moldova on the issues of the settlement of the Transnistrian problem. On the 
initiative of Ukraine in Kiev there was held a consultative meeting of the Secretaries of 
the Councils of national security of the four member-states of GUUAM. As a result of 
international collaboration, the Memorandum of collaboration with the CNS of Geor-
gia and the Plan of collaboration for 2005 with the CNS of the Russian Federation were 
signed, and numerous practical agreements were achieved.
In this period, the eﬀorts of the CNSDU Secretary aimed at developing internation-
al collaboration in the sphere of security that will correspond to Ukraine’s tendencies 
to European integration and its role of a new regional leader. In this context, a new im-
pulse will be given to CNSDU collaboration with international bodies working in the 
ﬁeld of assuring security at the regional and global level based on common interests.
The Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine can participate in this
collaboration on issues requiring settlement at the global level:
– combating terrorism;
– combating international organized crime;
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– minimizing consequences of natural disasters and catastrophes of a technical 
nature;
– preventing military conﬂicts, etc.
According to the Deputy Director of the Institute of Strategic Research O. Litvinenko, 
the main missions of the CNSDU in this period should be concentrated on the follo-
wing ﬁelds:
1. The consolidation of the Ukrainian society based on civic democratic values, 
overcoming the dangerous consequences of divisions in Ukraine during the electoral 
period. It is necessary to urgently develop and start the consecutive implementation 
of an eﬃcient state policy regarding the neutralization of political speculations on re-
gional diﬀerences, creation of mechanisms of presenting and coordinating regional
interests at the national level, and development of Ukraine’s socio-political integration 
strategy. Deﬁning a complex and comprehensive solution is necessary with respect to
the functioning of state power bodies in conditions of a multilateral democratization 
of all public spheres and the increase of the role of society. In addition, it is necessary 
to create a normative-legislative base of public protest actions. 
2. The reform of law enforcement agencies and intelligence services. Their ac-
tivity should ﬁrst of all be directed towards the assurance of rights of a person and a
citizen and it has to be supported by implementing an eﬃcient system of civil demo-
cratic control on state military structure. It is necessary to achieve the compatibility 
of Ukraine’s security forces with the corresponding structures of the EU and NATO 
states. It is necessary to have a program of reforming the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs in
order to transform the post-Soviet militia into an eﬃcient police force based on the Eu-
ropean model by reducing excessive personnel, carrying out the respective re-training, 
and eliminating excessive centralization. There is a need to change mission priorities
of intelligence services and, respectively, their structure to settle the issues of security 
of state power bodies’ personnel, access to state secrets, combating the threats of po-
litical radicalism and separatism, and assurance of economic security. An important 
direction of the intelligence services’ activity must be oﬀering assistance to Ukrainian
business and participation in the ﬁght with terrorism.
3. Army reform. It is necessary to accelerate the setting up of the Armed Forces of 
modern Ukraine that are ready for combat and that can accomplish the most compli-
cated missions of state leadership. The development of the Armed Forces and strategic
planning in the military ﬁeld should be based on Ukraine’s participation in the ac-
tivities of NATO and other systems of European security. It is necessary to accelerate 
the implementation of the Alliance’s standards in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and, 
in the ﬁrst place, the Allied Rapid Reaction Forces. Practical research of the issue of
modifying the methods of staﬃng the Armed Forces with military personnel is indis-
pensable. Priority should be given to the Air Forces, intelligence and research agencies, 
as well as special troops. It is necessary to clarify strategic missions of development of 
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the Maritime Military Forces of Ukraine, providing the organization of a program of 
constructing maritime ships. The budget of Defense should take into account the de-
velopment requirements of the industrial-military complex. 
4. Development of the industrial-military complex and technical-military collab-
oration. An extremely important mission should be the passing from the inertial model 
of using Soviet armaments towards the creation of new types of armament and modern 
military equipment, carrying out scientiﬁc and technical-experimental research, ﬁrst
of all, in aerospace, radio-electronic ﬁelds, etc. It is necessary to accelerate the settle-
ment of issues of creating some complete cycles of production, gradual reorientation 
of the industrial-military complex enterprises towards collaboration with EU states, 
implementation of EU and NATO standards, and maintaining the necessary level of 
relations with the Russian Federation. It is necessary to introduce eﬃcient mechanisms
of assuring national interests during the privatization of the industrial-military com-
plex enterprises. In addition, the sphere of military-technical cooperation requires the 
improvement of mechanisms necessary to respect the interests of Ukraine’s strategic 
partners from the viewpoint of the absolute priority of national interests.
5. Fight with corruption and “de-shadowing” of the economy. Priority should be 
given to overcoming the situation when corruption becomes a condition for survival 
and a prerequisite for the eﬃcient functioning of the state system. It is necessary to
obtain a much greater transparency of state mechanisms of resource distribution. It 
is necessary to introduce the civilized lobby levers of economic interests in the proc-
ess of making state decisions. It is required to make decisions to overcome the lack of 
coordinating eﬀorts in the ﬁght with corruption and to create a specialized body in
the structure of law enforcement agencies. In addition, it is essential to accelerate the 
implementation of the state policy regarding the “de-shadowing” of the economy, stip-
ulating eﬃcient measures regarding the increase of the transparency level of privatiza-
tion processes, of managing state property, introducing the respective amendments in 
the budgetary and ﬁscal system, etc.
6. Energy security and Ukraine’s transit country status. State policy in the en-
ergy sector should be based on the corresponding state strategy that would assure the 
diversiﬁcation of sources providing energy resources, improvement of eﬃcient use of 
Ukraine’s transit capacities, and up-dating infrastructure and the enterprises of the 
national energy complex. This strategy should be correlated with the European con-
cept of energy security and should take into account the legitimate interests of the Rus-
sian Federation. It is necessary to accelerate the creation of a complete energy-nuclear 
cycle as a basis for sustainable development of nuclear energy. 
7. Euro-Atlantic integration and relations with the US. In relations between 
Ukraine and the US, the priority should stay with the issues of security, including 
Ukraine’s accelerated integration into NATO. Ukraine should undertake the neces-
sary eﬀorts to obtain the support of the US in the issues of the European integration
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and relations with Russia. The issues of energy security and transit of energy resources
should become an important direction of collaboration. 
8. Relations with the European Union and member states as a priority direc-
tion of European integration. In the framework of settling this mission, we should 
take into account three basic priorities. First, it is essential to develop relations with 
the most important and inﬂuential European States, especially Germany, France, Italy
and Great Britain. Second, it is necessary to use the objective interest of the EU states 
that are Ukraine’s neighbors – and, especially, of Poland and Hungary, in deepening 
the bilateral relations as a source of increasing its own status within the European 
Union. Third, special attention should be paid to the direction of developing relations
with such EU institutions as the European Commission, the European Parliament, 
prospect president and foreign aﬀairs minister of the Union. Considerable importance
should be paid to the issue of streamlining close collaboration in the security sector 
and defense and Ukraine’s participation in strengthening and developing the relevant 
structures of the European Union. 
9. Development of relations with the Russian Federation and CIS member states. 
Ukraine’s relations with the Russian Federation should become an important source 
of progress for the processes of European integration. In this context, it is essential to 
develop a respective strategy in this sphere that should be based on the missions of 
transforming the relations with Russia to bring them into an international format, to 
increase their transparency and their predictability. It is absolutely imperative to speed 
up the evaluation of the normative framework of bilateral relations, especially in the 
sphere of national security and defense, and to assure strict enforcement of mutually 
advantageous bilateral agreements. In addition, the issue of the common European area 
requires conﬁrmation of Ukraine’s position on the free enterprise zone as a realization
of the highest level of integration. It is necessary to urgently settle the issue of GUUAM 
intensiﬁcation. It is necessary to accelerate the development of economic collaboration,
ﬁrst, in the energy sector and high technologies ﬁelds, emphasizing the realization of
deﬁnite common projects. An important direction should become the consolidation of
Ukraine’s borders in order to increase the level of eﬃciency in combating illegal migra-
tion, smuggling, illegal traﬃcking of narcotic substances, etc. It is necessary to con-
tinuously develop humanitarian contacts, contributing to the amelioration of relations 
between the structures of civil society of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
10. Relations with neighbor states should be based on the principles of partner-
ship and mutual advantage. Special attention should be paid to relations with Romania 
and, in the ﬁrst place, in the sphere of assuring national interests at delimiting the
continental shelf of the Black Sea. The foremost objective of the Ukrainian policy in
relation to Moldova should be the settlement of the Transnistrian issue as a source of 
danger to national security based on the principles of assuring sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity of Moldova and taking into account the interests of the Ukrainian 
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minority in the region and other national interests of Ukraine. Relations with Poland 
and other states from the basin of the region from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea will 
remain prioritized. The main mission in relations with Belarus for the next period will
the determination of the necessary balance between the relations with the state power 
and contacts with the opposition.
All these priority directions of activity of the Council of National Security and 
Defense of Ukraine should be reﬂected in the new edition of the “Law on National Se-
curity and Defense of Ukraine” and the National Security Strategy of Ukraine.
